

UNITED NATIONS

International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of
Former Yugoslavia since 1991

Case No. **IT-03-69-PT**

Date: 17 March 2008

TRIAL CHAMBER III

Before: Judge Patrick Robinson, Pre-Trial Judge
Judge Pedro David
Judge Michèle Picard

Registrar: Mr. Hans Holthuis

THE PROSECUTOR
v.
**JOVICA STANIŠIĆ &
FRANKO SIMATOVIĆ**

PUBLIC

**PROSECUTION'S SUBMISSION OF THE EXPERT REPORT
OF DR. ROBERT J. DONIA PURSUANT TO RULE 94bis**

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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Case No. IT-03-69-PT


THE PROSECUTOR
v.
JOVICA STANIŠIĆ &
FRANKO SIMATOVIĆ

PROSECUTION'S SUBMISSION OF THE EXPERT REPORT OF
DR. ROBERT J. DONIA PURSUANT TO RULE 94bis

1. On 6 March 2008, the Prosecution filed the "Prosecution's Submission of the Expert Report of Dr. Robert J. Donia Pursuant to Rule 94bis and Motion for the Admission of His Prior Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92ter." At paragraph 5 of that filing, the Prosecution stated, "the Prosecution intends to file an addendum to this expert report for purposes of this particular case as soon as it is available, and in any case no later than 17 March 2008."

2. On 17 March 2008, the Prosecution files herewith Dr. Donia's addendum or new report entitled, "Thematic Excerpts from the Assembly of Republika Srpska, 1991-1996," dated 17 March 2008, prepared for this case, and upon which the Prosecution intends to rely. Because of the updated, comprehensive and focused nature of this new report, the Prosecution will not rely on Dr. Donia's previous report from the *Slobodan Milošević* case and withdraws in its entirety the motion filed 6 March 2008 (seeking admission of that report and his prior testimony pursuant to Rules 92ter and 94bis). The Prosecution seeks to rely on the new report only and conduct a *viva voce* examination of Dr. Donia, as this will be a more productive use of court time.

3. The Prosecution submits Dr. Donia's report of 17 March 2008 pursuant to Rule 94bis.


Dermot Groome
Senior Trial Attorney

17 March 2008
The Hague, The Netherlands
Word count: 384


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Thematic Excerpts from the Assembly of Republika Srpska, 1991-96

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STATEMENT OF EXPERT WITNESS
PRESENTED TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
UNDER RULE 94 bis

CASE NO. IT 03-69,
PROSECUTOR V. JOVICA STANIŠIĆ AND FRANKO SIMATOVIĆ



Robert J. Donia

Submitted 17 March 2008

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Introduction

Purpose

This report was prepared in response to a request from the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY to compile selected excerpts from minutes and transcripts of the Assembly of the Republika Srpska (named the "Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina" from its founding session in October 1991 until August 1992, and called here simply the "Bosnian Serb Assembly"). I was asked to provide excerpts relevant to the indictment against Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović. The Assembly's minutes and transcripts consist of over 6,000 pages in BCS and almost that much again in English translation, so the following excerpts comprise less than 1% of the text in the Assembly records.

The Institution

The Bosnian Serb Assembly was the supreme decision-making body of Republika Srpska and was treated as such by its leaders. It was founded in October 1991 by delegates of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS – Srpska demokratska stranka) and other Serbs elected to the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the elections of November 1990. Sessions were held frequently but irregularly. The discussions were remarkably open and often included pointed criticism of Karadžić, Mladić, and other leaders of the SDS and RS.

Despite this, the Assembly approved almost all major measures proposed by the leadership, either unanimously or with few dissenting votes. Most discussions related only tangentially to the measures under consideration. The transcripts of these discussions are useful in illuminating the views of various delegates and in what they reveal about contemporary developments in the RS.

The SDS Main Board and Delegates' Club sometimes met together, and in many instances SDS Main Board members attended Assembly sessions even though not all of them were delegates. Every Assembly session is replete with references to the Delegate Club meeting earlier that day or the previous day, and some delegates state that they are repeating a statement that they made earlier in such a forum.

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Many of the first 14 sessions were open to observers and were closely followed in the Sarajevo press of the time.. Once the war began in April 1992, most sessions were open to journalists and guests for a brief introductory period, then the journalists and guests were invited to leave. As the war progressed, speakers on occasion referred back to earlier events, thus providing information about developments from earlier periods. Even highly controversial statements often elicited no response or refutation from others. Major exceptions occurred, however, following delegates' pointed criticism directed at their government leaders or at other delegates. One finds in such remonstrances some of the most illuminating recollections of earlier events.

Format

The eight thematic sections may be read in any order and independently of one another. Within each of the eight thematic sections, excerpts are provided in chronological order, permitting the reader to follow the evolution of delegate views on each topic. Dates of each session are provided so that the reader can place each excerpt in the chronological context of its time. Certain presentations could have been placed under two or more categories: They have either been divided into their thematic components or placed within the single category most relevant to their content.

The BCS original text is provided in the endnotes to facilitate translation (to avoid the need for double translation, to English and back again to BCS) and assure ready accessibility to readers of BCS. Endnote numbers of the BCS references correspond to the numbering of the English version at the beginning of each citation. English translations are those of the Tribunal's translators, but I have made occasional grammatical corrections to those translations, such as adding definite articles, conjunctions, and punctuation, when required for clarity. As the transcripts capture verbal speech, the conventions of written language were not always observed in the Assembly debates, and errors in transcription were frequent. The transcripts include many run-on sentences, and some words are implied but not stated.

Translator's clarifications are enclosed in forward slashes: "/-- /." My introductions, explanatory comments, and clarifications are enclosed in brackets and italicized: "[Explanation]." The reader is referred to the BCS original as the most authoritative available source.

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Introduction

Delegates frequently voiced their political views in the Assembly, particularly during the wide-ranging discussions on domestic and foreign policy scheduled for most sessions by Assembly President Momčilo Krajišnik. Delegates articulated general political principles as well as commenting on specific issues. They most commonly spoke of their commitment to Serb populist nationalism, but they also embraced the fundamental precepts of liberal democratic thought: constitutionalism, the rule of law, and parliamentary governance. Delegates rarely mused openly about possible contradictions between liberal democracy and Serb nationalism; the analysis of Aleksa Buha at the 4th Session (reported in this section below) is one such exception. Delegates often assigned priority to Serb national interests over other values and ideals, as is evident in many of the following excerpts.

1. 1st (Constituting) Session, 24 October 1991. Momčilo Krajišnik [Assembly President]:

“The present make-up of the BH Assembly does not contain any constitutional or legal institution that would protect any of the three constituent BH peoples from being outvoted in issues relating to the fundamental rights of the collective national corpus. True, one of the Amendments to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution of 1990 did introduce a Council for National Equality, a body within which the decisions on such issues should be made by consensus. To this day, however, this council has not yet been constituted. Although the draft Bill on the Council was tabled in the parliamentary procedure several months ago, the Bill has still not been adopted, simply because the SDA-HDZ coalition opposes this body having the powers prescribed by the Constitution.

“According to the definition set out in this Amendment to the Constitution, the Council should be an institution where motions and decisions would be adopted through consensus, with the power of veto included, while the SDA and HDZ deputies insist upon a law that would provide for the Council to adopt motions and decision by a two-thirds majority, and without the power of veto. In

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practice this means that the Serbian deputies could be outvoted on all nationally relevant issues.

“The illegal meeting of the deputies of the SDA, the HDZ, and a portion of the opposition, held on 15 October, which we do not consider valid, literally denied that the Council for National Equality existed as a Constitutional category by rejecting the legitimate request of the Serbian deputies to have the BH Presidency Platform and the SDA Memorandum first sent to the Council for consideration and adjustment. This has removed the last possibility, insufficient as it may have been, to ensure sovereignty and national equality for the Serbian people.”¹ English SA01-2055-SA01-2164-ET, pp. 35-36.

2. 1st (Constituting) Session, 24 October 1991. Stanko Cvijan [Guest], Minister of the Republic of Serbia:

“Our people [*the Serbs*] was the very people that has invested in and pledged, together with the Montenegrin people, its own state, the state of Yugoslavia. Today, in retrospect, we can say that we were seriously deceived. Or should I say that we were in danger precisely because of that. We are this state-forming people, but we have been put in a position where our fate is decided by a people that is by far in the minority, or rather by peoples that have never had a state of their own.”

“It needs to be said today that this people, the people that loved and wanted Yugoslavia more than anyone else, is possibly one of the unhappiest peoples because someone really wants to take this state of ours away from us by force. And of course, because of these facts, I have mentioned only a few, I do not want to go into the issue of the victims of genocide, I took part in many of these rallies where we were finally compelled to speak, but only after 50 years, to bury the remains of the sacred victims.

“In that sense, and in the belief that, by the virtue of indeed being the most populous people, and according to the law of probability, and because we had our state, because we were a state-forming people, we shall be, undoubtedly, smarter than the others and more capable, and I hope, more fortunate too. With this in mind I wish you good luck on the occasion of this historic beginning.”² English SA01-2055-SA01-2164-ET, pp. 50-51.

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3. 1st (Constituting) Session, 24 October 1991. Slobodan Bijelić:

[Bijelić reads a statement announcing the formation of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina]:

“The current constitutional and legal order in Yugoslavia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been severely disrupted. The rights and vital interests of the Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina are endangered. For a long time now, there has been a conspiracy aimed at reducing the Serbian people, a constitutive people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, into a national minority. However, taught by the tragic events the Serbian people experienced in this century, particularly the genocide it was exposed to, we have established the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because danger now threatens from new and similar events.”³ English SA01-2055-SA01-2164-ET, pp. 47-48.

4. 2nd Session, 21 November 1991. Krajišnik:

“It is essential that the Serbian people organize themselves into one legal and state entity, one common state with all the other peoples who want to build a happier future with us. ... The best way for us to express our interest and our will is through the Constitution. That is why we need to appoint a constitutional commission of the Assembly of the Serbian people in BH today. This commission should draft our constitution, which should provide for the full expression of the Serbian people. The task of the commission would be to clearly differentiate the interests of the Serbian people from those of other peoples in BiH. It is important to preserve every aspect of constitutionality and legality.”⁴ English 0093-0300

5. 2nd Session, 21 November 1991. Krajišnik:

“All the proposed solutions must be based on the Constitution and the laws, reflecting the interests of the Serbian people, but not at the expense of other peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Gentlemen, if we are outvoted in discussions of national interest to the Serbian people at the institutional proceedings, the will of the Serbian people will be expressed through the decisions of the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The basic principle we should observe in our activities is not to impose the will of the Serbian people on other peoples.

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We should respect the legitimate will of the Muslims and Croats, but we must not underestimate our advantages expressed through the realistic ratio of political forces in BiH. We must not cede our rights to others. ... Much as we would not allow for Serbs to be under anybody's control, we don't seek nor do we wish people to feel that /we/Serbs want to place them under our control."⁵ English 0093-0301

6. 2nd Session, 21 November 1991. Mr. Bojović, President of Serbian Autonomous Region [SAO] of Hercegovina:

"We have halted for 70 years and we no longer, nor do we have the right to because we paid the highest price on account of this hesitation. Because of it we lost two states, we lost yet another state of the Serbian population, we lost our liberty, power and rule over our very selves. Now when it seems that we are on the right path, war is imposed on us in the whole of the territory of the present Yugoslavia, a war of everyone against everyone else, if by any chance there cannot be a war of everyone against the Serbs. Even apart from this permanent danger, we have to finish the war and continue with our work. We will return to our national values, statehood-building, religion and morality. Those whom we will live with will have it the same as we do, but not better than us. Since our most important task is the building of a homeland /and/ the law based on the most modern democratic societies, we will be guided by the principle of the division of government into the legislative, executive and judicial /branches/."⁶ English 0093-0322 – 0093-0323, pp. 32-33.

7. 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. Milivoje Nadaždin:

"I think that here in Bosnia there is not a single metre of land which we can or should share forever with anyone. Those who do not like it with us and among us can seek their own space."⁷ English SA02-4931 – SA02-5059-ET, p. 45. Also 0093-3355

8. 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. Velibor Ostojić:

"In the final analysis the Serbian people does not recognize the existence of three truths in BH which should be equal, nor that objective press for the BH

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should mean the equal promotion of all three options. For the Serbian people and the Yugoslav-oriented citizens politically there only exists one truth which in the essential informative and propagandistic sense consists of the active democratic equality of peoples, a joint state, equality in BH.”

“As we know, information is a very important aspect of the life of Serbs in BH. Since Bosnian-Herzegovinian media have had a negative approach to the life of the Serbian people for a long time and continually, it is necessary as a matter of urgency to deploy an information system of the Serbian people in this territory which would be part of the Yugoslav information system.”⁸ English SA02-4931 – SA02-5059-ET, pp. 53-54. Also 0093-3363 - 0093-3364

9. 4th Session, 21 December 1991. Aleksa Buha [Subsequently appointed the Foreign Minister of Republika Srpska]:

“All this, that is, national identity, national equality, nation as the fundamental unit of individual and collective life, that was once sacred to them, our partners have forgotten overnight and adopted the civil principle and started advocating civil society instead of national society. ... Given the ethnic composition of BiH, this pseudo-democratic principle would lead to domination of an ethnic community on important issues. Therefore, we could not and will not accept it. Neither theory nor historical experience can demonstrate that the civil aspect of the individual or the collective is as strong and as detached from the national aspect that it could offer a solid base for the overall development of the individual and collective life.”⁹ English 0093-9642

10. 4th Session, 21 December 1991. Radovan Karadžić, President of the SDS:

“The Serbian side continues to be cooperative only for the sake of the peace in the house. Not because we are willing to be enslaved, but for the sake of the negotiations, that is, the negotiations on the transformation of Yugoslavia that are still going on. We are not afraid of the democratic transformation of Yugoslavia and BH.”¹⁰ English 0093-9656

11. 4th Session, 21 December 1991. Radovan Karadžić:

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“We have the right and the ability to prevent anybody on the territories where we conducted our referendum to secede from Yugoslavia. In all territories where Serbs took part in the referendum, regardless of whether they make 5% or 55% of the population, they are the constituent element of that town or that Republic. All the territories where we voted in our referendum to remain within Yugoslavia must stay within Yugoslavia if we decide so. Therefore, we can prevent them, but for the sake of peace in the house and because of two bad experiences of keeping certain people within Yugoslavia, we are prepared to accept the transformation of BH so that Muslims and Croats, if that is what they want, can loosen their links with Yugoslavia or leave altogether.”¹¹ English 0093-9674

12. 4th Session, 21 December 1991. Karadžić:

“War would destroy what people in our communities, which have always lived simultaneously separately and together, have been building over centuries. Throughout history, including the Turkish occupation, we have always had the Latin, the Serbian, and the Muslim quarters. The relations among them have at times been friendly and they lived at times autonomously and at other times... separately. And I do not see why we could not achieve that again in a peaceful way.”¹² English 0093-9677

13. 5th Session, 9 January 1992. Professor Milutin Najdanović:

"With today's enactment [*declaration of the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina*] we are taking one more step towards our vow that all Serbs shall live in one state. ...

“If we were to create a hierarchy of our aims, there is no doubt that establishing a united state area comprising the territories where the Serbs are the majority would be in first place. That would be our absolute minimum. Any option that fragments the unity of this area is unacceptable! (Applause) ...

“It is clear that it is impossible for a nation to exist for a longer period without a state. [*Translation of last sentence by rjd.*] Today it must be crystal clear to every Serb: is a third, new or rump Yugoslavia to be the type of state that will preserve the essence of the ethnicity of the Serbian people, or will it be an

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individual Serbian state. Should our concessions to others hamper the integration of the Serbian people for a third time, and should they prevent the recovery of the Serbian national being and its return to its own roots. Let nobody tell me that the homogenization of the Serbian people is a process that has been completed. More time is needed for all the Serbs to grasp why they are Serbs and what their common interests are.

“A new federation, confederation, or even association of states may therefore be formed, but the Serbian unit in any of these combinations must be united.”¹³ English L004-6745 – L004-6747

14. 5th Session, 9 January 1992. Milorad Bojović:

"They are offering us a miniature of the community where they would tailor a state, law and freedom for us but to their measurements. In other words, they would organize our lives. They say that they do not want to live with us, because the community in which we live looks to them like a Greater Serbia and they reproach us for our ties with Serbia and Montenegro. However, we dare not criticise the fact that the Croats, for example, are tied to Germany and other foreign lands of Germano-Hungarian origin, while our dear Muslims are linked to Turkey and other Islamic nations. Iraq is still closer to the Muslims than Serbia is to the Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina."¹⁴ English L004-6765

15. 5th Session, 9 January 1992. Biljana Plavšić [One of two Serb members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina]:

"Any Serb who even slightly keeps to his national identity cannot allow himself to be recast as an anonymous citizen of BiH in which every citizen would be the same, let's say 'green,'...

“By this act we are not fulfilling any national self-interest, nor are we taking part in creating the alleged centralistic hegemony. It is high time to reject loudly and clearly the accusation that we are creating a Greater Serbia at the expense of other peoples. Looking through history at the territory occupied by any of the current Yugoslav republics, the AVNOJ borders [*borders established by Communist-led Partisans in the Second World War*] gave BiH its largest area since the Middle Ages. ... Serbia, Montenegro and, if you like, were cropped

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significantly compared to BiH. Why, therefore, and by what right do a 'Lesser Serbia,' 'Lesser Croatia,' and a 'Greater BiH' exist, and at that a 'Greater BiH' under the actual control of one nation and one person?"¹⁵ English L004-6768 – L004-6769

16. 6th Session, 26 January 1992. Milovan Bjelošević:

"Let us start from the fact that Macedonia does not want to be with us and that the Muslims do not want to be with us. The fact is that we must create our own state. Regardless of whether it will be called Greater Serbia or United Serbian Lands, a segment of that state will also be the Serbian BiH. It does not have its own constitution but it also rejects the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, esteemed lawyers, draft our Constitution and do not waste our time by telling us that the existing Constitution does not allow us to do what we want to do."¹⁶ English SA02-5232 – SA02-5305, p. 24. Also 0301-8053

17. 6th Session, 26 January 1992. Vojislav Maksimović:

"Here, I do not accept any legal restraints. I am not asking our lawyers to make it more difficult for me to break the law. Rather, I am asking them to help me break the law. This is so because, by observing these laws and by paying heed to our lawyers, we have brought ourselves into a position of inferiority so that, in reality, our grand ideas often do not receive an adequate legal direction. ... I think that these conclusions do not put enough emphasis on sufficient autonomy."¹⁷ English SA02-5232 – SA02-5305, p. 37. Also 0301-8065

18. 7th Session, 15 February 1992. Karadžić:

"If we say that we are part of the federal state of Yugoslavia, and in a confederal relationship within the framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then we shall irritate any possible execution of secession from the federal state. We just support the authority of the federal state all the way to their areas. And we don't want Bosnia and Herzegovina to be split either, we want it transformed.

"Article 69, which regulates what the Republic ensures: in the negotiations among the republics we have constantly spoken of a common state, and, whether this is necessary here in connection with the system and the provision of defence,

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and reduce it to the Republic /as written/, with the proviso that something will relate to the federal state as well, let us see. The basic reason was that we cannot stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina the way that Alija imagined, without a federal constitution, the federal laws, the federal army, the federal inspections. But, we can here say: sovereignly arrange the defence and security system with the right to transfer part of this to the federal state."¹⁸ English 0305-5786 – 0305-5787, p. 20.

19. 8th Session, 25 February 1992. Vojo Kuprešanin:

"I am against any kind of joint institution with the Muslims and Croats of BH. I personally consider them to be our natural enemies. You already know what natural enemies are and that we can never again live together. We can never again do anything together."¹⁹ English 0084-0489

20. 8th Session, 25 February 1992. Krajišnik:

"If we succeed in creating a confederal BH, it shall consist of three states. And the Serbian state will form an alliance with the Serbian States. Everyone will have one state. We don't need the relics of Yugoslavia which no one else wants. We accept Yugoslavia as a Serbian state, and not as a Yugoslavia which would have to include Macedonia, Slovenia, and Croatia. I am not interested in Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is why I think we need to be open and honest here. The Serbian people should now be united more than ever before."²⁰ English 0084-0492

21. 9th Session, 28 February 1992. Krajišnik:

[In response to a proposal stating that the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the state of the Serbian people, Assembly President Momčilo Krajišnik enunciates his views of a Serbian state. The first sentence of this excerpt from the transcript is a summary; the remainder is a quotation from Krajišnik.]

"The Chair said that the aim was that no one in Serbian BiH should feel that their status is different. We do not wish to rule over anyone. No one who lives with us is in our way and they should be treated equally. But it is obvious that BH is going to be divided into three ethnic entities, three republics, three states, three

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peoples, the Serbs, Croats and Muslims, and there will be certain minority peoples. In Serbian BiH it will be others, and among the Muslims, the Serbs will be a minority."²¹ English 0110-9183

22. 11th Session, 18 March 1992. Professor Mitar Miljanović:

"I want to remind you that the position that the Serb-owned land shall enjoy the highest level of protection by the Republic of Serbian people and that it may not be wrested from them in any way, in spite of my efforts, did not get included into the BH constitution. The position that this land is a crucial element has been confirmed by the writing of *Muslimanski Glas*, where economists, retired university professors have explicitly claimed that our calculations of how much land we can claim to own were absolutely incorrect. It is all written there; professor, doctor, and so on, and they also rely on some sort of science to back their claims. On Saturday I shall propose a bill on land, a very short one. I ask your support; let us just ignore any legal norm and choose a different starting point because this is a struggle for survival, these are not times for the Roman or any other system of law."²² English 0190-4696 – 0190-4697

23. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Karadžić:

"Great powers have turned against us. But these powers shall nevertheless adjust to the power of the Serb people, its aspiration to live in its own state, that is, an alliance of states, or however else it wants to live."²³ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 18.

24. 19th Session, 12 August 1992. Vito Popović:

"I propose, bearing all of that in mind, to appoint the judges of Serbian nationality and to remove the rest [*from consideration*]. We went with the smallest number envisaged in the systematization. ... Let me mention that back then, in our talk with representatives from this Republic's Justice Ministry, we agreed to carry out the appointments according to a national key, but that the number be lowered significantly. Bearing in mind national representation, we proposed appointing about five percent of judges of other nationalities. However, I do not wish to interfere in this segment, it is up to you, as deputies, to decide. I

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would like to propose and I beg you to execute the appointment of the undisputed personnel of Serbian nationality.”²⁴ English ET 0410-2021 – 0410-2099, pp. 14-15.

25. 20th Session, 14-15 September 1992. President [Krajišnik]:

“Shall we vote on Amendment 9?

““The territory of the republic comprises Serbian ethnic areas including regions where genocide against the Serbian people has been committed. The borders of the Republic are determined and changed by plebiscite for which a three-quarter majority of the votes is needed. This amendment shall replace Article 2 of the Constitution of Republika Srpska.’

“Who is in favour of this Amendment?

“Anyone against? None.

“Any abstentions? None.”²⁵ English 0422-6193 – 9422-6338, p. 88.

[*Amendment 9 was subsequently published in Official Gazette of Republika Srpska (Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske), Year 1, number 15, 29 September 1992, p. 569.*]

26. 24th Session, 8 January 1993. Presiding [Krajišnik]:

“The Assembly is at the position that the Muslims are a communist creation and that they are a religious group of Turkish orientation. ... They are unbelievers, a nation that is not a nation, that is to say a nation that would like to be a nation but has no arguments for a nation.”²⁶ English ET-0214-9871 – 0214-9936, pp. 98-99.

27. 25th Session, 19-20 January 1993. Karadžić:

“It seems that the first proposed constitutional principle has forever removed the very element for which the Muslim side had in fact started this war, namely a unitary BH of the civic type. The Muslim side advocated a civic state counting on its birth rate and their large numbers. Had we accepted the Muslim proposal, the statehood constitutiveness of the Serbian people would have been lost forever and we would have become a national minority in an Islamic society. The fate of “*dimije*” i.e. second and third rank citizens of non-Islamic extraction in Islamic societies, is well known. We also know it from our own experience with those

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municipalities in which Muslims constitute the ethnic majority.”²⁷ English 0214-9937 - 0215-0019-ET, p. 5.

28. 26th Session, 2 April 1993. Gojko Djogo [Representative of the Association of Serbs of BH in Belgrade]:

"The suggested borders of Vance-Owen provinces were drawn with the intention to break apart the Serbian ethnic area forever as well as to make the Serbian people permanently poor by taking away their economic resources and private property. According to that proposal, more than half of Serbs would remain in Muslim and Croatian provinces as an ethnic minority without a direct connection with Serbia and two Serbian Krajinas, without access to the sea, without mines and energy sources, without fields and road communications, without churches and monasteries. In Serbian provinces there is no future life without that."²⁸ English, ET 0215-0023 – 0215-0081, p. 76.

29. 26th Session, 2 April 1993. Biljana Plavšić:

"I think that there is no need for us to discuss whether we would sign for 200,000 soldiers to come and occupy our country. I even do not want to mention the 45% of Serbian population in other provinces, which would need either to move out, or to convert to Catholicism or Islam."²⁹ English ET 0215-0023 – 0215-0081, p. 78.

30. 33rd Session, 20-21 July 1993. Karadžić:

"The UN has declared Žepa and Srebrenica protected areas and determined the way in which the areas are to be defended. The resolution that spoke about it was not in harmony with the Geneva Convention which states that only unarmed and demilitarised areas can be protected. We have a very good response regarding Goražde and Žepa. It's an historical contract speaking about stunning victories of our army, and about our outstanding behaviour at the negotiations. These are indeed historical documents which are very important. However, they have not been carried out because the Muslim side has fooled us, they did not completely demilitarise the area, very few weapons have been handed over. We have asked for

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the weapons to be handed over to the UN, not to us, as the victors, although we were entitled to that.

“Now a question is imposed upon us. Why should we make any agreements with the Muslims, it’s the RS territory, the Muslim state has no jurisdiction and it should not be one of the contractual sides, and our Assembly has to decide about the exception, because our Assembly has reached a general decision not to have the UN troops deployed in our territory.”³⁰ English ET 0215-0344 – 0215-0497, p. 43.

31. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Karadžić:

“You will remember the way we were making moves when we were with Izetbegović. Each of our moves was caused by some move by Izetbegović. By doing so, we have been justified through all this time in the eyes of the international public and in the eyes of Muslims throughout Bosnia. They do something, then we do something.”³¹ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, p. 329.

32. 39th Session, 24-25 March 1994. Karadžić:

"Before the war, Professor Milojević – while anticipating what ever would happen with that BiH – we were making plans, and it turned out to be almost similar to what will be in Sarajevo /sic/. We were thinking then, to capture Zvijezda Mountain and that it would be the border. The canyon of the Krivaja River would serve then for connecting Sarajevo and Banja Luka, so that the distance between Sarajevo and Banja Luka could be covered, on a good road, in 1.5 /sic/. That is a state. That is a well-integrated nation. That was our plan way back before the war.”³² English ET 0215-2251 – 0215-2477, p. 91.

33. 40th Session, 10-11 May 1994. Aleksa Buha [Foreign Minister of the RS]:

[This statement is part of a lengthy report on peace negotiations.]

“As for the political organisation, according to the platform of the Assembly, we explicitly informed that our option, our primary option is the uniting with

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Serbia. If not that, then it would be the independence."³³ English, ET 0215-2482 – 0215-2616, p. 16.

34. 2nd Extraordinary Session, 11 March 1995. Professor Jeftić:

“This is the most definitive proof that our Muslims no longer have a single form of collective identity left, any foundation block on which to rely except the most radical Islamic fundamentalism. This is a fact we have to count on, and the reason I said all this was to respond to the previous question.”³⁴ English 0410-1722-ET

35. 57th Session, 21 February 1996. Nikola Koljević [Serb Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina]:

“We signed in Dayton that we would cooperate with The Hague Tribunal. ... The only exception in this problem are the politicised and discriminatory demands of the Tribunal regarding the President of Republika Srpska and the Commander of the Main Staff, because they are not just persons, but a personification of the goals and results of the struggle of the Serbian people in the former Bosnia. ...

“Any kind of trial or handing over of our leaders would represent a trial of the people and the Army as a whole, and as was successfully defended as a legal principle by the English political thinker and lawyer Edmund Burke on the occasion of the American revolution, in law it is possible to try individuals, but not people as a whole. If we present this so, and I think that it indeed is so, I think that our chances to solve this problem are far greater. It is our continuing obligation to defend the President of RS and the Commander of the Army of RS by adequate arguments. I think this should be the position of the Assembly...”³⁵ English 0215-4929 – 0215-5068-EDT, pp. 94-95.

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Introduction

At the 16th Assembly session on 12 May 1992, the Assembly unanimously approved the "Six Strategic Goals" of the Serbian people. The six goals were subsequently published in the Official Gazette in November 1993. The central excerpt in this session is Radovan Karadžić's exposition of the goals as he first presented them to the Assembly at the 16th session. Excerpts below begin with earlier sessions in which delegates endorsed the basic principles of one or more of the goals that were eventually adopted. In sessions after the 16th, speakers referred to or reiterated some or all of the goals, continuing during the war years and several months beyond the end of the war. With very few exceptions, speakers hewed faithfully to the goals and cited them in support of Assembly decisions as they debated the various peace plans that their leaders negotiated with representatives of the international community.

36. 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. Milovan Bjelošević:

"Since I am expecting and assuming that problems will arise in the north of Bosnia from Srbac through Derвента to Bosanski Šamac and in-depth to Doboj, which is a very important strip for linking the Serbian Krajinas with Serbia and which is important for us in strategic terms as you all know because we have a small corridor via Doboj – some 10 kilometres, which I discussed with the President – that is Serb territory. The rest is mixed Serb and Croat territory, and I repeat that I am afraid and am therefore suggesting that the Assembly take a position in that connection. The Assembly should insist that the military authorities (and probably the leaders will negotiate) deploy in that area if possible part of the troops and materiel currently being pulled out from Croatia if we intend to exert military pressure on that area..."³⁶ English SA02-4931 – SA02-5059-ET, p. 9. Also 0093-3321

37. 4th Session, 21 December 1991. Karadžić:

"What I mean is that you suggest specific proposals for specific cities, and in particular, for Sarajevo, which could have an extraterritorial status and where Serbs, Croats, and Muslims could each organize their own administration. It seems

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to me that at this moment in time, given the amount of mutual suspicion, we should aim for as much separation as possible, and only later on let life and economic reasons bring people together. ... Serbian Sarajevo has its territory and is a territorial unit within the Serbian Republic of BiH, but we can make a deal. ...

“Sarajevo would not be divided by physical borders, except that there would be, like the whole of BiH, administrative jurisdictions corresponding to three different centres of government.”³⁷ English 0093-9677 – 0093-9678

38. 4th Session, 21 December 1991. Nikola Koljević [Serb Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina]

“Peace requires secure foundations. Peace can be built through continuing pacification and separation, and not through a false coexistence. That is precisely what we, as your representatives have been advocating with the idea of a tripartite Bosnia and Herzegovina from the very start.”³⁸ English 0093-9680

39. 7th Session, 15 February 1992. Goran Zekić:

“As for the territory of the Republic I think that this article has been given so as to leave the possibility for the greatest number of Serbian areas to get into Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, that is a real version for a peaceful development of the situation. However, a historical criterion ought perhaps to be left in the constitution. For let us say if it should come to a conflict, and if there is just one possibility in the constitution that areas that were once ours and were not lost only because of genocide but also because of migratory movements, let us say that Romanija links up with Serbia and with others, we have to foresee this. We cannot a priori not allow for this possibility, in the criteria and in some other possibility of the development of this variant.”³⁹ English 0305-5782, p. 16.

40. 8th Session, 25 February 1992. Milutin Najdanović:

“For centuries, the Serbian people has aspired to gain access to the sea. I think that we have neglected these aspirations at this important historical juncture.

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To be by the sea, and we are neither Hungary nor the Czech state, both of which we once owned, and not to have access to the sea is like living in a house with no door. The Montenegrin coast is Montenegrin and there is not enough room there for all Serbs. Our goal has to be access to the sea where Serbs come closest to it, which is Serbian Herzegovina.”⁴⁰ English 0084-0454

41. 8th Session, 25 February 1992. Milovan Bjelošević:

“I would like to single out the significance of the area of Northern Bosnia as a bridge between Knin [*capital of the Serbian Republic of Krajina in Croatia*] and us, that this has been the transportation for all cargos and all types of materiel going in that direction and this has not presented any major difficulties. These will arise the moment these areas in the north near Croatia become sovereign, when all cargo and persons /in transit/ will be stopped, as is already happening. ...

“I suggest that you propose in all earnestness to the Croatian gentlemen of BH, which is certainly a part of the HDZ of Croatia because a Bosnian one does not exist, to Mr. Tudjman an exchange of population in the north of BH so that this area spreading to Knin and the sea would be clear.”⁴¹ English 0084-0470

42. 8th Session, 25 February 1992. Karadžić:

“That area [*Posavina*] will be the hardest to deal with because the HDZ lays historical claims to it because of the Banovina /Croatian province immediately preceding World War II/. Those two years that Cvetković bestowed upon us created a great problem for us. ... I studied a detailed map of Bosanski Brod. Sixty percent of the territories there are held by Serbs who make up 40% /of the population/. We will have to reach some kind of compromises there and make some adjustments so that this corridor may be ours.”⁴² English 0084-0472

43. 8th Session, 25 February 1992. Goran Zekić:

“I think there is no great philosophical wisdom or particular art in having Banja Luka be the capital of the Serbian people! It is the capital. However, what would be intelligent, wise and successful would be to preserve as much of Sarajevo

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as possible, to have it be Serbian in terms of income, property and everything else.”⁴³ English 0084-0490

44. 9th Session Deputy Club Meeting, 28 February 1992. Krajišnik:

“I have to disappoint you, deputies from the BH Assembly: the BH that once was probably is no more, because Europe has understood that BH will have to be divided. We really enjoyed it yesterday when we saw how the Europeans were carrying maps like Serbs. The only thing missing were pistols they can be hiding. Because every Serb has a pistol and a map.”⁴⁴ English 0096-8094

45. 11th Session, 18 March 1992. Krajišnik:

“I think that the most fundamental thing we have achieved is the fact that they have agreed that the BH should be partitioned according to the ethnic principles, and into three national units. ... Since municipality borders may be adjusted, we have already made some adjustments and we plan to include all parts that will be Serbian territory in our municipalities, and what remains to be discussed, the discussion will be about where it is going to be, where we are going to put our lines.

“In this respect, it would be good if we could do one thing for strategic reasons: if we could start implementing what we have agreed upon, ethnic division on the ground. That we start determining the territory, and once the territory is determined, it remains to be established in additional negotiations whose authorities are to function and in what way.”⁴⁵ English 0190-4679 – 0190-4681

46. 14th Session, 27 March 1992. Karadžić:

“We did not need, it seems, to agree upon an objective. The objective was inscribed deeply within us. It is holy in the sense that it derives from God and was not placed there by human hand. This is a goal which the Serbian people feel and harbor in themselves and which they will not desist from no matter how difficult the times may be. We had to agree upon our tactics and on practical steps, but we did not have to reach agreement on the most far-reaching strategic goals. Everyone had the same thought and this is the surest guarantee that it derives from the most

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profound being of the Serbian people, the most profound core of every Serb.”⁴⁶
English 0092-6772

47. 14th Session, 27 March 1992. Karadžić:

“National communities which cannot live together do exist in the middle of Europe. They cannot because they hinder each other's development. In the plant world there are plants which cannot grow side by side. They have to be separated to flourish. ...

“I can say that there is not a single Serb who has fully rejected the ultimate strategic goal of the Serbian people, he may have set it aside temporarily but for tactical reasons, to live in a single state, or a community or association of states.”⁴⁷
English 0092-6773

48. 16th Session, 12 May 1992. Karadžić:

“The Serbian side in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency, the Government, the Council for National Security, which we have set up, have formulated the strategic priorities, that is to say, the strategic goals for the Serbian people.

“The first such goal is separation from the other two national communities – separation of states . Separation from those who are our enemies and who have used every opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us, and who would continue with such practices if we were to stay together in the same state.

“The second strategic goal, it seems to me, is a corridor between Semberija and Krajina. That is something for which we may be forced to sacrifice something here and there, but this is of the utmost strategic importance for the Serbian people, because it integrates the Serbian lands, not only of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, but Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbia, and the Serbian Krajina with Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. So, that is a very important strategic goals which we have to achieve because there will be no Krajina, Bosnian Krajina, Serbian Krajina or alliance of Serbian states if we do not secure that corridor, which will integrate us and give us unimpeded flow from one part of our state to another.

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“The third strategic goal is to establish a corridor in the Drina Valley, that is, elimination of the Drina as a border between two worlds. We are on both sides of the Drina, and our strategic interest and our living space are there. We now see a possibility for some Muslim municipalities to be set up along the Drina as enclaves, in order for them to achieve their rights, but that belt along the Drina must basically belong to Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina. As much as it is strategically useful for us in a positive way, it helps us by damaging the interests of our enemy in establishing a corridor which would connect them to the Muslim International and render this area permanently unstable.

“The fourth strategic goal is establishment of a border on the Una and Neretva rivers. ...

“The fifth strategic goal is division of the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim parts and implementation of an effective state government in each of these two constituent states. Thus, Sarajevo is strategically in the fifth place, but the battle in Sarajevo and for Sarajevo, seen strategically and tactically, is of decisive importance, because it does not allow the establishment of even the illusion of a state. Alija does not have a state while we have a part of Sarajevo. He has no government, no assembly, no functioning /state/, because the most important thing for Alija is to create an illusion for the world that there is a state and that we are terrorists. In addition, the fighting in Sarajevo keeps the fighting far away from Krajina, far away from Semberija, far away from the Drina, far away from all those areas, where we could possibly have conflicts with Muslims. Because the fighting around Sarajevo will decide the destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we suspected and said before that, if there was a war, it would start in Sarajevo and end in Sarajevo. The first part of this prophecy has come true, and the second part will come true the moment we have a map of Sarajevo, when I think the war will end in Sarajevo and in the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as far as the Serbs and the Muslims are concerned.

“The sixth strategic goal is the access of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the sea.”⁴⁸ English 0190-8523 – 0190-8524

49. 16th Session, 12 May 1992. General Mladić:

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"What is our goal? To have a corridor, the one to Serbia, my goal and our goal should be to have a state of our own where we have left our mark, the bones of our fathers, and that is the goal we must fight for, and in addition to this goal we are one distinct Serbian people and the third, we invite anyone whose forehead has touched this here, but first a Serb, I will not assign anyone else to a command duty, but I will assign someone, no matter who he is."⁴⁹ English 0190-8553

50. 16th Session, 12 May 1992. Krajišnik:

"As for the goals, I would just like to offer an explanation, since I have also taken part in adopting these goals. ... The first goal is the most important one, and in relation to all other goals, all other goals are sub-items of the first one. Have we finally decided to separate from the remaining two national communities? We can part from them if Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be torn into three parts. ... Saying that wherever there were Serbs it was Serbian territory, that represented a mobilisation of the entire Serbian people, we shall, in an organized and fair manner, provide our people with a roof over their heads. Resettle them if need be, we shall not put them in a genocidal position."⁵⁰ English 0190-8559 – 0190-8560

51. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Beli:

"This corridor is thin, its umbilical chord in Doboje, Orašje has not been seized yet, the area of Brčko has not been seized yet – we still have to do a lot on the military plan."⁵¹ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 56.

52. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Rajko Dukić:

"I request that the Assembly issues an order from here that all crisis staffs and war presidencies be closed down. Wherever civilian authorities can function they must function as of tomorrow and the military command must do its task. Wherever civilian authorities cannot be formed, military rule should be introduced as of tomorrow. If we do not do that, then we are sitting here in vain. I assure you, when we move further towards Višegrad and Rogatica ... please go to Srebrenica, to the Srebrenica region, the Bratunac region, the municipalities up there and then to the well known Žepa, Rogatica and further to Goražde. What do we practically have on the Drina and in Podrinje? Very little and unless the Drina and Podrinje

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are ours we have no chance. Nobody must prevent us in the future from being in one state, which is, I think, our final aim with the rest of the Serb people."⁵² English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, pp. 74-75.

53. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Krajišnik:

"Since the question of the sea is a very current one, we should publicly state our sixth strategic goal, namely that the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina claims rights to and disputes part of the territory along the sea, since this Republic has a natural right for an exit to the sea. This way, it seems to me, we would solve this problem in the most adequate manner."⁵³ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 77.

54. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Velibor Ostojić:

"The outline of the borders given by Mr Koljević is just an outline, but we held to the strategic goals brought by the Assembly in Banja Luka, those six strategic goals, and in the outline of all borders we followed those strategic lines which need to be further worked on. I don't think they need to be detailed now, they can be detailed at the parliamentary group meeting, at separate talks. Secondly, the borders, that is to say, the elaboration of the strategic lines relating to the borders, will be established by the people. That's its sacrosanct right."⁵⁴ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 87.

55. 20th Session, 14-15 September 1992. Karadžić:

"Namely, the Drina is of great strategic importance, it is of vital strategic importance, if the green transversal is cut off at the Drina, Muslim Bosnia will lose in importance. In that case, Europe will definitely walk away from Alija. In our analyses, we reached a conclusion and I think that we are right. Any military success achieved by Izetbegović in this period would result in prolonging the Conference and giving him time to improve his position. If there is a violation of his offensive intentions, Europe would certainly give up on him and force him to negotiate with what he has achieved, not with what he intends to achieve. In that sense, tomorrow we will agree to go back to Goražde and I think that the Assembly will support the idea to secure the Drina and all Serbian municipalities and homes

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on the Drina. This way, we will link up with the Eastern Bosnia Corps.”⁵⁵ English 0422-6193 – 0422-6338 ET, p. 15.

56. 20th Session, 14-15 September 1992. General Mladić:

“Our plans for the future should focus on diverting the attention of the international public as much as possible, establishing communications, broadening the corridor towards Krajina, especially in the Brčko area and in the Drina river valley and link up Herzegovina with other parts of our territory to enable a land route.”⁵⁶ English 0422-6193 – 0422-6338 ET, p. 24.

57. 20th Session, 14-15 September 1992. Mirko Mijatović:

“... of the five fixed goals, if we exclude the first goal which is a general one and applies to everyone – to create our Serbian state – of the remaining five goals we, the people of Herzegovina, have to directly participate in the realisation of three of them. There are only 60,000 Serbs in Herzegovina and great efforts must be made to achieve these three strategic goals.”⁵⁷ English 0422-6193 – 0422-6338 ET, p. 48.

58. 24th Session, Delegate Club, 8 January 1993. Karadžić:

“With this, I am not asking, nor would I recommend the Assembly to change its strategic aims. ... I think that if we make the right moves, without changing our strategic aim, but make the right moves, then we can count on all other Serbs, both in Yugoslavia and the world.”⁵⁸ English ET-0214-9855 - 0214-9870, pp. 17-18.

59. 25th Session, 19-20 January 1993. Grujo Lalović:

“Our message tonight will probably fail to meet their wishes and hopes because the Serbs will never again live with the Turks and Croats (applause).”⁵⁹ English 0214-9937 - 0215-0019-ET, p. 64.

60. 33rd Session, 20-21 July 1993. Karadžić:

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"They have not recognised borders of Republika Srpska yet. Goražde is ours. We might make some concessions in the area of Sarajevo itself, so that Goražde could remain ours. The significance of the Drina for Republika Srpska and Serbian people is enormous. Finally, one of the strategic objectives is that the Drina is not a border. We decided about it here, at this Assembly."⁶⁰ English ET 0215-0344 – 0215-0497, p. 55.

61. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Karadžić:

[In the Assembly's opening speech, Karadžić argues for acceptance of the Union of Three Republics peace plan and recites the strategic goals approved by the Assembly in May 1992.]

"Strategic goals adopted by this Assembly have been or will be achieved, to the fullest extent, just to remind those who do not know it. This Assembly reached the strategic goals of the Serb people, which have become, in a certain way, our tasks, our obligation to realize them, but those were the goals we aimed at, and the goals we aim now to achieve whenever it would be possible /as written/.

"Consequently, the first goal was to separate us, to keep our independence and avoid foreign domination. In other words, to create our state product in the former Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"The second goal is to have connected territories – we have called them a corridor, and that is to have connected territories in Posavina.

"The third goal is to let the river of Drina be never more a border between Serb people.

"The fourth goal is that the valley of the river of Neretva i.e. a left bank of Neretva is to belong to East Herzegovina and/or Republika Srpska due to the historical and ethnic right, geographical and economic right etc.

"The fifth goal is to maintain our part in and protect our rights to Sarajevo, because that part is very important for integrating the territories of East Herzegovina, Old Herzegovina and Romanija and because our interests in concentrating education culture, science and economy are met in this valley. Thus,

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that interest is to create Serb Sarajevo, whatever it is to be called, but to create it of the Serb territory in the town of Sarajevo.

“The sixth goal is to have an exit to the seaside.

“As you can see, the fifth goal has been achieved in this phase. We keep everything what is ours in Sarajevo and we shall probably keep all that in the period of two years. And if there would be any deal to solve Sarajevo definitively before this time, we are ready to compromise, because it is our interest to make two towns, in order not to disturb each other and to make them prosperous.

“The sixth strategic goal – the exit to the seaside should be solved because we have right to that sea. Nobody has a right to keep us far away from the sea when we are here just at the sea. The sea is general human benefit and we have to insist upon the exit to the sea.”⁶¹ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, pp. 14-15.

62. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Karadžić:

“Sarajevo is not in the Muslim state it is in the Serbian state because everything around is Serbian. And we keep everything. We are not going to cede a single footstep. If we would cede a single footstep on their pressure we will finish the job. Therefore, Sarajevo has more chances to become entirely Serbian than to become entirely Muslim. The most probable option is to divide Sarajevo and create two cities. We will not cede Sarajevo, gentlemen, we frankly said that to delegations. Do not be deceived. Not a single skirmish will pass, we will keep everything that is Serbian in Sarajevo. We have said that to the co-presidents [*negotiators Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen*]. For us Sarajevo incorporates Eastern Herzegovina, ancient Herzegovina and Romanija. Pale and Sokolac would not survive if they would have to go to Bjeljina. Romanija has its own downtown in Sarajevo. And it will remain like that.”⁶² English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, p. 64-65.

63. 36th Session, 30-31 December 1993. Karadžić:

“It is SDS policy that Sarajevo be preserved. This Assembly has incorporated that policy in its strategic aims, that is strategic objective 5, I believe. How shall we preserve it, we must definitely preserve it, we must also create a

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critical mass of the intelligentsia here, we shall be in contact with a huge world, an aggressive Islamic world. Our capital, our education, our culture, our economy, will be in touch there at the Miljacka /river/ with an entire world whose only exponent will be the Bosnian Muslims. We must not lose that battle ever and in no event. Therefore I ask you, calling not upon your party discipline only, but calling upon your national consciousness, let us not gamble with something that is a question of the people's survival. ...

"The Sarajevo battlefield has created the state, we cannot detract from anyone's importance, but had the Sarajevo battlefield broken down, had they reached the Drina and cut across the corridor, there would not have been a Krajina, nor the SRK, or Herzegovina, or anything. ...

"Izetbegović is talking [*negotiating*] because he cannot get out of Sarajevo without our permission.

"I have already talked about this with Milošević, Serbian Sarajevo will be supported by all of the 12 million Serbs."⁶³ English 0215-1176 – 0215-1426-ET, pp. 134-135.

64. 37th Session, 10 January 1994. Karadžić:

"We can consider ourselves as winners after occupying this land, since the land is 100% Serbian now. Therefore, even if we come down to around 50 per cent, we should be more than happy and satisfied, it is Dušan's empire. If we are not happy because of a stream or even because of a settlement, we will risk losing it all."⁶⁴ English ET 0215-20611 – 0215-2174, pp. 110-111.

65. 37th Session, 10 January 1994. Karadžić:

"Believe me, we are the winners so far comparing to what we could have got from it. We could have got the separation, the first strategic goal was separation, not occupation of 60% of it. The second strategic goal was to get the land in one piece, inter-connected and we got the corridor, so that was the strategic goal."⁶⁵ English ET 0215-20611 – 0215-2174, p. 111. 0215-2140

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66. 40th Session, 10-11 May 1994. Biljana Plavšić:

"As far as the map is concerned, of course, we cannot talk about the percentage and we should let it go. Maybe the issue of 49-51% will cool off. I think that what we can do is to mark the spots on our territory that are the most important from economic and military strategic aspects, and we should not give up on them."⁶⁶ English, ET 0215-2482 – 0215-2616, p. 54.

67. 37th Session, 10 January 1994. Presiding [Krajišnik]:

"Believe me, the biggest tragedy would be if the Muslims accepted to live with us now. You saw how they meddle in the Croatian territory now, but Croats do not want it, they would lose the country. That is the only thing I would never accept, and I would rather accept that we get a smaller percentage of the territory than it is the case now, provided that we remain separated from Muslims and that we have our country."⁶⁷ English ET 0215-20611 – 0215-2174, p. 128.

68. 42nd Session, 18-19 July 1994. Karadžić:

"We know for sure that we have to give something up, that is clear beyond a shadow of a doubt, if we wish to achieve our primary strategic aim, which is to get rid of the enemies in our house, the Croats and Muslims, and not to be in the same state with them any more."⁶⁸ English 0306-4273

69. 42nd Session, 18-19 July 1994. Karadžić:

"... we won the battle for our Republic on March 18 /1992/. We got it on March 18 thanks to the skill of Mr. Krajišnik. ... Then Alija for the first time said "Yes" to three Bosnias, that they would be ethnically based; and that was fatal for him. ... Then Bosnia broke; then we were accepted as a party in the conflict. Had they ignored us and remained silent, recognized Bosnia and said afterwards that there are some rebels who are destroying their own state, we would have had difficult problems; no one would negotiate with us..."⁶⁹ English ET 0215-2810 – 0215-3020, p.

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70. 51st Session, 14-15 June 1995. Presiding [Krajišnik]:

“Finally, with your permission, I'd like to say that this National Assembly notes that it has not changed its basic policy and /?our/ goals. We want freedom and a state for the Serbian people and a complete separation for all times from the Muslims and the Croats.”⁷⁰ English 0215-3925 – 0215-4164-EDT, p. 374.

71. 53rd Session, 28 August 1995. Karadžić:

[He has before him a draft of peace plan contents.] "What interests us is a border on the Una, a border on the Sava, a border on the Drina, a border on the Neretva, access to the sea and part of Sarajevo. So it moves there, the border on the Sava is the best corridor, no doubt about it, it's the best. The exchange of Goražde for parts of Sarajevo is mentioned there. We absolutely cannot leave Sarajevo because then the Muslims would really have a good state, and they would /?reduce us to/ these three provinces, Eastern Herzegovina, Old Herzegovina and Romanija, nothing would be left there if we don't have our own Sarajevo and that regional centre, so people can go to school there, get treatment, trade and do business."⁷¹ English 0215-4299 – 0215-4440-ET, p. 27.

72. 56th Session, 17 December 1995. Minutes:

"D E C L A R A T I O N
ON THE STATUS OF THOSE PARTS OF REPUBLICA SRPSKA THAT HAVE
BEEN ALLOTTED TO THE MUSLIM-CROATIAN FEDERATION

“Republika Srpska retains the right to use peaceful means and political measures in order to return under its sovereignty regions defined by strategic goals, as well as regions that have been acquired by the opposite side on the basis of genocide or of brutal conquest aided by the intervention of foreign powers.”⁷² English ET 0215-4749 – 0215-4957, p. 3.

73. 56th Session, 17 December 1995. Krajišnik:

"The task of this Republic and the first strategic goal is that we separate from Muslims and Croats and no one has the right to base the strategy of Srpsko

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Sarajevo on remaining in a joint country. Therefore, any danger or wish for connection and solution of Sarajevo in which we will stay with Muslims and Croats is out of the question. No one can make a new decision now, according to which we will stay together. Neither do the people in Sarajevo want that, that is to say, the people or the leadership of Sarajevo, but the flaw of our members of parliament is that they see the danger if we stay in the Muslim-Croat Federation, that Sarajevo would be the connection point keeping the union together.

“There is only one problem now - where shall we move those people to? Or to say it specifically, we will move them here and here, in this and this way. We need time, because this is a surprise, because none of this has been predicted in either option. That is why we need time for the political solution and final separation and in the end, the best solution for Sarajevo is to move out and to find the location where to accommodate the people and that we, if there is a danger, finally separate. ... that solution will not lead us to the creation of the union but to division, because that is our first strategic goal.”⁷³ English ET 0215-4758 – 0215-4917, p. 107.

74. 57th Session, 21 February 1996. Nikola Koljević:

“I am of the opinion that this Assembly should put all the existing and newly-formed political parties and our media under an obligation, where all the parties will have access, to request that they unambiguously state their position regarding the above-mentioned strategic goals of our struggle, and we know what they are.”⁷⁴ English: 0215-4929 – 0215-5068-EDT, p. 93.

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Introduction

Assembly leaders and delegates often spoke of relations between the Republika Srpska and the other Serb-led polities: The Republic of Serbian Krajina (the Serb breakaway state in the boundaries of the Republic of Croatia), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of the two Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. Leaders reported from time to time on their contacts with Serb office-holders in the other Serb polities. Delegates praised these relations at times but frequently criticized them, and they debated the question of "Greater Serbia," a term that most felt was a pejorative description and inappropriate for their hopes to eventually unite with other Serb states.

75. 7th Session, 15 February 1992. Dušan Urošević:

"I think that according to the principle of analogy, how our mother Republic of Serbia has regulated the protection of the Serbs outside of Serbia, it would be good to have the same protection of the Serbs outside this Republic. I don't insist on it, I just say that it would be good.

"This would make this people feel a part of the whole Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, at the end, it would know which /?address/ to apply to should, heaven forbid, it be necessary."⁷⁵ English 0305-5783, p. 17.

76. 7th Session, 15 February 1992. Biljana Plavšić:

"We have to some extent laughed at and talked about Tudjman, the way he concentrated on symbols and so on. But what they have achieved, in a major part, was through their actions and their orientation of the people towards these symbols.

"Why cannot the Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopt these symbols, and why not, for educative reasons, force them on Serbia, because in Serbia this process is long drawn out and the outcome is uncertain. I am for the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina knowing exactly at any time of the day and night, if someone is a true Serb, what his symbols are. And this should be

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forced on Serbia, which has been vacillating about its symbols for more than a year.”⁷⁶ English 0305-5785, pp. 29-30

77. 9th Session Delegate Club Meeting, 28 February 1992. Nikola Erceg:

“As regards tomorrow, I am simply afraid of what may happen in Banjaluka. I would add that there are indications that Šešelj’s men, his soldiers, may come tomorrow too, as a show of strength. The condition for their arrival is the fact that tomorrow is the first day of the referendum.”⁷⁷ English 0096-8104

78. 9th Session Delegate Club Meeting, 28 February 1992. Karadžić:

“Please, until two or three months ago we were hoping to be able to play the ‘Yugoslav card,’ and to say, The Yugoslav army, Yugoslavia, legality, etc. This is slipping out of our grasp. That’s why we started on another track: A Serbian Bosnia and Hercegovina. Our sovereign right, our army. We are preparing the constitutional framework to be able to have immediately, and on the basis of the negotiations in Lisbon, to have a national guard, to have our own police force, to have a government, to turn the Yugoslav army into the army of the Serbian BH. We have to play the interim moves. If they don’t give us Yugoslavia, Serbia must not come to Bosnian Krajina to defend it. It must not. Because Serbia will be destroyed too, and the goal is to destroy Serbia. ... Where is that power that can push Serbia into defending Bosnian Krajina. Serbia would be blamed for it immediately, that it is now trying to realize its aspirations. People, we have freed Serbia and Montenegro and we have to free Bosnia and say that we do not want to annex parts of Bosnia to Serbia and Montenegro. That is very important to say to the world.”⁷⁸ English 0096-8122

79. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Krajišnik:

"At this moment of international relations we are obliged to totally permeate politically, legally and in any way possible all Serb territories, but above all the Srpska Krajina and the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order not to spoil what we have now in the Srpska Krajina. They are the ones that help us to protect our borders, so to speak, but we should fuse all that, from the legal, political from the cultural, educational and any other relation.”⁷⁹ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 78.

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80. 19th Session, 12 August 1992. Aleksa Milojević:

“The corridor of 5 km in Brčko is a very thin stalk on which an entire state hangs. ... We have to provide that if we are thinking of future development and a prosperous Republika Srpska, a corridor, the shortest way, and a highway, and the infrastructure link between those two directions – between Krajina and the southern parts of the Serbian Republic, which is between Romanija and these lands below Belgrade. We are tying ourselves too much to Belgrade, and risking too much on a thin stalk, the 5 kilometres-worth of corridor.”⁸⁰ English ET 0410-2021 – 0410-2099, pp. 87-90.

81. 20th Session, 14-15 September 1992. Trbojević:

“Our Government has not had official contacts with the Serbian Government. I was in Podgorica and we were received like poor relatives. There are very many vehicles – both transport and passenger – in Serbia and no one will return them. I don't know how much our MUP insisted on their return. Their Government said, ask our police, we'll return them, but it seems to me that in six months time not a single truck or trailer-truck will be reported as confiscated and returned to us. Furthermore, in these contacts with the governments of Montenegro and Yugoslavia, I think we should discuss what we think of each other, right up to recognition of one another. Perhaps we don't have to announce all that, but we must agree on it.”⁸¹ English 0422-6193 – 0422-6338 ET, p. 38.

82. 22nd Session, 23-24 November 1992. Biljana Plavšić:

“I would like to say the following to Minister Stanišić, ‘It is not just talk, Mr. Minister, but it is true that, after the statement of the president of the Republic in which he appealed to all the volunteers in the Serbian lands and all Orthodox lands, I sent a letter to all the addresses /as printed/. I will tell you, I was trying to gather people /as printed/, to get together anyone who wants to fight for the Serbian cause. The letters went out and you are now talking about paramilitary formations and about non-paramilitary formations. Well, excuse me, this does not concern me at all. I was looking for people to fight for the Serbian cause, who want to fight in the territory of Republika Srpska. These letters were also sent to the Soviet Union, they also went to Šešelj and Arkan and Jović, whatever suits you,

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and now you can accuse me of that. With respect, I want to clear this up because this is the second time, Mr. Minister ... no rumours, I did this and you judge me. (Applause)."⁸² English 0340-2803 – 0340-3038, p. 21.

83. 23rd Session, 17 December 1992. Rajko Dukić:

[The delegates are considering an appeal to citizens of Serbia and Montenegro to refrain from voting for Milan Panić, Milošević's rival in the election for President of Serbia.]

"And here we send the message – a while ago I heard proposal to the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro. Not, gentlemen, to the citizens, but to the Serbs of Serbia and Montenegro, the Serbian people. Citizens of Serbia are also large numbers of Muslims who have found themselves there and found employment there, and are fighting against us and a large number of [iptars who are fighting against us, and a large number of Hungarians. We do not care about them. We should address a proclamation to the Serbian people of Serbia and Montenegro..." English 0214-9750 – 0214-9854 ET, no page number provided.

[Dukić's position prevails. The final resolution reads:] "We appeal to our co-nationals from Serbia and Montenegro..."⁸³

84. 23rd Session, 17 December 1992. General Mladić:

"We must understand, I think that at this last meeting, attended by president Karadžić, President Krajišnik, Professor Koljević, Minister Subotić and me, we clearly impressed upon both the military and the political leaderships of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that we are not as numerous as the Chinese and that we may not divide along these or those lines."⁸⁴ English 0214-9750 – 0214-9854 ET

85. 25th Session, 19-20 January 1993. Karadžić:

"We have assurances from both Serbia and Yugoslavia that, regardless of the sanctions and threats, they will be on our side as long as we defend our just goals and as long as we let others have what we are asking for ourselves. The rumours about blackmail are totally ungrounded. Serbia, Montenegro and

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Yugoslavia would never settle for the Serbian people in the former BH being placed in an unequal position. We are aware of the fact that the difficulties being experienced by Yugoslavia nominally stem from our justified struggle for freedom and equality.”⁸⁵ English 0214-9937 -0215-0019-ET, p. 8.

86. 25th Session, 19-20 January 1993. Milenko Vojnović:

“We must bear in mind that the resolution of the problems of the Serbs in BH started with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and we must not forget that initially we gave a free hand to the former and present President of Serbia, Mr. Milošević, to represent our interests. At the time we believed this to be the best solution and we must not forget that when Yugoslavia was falling apart, Mr. Milošević was probably in a dilemma as to whether pure nation-states should be formed on the soil of the former Yugoslavia with us Serbs from the Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska being able to be integrated into a Serbia in which the Serbian people would practically account for 100% of the population.

“However, Mr. Milošević probably opted for the second option, namely the inviolability of internal borders, which is creating insurmountable difficulties for us Serbs in BH at this point. That is why we Serbs in BH must create preconditions to be able to, at a certain moment, which we are certainly not wishing for, but then again as someone said before me, Serbia’s turn would come one day too, and when controversial issues in Serbia and their resolution are raised, make our dream come true and create a union of Serbian states, i.e. a single Serbian state, but certainly not at the expense of some disputable territories in the present Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”⁸⁶ English 0214-9937 - 0215-0019-ET, p. 45.

87. 25th Session, 19-20 January 1993. Vladimir Lukić [Newly-designated Prime Minister of the RS]:

[He outlines a government program. Following that, various delegates comment upon it, generally supportive, highlighting specific needs.]

“Since there is every indication that key political agreements have already been reached, actually they have, there are no more reasons or time to delay the technical and technological establishment of a functioning system of payment transactions in the areas of Republika Srpska and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the Republic of Serbian Krajina. It is also realistic to expect

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that a unified monetary and credit system will be established in the same period of time with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbian Krajina with all the necessary elements of issue and control in the monetary field. I expect that in the same way and with full respect for the overall relations of Republika Srpska, the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the issue of the tax and customs system will be resolved. We shall be stronger only if we rely on one another, and weaker if we harm one another.

“... More than before, the Government will support and assist the project of researching, documenting and presenting to the world war crimes committed against the Serbian people...”⁸⁷ English 0214-9937 - 0215-0019-ET, p. 76.

88. 30th Session, 5-6 May 1993. Slobodan Milošević:

[Serbian President Milosevic attended only one session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. At this session, he and the presidents of Yugoslavia, Montenegro, and Greece sought in vain to persuade the Assembly to accept the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, which had already been accepted by Croat and Muslim leaders. Milosevic both urged delegates to accept the plan and commented upon their common goal.]

“The question was asked, which I really find unacceptable: Whether we give up on our goal? I shall tell you no! We do not give up on our goal. The question then, if we look at the plan, is not whether the plan represents completion of the goal. Of course it does not. The question is, though, whether the plan represents a way towards the final goal. The goal was completed in many aspects, but not in all of them. But, it represents the way towards the ultimate goal, of course it does. But we should employ our heads a little more, our brains, and we should spill a little less blood.

“.... Since you are an Assembly, you probably know that we made a united system of money transfer, that we intend to introduce the same money, that we intend to have every possible link and transaction between the economies, as well as that we are going to stabilise the entire unified area of economy, in which those Serb lands shall belong economically, culturally, educationally, and in every other aspect. ... Let me tell you in the end, do not tell us that you feel abandoned. To us who felt your worries all the time. And we did not only mentally feel them, but we solved them and helped with all our powers and with all our capacities, for the cost of great sacrifices of the 10 million people of Serbia. We shall continue to help you, that is not disputed. But, do not tell us that you feel abandoned, because that

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is not fair. I want to tell you that this Assembly must have courage and self-confidence to realise its goal in new circumstances, based on one thing or the other, but based on something firm enough to realise the goal."⁸⁸ English ET-0215-0114 – 0215-0214, pp. 96-97.

89. 31st Session, 9 May 1993. Unidentified Delegate:

"The ones paid by Milošević, we should see whether they will fight on our side or not. A good portion of the officers receive their salary over there. This situation, if we vote no. If Serbia closes the roads, and we have to purchase other food articles, flour and oil. Gentlemen, we will only be able to do this through rich Serbs. There are Serbs who will give thousands of marks for those articles, this I am certain of."⁸⁹ English 0215-0208 – 0215-0230, pp. 17-18.

90. 32nd Session, 19-20 May 1993. Jovo Mijatović:

"Colleague Malidža spoke about the economy earlier ... we have got a Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economy, he is in Belgrade /as printed/. The man in charge of the economy is in Belgrade. Someone said we also have the President of the Chamber of Commerce, a former minister, who is also in Belgrade. There are a lot of people in Belgrade."⁹⁰ English ET 0215-0236 – 0215-0331, p. 60.

91. 32nd Session, 19-20 May 1993. Rajko Kasagić:

"There is a problem of dual power. Ministry of the Internal Authority is the Bureau in Belgrade and the Ministry of the Interior is in Republika Srpska. We have to determine whether the Bureau in Belgrade should remain functioning. According to my estimation it should be a kind of catering centre with certain people who would keep the registry for the State President and the members of Presidency. I propose that it should be investigated by the CSB /Security Service Centre/ as the inter-distance between [*meaning: "agency between"*] the Republic Ministry of the Interior and the Municipal one."⁹¹ English ET 0215-0236 – 0215-0331, p. 101.

92. 32nd Session, 19-20 May 1993. Vladimir Lukić [*Prime Minister of the RS*]:

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" ... our proposal will be for that meeting that we are supposed to hold with a small number of people, to reduce it to a very minimum. We need a certain number of people to sit and work in Belgrade, but we do not need the entire enterprises of the authorities and with such power that even the Government of this Republic does not have. I believe this is not going to happen. It has to be solved anyway, and we have to get rid of it, especially because we have enough information that this is about a parallel authority, a parallel MUP etc."⁹² English ET 0215-0236 – 0215-0331, p. 134.

93. 33rd Session, 20-21 July 1993. Presiding [Krajišnik]:

[Krajišnik summarizes conclusions of the previous Assembly session that require further action.]

"Regarding the dispute about the work of the Republika Srpska Bureau in Belgrade, the Government has undertaken the following measures within its competence: It was decided to revise those activities from the competence of the Government and certain ministries, which had been carried out in the Bureau up until that moment, as well as to do the systematisation of workplaces. In other words, to revise the number of people who were in charge of carrying out those assignments. Ministries were put in charge of some assignments and of the amount of work they should do in SRJ, in other words, in the Bureau. All the assignments and competencies necessary for the work, for the undisturbed functioning of the SRJ Government and state institutions, will be determined."⁹³ English ET 0215-0344 – 0215-0497, pp. 22-23.

94. 33rd Session, 20-21 July 1993. Presiding [Krajišnik]:

"The Ministry of Defence currently negotiates and finances the total production of ammunition and equipment in the Republic. By the means of compensation agreements with the companies from SRJ [*Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*], and by selling the goods from the war loot and commodity reserves, efforts are being made to provide and acquire the means for the purchase of ammunition and military equipment in SRJ and abroad. Of course, we can provide a more detailed report if you think this would be appropriate for such a complete meeting."⁹⁴ English ET 0215-0344 – 0215-0497, p. 24.

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95. 33rd Session, 20-21 July 1993. Rašula:

"I would like to draw your attention here to a couple of things, first of all regarding the issue of the Republic Bureau in Belgrade. I want to raise a question whether this Assembly has ever decided to appoint or create the Bureau and we should answer that question. Regarding this, I firmly stand by the point that it should be dissolved if it exists. As far as I am concerned, it definitely exists, but we have never reached a decision on its establishment. Since that bureau is a problem to a more efficient functioning of the state, of the Government which implements the conclusions of the Parliament; I am in favour of its final dissolution. I do not even support the idea of leaving part of the bureau in function. First we have to establish whether we need it or not. Believe me, I do not have any knowledge about it, I don't know what they do, how they do it, or who does it."⁹⁵ English ET 0215-0344 – 0215-0497, p. 71.

96. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Karadžić:

[Krajišnik reminds Karadžić to respond to a charge leveled by Delegate Momir Gaković that Milošević has had too great an influence over Bosnian Serb affairs. Karadžić responds.]

"I have to tell you that they are very cautious with us. They got burned and they are very cautious now. They appreciate us very much. I cannot say they do not put pressures on us, but these are not the ultimate pressures. They are talking, they are showing great patience with us. They'd rather convince us than put pressure on us. And Milošević is – I can tell you that – he's cunning as a fox and he made a great contribution towards completing this. He especially helped with constitutional principles, at the point when Tudjman was on the verge of sliding into federation *[with Slovenia]*, since he didn't know what would happen to Krajina and he was afraid of that."⁹⁶ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, pp. 93-94.

97. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Karadžić:

"We could have fought for Banja Luka if the enemy was more and we less prepared. In such case somebody from Serbia should say – what do I care for

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Banja Luka. I have told Milošević, in front of Tudjman, that if we are brothers our valets are not sisters. He said – they are now but they will not be anymore once you have your own country. Serbia is helping us 50 times more than we can pay or sell.”⁹⁷ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, p.80-81.

98. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Karadžić:

[Karadžić speculates that international negotiators are putting enormous pressure on Tudjman to sign the peace plan.]

“The whole military would be submitted to Mladić. It would be placed under one command and we would defend ourselves as one body. In that case we need to calculate whether we can bear the burden of such war to the completion. If we can, then we would stay within our current borders. Then we would have no more obligations to Croats regarding Kupres (applause), nor any obligations to Muslims regarding Ozren (applause). But it has to be done by this nation – which means, west of the Drina. This nation has to give all it has in order to succeed in this.”⁹⁸ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, p. 329.

99. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Momčilo Mandić:

“Most objections were that there is a Bureau established in Belgrade that is a parallel Government and that executes tasks from the authorization of the government. I am obliged here to give an explanation to members of the Assembly what it is about. By the decision of establishing of Economic bureau in Belgrade, that is “Official Gazette” No. 13/92 when the Government established Economic bureau, inter alia, the Government decided then that Economic bureau in Belgrade besides economic jobs executes the following jobs: long-term and joint investment, economic relations with foreign countries, monetary-credit policy, co-ordination and development of economic policies, etc. This means that the Government made this decision.

“I would like to inform that during these several months while I was there, RS Bureau returned to the RS aeroplanes, trucks and vehicles in value of 4 million dollars, so everything that we did we did in a favour of this country and this people.”⁹⁹ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, pp. 347-348

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100. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Momčilo Mandić:

"Regarding these people who work on security, you know that Mićo Stanišić is adviser to the president of the Republic and his task is a co-operation of Yugoslav MUP /Ministry of Interior/ with our MUP. He has two collaborators who perform tasks up there and that is in his jurisdiction. "¹⁰⁰ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, p. 348.

101. 35th Session, 2 October 1993. Drago Simić (Head of the Financial Police):

[In assessing proposed tax changes on behalf of the RS financial police, Simić compares the situation in the RS with that in the Republic of Serbia.]

"We share with our colleagues from the financial police in Serbia the view that tax rates are intolerable, that they are too high, and that we cannot afford to waste time /in addressing this problem/. ... I remind you that in Serbia itself, without Montenegro, the financial police have 1,920 inspectors, plus support staff, plus equipment. We have 53 inspectors for the RS without support staff and without any kind of equipment. "¹⁰¹

102. 35th Session, 2 October 1993. Minister of Agriculture (not identified here):

"We have only made one error, ... in that we have strictly followed Serbian policy..."¹⁰²

103. 35th Session, 2 October 1993. Vojo Kuprešanić:

"We have until now always depended on Mother Serbia in regard to wheat and corn, etc. We are a state unto ourselves and must develop our own strategy. Serbia probably helped us and I personally propose that Serbia not help us in matters of food stuffs..."¹⁰³

104. 35th Session, 2 October 1993. Karadžić:

"We have had sufficient reasons and justifications to unite with the Serbian Krajina." *[Were the sanctions to be lifted,]* "then we must propose the complete unity of the Serbian people, including Yugoslavia, the RSK, and the RS..."¹⁰⁴

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105. 35th Session, 2 October 1993. Karadžić:

"The entire Serbian nation must integrate around a few of its creations, above all around Belgrade and then around a few of its cores of polycentric development in the RS."¹⁰⁵

106. 36th Session, 30-31 December 1993. Biljana Plavšić:

"I did not bring Arkan, I heard for the first time that there existed someone by the name of Arkan when one night at 0100 hours the commander of the barracks in Tuzla called me and said, Mrs. Plavšić, Arkan is holding Abdić, Doko and Simović captive in Bijeljina. I asked him who Arkan was, I did not have a clue who Arkan was, when he explained it to me I asked for the phone number and we agreed how I was to get in touch with him, and he gave me the telephone number of the territorial defence, and I immediately got through to him on the telephone and I said, I do not know you, and he said, I know you well and I respect you. Well, if you respect me, then set these three men free, because tomorrow they will lock up hundreds of Serbs in Sarajevo on their account, and he said, if it is not /too/ late I will let them go. Luckily, it was not late, in the morning when I arrived in the Presidency I found Abdić there. I want to say to you, even though he said to me, you will regret this one day, I say to you even today that something terrible would have happened in Sarajevo, something terrible would have happened to the Serbs."¹⁰⁶ English 0215-1176 – 0215-1426-ET, p. 31.

107. 38th Session, 17 January 1994. Karadžić:

"If we immediately united with Krajina we would have Muslims and Muslims' friends on our side against the Croats and their friends. That would be a great opponent. In case that we get united with Serbia only, without the agreement of Muslims and Croats, we would not be able to achieve the aim. We would make some achievement but we would not reach the goal and then they would wait for Serbia in so-called Kuwait model of aggression because so far we managed to keep the international factor and had them admit that the war in BiH is a civil war between the people of different ethnicity and that Serbia is not military involved but is just giving moral and material support. It would be dangerous if we made them look at it as if it was a Kuwait model. That is to say that one country attacks another sovereign country, and therefore that country should be punished not only

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by being chased away from BiH but also in her own territory, as Iraq was severely punished and had several hundreds of thousands of dead."¹⁰⁷ English ET 0215-2178 – 0215-2234, p. 61.

108. 39th Session, 24-25 March 1994. Dušan Kovačević:

"We applied the procedure of return of conscripts from SRY /Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ territory in one of the possible ways. The Ministry of Defence sent their people to all counties in Serbia and Montenegro and sent call-up papers to around 12,000 conscripts who are in that area. Actually, more precisely, there are around 19,000 of them over there and we had the number of around 12, 000. We formed a reception centre in Zvornik, we used the military police of the Army of Yugoslavia and partially MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ of Yugoslavia and we returned 2,768 conscripts and deployed them in the units. However, the return provoked a very negative reaction in the SRY, political parties used this against the ruling party in Yugoslavia so the Supreme Command, that is to say, the Defence Council of SRY forbade the procedure. The return of our conscripts who are in this territory is totally impossible for us now. A special agreement between the President of the Republic, Mr. Karadžić and President Milošević is needed."¹⁰⁸ English ET 0215-2251 – 0215-2477, pp. 140-141.

109. 40th Session, 10-11 May 1994. Milan Martić [Guest: President of the RSK]:

"Let me tell you something that is my duty on behalf of the Serbian people in the RSK. Let us never allow again to separate us like it was done once after the World War II, it was an artificial border of Josip Broz with which he wanted to separate one people. We are one people and we will never allow anybody, regardless of the fact that it sounds that we are two republics, two countries, we are one people and be sure that very soon we will be one country, whether someone likes it or not. .. I want to say once again that the RSK, its people and all the inhabitants fit for military service are at the disposal to defend the corridor, to defend every inch of the Serbian country, no matter whether it is Goražde, Brčko, Benkovac or Obrovac. We have to be one people and have one defence."¹⁰⁹ English, ET 0215-2482 – 0215-2616, p. 21.

110. 40th Session, 10-11 May 1994. Radoslav Brđjanin:

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"Simply, there is no agreement regarding Brčko. There is no RS or RSK without Brčko. We have to say to the world that we are not in military mood, but the world must know the following: that every Serb has to become a kamikaze in defending Brčko."¹¹⁰ English, ET 0215-2482 – 0215-2616, p. 27.

111. 40th Session, 10-11 May 1994. Karadžić:

"However, we are in front of the door and all what Sloba /Slobodan Milošević/ used to say can be accepted except one thing – that we have missed something so far. We have not missed anything. We are taking them towards our goal. We seemingly accept this and that, but our permanent goal is our state and we are going straight for it. The thing that you said about Russia is true. About Serbia – nothing would happen without Serbia. We do not have those resources and we would not be able to fight. However, there are some misunderstandings and they are obvious. The main and major misunderstanding was the Vance-Owen Plan. It was a serious thing. It was not any kind of game, but it is better that the people think that it was a game."¹¹¹ English ET 0215-2482 – 0215-2616, p. 51.

112. 42nd Session, 18-19 July 1994. President Krajišnik:

"We had discussions with the representatives of Serbia and Montenegro until four o'clock this morning. That is not a secret at all. They think that we have to accept it [*the Contract Group Plan*]. We said, we do not have to, we cannot accept it. We led the way for our people, and we will lead them as long as we could. When we cannot, then Kecmanović will come in, and let him take the lead and sign it then, if the people accept it. General Perišić was there, as well as General Mladić, Tolimir. Everybody in our delegation said that we did not accept it. None of us said that this could be /sic/. But you should understand that we have to find a way – it is not enough that we just say 'no,' and we do not care about it anymore. There is no 'we do not care.' We have to win. We want a state, we do not want half the Serbs dead. I am not afraid of their bombing. They will not bomb. We have to find a way to continue the negotiations."¹¹² English ET 0215-2810 – 0215-3020, p. p. 28

113. 42nd Session, 18-19 July 1994. Krajišnik: 0215-2923

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“We have problems in getting supplies from Serbia because of poor resources. I will not say whether this is on purpose or not. I know that all the resources are used up, and we can by no means choose not to talk with Serbia, nor would it be good. We went to talk /sic/, it is true that Serbia and Montenegro /sic/, Mr. Bulatovic and Mr. Milosevic were there /sic/. They presented a complete picture. We said that everything was like that /sic/, the partisans and the people who fought between '41 and '45, they fought without a single bullet and without weapons. We will fight against the Muslims and we will snatch their weapons. We cannot accept this [*Contract Group Plan*] because this is a unitary Bosnia. Our standpoint was clear.”¹¹³ English ET 0215-2810 – 0215-3020, p. 28.

114. 42nd Session, 18-19 July 1994. Vojinović:

“It is only us, the Serbs from the former BiH, that have remained. What way out can we seek here? Please don't /sic/, I always say /sic/, we were always aiming at some unification /sic/. The world does not allow a Greater Serbia. It is a Greater Serbia because Serbia will get territories in BiH and Croatia, and it does not want to give territories where there is no Serbian population. If we give these territories proposed by the Contact Group, then it is not fair to 350 thousand people to distance ourselves now /sic/, some kind of union suits us /sic/. I do not now how many Serbs remain in this state /sic/ which we shall /sic/ /one word illegible/ where shall we put these people?”¹¹⁴ English ET 0215-2810 – 0215-3020, p. 33.

115. 42nd Session, 18-19 July 1994. Karadžić:

“Kozirev deceived us, before the war, we met in Lisbon where he asked if we could accept the external borders of BH in that situation, knowing that they would not give /?us/ Greater Serbia and unification, knowing that we had to do it in stages, accept internal borders, confederation that we have, our republic as part of this confederation.”¹¹⁵ English ET 0215-2810 – 0215-3020, p. 38, as revised in 0215-2931-ET.

116. 42nd Session, 18-19 July 1994. Krajišnik:

I am asking you, please, to support this, and that is, to create a state rather than some kind of union in which we would again have connections with Muslims

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and Croats and we would not be joined with Serbia and Montenegro."¹¹⁶ English ET 0215-2810 – 0215-3020, p. 42.

117. 44th Session, 18 August 1994. Branko Vojnica [Guest: President of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina]:

[Vojnica reads the text of a resolution for unification of the four Serb states, submitted jointly by himself and Krajišnik. The Assembly of the RS then approves the proposal.]

“Proposal for the Unification of the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Montenegro, Republika Srpska, and the Republic of Serbian Krajina in One State

1. We hereby appeal to the assemblies of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro to accept the Proposal for Unification in one State and to review the procedure and conditions in which such unification would take place.
2. A joint delegation of the assemblies of the RSK and the RS is hereby made responsible for initiating talks with representatives of the assemblies of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro as soon as possible in order to draft a declaration on unification and other relevant documents.
3. The joint delegation shall have one month to carry out this task after which it shall inform the assemblies of the results of the negotiations.

[Endorsed] President of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Branko Vojnica

[Endorsed] President of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, Momčilo Krajišnik

“The Chair: *[Momčilo Krajišnik]*

“I hereby establish that we have unanimously adopted the text agreed upon by the delegations of our Assembly and the Assembly of RSK.”¹¹⁷ English 0215-3078 – 0215-3130-EDT, pp. 52-53.

118. 46th Session, 9-23 November 1994. General Tolimir:

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“The rumours accusing the officers have reappeared and the political scene has been used to square the accounts between the officers, whether they are reserve or active officers although there is only few of them. They are accused of being the ones to blame for the loss of the positions, which they have allegedly ordered. Competent and incompetent, official and unofficial persons are telling conscripts that the ones to blame are the officers who are getting paid by Slobodan Milošević etc, although the very same Slobodan Milošević has stopped out their salaries since August.”¹¹⁸ English ET 0215-3243 -0215-3549, p. 60 (page numbers embedded in text) .

119. 48th Session, 28 December 1994. Vojislav Maksimović:

“The deputies think that the return of Mr. Šešelj would lead to the strengthening of trust in the institutions of a democratic state and significantly contribute to a final intranational reconciliation among the Serbs. So, I propose that the Assembly adopt a conclusion to appeal to Mr. Slobodan Milošević to pardon federal deputy Vojislav Šešelj, a citizen of the Republic of Serbia, for reasons I mentioned here because I think this gesture would mean a contribution towards intranational reconciliation and better unity among the Serbian people, particularly among the Serbian politicians. I ask you to show understanding and accept the proposal by the Serbian Delegates’ Club. Thank you.”¹¹⁹ English: 0215-3599 – 0215-3740-EDT, pp. 41-42.

120. 48th Session, 28 December 1994. Chairman [Krajišnik]:

“I note that, with two against and three abstentions, the conclusion is adopted to send an appeal to the President of Serbia, Mr. Slobodan Milošević, to pardon the deputy of the Federal Parliament, the citizen of Serbia, Mr. Vojislav Šešelj.”¹²⁰ English: 0215-3599 – 0215-3740-EDT, pp. 42-43.

121. 48th Session, 9-23 November 1994. Karadžić:

“I think Vojo said something emotionally, that we have squandered a chance to create a Greater Serbia, especially that I squandered it. Nothing has been squandered, we are now in a tug-of-war with the entire MZ [*International Community*] and the rope is still on our side and every day we pull it one millimetre to our side.”¹²¹ English: 0215-3599 – 0215-3740-EDT, p. 154.

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122. 49th Session, 13 February 1995. Mirko Mijatović:

“On one occasion, Mr. Milošević said he’d never allow, it seems in that sense, that’s how I understood him, the foreign monitors to come to the Drina river, ...it’s my opinion that we can’t, mustn’t and shouldn’t do anything or go anywhere without Serbia and the Serbian people over there. I am therefore arguing in favour of finding an option, a path and a way, of finding people who are able to tread that path, of our leadership, the SRJ /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ leadership and the leaderships of Serbia and Montenegro sitting down in order to find out whether they can reach an agreement on certain issues.”¹²² English 0215-3750 – 0215-3913-EDT, pp. 70-71.

123. 49th Session, 13 February 1995. Nikola Perić:

“I’m scared, how are we going to live without Serbia, how are we going to go on living, and if tomorrow this border is hermetically sealed off, how will we go on...”¹²³ English 0215-3750 – 0215-3913-EDT, p. 132.

124. 49th Session, 13 February 1995. Milenko Pantić:

“We’re aware that we’re growing ever more closed every day, whatever we wish to qualify this regime in Serbia as, it is, in the end, the one that’s closest to us. Serbia is the closest to us, and that regime is in Serbia. We must try and find the way, here, the President himself said, and we probably have to, they’re the only ones we have left, we’ve no other friends. It’s been forecast that the Drina river border will continue closing down ever more, We don’t even have any more human resources, let me tell you. The other day, four people were killed and 15 wounded in Brod, of those miserable wretches living there.”¹²⁴ English 0215-3750 – 0215-3913-EDT, p. 136.

125. 49th Session, 13 February 1995. Slobodan Bijelić:

[Bijelić reads the text of a letter to President Milošević and the Assembly approves sending it.]

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“Dear Mr. President,

“We were proud of you when you started the political struggle for the dignity of the Serbian people. We supported your position that, in case of a secession, the issue of administrative borders had to be raised. You had our full support for the idea of ‘all Serbs in one state’, because we had achieved that in 1918. We were ready to die to prevent Serbia from ever stooping. We were proud when in The Hague you withstood all the pressures and rejected the Hague document. Had you given way then, all Serbian chances of freedom and rights would’ve been lost. We believe you won’t recognise Croatia and Bosnia now either because otherwise your resistance in The Hague and our liberation struggle would’ve been in vain.

“At the time when our enemies are mounting the worst, genocidal and exterminating war against us, we have to tell the people in all Serbian states the truth. And the truth is that today the Drina River is but a steel curtain that nothing and nobody can pass through. Not only is our economy, which fed and defended our people, being suffocated, but our defences and preparations to resist the enemy have also been endangered.

“We call upon you, Mr President, to use your authority to re-establish the dignity of the Serbian politics and secure the unification of the Serbian state.

“Mr President, the West has proclaimed you the last and only hope for the realisation of their own goals in the Balkans. Their own, not Serbian goals. Mr President, we’d like to be proud of you again. We’d like for you and other Serbian leaders to be the hope for the creation of Serbian goals and an obstacle to the creation of our enemies’ goals. You can do that. And we can all do that together. We can be united and firm in defending our national interests and those of our state. The history will never forgive us if we don’t do it. If you don’t want to or can’t do that, then at least remove the painful border on the Drina river, separating the homogenous brethren. ... The survival of our people is at stake.”¹²⁵ English 0215-3750 – 0215-3913-EDT

[The Assembly approved sending the letter by a vote of 45 in favor and 12 abstentions. BCS ERN 0215-3884]

126. 49th Session, 13 February 1995. Karadžić:

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“Thus, Milošević was given three months to remove us, when he introduced it [*the embargo*] on 4 August, there you go – six months have passed and we haven’t collapsed, six months have passed, and after three months, we were already in a good position, and we even mounted a counter-offensive”¹²⁶
English 0215-3750 – 0215-3913-EDT, p. 246.

127. 50th Session, 15-16 April 1995. General Milovanović:

"We did not regard these salaries as charities, nor did we accept them, as somebody from the benches is shouting, in order to serve them. We received them following an agreement which the RS Presidency made with the Presidency of Yugoslavia. ... We know that with your signatures you made sure that we should be paid by Yugoslavia."¹²⁷ English ET 0084-5781 – 0084-6113, p. 20 (second sequence of page numbers, after first 171) of 376.

128. 50th Session, 15-16 April 1995. Karadžić:

"Gentlemen, we got the officers we asked for. I asked for Mladić. ... I took an interest in him, and together with Mr. Krajišnik, I went to General Kukanjac's office and listened to him issuing orders and commanding around Kupres and Knin. We spent countless nights in the office of General Kukanjac at that time. President Krajišnik was already President of the Assembly, and I was just president of the party, I did not have any state function. We asked for Mladić and said that they should set up the headquarters as they saw fit, we wouldn't interfere..."¹²⁸
English ET 0084-5781 – 0084-6113, p. 146 (second sequence of page numbers in document)

129. 50th Session, 15-16 April 1995. General Mladić:

“The GŠ [*General Staff*] increasingly had to resort to requests for humanitarian relief from the FRY, the Yugoslav Army, which mainly covered the needs of vital importance for conducting the armed struggle, and to our own agricultural production, production and repairs, the manufacture of ammunition and other forms of production not requiring any considerable financial investments.

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"The materiel received from the Army of Yugoslavia /VJ/ as humanitarian aid only covered about 45% of our munitions requirements and 5% of other needs. This was especially evident up to August 1994; ever since then it has been very difficult, supplies have almost dried up."

"As an illustration for increase, I submit an overview of expenditures of certain kinds of supplies from the beginning of the war to 31 December 1994, with needs for 1995 that we have at present. From the beginning of the war to 31 December 1994, a total of 9,185 tons of infantry ammunition has been expended. 1.49% was self-produced; 42.2% came from supplies inherited by the VRS and withdrawn from enclaves and kasernes of the former JNA; 47.2% was provided by the Yugoslav Army; and 9.11% was imported. At the present we have 9.69% of the total needs for 1995. ... We have expended 18,151 tons of artillery munitions, 26.2% of it from production, 39% from supplies, 34.4% provided by the Yugoslav Army, and 0.26% imported. At the present we have 18.36% of the needs for this year. As for anti-aircraft ammunition, we expended 1,336 tons. We secured none from production, which means we didn't produce one shell, one bullet, ... 42.7% came from supplies, 52.4% were provided by the Yugoslav Army, and 4.9% came from imports. We have 7.89% of the needs for this year."¹²⁹ English ET 0084-5781 – 0084-6113, pp. 49 – 51.

130. 3rd Extraordinary Session, 23-24 May 1995. Karadžić:

"The things that are being slipped to Serbia through the blockade, this is not done without America's knowledge; what we are getting from Greece is not being done without America's knowledge. They are making us drink through a straw, breathe through a straw because they need this crisis, this war, to go on. Clinton wants to destroy Europe, he wants to install NATO in our lands, we are a blade of grass in the storm; everyone is playing games with us. We have to consider this very seriously and we have to know that, if President Milošević does not recognise [*the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina*] now, and we refuse to make his position easier /as printed/.¹³⁰ English 0410-1808 – 0410-1809

131. 3rd Extraordinary Session, 23-24 May 1995. Karadžić:

"Of those present here I don't think there is anyone who is under oath. I mention this oath as I reckon that whoever is under oath most not disclose a state secret, both while he is in office and when he leaves office.

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“We met with President Milošević following the fall of Western Slavonia. To tell you the truth, there was speculation even before about how he was prepared to arrest us or to hide us away on some mountain and then tell the population that we had fled to Cyprus with their money and whatnot. I doubt that he would resort to this, but if someone were to do this, it would certainly work and the people would be desperate, confused and everyone would flee to Serbia. I don't think he is even entertaining such ideas, and when he invited us, we said we would go no matter what might happen to us. If something is to happen to these people, then let it first happen to the two of us, both of us will go. It was President Krajišnik and me. We went, and I must say that President Milošević didn't change a thing: accept the plan, write me a letter, I will ensure that Serbia's, Yugoslavia's sanctions are lifted, you'll do the negotiations for two, three or four months and during that time we'll reinforce you materially and then if there is any fighting, you'll endure, you'll endure easier once we accept the plan. There is no question that we are allowed to continue fighting.”¹³¹ English 0410-1815 – 1810-1817-ET

132. 3rd Extraordinary Session, 23-24 May 1995. Karadžić:

“Regarding Western Slavonia, we told President Milošević that this was a catastrophe for all of us, that we considered that we were all responsible for it being such a massacre, etc. He denied it and said that 200 people were killed, and we said let us hope to God that it was only 200, even though 200 is also horrendous. For us to be defeated by the Croats and for them to kill 200 of our people. We said that we feared it was more like two or three thousand. They said that it had been a form of taunting the Croats, that we should have been quieter and shrewder, and they refused to accept that the opening of the highway was to blame. But overall we felt that Serbia felt a certain sense of guilt for this, /?but that it decided not to do anything/.

“We asked to go after Orašje and for the 11th Corps go to the Spačva Forest and for us to meet and tear off a chunk of Croatia and charge for it and then link up Eastern Slavonia with the RS. President Milošević was against that. He said that they would show up there as a diversion to frighten them. Perišić was there and I can honestly say that Perišić is a good man. It cannot be said that he doesn't understand us and that he wouldn't help us if he could. He's probably helping as much as he can, and if he could do more he would, as far as his personal will is concerned. Simply put, we do not have that type of support over there for us to fight for a state and unite, etc.”¹³² English 0410-1815 – 0410-1817-ET

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133. 51st Session, 14-15 June 1995. Karadžić:

"Second, when we last met with President Milošević, President Krajišnik and I, where we some harsh words were exchanged and we said everything to each others' faces, and nothing, nobody changed the situation. However, we got intelligence information about the Germans frantically asking the Russians how it was possible that they met, well, that couldn't be allowed that they reconciled etc. And we realised that we might ought to pretend in the world, pretend now that we are inclined to reconciliation, or some cooperation, in order to somewhat strengthen our position, and we played that and did that. It seems to me that to that extent in the beginning there was no political game between us, and that now it might be good to play some political games to the advantage of the Serbian people, and without going into much detail, there is still a part of the agreement, that part is being implemented at their end."¹³³ English 0215-3925 – 0215-4164-EDT, p. 345.

134. 52nd Session, 6 August 1995. Vladika Atanasija:

"Karadžić's mistake is that he is too much attached to the politics of Slobodan Milošević. Mladić's mistake is that he is still trying to implement communistic politics. That is my personal conclusion. You can erase it and take it for my foolishness. ... Gentlemen, as for that gentleman from Dedinje [*Milošević*], at the end of 1991 when the plan was already signed in October and November but announced later on... Milan Babić still listened to him at that time; now he listens to him again, but it does not work. He said that everything else apart from Serbia and Montenegro will disappear without a trace."¹³⁴ English ET 0215-4171 – 0215-4296, pp. 48-49.

135. 52nd Session, 6 August 1995. Karadžić:

[Karadžić responds to General Tolimir.]

"We quarrelled with Milošević and everybody else because of Goražde, when we allowed a few more days on top of the five days that were planned for the conquest of the right bank. We did not capture the first row of houses, we could not capture them and I understand that. General Gvero spoke to me on the phone and kept saying today until five o'clock tomorrow until five o'clock. ... We

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keep deluding [*Churkin – Russian diplomat; and Stoltenberg – UN peace negotiator*] and all other foreigners as well as Milošević to whom they promised 300 tons of oil. We admit that he was right in this case. When we downed an aeroplane and created a drama on purpose. The Supreme Command has a record to prove that all of us were in favour of continuing fierce attack on Goražde. We were at the peak of a moral victory but things began sinking because we started making nuisance of the whole thing. We attacked the hospital and many other things but we never moved from a spot."¹³⁵ English ET 0215-4171 – 0215-4296, p. 114.

136. 52nd Session, 6 August 1995. Karadžić:

"Milošević told me personally that Zimmerman [*US Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992*] had visited him asking him to crush us [*and to*] close the border over the Drina River. I will never crush my own people. I have remembered that and I counted on that and I could never doubt that the border on the Drina River would be closed. For, he /? Milošević/ said that he would never crush his own people, so I have relied on his word and we all have relied on that and that is what I told you. Only once, during the Assembly session of 4 August, I said that we would stay alone, on the occasion when we were deciding whether we would accept it [*the Contact Group Plan*] or not. I could not even dream until then that we would leave /sic/."¹³⁶ English ET 0215-4171 – 0215-4296, p. 76.

137. 53rd Session, 28 August 1995. Karadžić:

"We never wanted to work separately, we always wanted to work together. President Milošević [*went with us to*] Geneva, that wasn't a united delegation, but it was, we did sit all together, ... we can say with satisfaction that we have always been equal to him, in terms that we could tell him everything, very honestly, in very rough form, both the other day and always /as written/. I don't know if he resented that, I know he resents those that have to listen to him. We could tell him very honesty what we thought and what can be done and what cannot be done both with regard to our situation and to his situation. We have no desire to become a separate state. We would like it best if we could become united today and let Milošević negotiate tomorrow ... However, if we form a joint, not a single but a joint delegation where Milošević will, of course, formally or informally, be the head, and he was also the head each time in Geneva, it's clear that he was the head."¹³⁷ English 0215-4299 – 0215-4440-ET, pp. 67-69.

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138. 53rd Session, 28 August 1995. Karadžić:

"... gentlemen, one should know that we took over personnel that is dependent on Yugoslavia and that is linked to Yugoslavia by its salaries and pensions and weapons and ammunition supply, etc. Although we have paid for a large amount of that, we were also given a large amount."¹³⁸ English 0215-4299 – 0215-4440-ET, p. 74.

139. 53rd Session, 28 August 1995. Krajišnik: 0215-4397

[Krajišnik speaks of the Contact Group Plan and is glad it was not accepted.]

"We have no right to change that strategic goal that is consistent with my predecessors' discussions, which is to have a compact territory, even if it's smaller, we'll talk again, it must be compact. ... We had a meeting with President Milošević. That's a secret and let it remain here, but seeing as it's known we should say, I don't even know who said it, but that was our initiative, gentlemen, regarding the decision made by this Assembly to appear together, to unite all our resources to defend the Republic, to see what to do with the RSK, that we cannot appear like this and that the Serbian block must have a joint policy /as written/. We must always try to get the Serbs to unite, because we know they are building their strategy on that."¹³⁹ English 0215-4299 – 0215-4440-ET, p. 78.

140. 53rd Session, 28 August 1995. General Tolimir:

"I can only say that the active officers have ensured the materiel with which 35% of the population of Republika Srpska, over a period of four years, succeeded in holding, over 70% of the territory on which more than 65% of the enemy population lives. I am speaking here about the population and not just about the soldiers and the officers; the officers were Serbian officers who procured materiel from the former Yugoslavia and brought it over because we were the majority and that is why we succeeded."¹⁴⁰ English 0215-4299 – 0215-4440-ET, p. 84.

141. 54th Session, 15-16 October 1995. Vojo Kuprešanin:

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"We have had many commanders in Banja Luka. We've had a large /complement of/ the military police and civilian police, but the effects of their work have been minimal. I propose that Mr. Arkan [*pseudonym of Željko Ražnjatović*] should come here and be appointed commander of the town of Banja Luka. Please, don't take it against me, but what he did in Eastern Slavonia, those were practical results. What he did in Novi in a short time ... he saved Novi, Prijedor and so on. Those were exceptional results. Please, bear with me, he carried out actions that had results and let's accept that as the truth."¹⁴¹ English 0215-4446 – 0215-4613-ET, p. 46.

142. 54th Session, 15-16 October 1995. Nedić:

"At this moment, I think that we can expect to get help from Yugoslavia, which we've been asking for all this time, only in volunteers. I mean, in volunteer army and voluntary contributions of material equipment. We seem to be unable to understand that they are in a very difficult situation there. These volunteers led by Željko Ražnjatović, they are patriots. I've heard they were quite successful. I could sense in General Milanović's speech that this wasn't acceptable either, that not even this kind of help is acceptable. I was surprised by that. I think that these units ... I suppose they are subordinated to the command of the VRS and are not independent or loose cannons."¹⁴² English 0215-4446 – 0215-4613-ET, p. 50.

143. 54th Session, 15-16 October 1995. Djurić:

"As far as I know, Arkan is in the service of Belgrade, otherwise he wouldn't be alive. In which state with the rule of law would a paramilitary unit like that exist? He didn't come from Belgrade to help us. He was sent by someone from Belgrade. We asked for him and wouldn't you know it, they sent him to help us, but not carry out the policies because of which he came, definitely not. He wouldn't have been able to return to Belgrade ..."¹⁴³ English 0215-4446 – 0215-4613-ET, p. 66.

144. 54th Session, 15-16 October 1995. Karadžić:

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[Karadžić makes the first of two references to the written record of a meeting of the collective Presidency of Yugoslavia in 1991 that he and other Bosnian Serb leaders attended.]

“It is written that in 1991 in the Presidency of Yugoslavia we said: Gentlemen, they put us in a bobsled run. If we continue to use tactics like this, they’ll lead us to the cat’s mouth. Let’s jump out of the bobsled run, pronounce unification, secure the borders, pronounce a state of war. We’ll defend ourselves, we have the resources, we have the equipment, we have everything. Now I also know that the US was not so much against us at the time because they were not in debt with Islam nor were they being obstinate, they would not lose their reputation.”¹⁴⁴ English 0215-4446 – 0215-4613-ET, pp. 84-85.

145. 54th Session, 15-16 October 1995. Karadžić:

“I was always saying to the opposition in Serbia, don't weaken President Milošević. Why? Do not weaken him. A weak President Milošević /means/ a weak Serbia, a weak President of Serbia /means/ a weak Serbia; make him stronger, get over this struggle for power, make him stronger, praise every step he takes. We have experienced the same thing in our country, gentlemen.”¹⁴⁵ English 0215-4446 – 0215-4613-ET, p. 85.

146. 55th Session, 22 – 23 October 1995. Milovan Milanović:

[Milanović delivers his impressions of the meeting between the 22-member Bosnian Serb delegation, authorized and selected at the Assembly’s 54th Session, and top Yugoslav officials in Belgrade.]

“But let me tell you that I personally was surprised to see members of the delegation who met us, because they were top State officials of the FRY [*Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*] and both Republics [*Serbia and Montenegro*]. In other words, in attendance were the President of the FRY, Mr. Zoran Lilić, the President of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Slobodan Milošević, the President of the Republic of Montenegro, Mr. Momir Bulatović, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Milan Milutinović, and the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Jovica Stanišić.

“What I would like to point out is first that the President of the Republic of Serbia is well informed about problems and views of this Assembly on priorities

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and tasks to be adopted by the international community. I think that what I, my impression is that the President got it right and that he knows, he is informed about our positions and desires and about priorities of RS, which members of the Assembly raised and which we supported. I do not know how, but I guess that in all of their contacts our delegation informed the President of the Republic of Serbia, who is very well informed about our demands and priorities, that they should be discussed at the international conference on the former Yugoslavia and the situation in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina.

“The President raised the well-known views, which you probably know, that we insisted on the present state of affairs, that we unfortunately missed, that we eased the situation when the state of affairs was to our advantage. He criticised us for being recalcitrant, let me not use other words, and for not accepting all the proposals he had put forward, the proposals we are familiar with from the press, and everything else we had already heard.

“President Milošević was surprised that we could allow, that the VRS /Republika Srpska Army/ could allow, he saw it as a military weakness, lack of organisation of all those factors that led to this situation and this state of affairs, which at the time of negotiations is unfavourable to the negotiating process, to the overall negotiating process, to RS and its delegation, regardless of the fact that it will be together with the FRY.

“The President said several times that it was in his and our interest to defend during the negotiating process and he considers it his obligation and diplomatic skill to ensure that the part of territory that is under temporary occupation is given back to RS during the diplomatic, that is to say, peace process.

“It [*the meeting*] was constructive. I think it was mutually beneficial, but that we are facing a painstaking process that should be completed in the period ahead of us.”¹⁴⁶ English 0215-4620 – 0215-4748-ET, pp. 4-7.

147. 55th Session, 22-23 October 1995. Djurić:

"I have here ... what Chairman Krajišnik has said, that Milošević prevented us from launching an offensive and taking Bihać. He accuses us of not helping Abdić. We should have done it for Abdić. He knows all the schemes. ... The man knows everything about us although he has never seen some of us, in addition to

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that thing in Pale, the man is in the know and he simply shifts all the blame onto someone else."¹⁴⁷ English 0215-4620 – 0215-4748-ET, p. 9.

148. 55th Session, 22-23 October 1995. Rašula:

"Mr. [Jovica] Stanišić raised certain things that we suspected and they confirmed our information. We were in constant dilemma as to who had stopped the taking of Bihać. General Ratko Mladić spoilt things in the Bihać pocket. Fikret Abdić remained loyal to the Serbs to end. We provided mind-boggling amount of ammunition and weapons, but not all is lost. I cannot tell you to what extent your Government was involved in private businesses."¹⁴⁸ English 0215-4620 – 0215-4748-ET, p. 17.

149. 55th Session, 22-23 October 1995. Karadžić:

"We are not inferior to President Milošević. We have never been. The first time I visited him, I realised that we are very strong. It was the end of September 1990. I took with me, I hope they will not hold it against me and that they will excuse me, I took, since he invited me, I asked Koljević and Kozić to come along. I took them with me because I did not want to go alone, and I immediately won an equal position. ... We were by no means inferior at that meeting, but President Milošević spoke with you differently than he does with us, because he realised that attack was the best form of defence. He realised that he would be attacked, so he attacked us. He explicitly, and we said during a conversation afterwards, all those coming to you, half of them, most of them are our people, and they come to us saying, you say, change the leadership and it will be better then, do not elect these recalcitrant lunatics again, you said all this, Mr President, you want to destabilise us, you want to topple us, and I am telling you, you cannot topple us, if you topple us, you will topple the State and the people, no one can topple us before elections nor can anyone do it at elections. We openly told him all this."¹⁴⁹ English 0215-4620 – 0215-4748-ET, p. 37.

150. 55th Session, 22-23 October 1995. Karadžić:

[As he had in the 54th Session, Karadžić refers to participating in a meeting of the Yugoslav Collective Presidency in 1991.]

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"... in 1991, we told the President of Yugoslavia [sic: In 1991, we said in the Presidency of Yugoslavia – rjd], it was all recorded and stayed there, [that] now we have a chance to come out on our borders and form a State. They will criticise us, they will attack us and then they will recognise us. There was no masculine strength or a statesman's vision to do it at the time, when we had greater resources and more territory and longer borders. America was not so dead set against us, everyone would have closed their ears if we had broken Slovenia and Croatia, broken them within a space of 15 days and then allowed them to leave Yugoslavia through Parliament, but we made such a fuss and now we are sinking deeper and deeper into a quagmire, and that is the reason why we fell out with the leadership of Serbia. There were no ideological differences, we are not afraid of elections.¹⁵⁰ English 0215-4620 – 0215-4748-ET, pp. 37-38.

151. 58th Session, 1-2 April 1996. Karadžić:

"We all know, we are striving for it and I hope that tonight we will be able to pass the Law on the Language. We want to become Serbia, to become one nation, but until we do become Serbia, gentlemen, I am against sycophany. We met with President Milošević the other day, we can talk to him decently, with dignity, harshly when necessary, but also gently and with tolerance, he allows it and we must behave like that. President Milošević does not need to know what our interests are, he may think something is in our interest, but we know that that is not true.

"We had to contribute to the negotiations, but in the future we will finally confuse even President Milošević if we act as meek lambs, he'll think that is a good thing, that we are on a straight path to ruin. If President Milošević realised that he had full authority over us, could they tell us to go back to the Federation or we would be punished and our opposition strengthened and so on? Last time we told him that it was very important, we told the President and the Minister, that is was very important for them to make it known that you cannot make us do anything, that we were a difficult and savage people, just out of war, distrustful and so on. Don't boast about being able to convince us of everything, the demands will just grow. In other words, in dealing with Serbia, act like a child with its mother, a child should not be submissive in its relationship with its mother, with no dignity and no personality, with no interests of its own."¹⁵¹ English 0215-5078 – 0215-5264-EDT, p. 197.

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152. 4th Extraordinary Session, 18 May 1996. Aleksa Buha [Foreign Minister of RS]:

“On 16 May 1996 we met with Milošević on his invitation, Krajišnik, Koljević and I, and as we were leaving, we heard through media that Karadžić had dismissed Kasagić [from his post as Prime Minister of the RS]. We got to Belgrade around 4:30 p.m. You know that Yugoslavia is the guarantor of the Dayton Agreement. ... Milošević said there were problems with implementation of the agreement, with freedom of movement, upcoming elections, and finally we spoke of excesses at the Socialist Party’s founding assembly in BiH. This first meeting ended quickly. ... Milošević suggested two-phase approach: ... First, that President Karadžić withdraw somewhat into background, that we appoint someone to exercise the role of president.¹⁵²

153. 62nd Session, 17 August 1996. Academician Stevan Akramata (Belgrade), President of the Council on the Regional Plan of the RS:

“Maintaining and developing existing links to the SR Yugoslavia and establishing new such links was and still is one of the bases upon which the Plan was envisaged. It need not be emphasised that this has to do not only with physical links, such as traffic, telecommunications, energy etc., but also with links in all areas of the economy and culture. The stronger these links are, the stronger the RS and Yugoslavia and the broader and more solid the foundations upon which we hope a unified Serbian state, with the Drina river as its backbone not a border, will be built one day.”¹⁵³ English 0215-5411 -0215-5500, p. 36.

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Introduction

“Regionalization” was the name the SDS employed for its campaign to segment territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina that the party claimed belonged to a single nation -- the Serbs -- under the party’s political leadership. Serbs announced formation of the Community of Municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina in April 1991 and subsequently created other regional bodies, well before the Bosnian Serb Assembly was organized in October 1991. Delegates provided considerable information about the development of regionalization in 1991 and its evolution as war began in spring 1992, as well as efforts to recentralize the Republika Srpska once the purposes of regionalization has been fulfilled.

154. 2nd Session, 21 November 1991. Krajišnik:

“We should destroy the bureaucratic approach of the centralised economic power of the BH authorities. ... It is our goal to decentralize all republican funds, to keep most of the income of citizens and legal entities in their municipalities, regions, and autonomous districts, so that only limited contributions are paid to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have a duty to determine the function of regions and autonomous districts with a view to preserving the unity of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is why why should not allow regions to become independent entities, separate from the rest of the Serbian people.”¹⁵⁴
English 0093-0300

155. 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. Nenad Veselinović:

“I think that the order of moves should be planned. Plainly speaking, to break up the existing municipalities where the Serbs are not a majority. For there are situations of some adjacent local communities, of settlements belonging to two municipalities where Serbs are not a majority. This means that from two or three neighboring municipalities we have space to form a large, nice Serb municipality.”¹⁵⁵ English SA02-4931 – SA02-5059-ET, p. 15. Also 0093-3326

156. 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. Krajišnik:

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“In municipal assemblies where Serb representatives are in a minority, such as Novi Grad, Olovo, etc. where decisions against the Serbian people are imposed on them by the majority, they should form municipal assemblies just like we formed the Assembly of the Serbian People here. This is what it is all about. Everything else, regionalization, is quite a different matter. ... Only municipalities where Serbian delegates are a minority should form such assemblies as this Republican Assembly of ours is, so as to exercise certain rights. Veselinović spoke about regionalisation, the rounding off of territories, like Mr. Vještica and others are doing.”¹⁵⁶ English SA02-4931 – SA02-5059-ET, pp. 15-16. Also 0093-3327

157. 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. Krajišnik:

“In municipalities such as Novi Grad, Hadžići, Stari Grad, etc., we have no rights whatsoever. It is there that assemblies of the Serbian people should be formed. For, by working in the joint assembly our representatives are only a front while others are working and implementing decisions about which they ask none of the Serb representatives. That is the gist of the matter. I do not mind if we do not adopt this. But, the initiative has come from numerous municipalities, which claim that the representatives cannot achieve anything, that everything is being done by outvoting and that the will of others imposed on them that way. We are imposing our will on them too, I must admit, but representatives of the Serb people are in question here.”¹⁵⁷ English SA02-4931 – SA02-5059-ET, p. 17. Also 0093-3328

158. 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. Vojo Kuprešanin:

“Gentlemen, I want to say that we have formed regions which do not have final borders, i.e, just contours, and in order to achieve that I absolutely agree that we should proceed with separating Serb territories, i.e., Serb municipalities in places where that is possible, specifically on the peripheral areas of our region.”¹⁵⁸ English SA02-4931 – SA02-5059-ET, p. 27. Also 0093-3338

159. 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. Vojo Kuprešanin:

“I am in favour of continuing the organizing of Serb municipalities, Serb territories, for this to be done faster and more efficiently, and for a deadline to be

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set for accomplishing this.”¹⁵⁹ English SA02-4931 – SA02-5059-ET, p. 27. Also 0093-3338 – 0093-3339

160. 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. Milorad Skoko:

“Despite the fact that this Assembly has broader powers than the municipal assemblies, i.e. that it can adopt decisions binding on the Serbian people in municipalities in which it forms a majority, I nevertheless think that we should go a step further if we do not want the Assembly to only make proclamations. By a step further I mean the forming of ministries, bodies of power, the provision of direct sources of revenue to finance these organs, etc. As for the municipalities, I fail to see what good will come out of creating Serbian municipal assemblies within municipalities where Serbs are outvoted unless important organs which will implement these decisions are formed.”¹⁶⁰ English SA02-4931 – SA02-5059-ET, p. 29. Also 0093-3339

161. 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. Milorad Skoko:

“We can carry out regionalisation so as not only to separate the Serbian regions but also to embrace the portion of the capital that we can in those regions which are not included. That is one of the key problems on which we really to have to work very hard.”¹⁶¹ English SA02-4931 – SA02-5059-ET, p. 40. Also 0093-3350

162. 4th Session, 21 December 1991. Duško Pejović:

“We have to warn them that in all municipalities where we control the institutions of power, we are going to use federal laws and those laws of the Republic which are not in contravention of them. Also we will make impossible the implementation of any law that has been passed without our consent. So, on the one hand we are going to prevent the implementation of these laws, and on the other we are going to do use all legally available means to ensure the implementation of federal laws and the Federal Constitution.”¹⁶² English 0093-9681

163. 7th Session, 15 February 1992. Dragan Kalinić:

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“Secondly, we shall have a Constitution, but it is a question whether our state will function, and I think, and I proposed this in a narrower circle of ours, that our ministerial council should go round all the municipalities in these seven days and determine the real state of affairs. For us to see if we have the structure for our authority to start functioning. Because we cannot be sovereign if we cannot exert the authority that is our due on our own territory. This implies many things: from the premises that are necessary, to finances, money, staff and so on.

“I would suggest that before we adopt the Constitution we should listen at one of our closed meetings to the report of our ministerial council, to see whether we are in the state, by 23 February this year, to start functioning as the Serbian state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is very important for us to assess this together. For us not to move too fast. To see what the real situation in the field is, and what we have at our disposal.”¹⁶³ English 0305-5800, p. 34.

164. 7th Session, 15 February 1992. Karadžić:

“Please let it be explained that the regions exist. In the division of power they will be big gainers. We here are not interested in the Serbian government concentrating some power or other. That has to be ensured there as well. So the deputies from the Krajina should work quite a lot with our people in the Party. Because the deputies exercise the highest authority. They have to take part in the work of the clubs and so on.

“Secondly, if it is necessary, and it seems to me it is, for our coordinator of the ministerial council, Mr Čizmović, to hold a consultative meeting with the presidents of the municipalities and other participations, we shall hold this. A questionnaire should be made, a list of questions to check out what the situation of individual segments of the infrastructure is in the field. Then the coordinator of the ministerial council, Mr Čizmović, will spend this coming week at the points, going round the places of our regions, Trebinje, Bugojno, Doboje, Banja Luka and Tuzla, in order, in this questionnaire of some ten or fifteen questions, to determine the way that elements of government function. What SUP /Secretariat for the Interior/ is like, whether it is loyal, what SDK [*Funds transfer agency*] is like, what the other elements of government are like.”¹⁶⁴ English 0305-5801 – 0305-5802, p. 36.

165. 8th Session, 25 February 1992. Karadžić:

“Of course, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will have its regions with full freedom to act according to the interests of the Serbian people.

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However, I promise you, Bosnian Krajina must not become an issue. If it becomes an issue we will lose the Knin Krajina. Alija is praying to God that we secede, and we screw up. They will send in UN forces, create 'Zone A' and 'Zone B' and we are certain to lose one of them. And the other will be part of an independent BH, with all sorts of conditions imposed. With the UN in place, with Blacks and dark-skinned kids being born, with this and that. We cannot allow that five people with personal ambitions to destroy our chances. We are very close to achieving our strategic objectives."¹⁶⁵ English 0084-0474

166. 10th Session, 11 March 1992. Jovan Čizmović:

"We are compelled to react as we are reacting, which means that we must complete the job of organizing the rule of the Serbian people in all the territories in which we are the majority, either in absolute or relative terms. This means the organizing of government organs in the territory of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."¹⁶⁶ English 0083-7000

167. 11th Session, 18 March 1992. Rabija Šubić [Representative of the Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina]:

"I am of the opinion that many of the things agreed on by this Assembly, as it was mandated to do by the Serbian people, have not been implemented on the ground in the Serbian municipalities.

"Somebody has just said that the executive branch is not functioning. Wherever we have established a Serbian municipality, we must also establish organs which would guarantee peace, security and safety to the Serbs in the area. Because what should I say, after all, you all know me, you know that I am on the side of truth and justice, in other words on the side of the Serbian people, so what should I say, who should I contact in the BH Ministry of Interior when there are threats of slaughter, rape, and so on. So, in a nutshell, let us establish Serbian organs in Serbian municipalities and let them do their job."¹⁶⁷ English 0190-4695

168. 11th Session, 18 March 1992. Momir Tošić:

"If we are scheduling an Assembly /session for Friday or Saturday, I propose that in the following two days, each autonomous district sets up a government and

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that the governments then propose who could be the man. Because for the last four or five months we have been watching the developments in MUP and have seen that they will blow up in our face. I want to know who the Serbian Defence Minister is. Because we at Romanija are implementing the de facto situation, we entertain no doubts. And those who talk here all the time have not done anything.”¹⁶⁸ English 0190-4697 – 0190-4698

169. 11th Session, 18 March 1992. Rajko Dukić:

“Unless we establish actual authority on the ground by 6 April, the importance of these negotiations, as well as the related results and agreements, shall be reduced to a minimum.”¹⁶⁹ English 0190-4701

170. 11th Session, 18 March 1992. Miroslav Vještica:

“... we must urgently establish a Serbian MUP in the Republic of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, we must establish national defence, our Serbian army, which is already there on the ground, we just need to transform it into what we need to have.

“In addition to this, we must urgently establish our own money transfers system. Following all this, we must take possession of all our Serbian territories, physically, with our own territorial defence, our Serbian police. This is something we have to do if we really want to achieve what we had agreed was the least we can accept.”¹⁷⁰ English 0190-4704

171. 11th Session, 18 March 1992. Miroslav Vještica:

“Mr. President, I think that you have to give us an order, that after the next /session of the/ Assembly you should order this, that we arrange it for the areas where it has not been done and to implement this: that the Serbs should occupy their territories so that no other force could enter them. Thank you. (applause).”¹⁷¹ English 0190-4705

172. 12th Session, 24 March 1992. Karadžić:

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“Newly established municipalities must establish their organs as soon as possible, have their stamps made and start to work. The police, that is, our organs must be positioned at the border. If it is this street, then /let it be/ this street. No one else is allowed to cross the street without the control and approval of our organs. Freedom of movement would, of course, be granted, but they must not enter the area with armed forces or anything else that would threaten our territory, our municipality. This also includes vans with money or anything else.”¹⁷²
English 0300-2043

173. 12th Session, 24 March 1992. Karadžić:

“We have a legal basis in the Law on Internal Affairs and we also have the insignia and at a desired moment, and this will be very soon, we can form whatever we want. There are reasons why this could happen in two or three days. Such are the forecasts but I cannot tell you the reasons now. At that moment, all the Serbian municipalities, both the old ones and the newly established ones, would literally assume control of the entire territory of the municipality concerned. The Zvornik municipality takes control over everything that constitutes the Serbian Municipality of Zvornik. Then, at a given moment, in the next three or four days, there will be a single method used and you will be able to apply it in the municipalities you represent, including both things that must be done as well as how to do them. How to separate the police force, take the resources that belong to the Serbian people and take command. The police must be under the control of the civilian authority, it must obey it, there is no discussion about that – that’s the way it must be. I think we shall hear it today in the form of instructions at the Delegate Club.

“The decision must, therefore, be adopted but its effect must be delayed. It should not be at this moment for numerous reasons.”¹⁷³ English 0300-2049

174. 12th Session, 24 March 1992. Presiding [Krajišnik]:

“Presidents of all SAOs must inform today on everything regarding the establishment of Serbian municipalities and point out why some of them were established in areas where we have no delegates, and others in areas with one or two deputies. This job must be completed and done properly, in accordance with our constitution. The Chairperson explained that all the presidents of autonomous district had received instructions and should have prepared and organized this. Those who have not done it should do so by Friday. ...

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“THE ASSEMBLY UNANIMOUSLY VERIFIES DECISIONS BY MUNICIPALITY ASSEMBLIES ON THE PROCLAMATION OF NEWLY-ESTABLISHED SERBIAN MUNICIPALITIES. MUNICIPALITIES WHICH HAVE NOT DONE SO SHALL SUBMIT BY FRIDAY THEIR DECISIONS VERIFIED BY THE COMPETENT ORGANS.”¹⁷⁴ English 0300-2050

175. 13th Session, 24 March 1992. Miroslav Vještica:

“I have not written any conclusion. However, it appears from the debate which we have had here that the Assembly should adopt a CONCLUSION instructing the prime minister of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ministers to prepare, by Friday, an operational plan for assuming power, that is, for establishing power in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular in the field of internal affairs, national defence and payment transactions, so that afterwards we may together decide in the Assembly as of which date we are to establish full power and control of the Serbian territory in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This should be simultaneously effected in all municipalities where we already have a Serbian authority, and in those municipalities where we have only recently established Serbian municipalities.”¹⁷⁵ English SA02-5828 – SA02-5849, p. 9.

176. 13th Session, 24 March 1992. Transcript:

“The Chairman suggested the adoption of the CONCLUSION THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD CREATE A PLAN WHICH SHOULD BE TIMED CAREFULLY FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS, AND THAT AS MANY PROPOSALS AS POSSIBLE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY FRIDAY, WHEN THE PLAN WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE ASSEMBLY. THE REST CAN BE DONE AT A LATER STAGE.

“THE ASSEMBLY UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED THE PROPOSAL OF THE CONCLUSION AS SUBMITTED, AND THIS WAS ESTABLISHED AND STATED FOR THE RECORD BY THE CHAIRMAN.”¹⁷⁶ English SA02-5828 – SA02-5849, p. 9.

177. 14th Session, 27 March 1992. Karadžić:

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"When you return to your municipalities, especially the newly-formed municipalities, I ask you to do what you are required and entitled to do under the law. The moment you arrive in your municipalities, you must urgently establish crisis staffs. You must try to organize the people so that they can defend themselves. Find a number of reserve officers for those staffs and have them register everyone who owns weapons as well as units. They should organize territorial defence and if the JNA is there, they must be placed under its command. If they are not, let them be placed under the command of reserve officers."¹⁷⁷
English 0092-6784

178. 14th Session, 27 March 1992. Karadžić:

"A war in BiH will not solve anything. If it breaks out, you will get the plans. But I urge you to immediately organize the people within Territorial Defense units headed by reserve officers, form squads, platoons and crisis staffs and engage retired officers. This must be done throughout our areas.

"The presidents of municipalities and executive boards will hold the highest ranks in the crisis staffs and our authorities in the area in addition to reserve officers. We must study the situation regarding the saving of lives, property, and territory. We have no other plans. It is important to ensure a stationery element which will defend the territory. A half or a third of the men can constitute operative troops or be dispatched to reinforce units to defend territories. We are convinced that they can achieve nothing through war and that they can do nothing to us. The number of male Serb adults is equivalent to their total number.

"According to the information at our disposal, the Croats do not really aspire to Serbian territories. However, the situation in Bosanski Brod is critical and we will have the same situation in Kupres, in the Neretva River Valley and in Derventa. I urge you to undertake, with the full authorization of the Assembly, the task of introducing discipline and organizing crisis staffs, headed by reserve and retired officers in order to organize the people for defensive purposes. Exclusively for defensive purposes. We should strive to maintain peace. Peace is in our interest and benefits us politically."¹⁷⁸ English 0092-6785

179. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Karadžić:

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"Fearing not to become empowered or dominated by the Izetbegović government, we prepared some political, not so much state mechanisms to resist the centre's abuses, meaning that we inherited such mechanisms, now that we have our own state. They return to us now as a negative echo. We know immediately that it is about the Serb tendency toward autonomy, creating of small principalities and small princes, behind which there is only private interest, never the people's interests."¹⁷⁹ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 17.

180. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Branko Djerić:

"I would also add the unclear jurisdictions and functions of crisis committees, which played an important role in some municipalities, but caused division in others, having become too numerous, slow and disorganised."¹⁸⁰ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 24.

181. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Milanović:

"In one period we worked according to the Government's Instructions and formed crisis staffs, which were a move forward at one moment, I think, and later a disturbance for themselves. I think we should probably go beyond them and return to regular Assembly life, which means affirm the regular assemblies and disregard the crisis staffs. We understood commissioners to represent distrust towards the elected representatives of the people, at least that is how it turned out, and in certain solutions they were a para-authority. I did not see the need for such a solution to be proposed for the Krajina. We feel that that Government solution should be applied where the authorities do not function, where the Government has to lean on commissioners. But if the regional and district assemblies function, there is no need for individuals to go there"¹⁸¹ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 24.

182. 20th Session, 14-15 September 1992. Jovo Mijatović:

"At a time when we had to destroy a unitary Bosnia, the SAO regions and districts were politically and territorially the best solution because with them we could round off our territories locally. However, in conditions of war, local rounding off leads to further rounding off at even lower levels, in the municipalities. At one point, and I said this in Zvornik municipality several times,

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we were at a point where we had a municipal army, municipal police and municipal administration – a state within a state. I hear that this is also the case at the regional level in eastern Herzegovina, there are instances of regional organisation at all levels.”¹⁸² English 0422-6193 – 0422-6338 ET, p. 70.

183. 20th Session, 14-15 September 1992. Vojo Kuprešanić:

“Last year we built up the region and made it strong with a clear purpose and goal. The task of the Region of Krajina was to destroy Alija's state. I think that other regions followed suit and we were successful in that respect. If we continue to affirm the region we will undermine the Serbian state. We mustn't do that. We will now find possibilities and ways to affirm this state and make it efficient. We are becoming aware of what decentralisation can do to our state in which we have invested considerable lives, casualties and efforts. I think we should opt for maximum centralisation not only because of the war but also because we are a newly-formed state. We can see that only very centralised states in the world are in fact successful, effective and achieve the best results.”¹⁸³ English 0422-6193 – 0422-6338 ET, p. 71.

184. 22nd Session, 23-24 November 1992. Vojislav Maksimović:

"Somewhere at the end of May or the beginning of June, following a decision by our War Presidency, war boards of commissioners were formed for individual sectors and mostly delegates were appointed /as commissioners/. ... The commissioners are not countering the local authorities: they are the authorities. Not only do they have to support them, but also activate them where they haven't been established, particularly in municipalities in which we didn't have a Serbian government before, but established it later. Therefore, the commissioners promote the work of the executive organs and the municipal assembly of a municipality and in places in which there is no municipality they establish it....

“The decision is not binding, it doesn't state that in every municipality of Republika Srpska a board of commissioners must be formed, but only in those where the need for it is felt. A commissioner is also obliged to coordinate a military command and the civilian government, to the extent to which this is possible, of course, and only where there is no mutual trust, of course. ... A commissioner also coordinates and establishes contacts with religious authorities where they exist, particularly when it involves eliminating discord between the

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behaviour of the civilian authorities towards the church, as is the case in some parts of Herzegovina.”¹⁸⁴ English 0340-2803 – 0340-3038-ET, p. 104-105.

185. 25th Session, 19-20 January 1993. Karadžić:

“The maps follow the principle of the communist division into municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not the principle of the ethnic distribution of peoples in inhabited places, which would be the only proper way. Were we to accept such a way to proceed, we would be accepting the sanctioning and cementing of all the injustices done the Serbian people by the former regime over the 45 years of its dictatorial rule. During that period, the Serbian regions were totally neglected in terms of development. First, the Turkish empire drove us out from our valleys and our fertile plains high up into the mountains, clearing the area for Serbs-turned-Turks who today call themselves Muslims; then the communist regime speedily developed solely Muslim and some Croat areas, and that it did, according to the socialist method of redistribution, using the joint money of all the three peoples.”¹⁸⁵ English 0214-9937 - 0215-0019-ET, pp. 6-7.

186. 36th Session, 30-31 December 1993. Miroslav Vještica:

"I think that we did an excellent job doing the work assigned us, even though we could criticise ourselves in relation to those instructions, we were at the same time members of municipal committees and of the SDS, and you know all the instructions that we had and there we could criticise our selves some. Some of us did not do work in the field following the instructions. In places the level of suffering of our people could have been avoided; had we from the SDS been more active in the field, genocide could have been avoided in some places.”¹⁸⁶ English 0215-1176 – 0215-1426-ET, p. 20.

187. 36th Session, 30-31 December 1993. Miljanović:

[In the midst of a long debate about dismissing Milorad Skoko from his post as head of Elektroprivreda RS, Miljanović rises to defend him.]

"I would like to remind you that he immediately joined the Serbian Liberation Movement in BH, that he actively participated in the work of the Economic Council of the SDS, participated in the work of the very important

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seminars we organised before the war. Let me remind you that his study on the justification of the existence of autonomous regions, a well-documented economic study, was published in several scores of copies."¹⁸⁷ English 0215-1176 – 0215-1426-ET

188. 38th Session, 17 January 1994. Karadžić:

“Remember how all the SAOs /Serbian Autonomous Regions/ and all those measures before the war always took place following Alija’s mistakes; there were 9-10 actions that we carried out, we brainstormed them all together, however, we did not pull all nine moves straight away, but we carried them out after Alija made a mistake, it is then that we would make a move and the Muslims would curse his mother afterwards and not ours.”¹⁸⁸ English ET 0215-2178 – 0215-2234, p. 77.

189. 50th Session, 15-16 April 1995. Karadžić:

"At the moment the war began, in the municipalities where we were in the majority, we had municipal power, held it firmly, controlled everything. In the municipalities where we were in a minority, we set up secret government, municipal boards, municipal assemblies, presidents of executive boards. You will remember, the A or B variant. In the B Variant, where we were in minority -- 20%, 15% -- we had set up a government and a brigade, a unit, no matter what size, but there was a detachment with a commander. The war began, and the JNA helped as much as it could here and there. It had helped before.”¹⁸⁹
English ERN ET 0084-5781 – 0084-6113, p. 145 (second sequence of numbers after first 176)

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Introduction

Police in socialist Yugoslavia were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP – Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova), and the Bosnian Serbs followed that precedent. Additionally, other state security services were active in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as is apparent from excerpts in this section. The excerpts allow the reader to follow police developments, from complaints in the first session about the MUP of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the formation of a separate Bosnian Serb MUP, and finally to the first steps in reforming the wartime police organizations.

190. 1st (Constituting) Session, 24 October 1991. Presiding [Krajišnik]:

“The MUP of the Republic is in the hands of the SDA-HDZ coalition, and there are even indications that the purpose of the huge increase in the number of the reserve police force, and the MUP’s frantic efforts to equip and arm, is to create a separate army in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The instruction by the Minister of Defence regarding the lists of conscripts, his orders that the conscripts and reserve forces should not respond to the draft represent blatant examples of violation of both federal and republican law and of introducing confusion into Bosnia and Herzegovina.”¹⁹⁰ English SA01-2055-SA01-2164-ET, p. 36.

191. 7th Session, 15 February 1992. Vojo Kuprešanin:

“Here in the Draft Constitution I have not found any Serbian police or any kind of police. If this is the Serbian Republic, I would like to know what kind of police there can be but Serbian police. A Serbian police /force/ has to have its emblems, its signs, to be /connected with?/ Serbian history, the Serbian tradition. We had all this, and come on, let us have it out at this Assembly today, are we Serbs, are we going to fight for the Serbian people or for some kind of unarticulated abstract goals? And all the aims, I link with Yugoslavia, with Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is just sand in the eyes of the Serbian people.

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“We have another 7 or 15 days, and we have to be really either patriots or, in my opinion, national traitors.”¹⁹¹ English 0305-5793, p. 27

192. 11th Session, 18 March 1992. Miroslav Vještica:

“Bosanska Krupa is a textbook example. It has been six months now since the current MUP, inspections or other services have not been to our Serbian territories around Mt. Grmec, into this area of Serbian municipalities. They cannot. We do not let them. They do not dare to. We have de facto occupied our own territories. But here we must reach an agreement that all Serbs in all municipalities, both the newly formed and the existing ones, take over the power, because we have not taken over.”¹⁹² English 0190-4705

193. 12th Session, 24 March 1992. Karadžić:

“I ask you now that following some instructions for national defence, information systems, etc. that will be given here, the real and sovereign authority of the Serbian Assembly and Serbian people be established on the ground as soon as possible. As soon as we are informed that we have our own separate MUP, which will probably follow the coming session, all the newly-established municipalities should immediately set up police stations and all policemen should be withdrawn. Because this is, in fact, what life has taught us. Our policemen were forced out of the municipalities of Stari Grad, Goražde and I think from Višegrad as well, etc. Policemen simply do not work together any more and this fact must simply be accepted, even though it was forced upon us, and tolerated so that supervision can be exercised.”¹⁹³ English 0300-2042

194. 12th Session, 24 March 1992. Karadžić:

“What is important to us at this moment is the Minister of the Interior. Of course, there will be a minister of defence, too. A regular and reserve police force of the size we would want is also important because no one is limiting us in any international agreement at this point.”¹⁹⁴ English 0300-2048

195. 13th Session, 24 March 1992. Mićo Stanišić:

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“The BH MUP has only been an instrument that was abused by the SDA /Party of Democratic Action/, and in part by the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/, at the time of their coalition, in order to achieve their political goals. They abused all the functions of the MUP in the country: public security, state security and personnel administration.

“I said this then, and I will repeat it today: the political manipulation of the BH MUP in the public security branch has been manifested in the creation of an army in the reserve force structure, an army belonging to only one people. Once it was created, the army was supplied with weapons. This is a fact which we are prepared to document any day. I can clearly see it in the documents, the distribution of weapons and the BH MUP storage facilities where the weapons would end up, whereas in this last period not one of these rifles reached the areas where Serbs lived. ... “The term itself, a unified MUP, was also part of the manipulation.”¹⁹⁵ English SA02-5828 – SA02-5849, p. 6.

196. 13th Session, 24 March 1992. Mićo Stanišić:

“I hope that in the future, the Serbian MUP will become a professional organisation, an organ of state administration which will actually protect property, life, limb and other values which must be protected.”¹⁹⁶ English SA02-5828 – SA02-5849, p. 7.

197. 32nd Session, 19-20 May 1993. Jovo Mijatović:

“And now let me mention what the President said, I waited for this moment to say ‘in Belgrade.’ When he mentioned MUP /Ministry of Interior/, he said there is a parallel MUP, and even that there is some kind of parallel authority. Listen. It is often that this is being implied it is known what circles these are. He should have told us clearly what these circles are that are a parallel authority and a parallel MUP /Ministry of Interior/. This parliament has to know that. Until we are told so, there is no such thing as a parallel MUP /Ministry of Interior/ or parallel authority for us. There is only one Government and we are all looking at President Lukić. If there is such a thing he has got to say that. And what is obvious is that a member of the Government located in Belgrade cannot feel for these people, if he is up there in Belgrade. He took his wife and kids to Belgrade found an apartment and now he is pursuing politics in the name of the Serbian people in Republika Srpska, from Belgrade. It cannot be.”¹⁹⁷ English ET 0215-0236 – 0215-0331, p. 60.

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198. 32nd Session, 19-20 May 1993. Jovo Mijatović:

"We heard the report of Zvornik Public Security Station Chief at a meeting the other day, which said that he controlled only one of four sectors located in the same building and associated with security. National security, traffic police, border police and public security station are all located in the same building. Out of these four, he controls only the sector called public security station. Of course, he has got no control over the other three. And there is also a special brigade in Zvornik, the fifth sector located in Zvornik, and the municipality has got the power over it, via the Chief, who factually doesn't have the control but he has got contacts, information and so on. Because he has got no power over that SJB /Public Security Station/ Chief.

"It has been a long time now since this story has been going around in Zvornik, that the border police became the last check-point for black-marketing goods from the Sarajevo and Romanija region. And everything is being covered up with documents via this border police. I don't even want to talk about the things that are happening in the customs. All of these things should be observed and investigated.

"Great complaints are being assigned to the National Security Service. There are only communists and people of the old regime left in the National Security Service, who used to collect information about us, the people who gave a lead to SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/. These people are still collecting data about us. And, as the ruling party, we have no control over that, or at least I don't know about it, the members of the Executive Board don't know about it, and the people I talked to don't know about it. The most complaints go to how this service is operating, what it is doing, where it is operating, to whom it submits its reports."¹⁹⁸ English ET 0215-0236 – 0215-0331, pp. 61-62.

199. 32nd Session, 19-20 May 1993. Ratko Adžić [Minister of Internal Affairs]:

"Today, there are lots of private intelligence services, also in this phase of the war. Last year. You are familiar with this. Certain services and individuals have been present that work outside the official MUP channels for the needs of the MUP of Serbia. One such intelligence service was TAJFUN, and it, truth be told, worked from a number of sides."¹⁹⁹ English ET 0215-0236 – 0215-0331, p. 121.

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200. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Kijac:

"In accordance with its duties SNB [*Služba nacionalne bezbjednosti-National Security Service*] is on a daily basis exchanging security related information with first of all the SB /Security Service/ of RS Army, then with Republic Serbia, Montenegro and SRK / Republic of Serbian Krajina/. The concept of establishment of SNB is dated from the period when part of its personnel had noticed the intentions of the Muslim – Croatian coalition. Understanding the politics of the SDS /Serb Democratic Party/, they were taking part in certain activities on collecting and providing the information that was of importance for the Serbian population and its leadership. This staff has helped to paralyse functions of the former MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, especially of former National Security Service, which was completely supporting the politics lead by the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Community/ and the SDA /Party of Democratic Action/. The staff got involved in military operations immediately after they began and all the employees that are now members of the National Security Service, "old personnel", have joined the Ministry of the Interior of SR /abbreviation unknown/. They were the essential part of today's SNB.

"We forwarded 550 pieces of written information from the military domain to the Intelligence Security Organ of the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska Army. In addition to aforementioned, on a daily basis, intelligence has been exchanged with the State Security Service of Serbia. Thus, 295 pieces of written information have been forwarded in this period."²⁰⁰ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, pp. 215 and 218

201. 36th Session, 30-31 December 1993. Momčilo Mandić:

"Vito [*Žepinić*] and Delimustafić, it is true gentlemen that they want to put me in prison. And do you know why. Because together with Stanišić I pulled out 560 Hecklers from the MUP to Romanija and distributed them to Sokolac, Rogatica, Han Pijesak and Pale. Because, when Zoran Cvijetović, the head of the SJB /Public Security Station/ in Sokolac, 3 months before the war expelled all the Muslims from the Station and was suspended by Vito and Alija and prohibited him /?to pay out/ salaries and pensions from the special treasury, gave all the money to maintain that treasury for fuel and salaries."²⁰¹ English 0215-1176 – 0215-1426-ET, pp. 170-171.

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202. 45th Session, 1 September 1994. Trifko Radić:

“The cooperation between the MUP and state organs is not good. When municipal organs adopt a decision to shut down cafes, the MUP avoids doing it, so I suggest... when Minister Stanišić was appointed Minister, he replaced all police station heads and commanders without SDS approval and we no longer have any influence there, he appointed completely different people there, including some we would not want in those positions. As for the MUP, I understand they also have a hard time on the line, with the fighting and all.”²⁰² English: 0215-3138 – 0215-3236 ET, pp. 70-71.

203. 3rd Extraordinary Session, 23-24 May 1995. Presiding [Krajišnik]:

“Third – it’s the corruption in the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, customs authorities and these organs, I can see what’s going on from my personal experience, without trying to act as a policeman, it has become so widespread, it’s really /?too/ much. We cannot make allowances for the situation in the MUP on account of these special units and the fact that these young men are good at waging war, I have to hand it to them, but they have nothing to do with these other affairs.”²⁰³ English 0410-1799-ET

204. 3rd Extraordinary Session, 23-24 May 1995. Karadžić:

“Regarding the border, something happened after that and this is now in the hands of our DB /State Security/ and their DB and there is no more smuggling or smugglers. What is passing through is by the book and under the control of the DB, which we fully trust, and their DB is the same. Therefore, it is a case of two states exchanging specific convoys between each other. Following that meeting, there was indeed a marked relief, which perhaps private entrepreneurs do not know about because it concerns our army more than it does them. Those of you from the GŠ /Main Staff/ know that things are under control, and we are under the impression that in the future, Serbia could do anything to violate that border, that is to say that it would find a way to help us bring through whatever we procure there. This was a significant advantage of that meeting; everything else was just more of the same.”²⁰⁴ English 0410-1815 -0410-1817-ET

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205. 51st Session, 14-15 June 1995. Tomo Kovač and General Gvero:

Kovač: “You omitted to mention that these men serve in the special units of the MUP. Therefore, there is no need for the creation of some kind of administrative apparatus, but for the one requirement, the replacement of the wounded and the killed who die daily and fight everywhere for the boundaries of this state. That was the basic reason for the instigation of all of this, since we have no other legal possibilities at the moment and it was necessary to pass it in this form, for such a Law to be passed, otherwise we would die every day without the possibility of replacement. I don’t know, maybe that was in someone’s interest, that all the police disappears, that it is killed off, you probably have another police force up your sleeve.”

General Gvero: “Mr Chairman, I do not intend to respond to these silly thoughts and insults...”²⁰⁵ English 0215-3925 – 0215-4164-EDT, p. 202.

206. 57th Session, 21 February 1996. Rajko Kašagić:

“The MUP is being put in order, and all I am asking is that priority be given to putting MUP in order. By 1 February, 957 people were excluded from the MUP, all the persons without appropriate education, all the persons with a file which says that they had done something they shouldn’t have, I mean illegal acts, and a considerable changes were carried out in the leadership of the Department. Chief of CJB, the Chief of CJB, and only Kijac should have presented it today, and he had to present it here today, considerable work has been done, and it can’t be so that nothing is done in the state, and that such state is in danger. What we are doing, creating a peacetime MUP, there will be no more paying for trucks in the MUP, but they are in a crisis, it has not been solved systematically, to pay in order to ensure conditions for functioning of the MUP, but we will solve that too, and one of these days the payment transactions should start functioning.”²⁰⁶ English 0215-4929 – 0215-5068-EDT, p. 194-195.

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Introduction:

This section presents the delegates' often contentious views on the origins, growth, behavior, successes, and failures of the Bosnian Serb military. In the early sessions, delegates were most concerned with the issue of whether the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA -- Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija) would defend the interests of the Serb people, and they were often suspicious that JNA officers were communists unsympathetic to Serb interests. With the formation of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS -- Vojska Republika Srpska) in May 1992, officers and civilians alike took the Assembly podium to offer analyses and critiques of the army's performance. These critiques intensified in late 1994 when Serb forces suffered their first major territorial losses, first in the Republic of Serbian Krajina and then in Western Bosnia.

207. 2nd Session, 21 November 1991. Unidentified Delegate from Laktaši:

“As far as I know, he [*Karadžić*] promised that he personally would make sure that several units of Serbs, about 2,000 should be organized from Romanija, Sarajevo, Ozren, etc. However, this has not happened. I think it is not fair that only Serbs from Krajina should be dying for Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina. I would like to thank Mr. Medić, who self-critically proclaimed that his Ozrenci /people from Ozren/ did not prove worthy of the heroism of their ancestors, both Partisans and Chetniks, yesterday when Vojvoda Šešelj made a guest appearance in Banjaluka, so he invited Vojvoda Šešelj to come to Ozren after the end of the war.”²⁰⁷ English 0093-0335

208. 2nd Session, 21 November 1991. Unidentified delegate:

“I would like to tell certain colleagues that men from Romanija have been waging a bloody war, that they are shedding their blood and are already dying on the Vukovar front. For those that do not know, they should know that two elite companies from Romanija took the infamous Hercegovačka Street in a suburb of Borovo and blew the Ustashas to bits. It is true that we suffered great losses: we already have two killed and some ten wounded, three of whom are our lads. At

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this moment SAO Romanija is preparing several battalions, and volunteers have already set off for the front at Okučani. ... The First and Second Romanija /units/ are on the Trpinska Street since the first day and when they arrived they were thrown straight from the bus to the line of fire.”²⁰⁸ English 0093-0338

209. 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. Milovan Bjelošević:

“Something has happened in the field, namely the army has the weapons and is using them literally to buy the Serbs. In such crazy times, fraught with war and economic hardship, it is clear that it is very important for our people to have weapons of any kind, although they are not aware of their use and the manner of conducting this war. For, they think that they will protect their cow, wife, home with one rifle. This is a war of ordnance and not of weapons. But, a man feels safe if he has weapons at hand. The Army, I am referring to the Banjaluka Corps and its commander, the commanders of garrisons in the regions of Doboj and Banjaluka, i.e., Doboj and Tuzla, has taken advantage of this and has, with weapons, ‘bought’ some or most of the Serbs so as to point a finger at the Serbian party and its leaders, to call us ‘right-wingers’ or ‘Chetniks,’ which, to tell the truth, we are actually not trying hard to refute.”²⁰⁹ English SA02-4931 – SA02-5059-ET, pp. 8-9. Also 0093-3320

210. 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. Transcript:

[Text of a request to the JNA, adopted unanimously by Assembly]

“Proceeding from the constitutional and legal obligation of the Yugoslav People’s Army to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the country, and in accordance with its Decision on the Territories of Municipalities, Local Communities and Settlements in Bosnia and Herzegovina which are Considered to be the Territory of the Federal State of Yugoslavia and its Conclusions on Giving Full Support to the Yugoslav People’s Army adopted on 21 November 1991, at a time when our state of Yugoslavia was synchronously attacked from all sides and with all means with the intention of dismantling and breaking it up, on 11 December 1991 the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina issues a REQUEST TO THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE’S ARMY to defend, with all the means at its disposal, the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina as integral parts of the state of Yugoslavia in which a plebiscite was conducted of the Serbian people and other citizens regarding their remaining in the

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joint state of Yugoslavia, and a decision brought of the Assembly of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the territories of municipalities, local communities and settlements in Bosnia and Herzegovina which are considered the territory of the federal state of Yugoslavia.”²¹⁰ English SA02-4931 – SA02-5059-ET, p. 31. Also 0093-3342

211. 4th Session, 21 December 1991. Radoslav Brdjanin:

“Since Europe apparently understands only force, I think that force must be responded to with force. Thus I urge us to stop pledging ourselves to Serbdom and instead I call upon Serbs in Sarajevo, SAO Romanija and Northern Bosnia to heed the call for mobilization so that we can defend our western border. Once we have secured our borders, Europe will accept the facts! ... We are not threatening anybody’s integrity, nor their freedom, but we have to defend their freedom at any cost.”²¹¹ English 0093-9660

212. 4th Session, 21 December 1991. Radislav Vukić:

“We have to have a strong Serbian army, and that army at the moment is the Yugoslav Army, whose members are Serbs, too, and I believe it will remain so. The Army should undergo a rapid transformation, as soon as possible, in this fight against fascism, or I should say, against the Ustasha.”²¹² English 0093-9663

213. 4th Session, 21 December 1991. Karadžić:

“Apart from causing the deaths of several hundred thousand people and complete destruction of several hundred towns, a civil war in BH would also result in massive and rapid population movements; in other words, it would lead to population homogenization. What would be the end result of it all? The end result would be the situation as it is today: separate Serbian, Croatian and Muslim areas, left impoverished by several hundred towns and several hundred thousand people. This is what would have happened if we did not demand from the Yugoslav institutions the prevention of secession. Naturally, that is our right, and the Yugoslav institutions could say to them: ‘Sorry, you have no right to secede because you do not fulfill the conditions.’ And since we are not going to attempt to prevent them from seceding, the federal institutions too would probably respect

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people's right to self-determination, including the right to secede."²¹³ English
0093-9676

214. 5th Session, 9 January 1992. Vladislav Vukić:

"The army is being transformed. At the request of our men of the Krajina we have a new wartime general in the Banja Luka Corps, Comrade Vuković who is reasonable and learned and skilled in the art of war, but also skilled in speaking to the men who are replenishing the Corps and who will not yield in the face of the Fascist invasion. The Bosanska Krajina is fighting not only against the Ustasha Croats, but also the Germans, Austria, Hungary and all those evil forces. ...

"I am not making threats. I say this simply because the Serbian people cannot write reports, poetry and prose, but rather must defend itself with force against force. The Bosanska Krajina is the force making the Turks and the Croats quake in their boots. And this force is 17,654 km. square and has a population of 1,200,000. (He points to a map.) ... is also an economic force which yesterday in Banja Luka succeeded in /illegible/ [breaking off] all funds towards Sarajevo. We will not feed the enemy. We will not feed those who are digging pits for us. If necessary, we will feed our brother Serbs in a Serbian BiH."²¹⁴ English L004-6787 – L004-6788

215. 6th Session, 26 January 1992. Aleksa Buha:

"Everything they adopted, they adopted in our absence. This way their next decision could well be to drive away a third of the Serbian people, to Islamicize and Catholicize another third, and to kill the remaining third. ... I would like to propose that this Assembly adopt a conclusion under which the Serbian recruits should serve in the Army only in those parts where Serbs live. This conclusion should be communicated to the Federal Secretariat for People's Defence."²¹⁵
English SA02-5232 – SA02-5305, pp. 31-32. Also 0301-8061

216. 6th Session, 26 January 1992. Dragan Kalinić:

"I think the time is now right to redefine our relations with the JNA on the basis of mutual political and existential interest. The sooner the better. Any territory may be defended, of course, in a legal or constitutional way. It can also be defended by physical force. Those who do not have such a force, those who

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may be at odds with such a force, or those who would be perhaps unwise to rely on such a force, etc., could, at some point be unable to hold on to those territories that are theirs or they may be unable to maintain the power that they need to establish in those territories. I think that we are now talking about ways of going about establishing our rule and the ways of organizing ourselves so that our governance may start functioning in all Serbian territories from the republican level to that of local communes."²¹⁶ English SA02-5232 – SA02-5305, p. 35. Also 0301-8064

217. 6th Session, 26 January 1992. Vojislav Maksimović:

"That relation [*with the JNA*] confuses our people. There is a certain degree of mistrust among us in the conduct of the Army. It is based on the experience that is what we have that was demonstrated in a very negative way in its performance in Slovenia and Croatia. We will not and we cannot allow any repeat of those mistakes. ... Therefore, it seems to me, that this Assembly should directly task the Council of Ministers, in this case, the most important thing for me is that the President of the Council of Ministers should, on our behalf and with our authorization, establish genuine contacts with the top army echelons in this territory of ours. ... The Army should know exactly who their partner [*is*] here and with whom they will be communicating."²¹⁷ English SA02-5232 – SA02-5305, pp. 37-38. Also 0301-8066

218. 7th Session, 15 February 1992. Vojo Kuprešanić:

"As for the JNA, I really up to this point did believe in the JNA. The JNA is made up 99% of Serbian people, Serbian reservists. Are we still to go on accepting this JNA, which is withdrawing from Macedonia, in tens of thousands, while the UN is coming here to us in Krajina to look after the Serbian people. I increasingly doubt it, and personally think that this JNA numbers enough men /and must?/ develop into the Serbian army, the Serbian army /*armija, vojska*/.

"Let Serbia and Montenegro, I have nothing against it, be the nucleus of the future Yugoslavia, and we, as the Serbian Republic will join this Yugoslavia in the framework of the federal state.

"It is my personal proposal that we should at last proclaim the army that is in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is made up of 90% Serbian officers and 99% Serbian reservists, a Serbian army. This will be a real hit. The results will be

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fantastic, the army will stay in Yugoslavia. That is my evaluation.”²¹⁸ English 0305-5793, p. 27.

219. 7th Session, 15 February 1992. Dragan Kalinić:

“I see that defence is to be looked after by the JNA. How nice it would be if this were the case and easy to put into practice. I think that these seven days should be employed by, in line with our preceding conclusion, and it said that our relation with the JNA should be redefined, in the sense of determining our joint political and existential interests, having urgent talks in the General Staff, and asking whether the JNA will be ready, on 23 or better on 29 February, when we promulgate our Constitution, to defend the territory of the Serbian people, or rather the territory that belongs to the common state of Yugoslavia. If the Army is not able to tell us this precisely, how many personnel, with what arms, on what positions in our territory it can do this, they we ourselves will have to work at turning our territorial defence on our Serbian territory into a Serbian army which then, with the army of Serbia and Montenegro, and the other lands that make up the common state, will recreate either the JNA or some other common army.”²¹⁹ English 0305-5800, p. 34.

220. 7th Session, 15 February 1992. Karadžić:

“I proposed that it should be like this: that the Republic sovereignly determines and partially transfers to other figures matters of defence and security. The army will naturally be in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because they cannot chase it out of the Serbian village, they can drive it to that village. But there have to be some legal grounds for us to be able to accept this army. Please all of you let us watch out for continuity, it is important for us, that there is no psychological second in which Yugoslavia does not exist, continuity is important for us. This relates to the JNA too, and it is important for us to get past this zero point in which there is no Yugoslavia. We have to make this continuity happen.”²²⁰ English 0305-5801, pp. 35-36.

221. 10th Session, 11 March 1992. Radoslav Unković:

“Who can demarcate the borders of the Serbian people? No one has the right to do so. We do not recognize those borders. We shall recognize them only

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when Serbian weapons have had their say. And Serbian weapons will soon have their say, rest assured: If Alija sacrifices peace, I shall sacrifice my life. (Mild applause).”²²¹ English 0083-7032

222. 12th Session, 24 March 1992. Karadžić:

[Referring to Zoran Djordjević, representative of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in Washington:]

“He criticizes us for getting hold of Bosnian Serbs who do nothing but speak about war. This often happens to me too, and to our people on the ground, especially to Vukić and the others. And the impression is, he says, that the Serbs are taking other people’s land through war. Then he concludes that we should not do that, that we should not mention war but should establish real authority and defend our territories. And if someone wants a war, he will wage it against us and we shall be the side being attacked, which is very important.

“There is a big difference between being attacked and us threatening we shall use war to prevent the introduction of a centralized government. It is much easier if we let the centralized government use force as for example on the occasion when special forces arrived in Bileća and then returned with their tails between their legs. They now do not dare cross over to our territory. They absolutely do not dare cross over. If they cross over, they are aggressors, offenders trespassing on our territory. On the basis of other top-level contacts with the army (JNA), we may say we can rest at ease in that regard.”²²² English 0300-2042

223. 12th Session, 24 March 1992. Karadžić:

“It does not suit us at this moment that a National Guard be established. The JNA is much better. If we established it now, the army would have to be divided. We would have to part with the funds which are currently in someone else’s hands. This way we will deal with it at an appropriate time. The National Guard should be established at a time when the army would possibly be forced to undergo fundamental changes. Our position at that moment would be much better.”²²³
English 0030-2048

224. 14th Session, 27 March 1992. Karadžić:

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"We know that our people have armed themselves. We don't know the various ways and means by which this is done, but we do know that the people have enough weapons. I must say, however, that we do not have paramilitary units."²²⁴ English 0092-6784

225. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Karadžić:

"After Yugoslav officers withdrew together with large numbers of those who were not supposed to, the Serb people linked with the officers who had stayed, the officers who in our opinion deserve much credit for the BiH Serb army and people's triumph. Many of our people were killed, mostly the powerless and elderly who were unable to escape from Ustaša knives, but the majority of the Serb people was saved, thanks to the Yugoslav army but also to the TO, to a greater extent, and later, thanks to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Serb Republic's Army, the majority of the Serbs did not experience what the enemy had planned for them."²²⁵ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 13.

226. 19th Session, 12 August 1992. Srđa Srdjić:

"It is not rare that, as Colonel and Commander Subotić said, in each municipality there are military, paramilitary, police and parapolice /sic/ /similar to militia/ authorities. It is not rare to see people in all sorts of uniforms with black hats of sorts, black shirts, perforated gloves /possibly mittens/, unlaced boots, with red, green and I don't know what kind of berets, black hats and similar. Which authority do these people represent and whose authority is it? I think that this is the place to discuss it and to enact a law determining what military and what civil authority is, what civilian authority should look like and what military authority should look like. I think that if we wanted to succeed in it, we should establish local authorities first."²²⁶ English ET 0410-2021 – 0410-2099, pp. 6-7.

227. 19th Session, 12 August 1992. General Talić:

"I think that the Army units are well organised, that they are fighting for a better future. We don't need to fight every 50 years, let's finish it now for good in order to have our state, to be on our own, to have our dignity and pride. That's what the fighters are fighting for. ... I am asking you to understand that we are in a

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great offensive now. It's correct what one deputy has said that there are some paramilitaries, that some of them are present in the Corps for two or three months sometimes, that those Corps are fighting against it, that we will have an undivided Army and we already have it. All this shouldn't be disputable. We have started to do this, support us and we will go further."²²⁷ English ET 0410-2021 – 0410-2099, p. 76.

228. 20th Session, 14-15 September 1992. Rajko Kašagić:

"...there is fear of paramilitary formations. Where is the military police, where is the police to put an end to this? When one woman dared put an end to it and called the military police, they laughed at her and told her to let them move in. In our municipality, we have decided to allocate as many flats to the army as it needs because I believe that there should be a military centre in Banja Luka in view of its position and existing facilities. This is a task of the republic, a task which Banja Luka municipality must carry out and it will, we are doing it, but we can't if there are paramilitary formations, refugees and others who unlawfully acquire flats and there is no one to put an end to this. The Executive Council alone cannot do much. However, there are honest people in the police who are really doing their job but the paramilitary formations come first and they do what they want and obstruct the Serbian authorities."²²⁸ English 0422-6193 – 0422-6338 ET, p. 33.

229. 21st Session, 30 October - 1 November 1992. Minutes:

"Military Report was submitted to the Assembly by General Ratko Mladić, Commander of the Main Staff of Republika Srpska. The General stressed amongst other things that military results are obvious, and that our position is favourable. However, not everything is solved yet, and the opinion is that militarily not everything could be solved. General Mladicé said that more attention should be paid to quality of the army, and not the quantity, from equipping of the army, through discipline to output. He requested that the Assembly more vigorously distance itself from para-politics and paramilitary, and not divide on any grounds, but to be united to the maximum."²²⁹ English ET 0410-2678 – 0410-2694, p. 8.

230. 22nd Session, 23-24 November 1992. Kerović:

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"These problems didn't crop up yesterday and it is a shame, in a way, that they are being discussed only now. They go back to October, September 1991, when the first soldiers started going out to the territory, which is now mainly held by the Serbs, as mobilised conscripts in the field, when they started wearing a military uniform."²³⁰ English 0340-2803 – 0340-3038-ET, p. 86.

231. 32nd Session, 19-20 May 1993. Jovo Mijatović:

"There are a lot of officers who want to become involved in the role of authorities. Let me first mention the issue of mobilisation. Local brigade commanders often show up with a list of people they need to mobilise. I witnessed this in Višegrad, I know of this example because I was a commissioner there. ... We practically accepted all the officers from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And they were often obsolete and couldn't really be used in combat operations. People like these were often secured livelihood in Staffs, while we have very little operational officers for leading the units, and very little capable ones."²³¹ English ET 0215-0236 – 0215-0331, p. 63.

232. 32nd Session, 19-20 May 1993. Trifko Radić:

"In Ilijaš/ With regards to the mobilisation, since I pay a visit to those municipalities on regular basis, there are around 150 mobsters driving unregistered "Golf" vehicles. They wear uniforms and sunglasses, they walk around carrying the most up-to-date weapons. Nobody dares either to do anything concerning that issue or to engage */probably to mobilise/* them. They walk around, plundering, killing, smuggling, etc. I asked the commanders of brigade about this, but they told me as follows: 'A person from draft board sends call-up papers to a person /any of the above mentioned persons/ but no one dares to mobilise him. It is the Mafia which is well connected from Ilidža, through Rajlovac and Vogošća to Ilijaš. All of us are afraid of them. A special unit should come and inspect it. You have no idea how it bothers honest soldiers who watch them doing it."²³² English ET 0215-0236 – 0215-0331, pp. 91-92.

233. 36th Session, 30-31 December 1993. Vojinović:

[Vojinović responds to charges that paramilitaries in Brčko murdered a military policeman.]

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"In the town of Brčko itself, namely /as regards/ the incident caused by certain members of the RS Army, these are not paramilitary units but are comprised within the RS Army, it is just that they wear different markings, they are the so-called "Red Berets"; otherwise, talking to the brigade commander /I learned that/ these lads are intended for some special offensive operations and they certainly enjoy a privileged status in our city, and it is perhaps because they were not used for a long time, so to speak, maybe that is why they committed these incidents, because they had not fought for a long time."²³³ English 0215-1176 – 0215-1426-ET, p. 25.

234. 39th Session, 24-25 March 1994. Karadžić:

"I established a Supreme Command so that I do not make decisions by myself. I did not establish it to use it as a cover. I am the one who signs, who decides, and I will be responsible for each decision. But I established a Supreme Command on a broad basis. I think that it consists of nine men who, based on their positions, are here to help me to review things and make decisions. And we accepted that this ring [*reference to the "Ozren Finger"*] should be resolved. ... We can use the peace forces by squeezing them into the area between the Muslims and us and freeze such a state."²³⁴ English ET 0215-2251 – 0215-2477, p. 88.

235. 50th Session, 15-16 April 1995. Karadžić:

"Distribution of weapons was carried out thanks to the JNA. What could be withdrawn was withdrawn and distributed to the people in the Serbian areas, but it was the SDS which organized the people and created the army, that was an army. Together with the police, those were the armed forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they created the space, liberated and created the space. In some places with the help of the JNA, in others without the help of the JNA, and in yet others, without the JNA knowledge, since Huso and Uso /*Muslim names*/ were commanding the JNA at that time, and what happened? We made various calculations and agreements with Yugoslavia, we decided to set up the TO, the Serbian brigades, which were indeed led by the SDS, but not as a Party army, but as a people's army because not anyone could lead an illegal brigade and confront the Green Berets..."²³⁵ English ET 0084-5781 – 0084-6113, pp. 145-146 (second sequence of numbers after first 176)

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236. 50th Session, 15-16 April 1995. Rašula:

"They are brave young kids, they are Kninjas /men from Knin –sic/ who have fought on all the fronts, and we asked them to stay and help supply the remaining families with the tractors. These young men were needed, they were supposed to be mobilized to go again..."²³⁶ English ET 0084-5781 – 0084-6113, p. 167 (first sequence of page numbers in document).

237. 52nd Session, 6 August 1995. Karadžić:

"We have surrendered great territory. The JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ assisted in that a lot, but somewhere [in some places – rjd] they hindered us. In Sarajevo they did not want to do what we asked them to do. They did not want to give a company of tanks so that we could do what we asked. The war would be over if they did that. When the bishop talked about the Banja Luka Corps he referred to the JNA, and present Commanders Talić and Kostić and others did a lot for us and after that they finally accepted the Corps and they created a Serbian Corps."²³⁷ English ET 0215-4171 – 0215-4296

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Introduction

Once war began in late March and April 1992, delegates provided considerable information, many interpretations, and often scathing critiques about the manner in which the war was conducted by the Bosnian Serb civil and military leaders. Commanders gave periodic reports to the Assembly about military developments, but the responses were so harsh that General Mladić ceased to attend personally the sessions in summer 1993 and left the reporting to other senior generals. Both the generals' assessments and the criticisms from assembly members contribute to an understanding of how the Bosnian Serb nationalists waged war.

238. 16th Session, 12 May 1992. Karadžić:

"I must say we are doing quite well, considering the forces that we had at our disposal, we hold the positions, which we had rather well. We hold all our areas, all the municipalities, all the settlements around Sarajevo, and we hold our enemies – now I must and can say – we hold our enemies in complete encirclement, so that they cannot receive military assistance, either in manpower or in weapons."²³⁸ English 0190-8522

239. 16th Session, 12 May 1992. Trifko Radić:

"...this war must end as soon as possible. Take my word for it, all work stopped in our region two months ago, all factories have closed down. We have, as the saying goes, everyone up in arms. We are prepared; we hold 50km of the line of encirclement around Ilijaš. We are organized and I have asked the TV to come and record how well organized for the war we in Ilijaš are, how our defense lines are organized. It is true, yes, that we have stolen a lot of goods. We have a lot of provisions down there to live on. We have stolen 32 tons of fuel oil and petrol in tanks. We have cut off and mined the railway line and no one can now get into Sarajevo. We have mined the motorway too. We shall do our

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best to prevent the enemy from ever getting to Sarajevo from the direction of Zenica, and anyone who tries the upper route will also meet his end.”²³⁹
English 0190-8530

240. 16th Session, 12 May 1992. Dragan Kalinić [Minister of Health]:

“...knowing who our enemies are, how perfidious they are, how they cannot be trusted until they are physically, militarily destroyed and crushed, which, of course, implies eliminating and liquidating their key people, I do not hesitate in selecting the first option, the option of war. ... As the unfortunate Minister of Health, I know that 150 people from the Military Hospital have been handed over to me – to all of us, indeed, because I view the army and us civilians as one – who managed to take their underwear and clothes, but not one instrument. However, those who plan the Sarajevo operation, the liberation of Sarajevo or destroying the enemy forces in Sarajevo, will have to plan what to do with the medical facilities. And let me tell you this right now, if the Military Hospital falls into the hands of the enemy, I am for the destruction of the Koševo hospital so that the enemy has nowhere to go for medical help.”²⁴⁰ English 0190-8531 – 0190-8533

241. 16th Session, 12 May 1992. Miroslav Vještica:

"I must tell you, to remind you all, that only 24% of the population are Serbs in the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa, there are 14,500 of us and there are 47,000 Muslims. As our president has said, we in the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa did not want the war, but there was nothing else we could do. One could not live any longer in the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa with all the insolence, military exercises, and many other things, with forcible take-overs of firms with guns in hand, with every single Serb thrown out of his job in the municipality of Bosanska Krupa, with not one Serbian teacher wanting to sign an oath of loyalty, as a matter of fact, not one Serb in the municipality of Bosanska Krupa. That is why we were forced to go to war, gentlemen.

“For a year and a half we have been preparing for war in the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa, because we knew that there would be war and it could not be avoided. I have to ask a question now, which I have

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every right to ask, how could it happen that two-thirds of the town were taken in two days of operations? Thank God, we did get to our borders, because that was how we had envisaged them and drawn them, and you, people's deputies, know well that we had said that the right bank of the Una River would be our border..."²⁴¹ English 0190-8534

242. 16th Session, 12 May 1992. General Mladić:

"People and peoples are not pawns nor are they keys in one's pocket that can be shifted from here to there. People and peoples are not pawns nor are they keys in one's pocket that can be shifted from here to there. ... We cannot wage war on all fronts nor against peoples. I would like to make one suggestion here that we adopt such a wisdom that we are against the war but that we will fight if attacked, and that we do not want a war against the Muslims as a people, or against the Croats as a people, but against those who steered and pitted these people against us.

"Therefore, we cannot cleanse nor can we have a sieve to sift so that only Serbs would stay, or that the Serbs would fall through and the rest leave. Well that is, that will not, I do not know how Mr. Krajišnik and Mr. Karadžić would explain this to the world. People, that would be genocide."²⁴² English 0190-8547 - 0190-8549

243. 16th Session, 12 May 1992. General Mladić:

"And we have to put a ring around the dragon's head of Sarajevo this very moment, and only those whom we let out should be allowed out, and this 'we' is not just anyone among us, but the one who is in charge, who is the commander. We should not say: we will destroy Sarajevo, we need Sarajevo. We are not going to say that we are going to destroy the power supply pylons or turn off the water supply, no, because that would get America out of its seat, but gentlemen, please, fine, well, one day there is no water at all in Sarajevo. ... Therefore, we have to wisely tell the world, it was they who were shooting, hit the transmission line and the power went off, they were shooting at the water supply facilities, there was a power cut at such and such a place, we are doing our best repairing this, that is what diplomacy is, ..." ²⁴³ English 0190-8552 – 0190-8553

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244. 16th Session, 12 May 1992. Trifko Radić:

“We are at war, we are surrounded, we are being attacked every evening, we have no other solution but to shell and destroy towns. We have destroyed one third of Visoko, maybe tonight another third will go. They infiltrate at certain places, kill and commit genocide, we have forwarded this to the TV, nine people were killed and then mutilated with knives. Every day they kill some of our people, because they are such crafty and cunning swindlers.”²⁴⁴ English 0190-8558

245. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Karadžić:

“Today we control all of our territories, and perhaps also some territories that will be given to other national communities once a deal is reached. Such territories cannot be handed over during the war out of security reasons; they may be handed over only after the international community guarantees peace and borders.”²⁴⁵ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, pp. 13-14.

246. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Karadžić:

“Looking at relations with the Muslims in the military sense, they do not want any negotiations, they are accepting co-existence in a few places, while waiting for a political solution. It is like that in Bijeljina and around Bijeljina, where the Muslims are not showing the will to fight against the Serbs and against their state, where they essentially live peacefully and well. It is also like that in Krajina, where, after the elimination of the extremists, the Muslims accepted living together with the Serbs. It is like that in Sanski Most, Ključ and Prijedor, where there was fighting unfortunately, caused by Muslim extremists, but after their elimination the remaining people were not in favour of fighting against the Serbs.”²⁴⁶ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, pp. 14-15.

247. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Karadžić:

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"The Serb people around Sarajevo, as you know, will not be defeated. They militarily control almost the entire surrounding area. We never allowed forces from Central Bosnia to connect with the forces in Sarajevo, because the outcome would be catastrophic, nor do we allow the bringing in of foreign mercenaries and volunteers from Turkey or Arab countries, that would definitely come here for money to fight against the Serb people. We know only too well how this would look. Thanks to the Sarajevo battlefield, the Government, Assembly and remaining state organs of Alija Izetbegović are not functioning, and it turns out that the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina never functioned, and was never established outside Yugoslavia"²⁴⁷ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 15.

248. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Karadžić:

"... our people are fully in favour of fighting, that is, peace, because we do not have any more reason to fight, we have liberated almost everything that is ours, in final talks we could even return some territories, villages that do not belong to us. This is an issue that cannot be easily defined, but in essence, we are able to say that we have our own state, we have our soldiers on our borders, and our people are fully determined to live in this state. Whether the Serbs will associate with the others in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or with somebody else, for which there are excellent political conditions, will be up to you to decide as the representatives of the people."²⁴⁸ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, pp. 18-19.

249. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Milanović:

"Why was it so that now we have whole cities as hostages, as well as the population of the entire region of Zenica, Sarajevo and even some other places."²⁴⁹ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 30.

250. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Plavšić:

"65% of Serb territory belongs to our people according to the cadaster and 70% of the conquered one, which is only 5% gain in relation to the previous number. If we presume that the enemy will gain as much as we

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will give him then who would dare explain our people to abandon what they already have, something which is compensation to them for destroyed or burned territories or the place they had been expelled from."²⁵⁰ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 38-39.

251. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Miladin Nedić:

"Let us treat the soldiers in accordance with military codes, let us not kill women and children for wearing dimijas /Turkish trousers/, or whatever. I told a colonel that I am for a knightly warfare and not for genocide."²⁵¹ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, pp. 60-61.

252. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Miladin Nedić:

"I particularly urge us not to discuss the borders, not to discuss at all about the location and the seat of the Government until the war is over. These are two suggestions I have, that is not to discuss about it at all. Our war goal is to see who is militarily stronger in Bosnia, but on the battlefield, since the battlefield is ... /one word unclear/ today. Our motive is the Serb state, the Serb states. This is my goal and my request to this Assembly: Let us not discuss the borders, let us not discuss the seat of the Government."²⁵² English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 61.

253. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Prstojević:

"When the Serbs started the uprising in Sarajevo and when they seized control over certain territories, there was no Government, or at least it was not known where it was then. Moreover, we even did not know if Mr. Karadžić was alive during the first couple of days. When we learnt that he was alive and when he visited us in Ilidža and encouraged us, the Serbs from Sarajevo retained control over the territory, and even extended their territory in some areas, driving the Muslims out of the territories where they had actually been a majority."²⁵³ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 67.

254. 18th Session, 11 August 1992. Krajišnik:

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“One of the initiatives was that we should submit a request of the Assembly to the international institutions and especially journalists, if they have visited our detention camps, to visit detention camps in which the Serbs are kept. Also, to demand exchange of the war prisoners, such a Declaration would be adequate and could be protection for our prisoners. If you remember, the last time we were in Sarajevo, we asked, and it was a task of this negotiating team, and demand to put as an item on the London Conference, the problem of prisoners, that is, our people kept as prisoners in Muslim ethnic areas. It is accepted that Co-ordination Body consisted of three representatives of three parties should be formed, so that everyone in closed town could go out to the free territory. I would like to ask a Commission to prepare such a request or maybe we could establish a commission whose task would be to send such a request to international commissions for release of prisoners and for exchange of prisoners.”²⁵⁴
English ET 0214-9601 – 0214-9631, p. 5.

255. 20th Session, 14-15 September 1992. Trbojević:

“The presidents are obliged to do everything to establish an international court for crimes, these crimes are mentioned several times, for those who ordered the crimes, ethnic cleansing and so on and so forth. Therefore, these are the basic outlines of the London conference and I think they give a very unpleasant impression about what we are to expect from the international community.

“Camps for inmates, prisoners, civilians and who knows what are being opened in the Republic but no one, or most authorities, know nothing about them. The minister in charge of refugees is stunned when people from the International Red Cross tell him about the camps. Is that a state? I'm sorry, but that cannot be a state. That's complete anarchy and crime in which all of us are involved, either consciously or unconsciously, to a greater or lesser extent.”²⁵⁵ English 0422-6193 – 0422-6338 ET, pp. 36-37.

256. 20th Session, 14-15 September 1992. Trifko Radić:

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"We have been without water for five months and nobody is doing anything. In Sarajevo, the UN is notified as soon as the city has no water for more than two hours. That is why I told our President Karadžić in Banja Luka and Prime Minister Prestojević in Ilidža to cut off the water supply to Sarajevo – if we don't have water, let them die as well."²⁵⁶ English 0422-6193 – 0422-6338, pp. 46-47.

257. 22nd Session, 23-24 November 1992. Srdjo Srdić:

"We didn't ask you, or Mr. Karadžić, or Mr. Krajišnik what we should do in Prijedor. Prijedor was the only green municipality in Bosnian Krajina, if we had been listening to you we would still be green today, we would still be Krupa, and Prijedor wouldn't be Prijedor. We fixed them and sent them in packing where they belong. (Applause)"²⁵⁷ English 0340-2803 – 0340-3038-ET, pp. 116-117.

258. 23rd Session, 17 December 1992. General Mladić:

"How would he feel if he were surrounded as are the Muslim people and its armed force, if it can be called that, in Cerska, in Srebrenica, waiting for the transport to bring him 500-800 bullets."²⁵⁸ English 0214-9750 – 0214-9854 ET, no page number provided.

259. 24th Session, 8 January 1993. Trifko Radić:

"Believe me when I say that we can not live together anymore. I don't know under what conditions we could live together now. I have to be honest and say that they caused so much evil to us, and this time we did not cause less evil for them either."²⁵⁹ English ET-0214-9871 – 0214-9936, p. 68.

260. 24th Session, 8 January 1993. General Mladić:

[In this excerpt Mladić informs the Assembly of the killing of Hakija Turajlić, Vice President of the Bosnian Government, by a Bosnian Serb soldier. Turajlić was riding in a French Armored Personnel Carrier with a

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delegation of the Turkish government that was being escorted into Sarajevo by UNPROFOR.]

"Hakija Turajlić, a vice-president of this faulty Government of BiH, was in an UNPROFOR car, together with Colonel Sartre, a French soldier. Our people stopped and searched the vehicle, and one of our soldiers killed this Turajlić with six bullets. (Applause)

"I ask you not to develop such climate towards the UNPROFOR, there are those who work well. We shall protest sharply. I ordered that a protest be written and sent to Nambiar. And I told them the last time that the UN and the UNPROFOR are not the service or the logistics of Alija Izetbegović, or of Franjo Tudjman or ours. But we still have to pay attention, we must have a very, very sober head. I ask you not to let some individual drive us to disaster."²⁶⁰ English ET-0214-9871 – 0214-9936, pp. 86-87.

261. 26th Session, 2 April 1993. Karadžić:

"As sovereign people we can not allow anyone to prosecute the Serbs who live in our parts, even if they eventually have committed crimes in our parts and, we could not swear that there are no crimes. We've heard of 18 instances of rape, in total. We haven't checked all those instances, but we shall do so /since/ no one has the right to commit rape, 18 not 18,000 but 18.

...

"We should try the Serbs who commit crimes. We won't allow anyone else to try them. We are sovereign people and we want to do that, and with that we bind the others to do that if they want to. If they don't want to, let them make farces, as Tudjman did, by putting them on trial and then releasing them. Nevertheless, during this war we had never depended on criminals. Our commanders are respectable officers and if they are not officers then they are one of us, our people, the ones who are not officers by training. And when that is known, it is clear that our army never committed any crime, that is, the army never committed any crime and only an individual could have done that. But I doubt if someone from our army could do so, only an individual who is not in the army could have committed a crime."²⁶¹ English ET 0215-0023 – 0215-0081, pp. 110-111.

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262. 27th Session, 3 April 1993. Duško Pejović:

"We caught the spies and the guides and those who collaborated with the Muslim side for months. These were the residents of the Pljevlja municipality, Muslim citizens of the FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/, who collaborated with the Muslims by providing food for them. We discovered a wide corridor through which food was provided to Goražde. We discovered who participated in that action and we found that a number of Serbs from adjacent villages were involved. ...

"In my opinion, critical territories are those Serbian territories, which are yet to be liberated. To us, those territories are such as Goražde. If we do not liberate that town, in which there are some captured Serbs, I am afraid that all of us around that municipality could be captured as well. I am afraid that everything we have done so far, will be no more than half-solution. It is an oasis that we have to clear up as soon as possible and thus cut all the connections between East and Sarajevo. If it remains intact, they will start spreading, attacking, and bearing down on us, who are located around them." Therefore, we think that the issue of liberation of that town must be addressed as soon as possible. In our opinion, Goražde has not been captured so far not because its defences are so good, but because our attack is poor. We must organise a good attack and solve that matter. Thank you."²⁶²
English ET 0215-0084 - 0215-0106, p. 38-39.

263. 31st Session, 9 May 1993. Radoslav Brdjanin:

[Brdjanin refers to the destruction of the historic Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka two days prior to the Assembly session.]

"And another thing, don't be more Catholic than the Pope. I propose banning demonisation of the Serbs by Serbs. Please, the main topic in Banja Luka 24 hours a day is the mosque, I'm not saying they should be praised for destroying it, but don't cry so much, at least not in our media. I shall enlarge a postcard for any of those who grieve it so they may carry it with them."²⁶³ English 0215-0208 – 0215-0230, p. 4.

264. 32nd Session, 19-20 May 1993. General Mladić:

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"Srebrenica and Žepa, we have defined a precise agreement and role of the UNPROFOR there. They will not trick us. It is about a precise demarcation of the confrontation line and from that confrontation line /as written/, as Srebrenica and Žepa are under the protection of the United Nations forces. It was precisely agreed that there will be one strengthen Canadian company there, that is to say one company in Žepa. They requested some additional forces for logistics needs and through an agreement and with the approval of the Staff President /as written/ and a Supreme Command we have allowed that. There is an ongoing negotiating process with regard to putting the central part of Sarajevo under protection at the moment. The separation of forces can take place along the line where the forces have been clashing."²⁶⁴ English ET 0215-0236 – 0215-0331, p. 20.

265. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Miroslav Vještica:

[Speaking in opposition to the peace plan called the Union of Three Republics:]

"... we will have to compensate everything we destroyed and burned and the 17 mosques that we flattened."²⁶⁵ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, p. 25.

266. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Nikola Kisin:

"I would say that the area of Srbobran has been free from the first day. We liberated it by ourselves, we didn't call anybody to help us. Our fighters stayed at home to defend their homes, their towns, their Krajina. Simply, they defended the Serbs and the Orthodox creed. They didn't look for their bread in Belgrade or Novi Sad, like some of them did."²⁶⁶ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, p. 37.

267. 33rd Session, 20-21 July 1993. Karadžić:

[Karadžić urges the Assembly to approve the deployment of 100 Ukrainian UNPROFOR troops to Gorazde. He contends that the Serbs must

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sometimes be magnanimous victors rather than always rejecting every concession.]

"Concerning Srebrenica, I think that it is the score for us because if we had entered Srebrenica, the people whose families had been killed (around 1200 Serbs had been killed) would have entered and there would have been bloodshed and we could have lost the state because of that. That is why I consider that by entering Srebrenica Morion /probably Morillon/ saved us, not the Muslims. They have rifles in Srebrenica but it could only justify us hunting them. They leave Srebrenica in-groups and each group consists of 300 to 350 people. Since they bear rifles we can not treat them as civilians so our army hunts them since they are enemy forces in our territory. Finally, Stoltenberg asked me whether we agreed that they evacuated Srebrenica and took all of them to Tuzla. What kind of profit did the Muslims make in Srebrenica? It is as if they were in a cage, and some Canadians are there selling them goods /as written/. "²⁶⁷ English ET 0215-0344 – 0215-0497, p. 55.

268. 33rd Session, 20-21 July 1993. Karadžić:

"The important thing is that we pulled Serbs out of Goražde. We do not want to shoot at Goražde. There is no need to shoot a single bullet at Goražde. ... Militarily, we have already won. Now we have to win politically. It means that we have to anticipate which things would happen and prevent the events. We have to consider making a move a day in advance, a move, which might only cause a senseless measure against us. ... Agreements signed by Muslim party are humiliating for the Muslims. It is a catastrophe, it should be written in history, it is the recognition of the Serbian victory. The UN signed it too; Morillon signed it. "²⁶⁸ English ET 0215-0344 – 0215-0497, pp. 55-56.

269. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Miroslav Vještica:

"As we agreed on 21 April in this Parliament, we in the municipality of Krupa na Uni, have made the River Una the western border of Republic of Srpska. The *Balije* /derogatory for Muslims/ were suppose to be on the other side, but they could not remain there, because we were on this side. ...

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The *Balije* are now between us and UNPROFOR forces, and they are lately provoking and harassing us.²⁶⁹ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, pp. 176.

270. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Petar Subašić:

“These /probably those people of Livno/ are the most ardent extremists, citizens of Muslim origin, whose fathers and grandfathers committed serious crimes and genocide in that /probably 2nd World War/ war and in this one. So, one of the aims is to scatter these Muslims. There are many of them in Livno and those people there don’t know what to do with them. Many of them came there as refugees...now they became a great problem for them.”²⁷⁰ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, p. 99.

271. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Srdjo Srdić:

[Srdić responds to complaints from other delegates that some non-Serbs have secured large apartments in other towns of the RS.]:

“They should have cleansed their municipalities, as we had done, and they would have not had any problems. If any agreement was made, if somebody came back, we would say that many people have been in municipality. You, that had done the job, take the responsibility as the war criminals. For that reason, I am against repeated voting. Save our dignity, do not look around for people who set up the hand and who did not do that.”²⁷¹ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, p. 161.

272. 38th Session, 17 January 1994. Karadžić:

“On that occasion [the Lisbon Conference, March 1992] we were given the right to form our republic and a considerable portion of the territory was included on this preliminary map. This is the territory that was considered as the Serbian territory, rather historically than ethnically, and this was preliminarily accepted before the war when the international community recognised that over 50% of BiH should belong to us and when it acknowledged that it was the Serbian territory without mentioning aggression. So, our territory and its borders are not the result of the aggression, but the result of the fact that we have been living here for centuries as a majority.

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"We were defending our territories in this war, we placed some lines as soon as the war started and sheltered the majority of our population that we managed to pull out from the Muslim and Croatian territories behind these lines. During all that time we were willing to talk, we took part in the said talks, we were very co-operative and the most co-operative when it comes to the humanitarian issues, the convoys, we had the most disciplined army and police and we never took revenge. We performed only justified and purpose serving military operations and went as far as the borders of our ethnic area. As for crossing the border of the neighbouring area, we used to do that rarely and for tactical reasons of defence only."²⁷² English ET 0215-2178 – 0215-2234, pp. 9-12.

273. 39th Session, 24-25 March 1994. General Tolimir:

"I just want to say that the date 16.08.1990 will be recorded in Serbian recent history. That was the date when the military conscripts in Knin did not want to turn in weapons. They did not want to receive General Trajčeski. They requested that I should come. I did, and they told me: You tell us when we are going to shoot. I said: When the Ustashas attack us. And then I said that I was the happiest officer because the Serbian soldier does not want to turn in weapons."²⁷³ English ET 0215-2251 – 0215-2477

274. 40th Session, 10-11 May 1994. Karadžić:

"We did not lose in Sarajevo. Look at the people in Sarajevo. They do not get killed; they live normally. We have divided the city and we established the border crossing points. Turks can move through our territory and we check them at the entrance and at the exit on their way to Visoko. And, what are they doing now? They are making incidents hoping that we will close it so that they can request the status of that road to be changed so that they can move without control, and we take the bait, fulfil their hopes, close it and do not let them pass. That is a big strategem, but we have to maintain the character of the Berlin kind of corridor in order to get Sarajevo definitely divided and the territories to become compact. Then we will /?,give/ them square metre of the hill between Vogošćaa and Vis, and we

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will take away from them square kilometre on the Drina."²⁷⁴ English ET 0215-2482 – 0215-2616, p. 64.

275. 42nd Session, 18-19 July 1994. Karadžić:

"They will challenge us because of ethnic cleansing, this and that; but we will say – Serbs have also been ethnically cleansed."²⁷⁵ English ET 0215-2810 – 0215-3020, p.

276. 45th Session, 1 September 1994. Miroslav Vještica:

"I know we are cut off from the entire world, from the SRJ, these are new circumstances and we have to be aware of them, of the fact that what will happen will happen after the 15th October, the war will continue, but fortunately the winter is coming, so *balijas* won't be able to wage war either, but by the spring they will most certainly acquire a lot of weapons, the UN will leave and we will have to finish this war next spring. We have time until next spring to make an assessment and prepare for that war as well, because it will definitely happen."²⁷⁶ English: 0215-3138 – 0215-3236 ET, p. 88.

277. 45th Session, 1 September 1994. Karadžić:

"It is my impression, and the same thing is evident from the international reports, nobody in the world expected Yugoslavia to impose economic sanctions on us, only military or political sanctions, we understand if Serbia, that is Yugoslavia, is forced to impose military and political sanctions, but economic sanctions, that we do not understand. It is wrong because it legitimizes the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia, we, on the other hand, are fully entitled to impose sanctions on the Muslims so that not a bird can cross over to their territory, until the world forces Yugoslavia to lift the economic sanctions, the military and political sanctions can stay in place. We don't need military or political help, but our economy cannot survive like this, and finally, Yugoslavia will most certainly suffer great losses because our economic space and the economic space of the Republic of Serbian Krajina account for about 25% of Yugoslav economic space."²⁷⁷ English: 0215-3138 – 0215-3236 ET, p. 42.

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278. 46th Session, Continuation, 24 November 1994. Karadžić:

“Please, we fired at the Sarajevo television with all means that we had but we could not do anything. When the war started I realised why the building of the Sarajevo television was so ugly. I was there as a writer etc. there are walls, halls and something strange, that all was made in case of war since they knew that there would be a civil war.”²⁷⁸ English ET 0215-3243 - 0215-3549, p. 51.

279. 46th Session, 9-23 November 1994. Kerović:

“Be sure, and I would like not to be right about it, if God helps us, that some day we will be forced to definitively settle accounts with Muslims, it will be once for all. We should not be afraid, there will be empty areas and it will be the same with Kupres now after the Croats had taken it. The Serbs did not stay there in their embrace. If we take any Turk town in the future, like Sarajevo or Tuzla, the Muslims will not stay in the Serbian embrace and the areas will be created which will be ethnically clean.”²⁷⁹ English ET 0215-3243 -0215-3549, p. 98 (page numbers embedded in text).

280. 3rd Extraordinary Session, 23-24 May 1995. Zlatko Kelečević:

“... irresponsible statements were made by responsible people in Krajina. The statement that Zagreb was shelled raised the hair on my head. , ...we missed two perfect chances, the first one is Croatia ... for the first time it was slapped by from the international community because it had done that and we turned these slaps into raps /on our heads/ with those statements. Simply put, Tudjman was given the legitimacy to do what he wanted to do because we shelled civilians, destroyed churches and so on ... oh my God.

“Next, the destruction of churches, gentlemen. I would publicly disassociate myself, and I will request that the Assembly disassociate itself from the destruction of churches despite the fact that they destroyed so many of our churches; this is not the Serbian way of thinking. Serbs have never

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been vandals. Serbs have never waged wars against buildings and churches. Gentlemen, that church is not a Croatian church, that is a church that belongs to the whole of the Catholic world. Let us not hurt the whole Catholic world unnecessarily. Never mind an act of vandalism, a mosque was destroyed and St. John's was destroyed in the war zone, and the world didn't lift a finger. But here in Banja Luka, it is not a war zone, gentlemen. No war is being waged here, civilian buildings are being destroyed here, not to mention that civilians are being killed, which certainly is not good.

"Gentlemen, the international community has not ever been inclined towards us, but it was not explicitly against us and this can be proved by the following examples. For one year, since this is a closed session, I can say this, we had the advantage in aircraft, tanks, *Lunas* /surface-to-surface missiles/, which our enemies did not have and even when, under the pressure from the public opinion, a flight ban was introduced, at first it was introduced for a month and instead of finishing the job then, a certain commander recited poetry and opened exhibitions instead of me, that is my turf, instead of concentrating on working with the air force, and the job was not done. Instead, we were shelling cities. Gentlemen, shelling cities is not a solution.

"Dubrovnik was very damaging for us. Because of a bullet fired from some window, we destroyed the building, so how can the world support us when we do things like this.

"What Milošević is doing to us is horrible, but we have contributed to it and in a way, given him an alibi. The case with Šešelj ... Šešelj was given a great deal of publicity by all our state media here. Šešelj may be 100% right, but gentlemen, he cannot be brought here, by international standards it is inappropriate to bring in a representative of the opposition of a neighbouring state, even if the state is one on which you depend, and for him to say things such as he said about President Milošević in public. It is natural that after this President Milošević will justify the blockade, even perhaps, God forbid, recognise Bosnia and Herzegovina. He will say, 'Look, what they're doing to me.'

"We must not do this; we must not behave this way. ... We did all sorts of things to UN convoys, robbed goods and requisitioned petrol.

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“I suggest that the Ministry of Information urgently work out a strategy for a media war that we will conduct for the benefit of Republika Srpska...”²⁸⁰ English 0410-1767 – 0410-1772-ET

281. 3th Extraordinary Session, 23-24 May 1995. Presiding [Krajsnik]:

“Don’t hold it against me, but if I could just make a comment. I think that Mr. Grahovac and Mr. Kelečević said what almost every participant here thinks, and I would like to thank them on my behalf, even though the truth is hard to bear sometimes. It isn’t pleasant to listen to this because it hurts us, but it is the truth.”²⁸¹ English 0410-1777-ET

282. 3th Extraordinary Session, 23-24 May 1995. Bosiljčić:

“Mr. President, deputies and colleagues. As a deputy, I will say that I was unexpectedly pleased when there were deputies like Zlatko Kelečević who said something openly and sincerely even if it diverged slightly from an official statement.”²⁸² English 0410-1786-ET

283. 3rd Extraordinary Session, 23-24 May 1995. Karadžić:

“Mr. Kelečević’s speech was rather good, if I may say so, neither Gvero nor I nor anyone else has the right to praise people, but I would like to say that I agree with many things that were said, but I cannot agree completely that we should have treated Churkin differently. ... Churkin and Kozirev are America’s men. They are not Russia’s and this will become obvious soon because I hope that Kozirev will soon fall.”²⁸³ English 0410-1806 - 1410-1807-ET

284. 3rd Extraordinary Session, 23-24 May 1995. Momir Tošić:

“Let’s see what the international factor says, how we’re assessing the international factor, what they will say about Skradin if we now say that Bihać should be taken, that Orašje should be taken. I believe that that we need to break up and lift the enclaves – maybe this is the easiest task – in

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Srebrenica and Žepa and so on. But we need to know what our goal is and use our forces to strike...”²⁸⁴ English 0410-1781-ET

285. 3rd Extraordinary Session, 23-24 May 1995. Karadžić:

“We really could not do /?much/ about Goražde, I explained this last time, because the Army would have accused us of halting the operation, while they could have taken the right bank of the river in the town of Goražde itself. We stopped when it became clear that we could not take that right bank. We tell you categorically that the Army was never stopped if it could complete a job. It was stopped and we accepted truces when it turned out that we had no more strength left at that time.

“I have to tell you that despite our superiority in weapons and other things, there were some things that we could not capture since the start of the war. For example, we could not take Dobrinja, we took the two areas of Dobrinja, but we could not take the centre. We attacked Žuč Hill in Sarajevo with heavy artillery for 90 days, completely destroyed it and then showed up and the Turks /derogatory for Muslims/ were still in the trenches waiting for us, just like we are waiting in Dobož. /?We should not let the Turks wait on Žuč like that/, like we are not waiting in Bihać, but the troops that are returning to take the territory cannot engage in combat, they go forward for two days and the Turks are nowhere to be found, so, our troops withdrew deep into the territory.”²⁸⁵ English 0410-1806 – 0410-1807-ET

286. 3th Extraordinary Session, 18 May 1996. Milorad Dodik:

“... regarding the shelling of Zagreb. I agree that we should strike Zagreb, but we cannot say that. If we were to say that, and if we were to broadcast it in that way, then it should have been run by a cautious editor. If we do not hold someone responsible here today, regardless of whether this is the editor of the television station, or a minister, or the prime minister, or someone else, all we have done today is purely give hollow statements.”²⁸⁶ English 0410-1827-ET

287. 3th Extraordinary Session, 18 May 1996. Presiding [Krajišnik]:

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“As for the demolition of churches, I think that our Ministry has taken a stand and that the Government has also taken a clear stand. It would not be good for the Parliament to take a stand, let me just say why: just because we will make the people there resentful. So many people have been killed, the statement of our Ministry of Religion is very measured, and that is good and that is political, the Parliament shouldn't do this again, even though I agree that it is good that we stated it.”²⁸⁷ English 0410-1914-ET

288. 51st Session, 14-15 June 1995. The Chair [Krajišnik]:

“It is the view of both the GŠ /Main Staff/ and this Parliament that we will not allocate areas to the members of UNPROFOR on our territories, although, truth be told, we sometimes do need to capture some hostages. This is a request from the UNPROFOR for a base to be set up for an UNPROFOR company in Ilijaš, which means that this is a negative answer, that we cannot answer that. The answer will be the same as we had done before.

Who's in favour of it not being granted?

Anyone against?

Anyone abstaining?

Thank you very much.”²⁸⁸ English 0215-3925 – 0215-4164-EDT, pp. 141-142.

289. 51st Session, 14-15 June 1995. Tomo Kovač:

“You all know there was a period when we traded with Herceg-Bosna, we even had military cooperation, and we must give, I think only this organ can give any classifications about this, because a question will be raised, what happened to the vast amounts of ammunition and hardware we gave to Herceg-Bosna, what about the vast trade, what about the other trade we effected, if all that was a failure and if all that was aiding the enemy, then all of us who took part in that must answer for it, the Government, and the GŠ /Main Staff/, and the MUP and everybody else. ... I'm afraid tomorrow we will accuse those that cooperated with Serbia if we continue like this what sorts of labels we will put on people, so the year 1949 will repeat itself all the time, some cleansing, when it suits someone /as written/.”²⁸⁹ English 0215-3925 – 0215-4164-EDT, p. 308.

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290. 51st Session, 14-15 June 1995. Karadžić:

“I must say that we decided to opt for an aggravation of the situation, and the Supreme Command and I as the Commander and with the Main Staff, we agreed that the worst for us is a war of low intensity, long duration etc., and that we have to heat up the situation, take whatever we can, create a fiery atmosphere and dramatize, threaten an escalation etc. because we noticed that whenever we advance on Goražde, on Bihać or elsewhere or if the situation escalates around Sarajevo, then the internationals come and diplomatic activity speeds up. We did that around Sarajevo, we took these artillery pieces, there are four artillery pieces, maybe they weren't crucial, but they resulted in the well-known bombing that unfortunately caused us material damage because we didn't disperse these weapons, although that would have been possible and dreadful had the depots been full, there would have been great, massive damage, which was significant anyway.”²⁹⁰

English 0215-3925 – 0215-4164-EDT, p. 343.

291. 51st Session, 14-15 June 1995. Karadžić:

[Karadžić refers to the time when UNPROFOR soldiers were detained, tied to telephone and flag poles, shown on television internationally, and eventually released.]

“We ordered the arrest, we didn't go into detail as to when they would be tied up, but it had a good effect, it was very shocking for the world, now it's easy, when they ask us if that was a nice gesture, I ask if it's a nice gesture to bomb the Serbian rear and frighten our children and old people /and force them/ to flee, then nobody has a reply. So, you don't respond with a response but with a counter-question and they have nothing to say. As you know, this led to a horrible heating up, there were condemnations too, even from Yugoslavia etc.

“At one point we realised and made the assessment when they managed to describe them as hostages, that we would have a dramatically ... spoil in our hands and result in a negative effect and a justification for a possible military intervention of large military dimensions where we would

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lose our state. ... We decided it would be better to get Serbia involved and to strengthen her position in the world, by which we slightly, just a little bit, weakened ourselves as negotiators, but we certainly gained tenfold, as far as Serbia herself is concerned.

“... [We] couldn't let them all go at once, but in proportions, we even left 15 until the end of this week so we could keep the weapons we have in Sarajevo, knowing about the offensive and planning to do something in Sarajevo. Now any return of weapons is out of question because of this offensive, so that, in a way, we even somewhat benefited from this whole crisis.”²⁹¹ English 0215-3925 – 0215-4164-EDT, pp. 343- 345.

292. 51st Session, 14-15 June 1995. Karadžić:

“...our last great success was the recapture of the Serbian municipality of Bihać, or that /?location/, and after that we have all those minor failures and our even more minor rectifications of these failures through partial recaptures etc., but there – and we concluded that last night at the meeting – there are several reasons for that. One reason is the lack of supplies in our military, but last night we openly and fairly outlined that it has nothing to do with inability or negligence on the part of the state, since we were often accused as a state, but rather with the difficulties we have encountered following the blockade by the FRY. We still lack some materials and matters to produce some calibres, and it turned out that we didn't have them both because of the blockade, but also because they had some breakdowns in some factories in Serbia, and you immediately felt the lack of this material to produce this. We are determined to do everything to more or less use all foreign currency reserves only on that, and I hope we will succeed in that.”²⁹² English 0215-3925 – 0215-4164-EDT, p. 349.

293. 51st Session, 14-15 June 1995. Karadžić:

“Humanitarian aid is also very important because we are getting enormous amounts of aid, and out of that aid about 50% of the aid, I don't know how much – Ministers, is that how much the army is getting, which is not something that should go beyond this hall. I think the international organisations know that, but there, in some way, they do it and Prof.

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Koljević, Dr. Kalinić and Mr Vladučić are indeed true martyrs."²⁹³ English 0215-3925 – 0215-4164-EDT, p. 350.

294. 52nd Session, 6 August 1995. Karadžić:

"As you know, we had a success in Srebrenica and Žepa. There are no objections or remarks on that success. Of course, many stupid things were done afterwards, because many Muslim soldiers were wondering around in the woods and we suffered casualties then. Still, we did not suffer any casualties during the action. We had a success in Žepa, though Žepa took us at least 15 days. We wasted a lot of time there so that we lost Glamoč and Grahovo in the meanwhile."²⁹⁴ English ET 0215-4171 – 0215-4296, p. 19.

295. 52nd Session, 6 August 1995. General Gvero:

"By solving the problem of Žepa, dear gentlemen, we got two brigades from the Drina Corps in the area of the 2nd Krajina Corps. By solving the problem of Srebrenica we also got adequate reserves and we did it in the period of time for which we estimated that the international community would not react, which was immediately after the events that took place in the Western Slavonija. That was the main reason why we did it and that was one of the strategic decisions of the GŠ [*General Staff*] which we realised taking the best chance and suffering the least possible casualties while using maximum of rationalisation and forces at the time when the same Drina Corps had a brigade deployed at Sarajevo front and when we did not take any other units of MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ or units from other areas of responsibility except for the units of the Drina Corps. I do not know whether I have understood well the President of the Republic, but I think that Žepa and Srebrenica have nothing to do with the loss of positions in Glamoč and Grahovo."²⁹⁵ English ET 0215-4171 – 0215-4296, pp. 38-39.

296. 52nd Session, 6 August 1995. General Gvero:

"When the problem of Srebrenica was solved and the international public made a pressure, we also received an instruction from the President of the State Committee for Co-operation with UNPROFOR. I talked with him

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every day because I had to lead the entire psychological and propaganda activities related to the operations in Žepa and Srebrenica. And, I did it. We contacted UNPROFOR 50 times. We were told to try to solve the problem of UNPROFOR so that we would not get blamed for taking hostages again, bearing in mind the situation that we had after the bombing. So, we did it in accordance with the existing accords and agreements."²⁹⁶ English ET 0215-4171 – 0215-4296, pp. 43-44.

297. 52nd Session, 6 August 1995. Karadžić:

"Lieutenant Colonel Milutinović has given information to foreign agencies. There is information that he has sold information. I do not care if he took 25 thousand German Marks or not, but he has given disastrous pictures to foreign agencies – pictures that could cost Mladić his life if they were presented in The Hague. They broadcast whatever they want and they have recorded corpses of women in the streets of Srebrenica after which they broadcast that on foreign media."²⁹⁷ English ET 0215-4171 – 0215-4296, p. 77.

298. 52nd Session, 6 August 1995. General Tolimir:

[He speaks of the first Serbian effort to take Goražde at the time of the London Conference in August 1992. He then begins this excerpt by discussing a second assault on Goražde, in spring 1993.]

"For the second time from Goražde, General Mladić was awakened on your order (*speaking to Karadžić*), at 3:00 a.m. And later we all went together to /in Belgrade/, when I and General Mladić and everyone else, and President Krajišnik also, were opposed to breaking off the offensive against Goražde. "We all know what was the role Goražde played during the London Conference. ... On a different occasion, General Mladić was called away from Goražde at three o'clock in the morning upon your order and later on we all went to Milošević. All of us, including General Mladić, Chairman Krajišnik and myself were against the idea to accept the cessation of the offensive against Goražde. I hope you are not going to stop us for the third time when we attack Goražde this time."²⁹⁸ English ET 0215-4171 – 0215-4296, p. 111.

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299. 52nd Session, 6 August 1995. General Tolimir:

"The second thing I want to say refers to what you said about Žepa. General Mladić came to Žepa by helicopter and left again and Krstić and myself were given a task that we carried out properly. I think that Generals should not be faulted on Žepa, on the contrary the issue of Žepa was solved, and I already explained what we created and what reserves we made by its liberation."²⁹⁹ English ET 0215-4171 – 0215-4296, p. 112.

300. 52nd Session, 6 August 1995. Karadžić:

"You remember that I urgently convened a meeting of the Supreme Command and all mayors. We decided to dress the police officers as civilians who would say that a part of those three kilometres belongs to them. This is not the way to treat your state. If we had entered Srebrenica when MORION [*General Morillon, French UNPROFOR Commander*] was there, they would have bombed us, they would have launched a bomb blanket attack against us, and scorched us.

"The time had come and I signed Directive No. 7 to capture Teočak, Srebrenica, Žepa and Goražde. The Directive was signed and we embarked on it. You described that in your cable message, and I was surprised why Tolimir shows such a respect of the President of the Republic. You reported that the President of the Republic was very pleased and encourages the Army to go on. Then people told me that you are trying to involve me, so I could not say that I am not in favour of that. I was in favour of all the decisions that we made and I support them. All the decisions are recorded in the Supreme Command, I ordered in verbal and written form to attack Žepa and Srebrenica."³⁰⁰ English ET 0215-4171 – 0215-4296, p. 115.

301. 53rd Session, 28 August 1995. Karadžić:

"Between Grmeč and Kozara -- I think Milošević must also know that, foreign negotiators have also been told this, between Grmeč and Kozara nothing can belong to anyone but us, because genocide was committed there, Serbian people have been killed there and the number of Muslims grew 50%

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because of the genocide and not because of some natural development. Genocide was also committed in the Neretva Valley."³⁰¹ English 0215-4299 – 0215-4440-ET, p. 70.

302. 54th Session, 15-16 October 1995. Jovan Spremo:

"Many of our men who were arrogant and irresponsible, drank a couple of glasses of brandy and said, let me throw one and then sowed chaos in the town by throwing hand grenades on civilians. Gentlemen, we never wanted to admit that those were our grenades. I know that neither the Supreme Command, nor the main Staff gave such orders, but some arrogant and irresponsible persons did it. We should have and should in the future admit that things like this happened, but let's say that irresponsible individuals did it who should be arrested. We should have had a trial, a mock trial, look at what Mr. Tudjman's doing."³⁰² English 0215-4446 – 0215-4613-ET, p. 38.

303. 54th Session, 15-16 October 1995. Milorad Dodik:

"Our ruin started in Bihać sometime around the New Year. ... It was euphorically presented to us that we were already entering the town and so on. Establishment of the peace process at that time and the ceasefire were a disaster for RS. This is my view and I don't propose that the Assembly should adopt it, but it's true. The biggest mistake of the war is Srebrenica and Žepa and someone should be made responsible for it. We shouldn't have given up the areas where we could have scored diplomatic points; instead, we created a diplomatic disaster. Who is responsible for it? We made it legal for protected areas to be captured before the eyes of the International Community and then five days later we clamoured that no one should strike against the protected area of the RSK, although five days earlier, we did what we did. We lost a position that we could have defended."³⁰³ English 0215-4446 – 0215-4613-ET, pp. 30-31.

304. 54th Session, 15-16 October 1995. General Milovanović:

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"Delegate Dodik: 'The only solution for the RS is a cease-fire.' I agree with that, but not at all costs. That means that we'll have to fight.

"He said that our biggest mistakes were Srebrenica and Žepa because we captured the protected areas, but now we /?complain/ that we're being attacked from protected areas. At a later date, smart people will probably decide if Srebrenica and Žepa were mistakes. I know at this time that if we hadn't taken Srebrenica and Žepa, we wouldn't now have Romanija, speaking from a military point of view. I won't discuss the political aspects and the methodology of capturing Žepa and Srebrenica; I wasn't there. I was informed of it just as you were. I was on the western borders of RS."³⁰⁴
English 0215-4446 – 0215-4613-ET, p. 74.

305. 54th Session, 15-16 October 1995. Karadžić:

"I have examined, approved and signed seven directives. No one submitted the eighth and the ninth to me, not even to read it, let alone to sign it, because General Gvero and the others wrote whom they should obey. I cannot be held responsible for the events from the 8th and 9th directive, I will not stand for that, I must tell you that. Do I need to tell the people as well, so they would get frightened, and I ask the journalists not to write about that. I must mention an example here again from that trial in Nuremberg, when a great German lawyer that was convicted was justifying himself, he was justifying himself before his American colleague and the President of the Tribunal, he said, I didn't know it would come to that... No, Sir, colleague, with the first case that you made you transgressed against the law and humanity, I don't care how big your mistakes are."³⁰⁵ English 0215-4446 – 0215-4613-ET, p. 85.

306. 54th Session, 15-16 October 1995. Karadžić:

"As the Supreme Commander, I stood behind the plan for Žepa and Srebrenica, mainly for Srebrenica, Žepa was implied. Gentlemen, we would lose the war if there were 90 thousand armed Muslims in Žepa, we would lose the war. I personally supervised the plan without the knowledge of the GŠ [*General Staff*], not even hiding /anything/ but I happened to run into General Krstić and advised him to go straight into town and to pronounce

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the fall of Srebrenica, and later we will chase the Turks around the woods. I approved an /?immediate/ task and a radical task and I don't regret it."³⁰⁶
English 0215-4446 – 0215-4613-ET, p. 88.

307. 58th Session, 1-2 April 1996. Miroslav Vještica:

"I was lucky enough to have been personally able to arm the entire population of Mount Grmeč, I gave each of them a rifle, and praise be to God, some even a hand-held rocket launcher, some the 120, some the 82, and some the 60mm mortar. All that because in that war, between 1941 and 1945, a terrible genocide occurred, twelve thousand Serbs from the Krupa municipality were killed in that war. I was fortunate so far to have worked with you in this state. However, I also had the great misfortune of leading the brigade for the first two months, I came to Una, took Krupa, took everything. This Assembly decided that it would be the state boundary, fortifications went up there, mine field, and so on."³⁰⁷ English 0215-5078 – 0215-5264-EDT, p. 40.

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Introduction

Leaders and delegates held strong and largely similar views about the importance of achieving demographic change. The passages below show the thought given to instigating demographic changes to the benefit of the Bosnian Serbs using various strategies.

308. 3rd Session, 11 December 1991. Vojo Kuprešanić:

“I personally think that our living space and the territory in which we live and work is endangered and we have to avert that danger. Actually we have to prevent Muslims from moving into our territories and regions. In Cazinska Krajina there are between 250,000 and 300,000 Muslims in a very small space. We can simply shut them off in that ring and it does not suit us at all for them to join us. It is even suitable for us that they are a separate Krajina, the Cazinska Krajina, which will absolutely depend on us in economic terms. Every square metre of Serb land will reach astronomical prices in a short time, and our policy must absolutely be such as to put them in such a situation.”³⁰⁸ English SA02-4931 – SA02-5059-ET, p. 27. Also 0093-3338

309. 4th Session, 21 December 1991. Goran Zekić:

“We need to be particularly aware of another issue – genocide against Serbian people, because many areas were depopulated thanks to the certain enemies of ours that have arisen once again. That crime must not be allowed to benefit anybody, either. This is particularly true in the case of the Bosnian Krajina, and more specifically the area of Kozara and some other areas where our community is majority, but only just. And this is all because of the genocide.”³⁰⁹ English 0093-9655

310. 4th Session, 21 December 1991. Rajko Dukić:

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“I suggest we should emphasize that although Serbs are second in terms of population size, they own 64% of the territory of BiH.”³¹⁰ English 0093-9655

311. 7th Session, 15 February 1992. Karadžić:

“As for majorities, many areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain undefined, because no one knows what the majority is. I think it is necessary for it to say: areas where we are a majority. With one of our partners we have agreed that where they constitute a relative majority we shall define the areas as theirs, and where we constitute this relative majority, ours.”³¹¹ English 0305-5786, p. 20.

312. 8th Session, 25 February 1992. Milutin Najdanović:

“What we must do as of today is to communicate to the Serbian people that it must be prepared for territorial exchanges, for relocation of populations. The familiar tune of ‘betrayal of the Serbian people’ is easily invoked these days. Regardless of the pain, the global goals of the nation must take priority. We must be ready to give some crags in Kraina for other crags, only this time from Metković to Dubrovnik. And this means gaining access to the sea. The future Serbian state must not be a geographic monster either, whose one part may not communicate with the other, to be one country with Bangladesh. ... The birthrate issue should be our priority, second only to the resolution of the state issue. We must do everything to motivate the Serbian women to bear children.”³¹² English 0084-0454

313. 9th Session Deputy Club Meeting, 28 February 1992. Karadžić:

“... and it is not our goal for Croatia to cease to exist. It is our goal for Croatia to consolidate its territory, but it is clear to every Serb that Croats and Serbs cannot live in a single state. Consequently, they cannot be in the same army, and also that BH cannot have its army. There would remain national guards in each of the republics, and the police which would be under the control of the respective republics. We discussed a little about the principles on which Serbian-Croatian relations in general could be resolved as regards the Krajinas. They think that the best solution would be to relocate the population. The Europeans’ hair stands on end at the thought. They deem that there are 150,000 to 250,000 Serbs in barren wasteland, that they are very poor, etc., and that we would give the richest

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farmsteads in Vojvodina, as if the people from Vojvodina would be willing to go to the barren wasteland. That's an unrealistic picture."³¹³ English 0096-8091

314. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Plavšić:

"Unfortunately we can count on Serbia less and less, which is already exhausted by receiving our refugees and those wounded, while itself is also in a difficult situation and under a blockade. That is why we have to create conditions for domestic military and forced emigration and we cannot do that without territories. We have to remind foreign countries to remember how difficult it is to give up what has been conquered. The last thing that can be allowed for is a compromise at the expense of conquered territories."³¹⁴ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 39.

315. 17th Session, 24-26 July 1992. Karadžić:

"What shall we do if we get the country in which we make a minority? What shall we do if we get killed on account of some river or a hill and in such a way again get to have an enemy in our own country? As Mr Kuprešanin is saying, there are speculations in Europe, in an unofficial, secret way, through jokes, through foreign journalist's questions, foreign diplomats statements, there are speculations that Europe does not want and must not allow for an Islamic state to be created here, that is our great problem, that is our greatest problem. They want to keep us and the Croats in one unitary state so that we control the Muslims, and we cannot control the Muslims in such a unitary state.

"We know very well what the fundamentalism is and that we cannot live together, there's no tolerance, they quadruple through the birth-rate, and we Serbs are not up to that. Not only are the Serbs not up to that but the Christians in Lebanon are not up to that Oriental mentality stemming from Islam. Therefore, we cannot do that. Neither Serbs nor Croats together can control through the birth-rate the penetration of Islam into Europe, since in 5-6 years Muslims would make 51% of the population of inner Bosnia. Therefore, even if we had good relations with Croats, although we do not get on well in a unitary state, and I guess we shall get on well when we separate from the unitary state. So, if they don't want any kind of Islamic state in the Balkans, then it is less likely that they will want a pure Islamic state, that is to say an Islamic canton, a Muslim canton on Bosnian territory. There is truth in what Mr Kuprešanin has said, although nobody in Europe will say it

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openly, that this conflict was roused in order to eliminate the Muslims."³¹⁵ English ET 0214-9496 – 0214-9600, p. 87.

316. 27th Session, 3 April 1993. Branko Simić:

"Lately, I have noticed a rather serious political problem. That is the problem of displacement of non-Serbian population. There are no unique criteria or legal acts about it in the Republika Srpska. A terrible chaos unfolded in the wake of our inappropriate approach to this, in my view, serious political issue. I do not know what you think about it? I think that there should be as few of them as possible among us. We should enable them to go away as soon as possible, and wish them a nice trip. However, due to the lack of proper legislation, there is the impression that we are preventing them to get out of here.

"I think that the Banja Luka municipality did the best thing. Only three documents are required for the non-Serbian citizenship to move out of Banja Luka. The Ministry of National Defence adopted 14 legal acts concerning the displacement. According to the law, even the payment of PTT services is required before one can leave the territory of the RS. On the other hand, some military commands impose their own criteria. Some of the Serbian municipalities even charge the bridge toll. For instance, in Bosanska Gradiška, Muslims pay 100 German Marks per person to cross the bridge. That is called a bridge toll. Gentlemen, if only the RS had enough money, we would pay them to go away."³¹⁶ English ET 0215-0084 - 0215-0106, pp. 34-35.

317. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Velibor Ostojić:

[Velibor Ostojić, Minister without Portfolio, heads a commission charged with facilitating the resettlement of refugees.]

"We were aiming to achieve our goal, which was ethnical - geographical continuity of Serb population, while accommodating the refugees, and actually we were building new demographic politics for the RS. With this aim, we had two tasks. Those are to as soon as possible shelter and accommodate displaced persons and to find them jobs so that the economical consolidation and later on political integration of their lives in the area would move on."³¹⁷ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, p. 213.

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318. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Velibor Ostojić:

“... for the first time we started thinking about demographic politics and if we would analyse anti-Serbian politics we could see how meticulously and on long-term it is. This job contains one more program, one more duty of a state, and that is a stimulation of birth rate. Gentlemen, we need people to cover the territories we have and it should be done in accordance with following criteria.

“We should at first, strategically, cover the communications, riversides, towns, and places of strategic importance and to move the people from one to another place where they would have similar living conditions. Thank you.”³¹⁸
English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, p. 213.

319. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Dobroslav Milinković:

[He speaks in support of the Union of Three Republics, but rejects return of refugees and sees further population transfers.]

“Alija is offering and promising that everyone can go back to their own homes. Gentlemen, there is no Serbian state in the Bosnian pot without gradual depopulation and relocating. If we want ethnically pure Serbian state, and we do, don't we, if we all know and emphasise that we cannot live with them, then we have to realise that these draft maps are offering exactly that and there has to be relocation.”³¹⁹ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, pp. 33-34.

320. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. General Djukić:

“ I am not worried about Muslim enclaves in our areas. Smart state politics in future will resolve this successfully, I am worried about the areas that are surrounded by them or under international administration, and they are counted under 53% area that was given to us, I am thinking about Sarajevo here before anything else. ... I have to say, and I am saying this so it would be easier for you to make conclusions, that majority of Serbs left Sarajevo.”³²⁰ English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, p. 122.

321. 34th Session, 27 August – 1 October 1993. Karadžić:

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"There are 500-600 Serbs down south of Bihać. That is all. And we have preserved 250.000 places of the living space where Muslims use to live."³²¹
English ET 0215-0508 – 0215-1073, p. 80.

322. 37th Session, 10 January 1994. Vojislav Maksimović:

"What I would really like to see here, is a firm attitude that the Muslims and the Croats will not be allowed to return to the areas under our rule. Accordingly, we should not return to the areas that will be under the Croatian rule. ... I do not care if the Muslims will live at all, where they will live, whether they will have a country or not. I am not interested in that. The only thing I am interested in is my people and the territory where my people live. Therefore, any thought about having 500 or more Muslims within our future country is out of the question."³²²

323. 39th Session, 24-25 March 1994. Karadžić:

"It can happen that either they will try to dump all the Muslims on us or they will try to divide Bosnia as Sandžak – one half to Serbs, one half to Croats. In that case they will try to dump Tuzla on us. We may be in a position to have to accept that. But we will delimit /sic/ them in some kind of autonomous province of theirs from which they will not be able to move freely and settle in our areas."³²³ English ET 0215-2251 – 0215-2477, p. 91

324. 39th Session, 24-25 March 1994. Miroslav Toholj:

[This passage refers to the Serbian Civic Council that had just been formed in Sarajevo by Mirko Pejanović and other Bosnian Serbs who had remained loyal to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.]

"The deputies of the RS NS /Republika Srpska National Assembly/ at its 39th regular session have taken notice of the attempt of the Muslim authorities to manipulate with the part of the Serbian people whom they keep as ethnic hostages in towns under their occupation. It was not difficult to see through what the original purpose was of depriving the Serbs of their civil rights in the Muslim part of Sarajevo, in Tuzla, Zenica, and other towns from the beginning of the war. The purpose of establishing the ethnically humiliating and allegedly Serbian consulting

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councils; it is not difficult either to see through what the real background is of the latest establishment of the so-called assembly of citizens of Serbian ethnicity [*Serbian Civil Council*]."³²⁴ English ET 0215-2251 – 0215-2477, p. 101.

325. 39th Session, 24-25 March 1994. Velibor Ostojić:

We have to deal with this problem first, in order to establish the geographic continuity of the Serbian population in RS area. There are four areas that are extremely sensitive and which should be worked on. The first one is old Herzegovina, in the area of Srbinje, Višegrad, Rogatica. The second one is Birač in the areas of Vlasenica, Bratuna, Zvornik. The third one is Posavina, in two directions – along the Sava River and outskirts of Trebava, Vlačić, etc. The fourth one is the Sana – Una area, and the fifth one is Vrbas area. The Sana – Una area Krupa, Novi Prijedor and Ključ, Sanski Most up to Ključ, and the Vrbas are on the direction of Kupres – Srbobran – Jajce. We lack the population.³²⁵ English, ET 0215-2251 – 0215-2477 p 173.

326. 39th Session, 24-25 March 1994. Lukić:

"We succeeded in carrying out the homogenous relocation of refugees in the beginning of the war. I think that we should be more flexible in reference to this issue since it is going to be increasingly difficult to relocate complete villages in the forthcoming period."³²⁶ English ET 0215-2251 – 0215-2477, p. 267.

327. 41st Session, 31 May – 1 June 1994. Radoslav Brđjanin:

"First of all, gentlemen, you cannot fool me that you believe in the greatest wonder of the world such as that Brđjanin could participate in a process of return of Croats and Muslims. I openly say from this floor that half of our towns would belong to Muslims now if it were not for such fools as Brđjanin and similar people. ... I really did get angry just because of few things, because you mentioned Muslims and Croats, etc."³²⁷ English ET 0215-2617 – 0215-2798, pp. 46-47.

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328. 42nd Session, 18-19 July 1994. General Tolimir:

“The territorial solution implies the moving out of more than 300 thousand Serbs, including those who have to leave the areas belonging to our enemies, as well as the part of Serbs who have already left once the territory controlled by our enemies. This also includes the process of moving out from the RSK [*Republic of Serbian Krajina*] since there are already such indicators and fear because of the Corridor that the traffic through the Corridor has already been reduced because of the specific status and relations of international factors regarding Brčko.”³²⁸
English ET 0215-2810 – 0215-3020, p. 52.

329. 46th session, 23 November 1994. Karadžić:

“We have created new realities. Speaking in narrow terms, Zvornik used to be 60:40 to the advantage of Muslims, but the Serbs from Zenica came, they occupied Kozluk, the Muslims left for Europe and I do not know where else. And then those gentlemen told us – who gives you a right to ask for Zvornik. We said that the whole Bosnia was the Serbian land. That is the history, but it is not what we are interested in. This war has created the new reality, there are now the Serbs from Zenica here. If you want to give Zvornik to the Muslims then you have to wage a new war in order to expel these Serbs back to Zenica. We request Zvornik according to this right. We use the same right to ask for our state.”³²⁹
English ET 0215-3243-0215-3549, p. 30 of Second Part (after first 110 pages)

330. 53rd Session, 28 August 1995. Vidić and Chairman Krajišnik:

“I am afraid about what is happening in Banjaluka. I don’t like the Croats and Muslims, I especially don’t like the Croats, but I am afraid of what is happening. Something that the whole world considers is the biggest crime, the crime of expulsion, is going on. Why? I don’t think it’s a bad thing if Croatian television is devoting so much attention to the expulsion of the Croats and Muslims from Banjaluka though I tell you that the fact that their television is broadcasting reactions from the world and foreign news agencies and TV reports is not at all benign.”

“(Chairman [*Krajišnik*]: Mr. Vidić, let’s try to concentrate on the agenda. I think we have strayed quite a way from the agenda. Keep your discussion limited

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to the negotiations. Do you have a suggestion for the negotiations, for us to bring this item to an end and to go on?"³³⁰ English 0215-4299 – 0215-4440-ET, p. 92.

331. 54th Session, 15-16 October 1995. Vojo Kuprešanin:

“This proposal, to go to the Assembly of Yugoslavia and request that the Serbs from these areas be allowed to settle in Yugoslavia. That the Muslims from Sandžak move here, that some Albanians from Kosovo move here, that some Muslims and Albanians from Montenegro move here, that's what the world and Europe want ... We should have another plan to force Yugoslavia to defend these areas, either to receive us there, or defend these areas.”³³¹ English 0215-4446 – 0215-4613-ET, p. 45.

332. 57th Session, 21 February 1996. Karadžić:

“We have to stand in front of our refugee population and be responsible for the property, that is to say, responsible for the settlement. This is very important to us, that we compensate those [*Serbs*] who fled from Drvar as much as we can, with the property which was abandoned by our enemies. Because, if they hadn't been our enemies, they wouldn't have abandoned it. Then we should say: ‘You, whose property this is, have nothing to do with this man any longer. Please talk to us, and we will see what we can do for you.’

“We will now ask that our property which was abandoned in Drvar be compensated, in order for us to be able to compensate their returnee. That means we have to make the law as complex as possible, or even get into an impossible situation where we cannot compensate it, and that we have to find a way to compensate it, but so that the refugee population feels assured that it has received it and that the State stands behind it.”³³² English 0215-4929 – 0215-5068-EDT, pp. 27-28.

333. 57th Session, 21 February 1996. Miskin:

“Regarding abandoned property, we are not distributing Serbian property. What do you mean Croatian, what Muslim? It is abandoned, so their treatment is the same as that of deserters.”³³³ English: 0215-4929 – 0215-5068-EDT, p. 84.

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334. 58th Session, 1-2 April 1996. Boško Maričić:

“The housing for the refugees is the basic human and humane issue. However, in the Brčko municipality it is a strategic issue, we need every inhabitant, every child, every woman, every soldier in the defence of the country, if we fill up the Brčko area, there will be no danger of anyone invading. I want to tell you that a decisive strategic battle is being fought in Brčko right now. I participated in negotiations with the Muslim – Croatian side near Doboj, I was part of the delegation there and I realised that the position of the Muslim – Croatian Federation has not changed one bit since 1991, they still want to attain the same goals, they haven’t changed their tactics, they don’t even disguise their intention of us living together.”³³⁴ English 0215-5078 – 0215-5264-EDT, p. 189.

335. 4th Extraordinary Session, 18 May 1996. Gojko Kličković:

“There will be care for refugees and displaced persons, i.e. a consistent, quick and efficient implementation of the Law on Abandoned Property and the Law on Refugees and Displaced Persons. We will certainly make sure to settle the parts of RS /Republika Srpska/ which are strategically the most important for us, as was mentioned in discussions at the previous meeting of the Club and the Main Board, so we will take into account where we must build, work, and settle /people/ first.”³³⁵ English 0410-2257 – 0410-2258-ET

336. 62nd Session, 17 August 1996. Academician Stevan Akramata (Belgrade), President of the Council on the Regional Plan of the RS:

“Only a rise in the birth rate, a rational distribution of the population, the populating of border areas and other uninhabited and inadequately inhabited areas, agricultural incentives aimed at keeping people connected to the land and encouraging them to cultivate every square foot of it, while relying on their own resources... and increasingly less dependent on... vital products can ensure political and any other independence and stability for the RS. This approach has been consistently applied in the Plan to a maximum.”³³⁶ English 0215-5411 -0215-5500, pp. 35-36.

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Endnotes

¹ “Uz sve ovo u sadašnjoj strukturi Skupštine Bosne i Hercegovine nema ustavno-pravne institucije koja bi štitila svaki od tri konstitutivna naroda Bosne i Hercegovine od preglasavanja. U bitnim pravima nacionalnih kolektiviteta istina jednim amandmanom na Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine iz 1990. uveden je Savjet za nacionalnu ravnopravnost u kome bi trebalo da se o tim pitanjima odlučuje koncenzusom. Savjet ni do danas nije konstituisan. Iako je Nacrt zakona o savjetu prije više mjeseci ušao u Skupštinsku procedure zakon je još nije donesen naprosto zbog toga što se koalicija SDA i HDZ proviti njegovom ustavno predodređenim ovlaštenjima. Po definiciji ustavnog amandmana Savjet bi trebalo da bude institucija u kojoj se prijedlozi i odluke donose na bazi konsenzusa odnosno pravo veta, a poslanici SDA i HDZ, insistiraju na zakonu koji bi propisao da se prijedlozi i odluke Savjeta donose dvotrećinskom većinom, i bez prava veta. To praktično znači da bi srpski poslanici mogli biti nadglasani u svim nacionalno relevantnim pitanjima. Nelegalni za nas ne važeći sastanak poslanika SDA i HDZ i dijela opozicije od 15. oktobra ove godine doslovno je negirao Savjetzja medjunacionalnu ravnopravnost kao ustavnu kategoriju. Utoliko što je odbacio regularni zahtjev srpskih poslanika da se platform Predsjedništva BiH i memorandum SDA upute na prethodno razmatranje i usaglašenje u Savjetu.

“Tim je ukonjena poslednja makoliko nedovoljna mogućnost da se srpskom narodu u Bosni i Hercegovini osigura suverenitet i nacionalna ravnopravnost.” BCS ERNs SA01-2119 - SA01-2120

² “Podjimo samo od toga da smo mi narod zajedno sa Crnogorskim narodom upravo taj koji je uložio ili založio svoju državu Jugoslaviju da bi sad sa aspekta ovoga trenutka rekli da smo bili ozbiljno prevareni i da ne kažem baš danas gotovo ugroženi. Mi smo eto taj državotvorni narod dovedeni zaista u poziciju jednostavno da o nama odlučuje daleko manjinski narod, upravo bolje reći oni narodi koji nisu nikad imali svoju državu u koji dabome nisu državotvorni narod.

“... mi danas moramo da kažemo upravo taj narod koji je Jugoslaviju najviše voleo i želeo da smo mi eto možda jedan od najnesrećnijih naroda što nam neko zaista na silu želi jednostrano da oduzme tu našu državu. I naravno zbog ovih činjenica samo sam neke napomenuo da ne govorim o žrtvama genocida gdje sam i bio učesnik u mnogim tim skupovima gdje smo

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eto bili prinudjeni da tek 50 godina progovorimo i da sahranimo te mošti svetih stradanika.

“U tom smislu verujući da ćemo mi zaista kao najbrojniji narod i po Zakonu verovatnoće što smo imali svoju državu, što smo imali svoju državotvornost biti sigurno i pometniji od drugih i sposobniji, a i ja se nadam srećniji, u tom smislu neka vam je srećan ovaj istorijski početak.”
BCS ERNs SA01-2145 - SA01-2146

³ “Postojeći ustavno- pravni poredak je uveliko narušen u Jugoslaviji i u Bosni i Hercegovini. Ugrožena su prava i bitni interesi srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini. Već dugo traje zavjera da se srpski narod kao konstitutivni narod u Bosni i Hercegovini, svede na nacionalnu manjinu. Pošto je srpski narod poučen tragičnim iskustvima u ovom vijeku, pogotovo, genocide izvršen nad njim, pošto prijeti opasnost od novih i sličnih tragičnih događaja, ustanovana je Skupština srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini.”
BCS ERN SA01-2139

⁴ “...srpski narod ne treba – već mora ... biti organizovan u državno-pravnom smislu u jednu cijelinu, u jednu zajedničku državu i sa drugim narodima koji žele da zajednički gradimo i našu volju, najbolji je način da to uradimo kroz Ustav. Zbog toga nam je potrebno da danas izaberemo ustavnu komisiju Skupštine srpskog naroda u BiH, koja bi trebalo da napravi model našeg ustava u kojem bi do punog izražaja došla suverenost srpskog naroda. Zadatak komisije bi bio da jasno razgraniči interese srpskog naroda od interese drugih naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini. Bitno je da se sačuva ustavnost i zakonitost u svakom pogledu.” BCS ERN SA01-2009

⁵ “Sve što budemo radili trebalo bi da imamo u vidu složene društveno-političke prilike u nas, a sva ponudjena rješenja mora da budu zasnovana na Ustavu i zakonu, da odražavaju interes srpskog naroda, ali i da se e odvijaju na štetu ostalih naroda u BiH. Gospodo, o svemu što budemo raspravljali u institucionalnom postupku, a tiče se nacionalnih interesa srpskog naroda, ako budemo preglasani – volja srpskog naroda biće iskazana kroz odluke Skupštine srpskog naroda Bosni i Hercegovini. Osnovni princip kojeg se, mislim, treba da držimo u našim aktivnostima – jeste da ne namećemo volju srpskog naređa drugim narodima. Treba da poštujemo opravdanu volju i muslimanskog i hrvatskog naroda, ali ne smijemo potojenjivati i svoje prednosti izražene kroz realni odnos političkih snaga u Bosni i Hercegovina i ne smijemo ustupati svoja prava drugima.” BCS ERN SA01-2010

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⁶ “Mi smo zastali 70 godina a više niti možemo, a na to nemamo niti pravo jer smo zbog toga zastoja platiti najveću cijenu. Zbog toga smo izgubili dvije države, izgubili još jednu državu srpskog stanovništva, izgubili smo slobodu, vladu i upravu nad samim sobom. Sada kada smo, čini se, na pravom putu nameće nam se rat na cjelokupnom prostoru postojeće Jugoslavije i to u stilu rat svih protiv sviju, ako koji slučajem ne može rat sviju protiv Srba. No, i pored te stalne opasnosti mi moramo završiti rat i nastaviti posao. Vrat ćemo se našim nacionalnim vrijednostim, državotvornosti, vjeri i moralu. Onima s kojim budemo življeli biće kao i nama, ali ne bolje nego nama. Pošto nam je najpreči posao stvaranje domovine prava po uzoru na najmodernija demokratska društva rukovodićemo se načelom podjele vlasti na zakonodavnu, izvršnu i sudsku.” BCS ERN SA01-2034

⁷ “Ja sam zato mišljenja da mi nemamo ni metra zemlje ovdje u ovoj Bosni koju se nekim ili bilo s kim možemo ireverzibilno nepovratno dijeliti. Kome ne valja s nama i medju nama neka traži prostor.” BCS ERNs SA02-5002 – SA02-5003. Also 0089-8298 - 0089-8299

⁸ “U krajnjem slučaju srpski narod ne priznaje da postoje tri istine koje treba da su ravnopravne u BiH, niti da objectivna štampa po BiH treba da znači ravnopravno zalaganje za sve tri opcije. Za srpski narod i jugoslovenski orijentisane građane politički postoji samo istina koja se u udarnom informativno-propagandnom smislu sastoji u aktivnom u demokratskom smislu ravnopravnosti naroda, zajednička država, ravnopravnost u BiH. ...“U okviru ukupnog života srpskog naroda u BiH informisanost je kao što znamo vrlo važan segment. Pošto već duže bosanskohercegovačka glasila imaju negativan pristup života srpskog naroda i to u kontinuitetu neophodno je hitno razviti informativni system srpskog naroda na ovom prostorima koji bi bio dio jugoslovenskog informativnog sistema.” BCS ERNs SA02-5016 and SA02-5018. Also 0089-8312 and 0089-8314

⁹ “Na ovo su naši partneri preko noći zaboravili, ono ušta su se zaklinjali, naime nacionalne osobnosti, nacionalnu ravnopravnost, naciju kao fundament pojedinačnog i kolektivnog života, a latili se građanskog principla pa umjesto nacionalnog stali da zagovaraju civilni ili građansko društvo. Naravno, ovaj princip bi bio svetogradje na nivou Jugoslavije, ali je za uzvrat Bogom dano rješenje za BiH.

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“S obzirom da bi se zbog specifične nacionalne konstelacije u BiH ovim putem moglo na pseudodemokratski način majorizovati jedna nacionalna zajednica, prije svega u bitnom pitanjima, mi ovu opciju nismo prihvatili i ne možemo prihvatiti. Jer, ni teorija, ni historijsko iskustvo ne pokazuju da je građanska dimenzija čovjeka i ljudi toliko snažna i u tolikoj mjeri po strani od nacionalne da bi se na njoj kao na sigurnoj osnovici mogao graditi cjelokupni individualni i kolektivni život.” BCS ERN 0089-8134

¹⁰ “Uprkos svemu tome i zarad mira u kući srpski narod kao cjelina i stranke koje ga zastupaju održavao je u najvećoj mogućoj mjeri saglasnost svojih postupaka na Ustavom i zakonom. ... Ne radi toga što smo mi spremni da budemo porobljeni, nego radi toga što su pregovori, razgovori i preuredjenju Jugoslavije u Bosne i Hercegovine u toku. Mi ne bježimo od demokratske transformacije Jugoslavije i BiH.” BCS ERNs 0089-8164 – 0089-8165

¹¹ “Mi imamo pravo i možemo da spriječimo bilo koga u svim mjestima u kojima smo imali plebiscite da se odvoji od Jugoslavije. Gdje god su Srbi glasali, bez obzira na to ima li ih 5% ili 55%, to je konstitutivni dio toga mjesta i te Republike. Gdje smo se god na svom plebiscite izjasnili da ostanemo u Jugoslaviji i to mjesto po našoj volji mora da ostane u Jugoslaviji, ako mi tako odlučimo, (aplauz) Mi, dakle, to možemo da spriječimo, ali radi mira u kući i radi drugog vrlo lošeg iskustva sa održavanjem naroda u Jugoslaviji, onih elemenata i onih naroda koji ne žele da ostanu u Jugoslaviji, mi smo spremni da se izvrši transformacija Bosne i Hercegovine u tom smislu da se omogući Muslimanima i Hrvatima, ako je to zaista želja, da olabava veze s Jugoslavijom, odnosno da potpuno izadju iz Jugoslavije.” BCS ERNs 0089-8202 – 0089-8203

¹² “Mislimo da bi rat u Bosni i Hercegovini doveo do istog rezultata, ... Tu bi se ono što su ljudi vijekovi a sticali u ovim naši čaršijama koje su od oduvijek na neki način bile i odvojene i zajedno poremetilo. Mi smo uvijek, i za vrijeme turske okupacije, imali i latinsku čaršiju, i srpsku čaršiju, i muslimansku čaršiju, i dobre odnose medju njima i autonomni život i njihov zajednički život. I, ne vidim zašto ne bismo to ponovo mogli da ostvarimo na miran način.” BCS ERN 0089-8207 – 0089-8208

¹³ “Današnji aktom mi činimo još jedan korak ka našem yavetovanju da svi Srbi žive u jednoj državi. ...

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“Ako bi napravili neku vrstu hijerarhije naših ciljeva onda bi van svake sumnje na prvom mestu trebalo da bude uspostavljanje jedinstvenog državnog prostora od teritorija gdje u većini žive Srbi. To mora da bude naš minimum.

“Svaka opcija koja razbija celinu toga prostora je neprihvatljiva!

“Jasno je da je opstanak jednog naroda na duži period bez država nemoguć. Danas mora da bude kristalno jasno svakom Serbinu: je li treća, nova ili krnja Jugoslavija državna forma koja treba da očuva etničku supstancu srpskog naroda ili je to posebna srpska država. Smeju li naše koncesije drugima da po treći put ometu integraciju srpskog naroda da spreče ozdravljenje srpskog nacionalnog bića i njegovo vraćanje sopstvenim korenima. Neka mi niko ne kaže da je homogenizacija srpskog naroda završen proces. Trebaće još vremena dok svi Srbi shvate zašto su Srbi i koji su im zajednički interesi.

“Dakle, može da se pravi neka nova federacija, konfederacija ili čak asocijacija država, ali u svakoj od tih kombinacija srpska jedinica mora da bude jedinstvena.” BCS ERNs 0224-1689 – 0224-1692

¹⁴ “Naše komšije su bile i ostale protiv zajedničkog života i zato ruše državu u kojoj smo da sada živjeli a nude nas neku minijaturu zajednice u kojoj bi nam po njihovoj mjeri krojili državu, pravo, slobodu, bolje reći oni bi nam uređivali život. Kažu da sa nama neće jer im ova zajednica u kojoj živimo liči na Veliku Srbiju i strašno nas zamjeraju zbog naših veza sa Srbijom i Crnom Gorom. Ali, mi njima i ne smijemo zamjeriti, što se npr. Hrvati vežu sa Njemačkom i drugim stranim zemljama germansko-ugarske provijencije, a naši dragi Muslimanima Turskom i drugim islamskim zemljama. Znači, ipak je za Muslimane bliži Irak nego Srbina iz Bosne i Hercegovine Srbija ” BCS ERN 0224-1709 – 0224-1710

¹⁵ “Ni jedan Srbin koji i malo drži do svog nacionalnog identiteta ne može pristati da bude pretrpljen u bezimenog gradjanina u Bosni k Hercegovini, Bosni i Hercegovini, kojoj bi svi gradjani bili isti, recimo zeleni. ... Dame i gospodo, ovim činom mi ne ispoljavamo nikakvu nacionalnu sebičnost niti učestvujemo u ostvarivanju navodnog velikodržavne hegemonije. Krajnje je vrijeme da se jasno i glasno obdije optužba da stvaramo Veliku Srbiju na račun drugih naroda. ...S druge strane Srbije, Crna Gora, ako hoćete i Hrvatska, po istom kriterijumu su u odnosu na Bosnu i Hercegovinu izrazito prikraćene. Pa zašto, po kojem pravu da sada egzisteraju Male Srbija, Bala Crna Gora, Mala Hrvatska a Velika Bosnia i Hercegovina i to Velika Bosna

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i Hercegovina pod stvarnom vlašću jednog naroda i jednoga čoveka. (aplauz).” BCS ERN 0224-1712- 0224-1714

¹⁶ “Idemo od toga da Makedonija neće sa nama idimo od toga da Muslimani neće sa nama, faktičko stanje jeste da mi moramo praviti svoju državu. Da li će se ona zvati Velika Srbija, da li će se zvati Ujedinjene srpske zemlje, segment te države će biti i Srpska Bosna i Hercegovina. Ona nema svog ustava, a ona neće Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine. Prema toma, gospodo pravnici, pravite nam ustav i nemojte nas zamajavati timeda ne možemo da po postojećem Ustavu da to radimo.” BCS ERN SA01-1678

¹⁷ “Ja ovdje ne prihvata bilo kakvo pravno suzdržavanje ja od naših pravnika ne tražim da me sputavaju u kršenju zakona nego da mi pomognu da ja te zakona kršim. Jer mi slušajući te zakone i slušajući pare pravnike doveli smo sebe do jedne inferiorne pozicije da ustvari često naše krupne ideje ne dobiju i adekvatnu pravnu usmjerenost. ... Mislim da ovdje u zaključcima nije naglašeno dovoljno autonomnosti.” BCS ERN SA01-1698 – SA01-1699

¹⁸ “Ako kažemo da smo u sastavu savezna država Jugoslavije i u konfederalnom odnosu u okviru Bosne i Hercegovine onda mi iritiramo eventualno izvršavanje secesije od savezne države. Mi samo podžavamo ingerencije savezne države sve do njihovih područja. Ni mi nećemo da se cijepa Bosna i Hercegovina, hoćemo da se transformiše. ”

“Clan 69 koji reguliše šta Republika obezbjedjuje, mi smo u pregovorima izmedju republike stalno govorili o zajedničkoj državi, i, da li ovdje to treba u vezi uredjenje i obezbjedjenja odbrane i svasti na Republiku, s tim da će se nešto odnositi i ne saveznu državu, da vidimo. Osnovi razlog je bio što mi u Bosni i Hercegovini ne možemo da ostanemo kako zamišlja Alija bez saveznog ustava, saveznih zakona, savezne vojske, saveznih inspekcija. Ali, ovdje možemo da kažemo suvereno uradjuje system odbrane i bezbjednosti sa pravom prenošenja dijela na saveznu državu.” BCS ERNs SA02-5336 - SA02-5337

¹⁹ “Dakle, ja nisam ni za bilo kakvu zajedničku instituciju zajedno s Muslimanima i Hrvatima BiH. Lično smatram da su oni nama prirodni neprijatelj. Vi već znate šta su prirodni neprijatelji, i, da mi više nikada ne možemo živjeti zajedno, niti možemo bilo šta zajednički raditi.” BCS ERN0081-6591 0081-6592

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²⁰ “Gospodo, ako uspijemo napraviti konfederalnu BiH to će biti tri države. I srpska država će napraviti savez sa srpskim državama, svi će imati jednu državu. U Jugoslaviji nam ne trabe starudija koju više niko neće da prihvatić. Prihvata Jugoslavija kao sprska država a ne Jugoslavija u kojoj će morati biti Makedonija, Slovenija i Hrvatska. I, nema ni interesuju Muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini. Meni interesuje srpski narod u Bosni i Hercegovini. Zato mislim da treba da budemo otvoreni i poštteni ovdje. Srpski narod bi trebalo da bude jedinstven sada, više nego ikada.“ BCS ERN 0081-6595

²¹ “Predsjedavajući ističe da je cilj da se u Srpskoj BiH niko ne osjeća u drugom položaju, mi ne želimo s nekim da vladamo. Nama niko ko s nama živi ne smeta i da ima ravnopravan tretman, ali je očito da će BiH biti podjeljena na tri etničke cjeline, tri republike, tri država, tri naroda Srba, Hrvata i Muslimana, a biće određenih naroda u manjini. U Srpskoj BiH drugi, kod Muslimana će u manjini biti Srbi.” BCS ERN SA01-1331

²² “U vezi s tim podsjećam da se nijesam mogao izboriti da u Ustav BiH udje stav da zemljište koje je u srpskom vlasništvu uživa najvišu zaštitu Republike srpskog naroda i da se od njega neće moći ne na koji način otudjivati, da je to zemljište kao činilac od najvećeg značaja, sto svjedoči i pitanje Muslimansmog glas, gdje ekonomisti, profesori Univerziteta u penziji izričito tvrde da su naše računice o toma koliko zemljišta pripisujemo da su u našem vlasništvu apsolutno netačne. Tamo je napisano, profesor, doktor, itd. i oni se pozivaju na neku nauku takodja.

Ja ću u subotu predložiti Zakon o zemljištu (o vlasništvu) i to veoma kratak. Molim da me podržite i da uopšte ne polazimo od nekakvih pravnih normi itd. jer ovo je borba za egzistenciju, a nije vrijeme rimskog ili nekog drugog prava.” BCS ERNs SA01-1210 – SA01-1211

²³ “Naravno protiv sebe imamo velike sile. Ali još uvijek te sile će se prilagodjavati sili srpskog naroda, odnosno njegove težnje da živi u svojoj državi, odnosno u savezu država, odnosno da živi onako kako hoće.” BCS ERN 0214-9510.

²⁴ “Ja predlažem da se sve ovo ima u vidu, da se izvrši izbor sudija srpske nacionalnosti, a ove možete skinuti. Mi smo išli sa najmanjim brojem, koji je predviđen prema sistematizaciji.

“Poštujući svu tu proceduru spisak ovih kandidata smo dostavili još prije dva mjeseca na usvajanje. Trebi reći da smo mi tada, u razgovoru sa

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predstavnicima Ministarstva za pravosuđe naše republike, dogovorili sa se ide sa izborom na nacionalnoj strukturi, ai da se taj broj znatno smanji. Mi smo, imajući u vidu nacionalnu zastupljenost, išli se predlogom od nekih 5% sudija druge nacionalnosti. Medjutim, ja u taj dio ne bih ulazio to odlučite vi kao poslanici, ali bih predložio molio bih da se izvrši izbor nespornih kadrova srpske nacionalnosti.” BCS ERN 0410-2032

²⁵ “Molim poslanika da se izjasne o Amandmanu 9.

“Teritoriju republike čine srpske etnicke cjeline uključujući i područja na kojima je izvršen genocid nad srpskim narodom. Granice Republike utvrđuju se i mijenjaju Plebiscitom tričetvrtinskom većinom glasača. Ovaj amandman zamjenjuje se članom 2. Ustava Republike Srpske.

“Ko je za ovaj amandman.

“Imali neko protiv. Nema.

“Imali neko suzdržan. Nema.

“Zahvaljujem se poslanicima.” BCS ERN 0422-6288

²⁶ "Skupština je zauzela stav da su Muslimani komunistička tvorevina i da predstavljaju vjersku skupinu turske orijentacije. ... Oni su nevjernici, narod koji nije narod, odnosno narod koji hoće da bude narod i nema nikakve argumente za naciju." BCS ERN 0214-9935.

²⁷ “Čini seda je prvi predloženi ustavni princip za sva vremena odagnao ono zbog čega je muslimanska strana i pvela ovaj rat, a to je unitarna BiH građanskog tipa. Za građanski tip države zalagala se muslimanska strana zato što se pouzdala u svoj visok natalitet i svoju brojnosti. Da smo prihvatili muslimanski prijedlog državotvornost srpskog naroda bila bi izgubljena za sva vremena, a mi bi smo postali nacionalna manjina u jednom islamskom društvu. Poznata je sudbina dimija tj. građana drugog i trećeg reda neislamskih naroda u islamskim društvima. Ona nam je poznata i iz našeg iskustva u onim opštinama u kojima muslimani čine nacionalnu većinu.” BCS ERN 0214-9941

²⁹ "... hoćemo li mi da potpisujemo da nam 200 hiljada vojnika dodje sa našom potpisom da nam okupira naše zemlje, a da ne govorim o 45% srpskog stanovništva u drugim provincijama koja treba da se iseljavaju ili da prime katoličanstvo ili da predju na islam." BCS ERN 0215-0064 -- 0215-0065.

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³⁰ "Ta rezolucija koja je o tome govorila nije bilo uskladjena sa Ženevskom konvencijom koji govori da se samo mogu zaštititi nenaoružana, odnosno demilitarizovana područja. Mi imamo na odnosu Goražde i Žepu vrlo dobar odgovor to je ugovor koji za istoriju ostaje koji govori o briljantnom pobjedama naše vojske, a i o briljantnom ponašanju za pregovaračkim stolom i zaisto su to istorijski dokumenti koji su vrlo značajni, međjutim oni nisu prevedeni u djelo, jer je muslimanska strana prvarila (*sic*: prevarila?), nije izvršena potpuna demilitarizacija, vrlo malo je oružja predato. Mi smo trazili da se to oružje preda UN nismo trazili da preda nama, kao pobjednicima iako smo na to imali pravo. Sada nama se postavlja pitanje zašto bismo mi skladali ikakav ugovor sa muslimanima, to je teritorija RS, tu muslimanska država nema nikakvih prava niti treba da bude ugovorna strana i naša skupština treba da odluci o izuzetku, jer je naša skupština donijela generalu odluku da se našem području ne rasporedjuju snage UN." BCS ERN 0215-0369.

³¹ "Ako se sjećate kako smo radili naše poteze kada smo bili sa Izetbegovićem. Svaki naš potez je bio izazvan nekim Izetbegovićem potezem. I tu smo čitavo vrijeme, a kod međunarodne javnosti u Bosni šitavoj bili opravdani kod Muslimana. Oni urade nešto, mi uradimo nešto." BCS ERNs 0215-0895 - 0215-0896.

³² "Prof. Milojević prije rata planirajući šta će sve biti od one BiH uplanirali smo i ispalo je skoro slično onome sta će biti u Sarajevu, razmišljali smo tada da osvojimo planinu Zvijezdu i da to bude granica i da kanjon rijeke Krijave posluži za povezivanje Sarajeva i Banja Luke i da se za 1,5 jednim dobrim putem može stići iz Sarajevo u Banja Luku, to je država, to je dobra integrisana nacija, to je bio naš plan daleko prije rata, molim vas ta opcija još nije izgubljena..." BCS ERN 0215-2322.

³³ "... mi smo u skladu platforme Skupštine iricito (*sic*: izricito?) stavili do znanja da je naša opcija, primarna opcija ujedinjenje sa Srbijom, ako ne ide to onda nezavisnost." BCS ERN 0215-2498 - 0215-2499.

³⁴ "Naši Muslimani više nemaju ni jedan oblik kolektivnog identiteta i nijedan kamen temeljac za koji bi se uhvatili osim najradikalnijeg islamskog fundamentalizma. To je činjenica sa kojom se mora računati, a zasto sam sve to ispricao da bi odovorio na prethodno pitanje." BCS ERN 0410-1722

³⁵ "Mi smo u Dejtonu potpisali da ćemo saradjivati sa haškim tribunalom. Jedini izuzetak u tom problemu predstavljaju ispolitizirani i diskriminarski

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zahtevi tribunala prema predsjedniku Republike Srpske i komandantu Glavnog Štaba, jer nisu u pitanje samo ličnosti, već personifikacija ciljeva i rezultata borbe srpskog naroda u bivšoj Bosni.

“Bilo kakvo sudjenje ili izručivanje naših čelnih ljudi predstavljalo bi sudjenje narodu i vojsci u celini, a kao što je o povodom američke revolucije branio i odbranio kao pravno načelo engleski politički mislilac i pravnik Edmund Berk, u pravu je moguće suditi pojedincima, ali ne i narodu u celini. Ukoliko mi tu stvar predstavimo, a ja mislim da ona to i jeste, mislim da su naše šance za rešavanje ovog problema daleko veće. Naša je trajna obaveza da adekvatnim urgumentima odbranimo i predsjednika RS i komandanta Vojske RS i mislim da bi to trebao da bude skupštinski stav...” BCS ERNs 0215-4986 – 0215-4987.

³⁶ “S obzirom da očekujem, a to predpostavljam, probleme na sjeveru Bosne na liniji od Srpeca, preko Dervente do Bosanskog Šamca i u dubinu do Doboja, a to je vrlo bitan pojas za vezane srpskih krajina sa Srbijom a za nas je strateški važan – i vi svi to dobro znate: imamo mali prolaz preko Doboja – 10-tak km o čemu sam s predsjednikom razgovarao – da je to srpska teritorija, ostalo je izmiješano srpska i hrvatska, kažem bojim se i zbog toga sugeriram Skupština da u vezi s tim zauzme stav. Da Skupština insistira kod vojnih vlasti (a glava će s glavom pregovarati vjerovatno) da se na tom području ukoliko je to moguće izmjesti dio vojske i tehnike koja se povlači trenutno iz Hrvatske ako mislimo da to područje vojno pritisnemo ...” BCS ERNs SA02-4941 – SA02-4942. Also 0089-8237 - 0089-8238

³⁷ “Ja vas molim ... da eventualno predložite za neka specijalna rješenja, za neke gradove, prije svega za Sarajevo kojebi možda bilo ekstrateritorijalno, gdje bi Srbi, Hrvati i Muslimani takodje organizovali svoju upravu, svoju administraciju. Čini mi se da sada kada je ovoliko nepovjerenje treba ići na što više razdvajanja pa neko poslije život i ekonomija, ekonomski rezone spajaju. ...

“Srpsko Sarajevo ima svoju teritoriju i svoju autonomnu jedinicu u sklopu Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, ali možemo da se dogovorilo. ...

“...u Sarajevo ne bi bilo nikakvih granica, osim što bi postojala i u čitavoj BiH I u Sarajevu administrativna pripadnost jednom centru, jednoj upravi, jednoj administraciji.” BCS ERN 0089-8164 – 0089-8165

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³⁸ “Za mir je potrebno da se izgradi mir. A mir se može izgraditi pacifikacijom i rastavljenjem, a ne lažnim zajedništvom. Mi ćemo to i zastupati kao vaši predstavnici upravo s ovom idejom o tripartitnoj Bosni i Hercegovini.” BCS ERN 0089-8215

³⁹ “Kod teritorije Republike mislim da je ovaj član dat tako da ostavlja mogućnost da najveći broj srpskih teritorija udje u Srpsku Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Međutim, to je jedna realna verzija za jedan mirni razvoj situacija. Međutim, u ustavu možda treba ostaviti jedan istorijski kriterij. Jer, recimo ako dodje do sukoba da u ustavu postoji jedna mogućnost da se i teritorije koje su nekada bilo naše (a nisu samo zbog genocida izgubljene) već i zbog migracionih kretanja) Recimo da se spoji Romanija sa Srbijom i s drugim to moramo predvidjeti. Unaprijed ne smijemo ne dati i tu mogućnost, u kriterijama i nekoj drugoj mogućnosti razvoja ove varijante.” BCS ERNs SA02-5329 – SA02-5330

⁴⁰ “Vjekovni cilj srpskog naroda bio je izlazak na more. Mislim da je ovaj cilj u ovom važnom istorijskom trenutku za naš narod zanemaren. Biti kraj mora, a mi nismo ni Mađarska ni Češka, koje smo mi nekada posjedovali a nemati izlaz na njega isto je kao i stanovati u kući koja nema vrata. Crnogorsko primorje je crnogorsko i tamo nema mjesta za sve Srba. Naš cilj gmora da bude izlaz na more gdje su mu Srbi najbliži, a to je Srpska Hercegovina.” BCS ERN 0081-6545

⁴¹ “... htio bih da apostrofiram prostor Sjeverne Bosne kao most između nas i Knina, da su tim putem prošli svi tereti i svi vrste tehnika u tom pravcu i da nije bilo nekih većih problema. Oni će nastati onog trenutka kada ti prostori na sjeveru prema Hrvatskoj budu suvereni, kada će doći do zaustavljanja svih tereta i ljudi što se već i događa.

“Predlažem da veoma ozbiljno predložite gospodi Hrvatima BiH, koji su svakako sastavi dio HDZ Hrvatske jer bosanska ne postoji, g. Tuđman zamjenu stanovništva na sjeveru BiH kako bi taj prostor od Knina do mora bio čist.” BCS ERN 0081-6567

⁴² “Taj kraj tamo biće najteže riješiti jer HDZ polaaže neko istorijsko pravo s obzirom na banovinu. Te dvije godine koje nam je Cvetković učinio, učinio nam je veliki problem. ... Ja sam gledao detaljnu mapu Bosanskog Broda. 60% teritorijetamo drže Srbi kojih ima oko 40%. Tu ćemo morati da

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nadjemo neke kompromise i da izvršimo neka uskladjivanja kako bi taj koridor mogao naš da bude.” BCS ERN 0081-6570

⁴³ “Mislim da nije ni filozofija, ni mudrost ni kunst da Banjaluka bude glavni grad srpskog naroda! Ona jesta sama po sebi glavni grad, ali jeste filozofija i mudrost i uspjeh sačuvati što je moguće više od Sarajeva, da ono bude srpski i po pitanju prihoda, imovine, i svega ostalog.” BCS ERN 0081-6593

⁴⁴ “Moram da vas razočaram pošto vi poslanici iz Skupština BiH da vam više BiH ovakve kakva je bila vjerovatno više nema, jer je Evropa shvatila da će BiH morati biti podijeljena. Mi smo tako juče uživali kada smo vidjeli kako Evropljani nose kartu kao Srbi, nemaju samo pištolje pa da se sakriju. Jer, svaki Srbin ima pištolj i kartu.” BCS ERN SA01-1361

⁴⁵ “Postigli smo, po mom mišljeneju, osnovnu stvar da su oni pristali da se BiH trebada podijeli po etničkom principu i da to budu tri nacionalne jedinice. ...

“Pošto se opština može korigovati mi smo već izvrđili korekcije i sve ono što je srpska teritorija mislimo da bude u našim opštinama, a što bude stvar razgovora, razgovor će biti u tom smislu da se ona vodi, da vidimo kuda ćemo svoju martu povlačiti. ...

“U tom smislu biilo bi dobro strateški učiniti jednu stvar: početi ovo što smo se dogovorili: etničko razdvajanje na terenu. Početi utvrdjivati teritoriju, a kada se teritorija utvrdi onda je stvar dodatnih razgovora kako će čija vlast da funkcioniše.” BCS ERNs SA01-1183 – SA01-1185

⁴⁶ “Nama, izgleda, nije bilo potrebno da se dogovaramo oko cilja. Cilj je zapisan duboko u nama. On je svet po tome što je božanski i što ga nije ljudska ruka tamo postavila. To je cilj koji srpski narod osjeća i gaji u sebi i od koga nikad ne odustaje ma koliko vremena bila teška. Mi smo morali dogovarati o taktici, mi smo se morali dogovarati o praktičnim koracima, ali o najdaleko-sežnijim strateškim ciljevima nismo se morali dogovarati jer je svako imao jednu te istu misao a to je najsigurnija garancija da je to iz najdubljeg bića srpskog naroda, iz najdubljeg bića svakog njegovog pripadnika.” BCS ERN 0090-8355. Also SA02-5850.

⁴⁷ “Mogu da kažem da nema ni jednog Srbina koji je odbacio, mogao je privremeno da stavi u stranu ali iz taktičkih razloga, ali nije odbacio konačni strateški cilj srpskog naroda da živi u jednoj državi, odnosno u jednoj zajedničkoj država, u jednom savezu država.” BCS ERN SA02-5853

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⁴⁸ “Srpska strana u BiH, Predsjedništvo, Vlada, Savjet za nacionalnu bezbjednost koji smo formirali donijela je strateške prioritete srpskog naroda, odnosno strateške ciljeve srpskog naroda, od kojih je prvi strateški cilj razdvajanje od druge dvije nacionalne zajednice, državno razdvajanje.

...

“Drugi strateški cilj je, čini mi se, koridor između Semberije i Krajine. To je stvar za koju ćemo, možda, biti prisiljeni na ponegdje nešto žrtvujemo, ali je to od najveće strateške važnosti za srpski narod, jer to integriše srpske zemlje, na samo Srpske BiH, nego i Srpske BiH sa Srbijom i Srpske Krajine sa Srpskom BiH i Srbijom. Na kraju, to je strateški cilj veoma visoko rangiran, koji moramo da ostvarimo jer nema Krajine, nema Bos. Krajine, nema Srpske Krajine, nema Saveza srpskih zemalja, ukoliko ne ostvarimo taj koridor koji će nas dobro integrisati koji će nam omogućiti nesmetan protok iz jednog dijela naše države u drugi.

“Treći strateški cilj je uspostavljanje koridor u dolini rijeke Drine, odnosno, eliminisanje Drine kao granice između dva svijeta. I s jedne i s druge strane Drine smo mi i naš strateški interes i nam životni prostor. Mi sada vidimo mogućnost da se sada neke Muslimanske opštine, kao enklave, uspostave uz Drinu, pa bi oni ostvarili [*sic: ostvarili?*] svoja prava, ali da to u osnovi mora da pripadne Srpskoj Bosni i Hercegovini, taj pojas koji je uz Drinu u koji, koliko nama strateški pomaže, nama na pozitivan način, toliko nama pomaže na način što štetimo interese naših neprijatelja da ostvare koridor koji bi povezivao sa islamskog internacionalom i uvijek činio ovo područje nestabilnim.

“Četvrti strateški cilj je uspostavljanje granice na rijeci Uni i rijeci Neretvi.

“Peti strateški cilj je podjela grada Sarajeva na srpski i muslimanski dio i uspostavljanje svakog od ova dva dijela efektivne državne vlasti te konstitutivne države. Dakle, Sarajevo nam je, strateški gledano na petom mjestu, ali su borbe u Sarajevu i za Sarajevo, i strateški taktično gledano od presudne važnosti, jer ne daju uspostavljanje čak ni privide, ali ni država. Alija nema državu dok mi imamo dio Sarajeva. Nema Vladu, nema Skupštinu, nema funkcionisanje, jer Aliji je bilo najvažnije da on za svijet stvara privid kako postoji država, a kako smo mi teroristi. Međutim, borbama za Sarajevo držimo borbe daleko od Krajine, daleko od Semberije, daleko od Drine, daleko od svih onih krajeva gdje bi se, eventualno, mogli sukobiti sa Muslimanima. Jer, borbe oko Sarajeva odlučuju sudbinu BiH i mi smo to i ranije slutili i o tome smo govorili, ako rata bude on će početi u

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Sarajevu i završiti u Sarajevu. Ovaj prvi dio tog predviđanja se ostvario, a vjerujem, da će se i drugi dio ostvariti onog trena kad dobijemo mapu Sarajeva, a tada mislim da će rat prestati u Sarajevu i cijeloj BiH, što se tiče Srba i Muslimana.

“Šesti strateški cilj je izlaz Srpske Republike BiH na more.” BCS ERN 0084-7722 - 0084-7723

⁴⁹ “Šta je naš cilj, da imam koridor, ovaj sa Srbiju, moj je cilj i naš cilj treba da bude da imamo svoju državu tamo gdje su nam tragovi i kosti očeva i za taj cilj mi se moramo boriti, i mimo taj cilj mi smo jedinstven srpski narod i treći pozivamo svakog ko je čelom poljubio ovdje a prvo Srbinu neću ja dati sada nekome drugome komandnu dužnost, nego ću dati nekome koji neznam šta da je.” BCS ERN 0084-7747

⁵⁰ “Samo ja bih htio jedno objašnjenje, potso sam i ja učestvovao u donosenju tih ciljeva. Mi se moramo opredjediti u jednom. Prvi cilj je najvažnije i on je sa ove ostale ciljeve, svi ostali ciljevi su potačke prvog. Jesmo li se opredjelili, da se konačno razgraničemo sa druge dvije nacionalne zajednice. Mi ćemo se razdvojiti sa njima, ako se Bosna i Hercegovina pocijepa na trije. ... Kad smo govorili da gdje su Srbi, to je srpska teritorije, to je mobilizacija cijelog srpskog naroda, mi ćemo organizovano, korektno naseg narodu dati krov nad glavom. Preseliti ga a ko treba, nećemo dovesti u genocidan položaj.” BCS ERN 0084-7752 - 0084-7753

⁵¹ “Taj koridor je tanak, pupčani vrpca u Doboju, Orašje nije zauzeto čitava okolica Brčkog nije zauzeta, mi na vojnom planu ima da radim još.” BCS ERN 0214-9549.

⁵² “Tražim da Skupština odavde naredi da se ukinu svi krizni stabovi koji postoje i ratna predsjedništva, tamo gdje može da funkcioniše civilna vlast, mora da funkcioniše od sutra i vojna komanda radi ono sto je njen zadatak, tamo gdje ne može da se formira civilna vlast uvodi se vojna uprava i to sutra, ako to ne napravimo džaba (država?) mi sjedimo ovdje, ja vas uvjeravam, dalje kad krenemo gore do Višegrada, Rogatice, molim vas krenite u Srebrenicu, srebrenički dio, bratunački dio, gore opštine, pa onda gore uz poznati Zep, Rogaticu i idemo dalje do Goražda, praktično što mi imamo na Drini i Podrinju, vrlo malo, a Drina i Podrinje ako ne bude naše onda mi nemamo šanse, i da nam niko ne brani sutra da mi budemo u jednoj

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državi, a što nam je mislim krajnji cilj sa ostalim srpskim narodom." BCS ERN 0214-9569.

⁵³ "... negdje imaju nedefinisane teritorije, vezano za to pitanje trebalo bi da donesemo zaključak a to je pošto je aktuelno pitanje mora da mi javno iznesemo svoj šesti strateški cilj da Srpska Republika BiH polaže pravo i osporava dio teritorije, znači uz mora, kao prirodno pravo izlaska ove Republike na more, time bi ovaj problem čini me se najadekvatnije rješili..." BCS ERN 0214-9571

⁵⁴ "One što je saopštio g. Koljević, saopštio je po dogovoru da za javnost dovoljno opisno, a da u konkretnom radu prenesemo nešto što je detaljno, naime, opis granica koje je dao prof. Koljević je u stvari opis samo mi smo se držali strateških ciljeva koje je Skupština donijela u Banja Luci, onih 6 strateških ciljeva i u popisu ovih granica mi smo slijedili te strateške linije koje treba dalje razradjivati." BCS ERN 0214-9577

⁵⁵ "Drina je naima od veoma velika strateške važnosti, zapravo od najveće strateške važnosti, ako se na Drini prekine zelena transverzala, muslimanska Bosna gubi značaju. U tom slučaju će u Evropi definitivno da dignu ruke od Alije. Svojim analizama mi smo došli do zaključka i mislim da smo u pravu, da bi bilo kakav vojni uspjeh Izetbegovića u ovom trenutku doveo od toga da se Konferencija oteže i da se njemu daje vrijeme da popravi svoj položaj. Svako kršenje njegovih ofanzivnih namjera sigurno bi dovelo do toga da Evropa od njega odustane i da ga natjera da pregovora sa onim što ima u ruci nego sa onim šta ima namjeri. U tom smislu mi ćemo se sutra dorov opiti o povratku na Goražde a mislim da će to Skupština i podržati da obebijeđimo Drinu i sve naše opštine i sve naše kuće na Drini. Na taj način ćemo da se povežemo sa istočno-sanskim korpusom." BCS ERN 0422-6208

⁵⁶ "Naši planovi za budući trebali bi da se odnose, u mjeru kojoj je to moguće da otgrnemo od pažnja svjetska javnost, da i pravimo veze, proširimo koridore prema Krajini, naročito ovaj u nu Brčko, ovaj u dolini Drine, a da spojimo Hercegovinu sa ostalim deovima teritorije, da je kopnom moguće proći." BCS ERN 0422-6218

⁵⁷ "Da mi u Hercegovni od pet zacrtanih ciljeva oko izuzmemo prvi koji je opšti i za svakoga važi a to je stvaranje naše srpske države, da su preostale pet tri pripadaju ili neposredno u njima učestvuje narod Hercegovine. U Hercegovini ima svega 60,000 srpskog stanovništva i za ostvarenje ta tri strateška cilja zaista treba uložiti ogromne napore i mislim da bi o tome

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trebalo voditi računa za svako podnese jednako teret rata.” BCS ERN 0422-6243

⁵⁸ "Ja ne tražim, niti bih preporučio da Skupština mjenja strateške ciljeve. ... Ja mislim da mi ukoliko budemo taktički mudri, ne mijenjamo strateški cilj nego taktički mudri da možemo računati i na sve Srbe u Jugoslaviji i u svijetu." BCS ERN 0214-9867.

⁵⁹ "Naša večerašnja poruka sigurno nebi bila u skladu sa njihovim željama i nadama, jer Srbi nikada više neće živjeti sa Turcima i Hrvatima. (Aplauz)." BCS ERN 0215-0000

⁶⁰ "Još oni nama nisu priznali granice Republike Srpske, Goražde je naše, možda ćemo morati praviti neke ustupke u samom djelu Sarajeva da bi Goražde ostale naše, jer značaj Drine za Republiku Srpsku i za srpski narod je ogroman i konačno jedan od strateških ciljeva da Drina ne bude granica, to smo donijeli ovdje u ovaj skupštini." BCS ERN 0215-0376.

⁶¹ "Strateški ciljevi koje je ova skupština usvojila u najvećoj mjeri su ispunjeni ili će biti ispunjeni. Da potsjetim one koji to ne znaju. Ova skupština je usvojila strateške ciljeve srpskog naroda koji su na izvjestan način postali naši zadaci, naša obaveza da ih ispunjavamo, ali to su bili strateški ciljevi kojima smo težili, kojima sad težimo da ih završimo kada bude to moguće." "Prvi je, dakle, bio da se odvojimo, da očuvamo svoju nezavisnost i izbjegnemo tudju dominaciju. Drugim riječima, da stvorimo svoju državnu tvorevinu u bivšoj republici Bosni i Hercegovini.

"Drugi je da imamo povezane teritorije – mi smo to zvali koridorom, ali to je da imamo povezane teritorije u Posavini.

„Treći cilj je da ne dopustimo da Drina ikad više bude granica između srpskog naroda.

"Četvrti je da u dolini Neretve, lijeva obala Neretve, po istorijskom i etničkom pravu, po pravu u geografskom i privrednom smislu itd. pripadne istočnoj Hercegovini, odnosno Republici Srpskoj.

"Peti je da očuvamo svoj dio i svoja prava u Sarajevu, koji je za nas veoma bitan za integrisanje teritorija istočne Hercegovine, stare Hercegovine i Romanije, jer se u toj dolini susreću naši interesi za koncentrisanjem obrazovanja, kulture, nauke i privrede. Dakle, taj interes je da se srpsko Sarajevo stvori, kako ga god nazvali, ali da se stvori od srpskih prostora u gradu Sarajevu.

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“Šesti cilj je da izadjemo na more.” BCS ERNs 0215-0520 - 0215-0521.

⁶² “Nije Sarajevo u Muslimanskoj državi, nego je Sarajevo u srpskoj državi, jer je sve okolo Srpsko. I sve zadržavamo. Nećemo pustiti ni jednu stopu. Ako bude puštena ijedna stopa na neku silu njihovu mi ćemo završiti posao. Prema tome, Sarajevo ima više šansi da postane kompletno srpsko nego da postane muslimansko. A najrealnija je šansa da se Sarajevo podijeli i da se stvore dva grada. Jer mi Sarajevo, gospodo, nećemo da pustimo, to smo rekli otvoreno delegacijama. Nemojte sa zavaravati. Ni jedna itna čarka proći neće, sve sto je srpsko u Sarajevu zadržaćemo. To smo rekli i kopredsjednicima. Jer nama Sarajevo integriše istočnu Hercegovinu, Staru Hercegovinu i Romaniju. Nema tih Pala i toga Sokoca koji bi opstali ako bi morali da idu u Bijeljenu. Romanija ima svoju čaršiju u Sarajevu. I tako će i ostati.” BCS ERNs 0215-0570 – 0215-0571.

⁶³ “Politika SDS je da Sarajevo zadrži. Ova skupština je tu politiku uradila u strateške ciljeve, to je čini mi se 5. strateški cilj. Kako ćemo ga održati, moramo svakako održati, moramo stvoriti kritičku masu inteligencija ovdje mi ćemo ovdje biti u dodiru sa jednom ogromnom svijetom, agresivnim svijetom islamskim. Naš kapital, naše obrazovanje, naša kultura, naša privreda bit će tu u dodiru sa Miljacki u dodiru sa čitavom jednim svijetom čiji eksponent će biti bosanski muslimani. Mi tu bitku ne smijemo izgubiti nikada i neispošto. Zato vas molim ne pozivajući samo na stranačku disciplinu, nego poživajući vas na nacionalnu svijest. Nemojmo se kockati sa nečim što je pitanje opstanka naroda. Moramo, nacija ima smisla samo utoliko ukoliko će oni koji se razvijaju prirodno i oni koji su jaki pomoći one slabe da bi svi zajedno bili jaki. Ja ovdje hoću da ponovim, evo i generala. Sarajevsko ratište je stvorilo državu, ne može se umanjati ničiji značaj, ali da Sarajevsko ratište puklo, da su oni izbili na Drinu i presekli koridor, ne bi bilo ni Krajine, ni RSK, ni Hercegovine, ni ničiga.

“Izetbegović razgovara što ne može da izadje iz Sarajeva bez naše dozvole.

“Ja sam sa Miloševićom već o tome razgovarao, Srpsko Sarajevo će biti poduprto od svakog od 12 miliona Srba.” BCS ERNs 0215-1327 – 0215-1328

⁶⁴ “Mi možemo smatrati da smo pobjednici kada smo pritisnuli ovoliko zemlje računajući da je ta zemlja sada 100% srpska makar i da spadnemo na 50 i koji procenat mi treba da budemo presrećni i prezadovoljni to je

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Dušanovo carstvo, ne budimo li bili zadovoljni zbog nekog potoka, pa čak zbog neke varošice mi rizikujemo da izgubimo sve." BCS ERN 0215-2140

⁶⁵ "... vjerujte mi smo do sada pobjednici, šta smo od toga mogli izvući, mogli smo izvući da se odvajamo, prvi strateški cilj je da se odvojimo i ne da zauzmemo 60%, drugi strateški cilj je da u komadu da je povezano, imamo koridor i dalje ti strateški ciljevi." BCS ERN 0215-2140

⁶⁶ "Sto se tiče mape, ... Ja mislim ono sto možemo da uradimo da definišemo na toj našoj teritoriji koji su to punktovi sa ekonomskog stanovišta i sa vojno strateškog stanovišta za nas najvažniji i da od toga ne ostupamo (*sic?* odstupamo?)." BCS ERN 0215-2535.

⁶⁷ "vjerujte da bi najveća tragedija bili kada bi muslimani prihvatili sada da žive sa nama skupa. Vidjeli ste kako se utrpavaju Hrvatima, hrvati neće mi bi izgubili državu. Ja samo to ne bih prihvatio, a prihvatio bih manji procenat nego što sada imamo da mi ostanemo odvojeni i da imamo svoju državu da ne budimo sa muslimanima." BCS ERN 0215-2152.

⁶⁸ "Mi sasvim signurno znamo da moramo nešto da damo, to je van svake sumnje ukoliko hoćemo da ostvarimo prvi strateški cilj, a to je da se ratosiljamo neprijatelja iz kuće, a to je hrvata i muslimana da nebudemo više zajedno u državi." BCS ERN 0215-2880 – 0215-2881.

⁶⁹ "... smo mi 18. Marta dobili bitku za svoju Republiku. Dobili smo 18. Marta i to na vještinu g. Krajišnika. ... Tada je Alija prvi put rekao da na tri Bosne i da budu na etničkoj osnovi i to je za njega bilo fatalna.

"Tada je Bosna pukla, tada smo mi prihvaćeno kao stranu u sukobu, da su oni nas ignorisali i čitali, priznali Bosnu i kazali poslije toga postoje tamo neki pobunjenici koji sopstvenu državu ruše mi bi bili u teškim problemima, niko sa nama nebi razgovarali..." BCS ERN 0215-2883 – 0215-2884

⁷⁰ "Na kraju želim da kažem da ova Narodna Skupština konstatuje, ako se vi slažete, da nije promijenila osnovnu politiku i naše ciljeve. Želimo slobodu i državu za srpski narod i potpuno razdvajanje za sva vremena sa Muslimanima i Hrvatima." BCS ERN 0215-4164

⁷¹ "Nas zanima granica na Uni, granica na Savi, granica na Drini, granica na Neretvi, izlaz na more i dio Sarajevo. Znači tamo se pominje, granice na Savi to je najbolji koridor, to nema šta, to je najbolje. Tamo se pominje

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zamjena Goražda sa dijelove Sarajevo, naima mi Sarajevo nipošto napustiti ne možemo, jer bi tada tek muslimani imali dobru državu, a nas bi osušili bi nam ove tri pokrajine Istočne Hercegovine, Staru Hercegovinu i Romaniju, tu ne bi ništa ostalo ako me ne budemo imali svoje Sarajevo i taj regionalni centar da se tu može i školovati i liječiti i trgovati i obavljati posao." BCS ERN 0215-4332

⁷² "RS zadržava pravo da mirnim putem i političkim sredstvima pod svojom suverenitet vrati područja definisana strateškim ciljevima, te područja koja su drugoj strani pripala na osnovu genocida ili brutalnog osvajanja intervencijom stranih sila." BCS ERN 0215-4751

⁷³ "Zadatak ove Republike i prvi strateški cilj da me se odvojimo od Muslimana i Hrvata i nema niko pravo da zasniva strategiju Srpskog Sarajeva za ostanku u zajedničkoj državi. Tako da je isključena bilo kakva opasnost ili želja sa kopcem i rješenjem Sarajeva mi želimo da ostanemo sa Muslimima i Hrvatima. Niko ne može sada novo rješenje praviti da ostanemo skupo niti to ljudi u Sarajevu žele, odnosno narod, niti želi rukovodstvo Sarajevo, ali je jedna manjkavost naših poslanika koji vide opasnost, da bi ako ostanemo u MHF (Muslimanskoj-Hrvatskoj federaciji – rjd), da bi Sarajevo bilo kopča unija. Ima samo jedan problem gdje ćemo sada ljudi iseliti, da se kaže iselićemo ih tu i tu, na taj i taj način. Treba nam vrijeme, jer je ovo iznenadjenje jer ni u jednoj varijanti ništa nije predviđano. Zato nam treba i vrijeme za političko rješenje i konačno razlaz i na kraju krajeva najbolje rješenje da se Sarajevo iseli i da se naše lokacija da se smjeste ljudi i da se mi i tu ako imamo opasnosti sa tom kopčom konačno raskopča. ... to rješenje ne dovodi do uspostavljanja unije nego do raspada jer nam je to prvi strateški cilj." BCS ERN 0215-4843

⁷⁴ "Ja smatram da bi ova skupština trebalo da sve postojeće i formirane političke stranke obaveže i da našim medijama, gdje će sve stranke imati pristupa, da traži da se nedvosmisleno izjave u pogledu pomenutih strateških ciljeva naše borbe, a mi znamo šta su oni, to je što veće jačanje državnosti RS, normalno i naša nacionalna prava zbog kojih smo se i borili." BCS ERN 0215-4985

⁷⁵ "Mislim da bi mi po principu analogija, kako je i naša matična Republike Srbije regulisale zaštitu Srba izvan Srbije, bilo dobro da imamo istu zaštitu Srba izvan ove Republike. Na tome ne insistiram, samo kažem da bi bilo dobro.

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Time bi se i taj narod ocjeđao dijelom cjeline srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini, i, na kraju znao bi odresu gdje će da se javi, ne da može, ako zatreba." BCS ERN SA02-5331

⁷⁶ "Mi smo se donekle smijeli i govorili smo o Tadjmanu kako se koncentrisao na simbole itd. Ono što su oni postigle dobrim je dijelo bilo onim njihovim akcijama i usmjeravanjem naroda prema tim simbolima.

"Zašto srpski narod Bosne i Hercegovine ne može da donese te simbole, ja mislim čak i uz pedagoških razloga da ih nemetne Srbiji, jer se u Srbiji taj process dosta razvlači i neizvjestan je ishod. Jas am za to da srpski narod u Bosni i Hercegovini tačno zna u svaka doba dana i noći, ako je pravi Srbin, koji su njegovi simboli. I bilo bi potrebno to nametnuti Srbiji kaje da dvoumi ako simbola ima više od godinu dana." SA02-5352 – SA02-5353

⁷⁷ "Ja se za sutra prosto bojim šta se može desiti u Banjaluci. Dodao bi da se indicije da će sutra doći i Šešeljevci, njegovi vojnici, da demonstriraju snagu. Uslov da oni dodju jeste što je sutra prvi dan referendum." BCS ERN SA01-1376.

⁷⁸ "Molim vas lijepo, sve do prije dva tri mjeseca mi smo se nadali da možemo da igramo 'jugoslovensku kartu' i kažemo jugoslovenske vojske, Jugoslavija, legalitet itd. To izmiče. Zato smo mi prošli na još jedan kolosjek Srpska Bosne i Hercegovina. Naša suvereno pravo, naše vojske. Pripremamo ustavni osnov da možemo istog časa i po osnov promovov [unclear] u Lisabonu, da imamo nacionalnu gardu, da imamo svoju policiju, da imamo vlast da jugoslovensku vojsku pretvorimo u vojsku Srpske Bosne i Hercegovine.

"Moramo odigrati medjupoteze. Ne daju li nam Jugoslaviju, ne smije Srbije doći Bosansku krajinu da je brani. Ni smije, jer, i Srbija će biti uništena, a cilj je da se Srbija uništi. ...

"Neka sada to sil [unclear] koja Srbiju smije uvaliti da brani Bosansku krajinu. To bi odmah bilo [unclear] Srbiji na nas, jer ona sada pokušava da ostvari svoje pretenzije.

"Mi smo oslobodili, ljudi moji, Srbiju i Crnu Goru i moramo osloboditi i kazati da ne želimo da pripajamo dijelove Bosne Srbiji i Crnoj Gori. To je vrlo važno da svijetu kažemo." BCS ERN SA01-1403 – SA01-1404.

⁷⁹ "... mi smo obavezni da sav srpski prostor, a sad prvenstveno Srpsku Krajinu i Srpsku Republiku BiH potpuno prožmemo, politički, pravno i bilo

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kako i sve ono što je moguće u ovom momentu međunarodnih odnosa da ne bi pokvarili ono što sad imamo u Srpskoj Krajini to je oni koji nam pomažu da štite granice tako da nazovem, ali da to sve odjedino, od pravnog političkog, od kulturnog, prosvjetnog i bilo kakvog drugog odnosa." BCS ERN 0214-9572.

⁸⁰ "Koridor od 5 km na Brčkom je vrlo tanka peteljka na kojoj visi jedna država. ... Mi moramo obezbijediti ukoliko razmišljamo o budućem razvoju i uspješnoj Srpskoj Republici, koridor, najkraći put i autoput i infrastrukturu u vezi između ta dva pravca – između Krajine i južnih dijelova Srpske Republike, odnosno Romanije i ovih zemalja ispod Beograda. Mi se i suviše mnogo vežemo za Beograd a i suviše mnogo riyikujemo na tankoj peteljci od 5 km koridora." BCS ERN 0410-2096 – 0410-2097

⁸¹ "Vlada nama nije imala službeni kontakt sa Vladom Srbije. Ja sam bio u Podgorici bogami su nas dočekali kao trinaesto prase, silna su prevozka sredstva k prevozna i putnička po Srbiji to niko neće da nam vrati, ja neznam koliko je nam MUP insistirao da nam se to vrati, kod njih u Vladi kažu pa tražite od naše policije nema problema vrtićemo ali čini mi se da za pola godine ni jedan kamion ni jedan šleper ne pokaza se oduzetim i vraćenim na ovu stranu. Nadalje, u tim kontaktima sa vladama Crne Gore i Jugoslavije ja mislim da mi moramo raspraviti šta ko o kome misli, pa sve do priznanja jedni drugih." BCS ERN 0422-6233

⁸² "Ja bi da kažem ministru Stanišiću, ne da se govorka minister, nego je to istina da samja nakon izjave predsjednika Republike, odnosno poziva svim dobrovoljcima u srpskim zemljama i svim pravoslavnim zemljama uputila pismo na sve adrese. Ja ću da vam kažem nastojala sam da skupimo ljude koje kod hoće da se bore za srpstvo da se okupe, pa su pisma otišla, vi govorite o paravojnim formacijama i o ne paravojnim formacijama, oprostite, to se mene ni male ne tiče. Ja sam tražila ljude koji hoće da se bore za srpstvo koji hoće da se bore na teritoriji Republike Srpske. Ta su pisma otišla i u Sovjetski Savez, otišla su i Šešelju i Arkanu i Joviću, kako kod hoćete, pa me sada optužite za to, molim vas lijepo, hoću da tu stvar razjasnim, er ovo je već drugi put g. minister ne da se govorka nego sam to uradila, i vi me osudite. (Aplaudiranje)" BCS ERN 0214-0651

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⁸³ "Ne, gospodo, građaninama, nego Srbima Srbije i Crne Gore, srpskom naroda. Građani Srbije su i veliki broj Muslimana koji se našao tamo i hljebio, a bore se protiv nas, i veliki broj Šiptara koji se bori protiv nas, i veliki broj Madjara za koje nas i nije brige. Mi trebamo da uputimo proglas srpskom naroda Srbije i Crne Gore..." BCS ERN 0214-9970.

"Apelujemo na svoje sunarodnike iz Srbije i Crne Gore..." BCS ERN 0214-9771

⁸⁴ "Mi moramo shvatiti, ja mislim da smo to mi na ovom zadnjem sastanku, na kome smo prisustvovali Predsjednik Karadžić, Predsjednik Krajišnik, i Prof. Koljević, Ministar Subotić i ja, jasno stavili do znanje i vojnom i političkom vrhu Savezne Republike Jugoslavije da nas nema kao Kineza i da se mi nemožemo deliti ovako ili onako." BCS ERN 0214-9843

⁸⁵ "Imamo uvjeravanja i iz Srbije i iz Jugoslavije da će, bez obzira na sankcije i prijetnje biti na našoj strani dok me branimo svoje pravedne ciljeve, a dok ono što tražimo za sebe priznajemo drugima. Glasine o ucijenjenosti nemaju nikakvog osnova. Srbija, Crna Gora i Jugoslavija nikada ne bi prihvatile da srpski narod u bivšoj BiH dodje u neravnopravan položaj. Mi so svjesni da teškoće kroz koje prolazi Jugoslavija nominalno potiču od naše opravdane borbe za slobodu i ravnopravnost." BCS ERN 0214-9943 – 0214-9944

⁸⁶ " Mi se moramo podsjetiti da je rješavanje problema Srba u BiH počelo raspadom bivše Jugoslavije i mi ne smijemo zaboravati da smo u prvo vrijeme dali odrješene ruke bivšem i sadašnjem predsjedniku Srbije g. Miloševiću da zastupa naše interese. Tada smo mislili da je to najbolje rješenje i ne smijemo smetnuti s uma da je g. Milošević, kada se raspadala Jugoslavija, vjerovatno bio doveden u dilemu da li na tlu bivše Jugoslavije da se stvaraju čiste nacionalne države, u kojoj bi mi Srbi iz Srpske Krajine i Republike Srpske mogli da udjemo u sastav neke Srbije u kojoj bi srpsk narod procentual no bio gotovo sto postotan.

Medjutim, vjerovatno se g. Milošević opredijelno za drugu opciju, a to je nepovredivost unutrašnjih granica koja nama Srbima u BiH u ovom momentu stvara nepremostive teškoće. Zato mi Srbi u BiH moramo stvariti preduslove da se u datom momentu koji sigurno ne priželjkujemo, ali neko je prije mene rekao da će i Srbija jednog dana doći na red, pa možda kad se potegnu sporna pitanja u Srbiji i njihovo rješavanje, da ćemo mi tada moći ostvariti san i stvoriti savez srpskih država, odnosno jedinstvenu srpsku

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državu, ali sigurno na uštrb nekih spornih teritorija u sadašnjoj Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji.” BCS ERN 0214-9981

⁸⁷ “Pošto su po svemu sudeći ključni politički dogovori već postignuti, zapravo već jesu. Nema više razloga ni vremena za odlaganje tehničkog i tehnološkog uspostavljanja sistema funkcionisanja platnog premeta na područjima Republike Srpske i Savezne Republike Kugoslavije, kao i Republike Srpske Krajine. Isto tako realno je očekivanje da se u tom roku uspostavi jedinstven monetarno kreditni sistem sa Saveznom Republikom Jugoslavijom i Republikom Srpskom Krajinom sa svim potrebnim elemenima emisije i kontrole u monetarnom području. Očekujem da će se na isti način uz punu saradnju i respekt cjeline odnosa Republike Srpske, Republike Srpske Krajine, i Savezne Republike Jugoslavije riješiti pitanja poreskog i carinskog sistema. Jačićemo biti ako se jedni na druge budemo naslanjali, a slabiji ako jedni drugima budem štetili. Vlada će u većoj mjeri nego do sada podržati i pomoći poduhvat istraživanja dokumentovanja i prezentovanja svijetu ratnih zločina koji se čine protiv srpskog naroda.” BCS ERN 0215-0011

⁸⁸ “Otvorilo se čak i pitanje, što ja smatram zaista neprihvatljivim. Da li se odustaje od cilja? Ja ću da vam kažem ne! Neodustaje se od cilja. Nije pitanje, dakle ako gledamo taj plan. Da li plan predstavlja postignuti cilj. Naravno da ne predstavlja. Već je pitanje da li predstavlja put ka konačnom cilju? U mnogo čemu je postignut a ne do kraja. Ali da predstavlja put ka konačnom cilju naravno da predstavlja. Ali se treba pomučiti malo više glavom, malo više pameću, a malo manje krvi proliti.

“Pošto ste skupština da smo napravili jedinstven platni promet, da idemo na jedinstven novac, da idemo na sve moguće veze i transakcije između ekonomije, da idemo u jedno stabilizovanje jednog cjelovitog jedinstvenog privrednog područja gdje će te tu srpske zemlje biti u ekonomskom i kulturnom i u obrazovnom i u svakom drugom pogledu...Na kraju da vam kažemo nemojte nama govoriti da se osećate napuštenim. Nama koji smo za sve ovo vreme brinuli sve vaše brige. I to ne brinuli, mentalno samo, nego rešavali i pomagali svim svojim snagama i svim svojim mogućnostima po cenu ogromnog lišavanja 10-tomilionske Srbije i dalje ćemo vas pomagati, što nije sporno. Ali nemojte nam govoriti da se osećate napušteni, jer to nije korektno. Želim da vam kažem da ova Skupština mora da ima i hrabrosti i samopouzdanje da se u novim okolnostima na kakvoj takvoj osnovi, ali dovoljnoj osnovi plana postigne

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cilj, a ne tragična greška koja svirepo preseca put prema uspehu." BCS ERN 0215-0191

⁸⁹ "Ove koje plaća Milošević treba da se vidi da li će se oni boriti na našoj strani ili neće. Dobar dio oficira primi platu tamo. Ako Srbija zatvori puteve i ako budemo morali nabavljati i ostane namirnice, brašno i ulje. To ćemo gospodo moći samo preko bogatih Srba. Ima Srba koje će dati hiljade i hiljada maraka za te stvari u to sam siguran." BCS ERN 0214-0223

⁹⁰ "Male prije je Kolega Malidža govorio o privredu, mi imamo potpredsjednika vlade zaduženog za privredu, koji sjedi u Beogradu. ... Neko je rekao da imamo i predsjednika Privredne komore, a bišeg (*sic: bivšeg*) ministra, koji takodje sjedi u Beogradu. Imate puno ljudi koje sjede u Beogradu." BCS ERN 0215-0274

⁹¹ "Nadalje gdje je problem dupla vlasti. Ministarstvo Unutrašnje vlasti je Biro u Beogradu i Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih poslova u Republici Srpskoj. Trebamo da utvrdimo da li ovaj Biro u Beogradu treba da postoji po mojoj ocjeni to treba da to bude nekakav ugoštiteljski centar sa određenim licima koji mogu voditi protokol sa predsjednika države i članove Predsjedništva. Predlažem da se ispita CSB kao medjistanica između Republičkog Ministarstva Unutrašnjih poslova i opštinskog." BCS ERN 0215-0300

⁹² "Naš će predlog biti i za onaj sastanak koji treba da držimo u užem krugu, da to svedemo na minimum minimuma. Nama treba jedan broj ljudi da sjede i rade u Beogradu, ali ne trebaju čitave firme vlasti i sa takvim ovlaštenjima koje čak šta više ni vlada ove republike nema. Mislim da to neće ići i da u svakom slučaju treba razriješiti i osloboditi se toga, pogotovo što imamo dovoljno podataka da je tu u pitanje paralelna vlast, i paralelan MUP, itd." BCS ERN 0215-0321.

⁹³ "Zaključeno je da se preispitaju poslovi iz nadležnosti Vlade. Vlade i pojedinih ministarstava, koja su do sada obavljana u Birou i sistematizaciji radnih mjesta. Odnosno broj radnika koji su obavljali te poslove. Zadužena su ministarstva koje bi poslove i u kom obimu iz njihove nadležnosti trebalo obavljati u SRJ, odnosno u Birou, i da utvrde broj i profil radnika koji bi obavljali te poslove na osnovu toga izvršit će imenovanje, odnosno prijem radnika. ... utvrdit će se svi poslovi i nadležnosti koji se neophodni za rad..." BCS ERN 0215-0356.

⁹⁴ "Ministarstvo odbrane trenutno pregovara i finansira ukupno proizvodnju municije i opreme u Republici, a putem kopezacijonih (*sic:*

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kompenzacionih) ugovora sa preduzećima iz SRJ i prodajem roba iz ratnog plijena i robnih rezerva, čini se na napori za obezbjeđivanje i nabavku sredstava za kupovinu municije i vojne opreme u SRJ u inostranstvu..."
BCS ERN 0215-0357

⁹⁵ "Ja bi samo na neka mjesta ovdje ukazao dotakao bi se pitanja Biroa Republike u Beogradu. Ja bih postavio pitanje da li se ova Skupština kada izjasnila za postavljanje, formiranje Biroa i da na to odgovorimo ? Absolutno sam ovdje kod stava da ga treba ukinuti ako već postoji, za mene on stvarno faktično postoji, ali nikada nismo donijeli odluku da postoji. Koliko je jedan od problema taj biro, efikasnijeg funkcionisanja država, Vlada koja sprovodi zaključke od Skupštine, ja sam za to da se on potpuno ukine, čak nisam ni za oni dio da se kaže šta je to što treba da ostane. Prvo trebamo utvrditi da li nam treba ili netreba. Vjerujte nemam prestavu o tome, ni šta radi, ni kako radi, ni ko radi." BCS ERN 0215-0386

⁹⁶ "Ja moram da vam kažem da su oni veoma oprezni sa nama. ... Vrlo nas uvažavaju. Ne mogu da kažem da ne vrše pritisak, ali ne vrše ultimativne pritiske. Razgovaraju, pokazuju veliko strpljenje s nama. Radije bi da nas ubijede nego da vrse pritisak. A Milošević je, mogu da vam kažem, lukav kao zmija i on je pomogao dosta da se ovo uradi. Naročito je pomogao kod ustavnih principla, gdje je Tudjman bio na granici da sklizne u federaciju, jer se on boji kako će Krajina proći." 0215-0609 – 0215-0610

⁹⁷ "Morili smo se boriti za Banja Luku da je neprijatelj bio spremniji i da smo mi bili manje spremni. ...Ja sam Miloševiću sad rekao pred Tudjmanom da, ako smo braća kese nam nisu sestre. On kaže – sad jesu, ali neće biti sestre kad vi dobijete državu. Više Srbija nas pomaže 50 puta nego sto mi nešto tamo platimo ili prodamo." BCS ERN 0215-0593

⁹⁸ "... da se sva vojska potčini Mladiću i da se stavi pod jednu komandu i da se branimo kao cijelina.... U tom slučaju treba da proračunamo da li možemo da isnesemo taj rat, i ako možemo mi bismo onda ostali u granicama u kojima jesmo. Ni bismo imali više nikakvih obaveya prema Hrvatima u pogledu Kupresa (aplauz), niti Muslimanima u pogledu Ozrena. (Aplauz) Ali to mora ova nacija, znači, zapadno od Drine, da i crno ispod nokta vuče i da to uspije." BCS ERN 0215-0895

⁹⁹ "Najviše primjedbi je bilo da je u Beogradu osnovan Biro koji je paralelna Vlada i koji dosta vrši poslova iz ingirencije Vlade. Ja sam dužan ovdje da dam objašnjenje poslanicima o čemu se radi. Odlukom osnivanja

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Ekonomskog biroa u Beogradu, to je ćSluybeni glasnikć br. 13-92, kada je Vlada osnovala Ekonomski biro pored ostalog tada je Vlada odlučila da Ekonomski biro u Beogradu osim ekonomskim poslova vrši i sledeće poslove to suĆ dugoroćni i zajednićka investiciona ulaganja, ekonomski odnosi sa intostranstvom, monetarno-kreditnu politiku, uskladjivanje i razvoj ekonomskih politika itd. Znaći da to donijela naša Vlada ovu odluku.

“Ja bih htio da obavijestim, za ovo nekoliko mjeseci dok sam ja gore Biro RS je vratio u RS od aviona do kamijona i vozila vrijednosti oko 4 milijona dolara, tako sve što smo radili, radili smo u korist ove države i ovog naroda mi smo to gore radili.” BCS ERN 0215-0921

¹⁰⁰ "Vi znate da je Miće Stanišić savjetnik Predsjednika Republike i njegov je zadatak saradnje MUP-a Jugoslavije i našem MUP-om, on ima svoja dva saradnika koji obavljaju gore poslove i to je u nadležnosti njegovoj." BCS ERN 0215-0922

¹⁰¹ "Mi imamo kao mišljenje kolege iz finansijske policije iz Srbije, da su poreske stope nesnošljive, i one su previsoke i o tome ne bi trebalo gubiti vrijeme. ... Osjetitću vas, da u Srbiji samoj bez Crne Gore finansijska policija ima 1,920 inspektora, plus pratiće službe, plus materijalnu opremu. Mi imamo 53 inspektora za RS bez pratećih službi bez ikakve opreme." BCS ERN 0215-1100 - 0215-1101

¹⁰² "Smo napravili jednu grešku, ... što smo tvrdo pratili politiku Srbije..." BCS ERN 0215-1114

¹⁰³ "Mislim da smo se do sada uvijek oslonjali na majku Srbiji, kada je u pitanju psenica i kukuruz itd. Mi smo država za sebe i moramo da razvijemo vlastitu strategiju. Srbija je vjerovatno nam pomagla i ja lićno predlažem Srbiji da nam ne pomaže kada je u pitanju prehrana..." BCS ERN 0215-1117

¹⁰⁴ "Imali smo dovoljno razloga i opravdanja da se ujedinjemo sa Srpskom Krajinom." "onda mi treba da predložimo kompletno ujedinenje srpskog naroda i Jugoslavije i RSK i RS..." BCS ERN 0215-1146.

¹⁰⁵ "Ukupna srpska nacija treba da se integriše oko nekoliko svojih stvorišta, prije svega oko Beograd pa onda oko nekih ćvorova policentrićnog razvoja u RS." BCS ERN 0215-1165

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¹⁰⁶ “Ja Arkana nisam dovela, ja sam prvi put čula da postoji neki Arkan kada je me u noći u jedan sat, komandant kasarne u Tuzli zvao i rekao g. Plavšić u Bijeljini kod Arkana su zarobljeni Abdić, Doko i Simović. Ja pitam ko je Arkan, jer pojma nemam ko je Arkan, kada mi je on objasnio ja sam tražila broj telefone i dogovarali smo se kako da stupim u kontakt sa njim i dao mi je broj telefona teritorijalne odbrane i ja sam odmah njega dobila na telefon i rekla sam ja vas ne poznajem, on kaže ja vas jako poznajem i cijenim vas. E ako me cijenite onda ta tri čovjeka pustiti jer će sutra stotine Srba za njih zatvorite u Sarajevu i rekao je ako ne bude kasno ja ću ih pustiti. Sreća nije bilo kasno, ujutro kada sam došla Predsjedništvo Abdića sam našla. Hoću da vam kažem, iako mi je rekao žalićete jednom, ja i još dan danas vam kažem bilo bi nešto strašno u Sarajevu, strašno bi se desilo Srbima.” BCS ERN 0215-0213

¹⁰⁷ “Da se odmah sada ujedini sa Krajinom imali bismo i Muslimane i Muslimanske prijatelje protiv Hrvate i Hrvatske prijatelje protivnike i to je veliki protivnik, ako bismo se samo ujedinjavali sa Srbijom, a bez pristanka Muslimana i Hrvata ondanebi uspjeli da ostvarimo, džilitnuli bi se ali nebi postigli cilja i onda bi Srbiju čekali na takozvanog Kuvajtskiom modelu agresije, jer zasada ipak uspjelismo da zadržimo međunarodne faktore dapriznaju da je to gradjanski etnički rat u okviru BiH, a da Srbija tu pruža moralnu i materijalnu podršku i da nije vojno prisutna. Opasno bi bilo kada bi [illegible] gotovo da se to posmatra kao Kuvajtski model, jedna yemljanapada na drugu suverenu yemlju i tu yemlju treba kayniti ne samo istjerati je iz BiH nego je još kazniti na njenom tlu, kao što je Irak bio žestoko kažnjen nekoliko stotina hiljada mrtvih.” BCS ERNs 0215-2222 – 0215-2223

¹⁰⁸ “Realizovali smo postupak vraćanja vojnih obveznika sa prostora SRJ na jedan od mogućih načina. Ministarstvo Odbrane je poslalo svoje ljude u sve okrug i Srbiji i Crno Gori, uputili poziva oko 12,000 vojnih obveznika koji su nalaze na tom prostoru, odnosno tačno ih ima tamo oko 19,000, i ono što smo imali oko 12. Formirali prihvatni centar u Zvorniku, koristili vojnu policiju Vojske Jugoslavije i delom MUP Jugoslavije a vratili smo 2,768 vojnih obveznika i podelili ih jedinicima, međjutim u vreme vraćanja došlo je do jako negativnog odjeka u SRJ, političke stranke koristili su protiv vladajuće stranke u Jugoslaviji i Vrhovna Komanda, odnosno Savet Odbrane SRJ je zabranio taj postupak i nama se sada potpuno onemogućeno bilo koji način vraćanja naših vojnih obveznika na tim prostorima. Treba posebno da

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se dogovori predsjednika Republika Dr. Karadžić i Predsjednik Milošević." BCS ERN 0215-2359

¹⁰⁹ "Da Vam kažem nešto što je moja dužnost ipred (*sic*: ispred) srpskog naroda u RSK, a to je da ne dozvolimo više nikada nikome da naš dijeli kao što je to jednom napravljeno poslije drugog svjetskog rata, jednom umjetnom graniciom (*sic*: granicom) Josipa Broza, da razdvoji jedan ti isti narod." 0215-2502 "Mi smo jedan te isto narod i više nikada nikome nećemo dozvoliti, ma koliko to zvučalo to da smo mi dvije republike, dvije države, mi smo jedan narod i budite sigurni neće dugo vremene proći, da li se to nekoma svidjalo ili ne mi ćemo biti jedna država. ... RSK, njen narod sve vojno sposobno stanovništvo stavlja se na raspolaganju u odbranu koridora, u odbranu svakog pedlja srpske zemlje bilo to na Goraždu, bilo to na Brčkom, bilo to Benkovcu, Obrovcu mi moramo biti jedan narod i imati jednu odbranu." BCS ERN 0215-2502 – 0215-2503

¹¹⁰ "Jednostavno oko Brčkog nema pogodbe, bez Brčkog nema RS niti RSK. Mi moramo reći svijetu da mi nismo ratnički raspoloženi, ali svijet mora znati sledeće: Da sve i jedan Srbin mora postat kamikaza u obrani Brčko." BCS ERN 0215-2509

¹¹¹ "...i mislim sve što je Sloba govorio može da se prihvati osim jednoga da smo mi od sada nešto propustili, nismo propustili." Mi njih vodimo na naš cilj. ... Bez Srbije nebi bilo ništa, nemamo mi te resurse i nebi mogla da ratujemo, a da ima nesporazuma ima, oni se vidi. Glavni prvi i veliki nesporazum bio je Vens-Ovenov plan i to je bilo ozbiljno i to nija bila igra nikakav, bolje što narod misli da je bila igra." BCS ERN 0215-2533

¹¹² "Mi smo jutros od 4 sata diskutovali sa predstavnicima Srbije i C. Gore, nije to nikakva tajna, oni smatraju da mi to moramo prihvatiti mi smo rekli mi nemoramo, mi to nemožemo prihvatiti. Narod smo povelili mi ćemo ga voditi dokle možemo, kada nemožemo doci će Kecmanović i nek on vodi i potpiše, ako narod prihvati, bio je general Perišić, naš general Mladić, Tolimir, sva je naša delegacija do jednog rekla da nemožemo prihvatamo. Niko od danas nije rekao da to može biti, ali shvatite da moramo naći načina, nije dovoljno da kažemo ne i briga se nas. ... Mi moramo pobjediti hoćemo državu a ne da bude pola Srba mrtvih. Ja se ne bojim njihovog bombardovanja, oni neće bombardovati. Moramo naći način kako da se nastave pregovori." BCS ERN 0215-2923

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¹¹³ "Mi imamo problem zbog loših resursa iz Srbije, ja neću da kažem da li je to namjerno ili ne. Ja znam da su svi resursi iscrpljeni i mi ne možemo u kom slučaju da uvažimo da ne razgovaramo sa Srbijom niti to biti dobro. Otišli smo da razgovaramo, tačno je da Srbija i Crna Gora, bio je gospodin Bulatović i Milošević, prezentirali su svu sliku mi smo rekli sve da je to tako, partizani i ljudi koji su se borili 41. – 45. borili su se bez ijednog metka i oružja, mi ćemo se boriti protiv muslimana i otimati njima oružje, mi nemožemo ovo prihvatiti jer ovo je unitarna Bosna. Naš je stav bio jasan..." BCS ERN 0215-2923

¹¹⁴ "Ostali smo mi Srbi iz bivše BiH sami, kakav izlaz mi tu da tražimo, nemojte ja uvijek kažem, mi smo stalno isli na neko ujedinjenje, svijet neda veliku Srbiju. Velika Srbija je zato što će Srbija da dobije teritorije u BiH i Hrvatskoj, a neda teritorije gdje nema srpskog naroda. Mi ako damo ove teritorije koje je predložila kontakt grupa, ona gdje nepravedno prema 350 hiljada ljudi da se mi sada distanciramo, nama odgovora neka unija ne znam koliko ostaje Srba u ovaj državi koju ćemo doboju, gdje ćemo se tim ljudima." BCS ERN 0215-2927

¹¹⁵ "Nas je Kozirev prevario u Lisabonu smo se prije rata sreli sa njim i pitao je da li mi možemo prihvatiti vanske granice BiH u tim uslovima znajući da ne daju veliku Srbiju i ujedinjenje, znajući da moramo to etapno, prihvatimo da dobijemo unutrašnje granice, da to bude konfederacija, da mi svoju republiku imamo unutar te konfederacije." BCS ERN 0215-2931

¹¹⁶ "Ja vas molim da to podržite, a to je da stvaramo državu i ne nekaku zajednicu u kojoj bio opet imali vezu sa muslimanima i Hrvatima a da ne bude spojeni sa Srbijom i C. Gorom." BCS ERN 0215-2935

¹¹⁷ "PREDLOG ZA UJEDINJENE REPUBLIKE SRPSKE, REPUBLIKE SRPSKE KRAJINE, REPUBLIKE SRBIJE I REPUBLIKE CRNE GORE, U JEDNU DRŽAVU

1. Upućuje se poziv skupštinama Republike Srbije i Republike Crne Gore, da private Predlog o ujedinjenju u jednu državu i d arazmotre procedure u uslove pod kojima bi se obavilo ovo ujedinjene.

2. Zadužuje se zajednička delegacija skupština Republike Srpske Krajine i Republike Srpske da što pre otpočinu razgovore sa predstavnicima skupština Republike Srbije i Republike Crne Gore kako bi se izradila deklaracija o ujedinjenju, kaoi nacrt drugih relevantnih dokumenata.

3. Zajedničkoj delegaciji daje se rok od mjesec dana da obavi ovaj posao i posle toga obavesti skupštine o rezultatima pregovora.

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Predsjednik Skupštine Republike Srpske Krajine, Banko Vojnica
Predsjednik Skupštine Republike Srpske, Mr. Momčilo Krajišnik

Konstatujem da ste jednoglasno usvojili tekst usaglašen od delegacije naše skupštine i skupštine RSK i zahvaljujem se.” BCS ERN 0215-3112

¹¹⁸ “Pojavile su se ponovo glasine u kojima su se počeli optuživati oficiri i koristi se sada politička scena za obračun oficira bilo da su rezervni ili aktivni iako je njih mali broj i da su oni osnovni i glavni krivci za gubitak položaja, da su oni naredili i plasira se i vojnim obveznicima i od strane odgovornih i neodgovornih lica i zvaničkih i nezvaničkih lica da su to uradili oficiri koji su plaćeni koje plaća Slobodan Milošević i sl. iako je isti taj Slobodan Milošević tim oficiri ukikuo platu od avgusta mjeseca.” BCS ERN 0215-3302

¹¹⁹ “Poslanici smatraju da bi povratak g. Šešelja vodio jačanju povjerenja u institucije demokratske države i značajno doprinio konačnom unutar nacionalnom izmirenju medju Srbima, znači ja predlažem da skuština donese zaključak u kome se apeluje na g. Slobodana Miloševića da oslobodi od daljeg izdržavanja kazne savenog poslanika Vojislava Šešelja inače državljanika Republike Srbije iz razloga koje sam ovdje pomenuo jer smatramo da bi taj test značio doprinos unutar nacionalnog izmirenju i boljoj slozi u okviru srpskog naroda, a naročito medju srpskim političarima. Molim vas da imate razumijevanje i da prihvatite predlog Kluba sprskih poslanika. Hvala.

“Poslanici smatraju da bi povratak g. Šešelja vodio jačanju povjerenja u institucije demokratske države i značajno doprinio konačnom unutar nacionalnom izmirenju medju Srbima, znači ja predlažem da skuština donese zaključak u kome se apeluje na g. Slobodana Miloševića da oslobodi od daljeg izdržavanja kazne savenog poslanika Vojislava Šešelja inače državljanika Republike Srbije iz razloga koje sam ovdje pomenuo jer smatramo da bi taj test značio doprinos unutar nacionalnog izmirenju i boljoj slozi u okviru srpskog naroda, a naročito medju srpskim političarima. Molim vas da imate razumijevanje i da prihvatite predlog Kluba sprskih poslanika. Hvala.” BCS ERN 0215-3625 – 0215-3626

¹²⁰ “Konstatujem sa dva protiv i tri suzdržana usvojen je zaključak o upućivanju apela predsjednikuj Srbije, g. Slobodanu Miloševiću da se pomiluje od daljeg izdržavanja poslanik Saveznog Parlamenta, držđavljanin Srbije, g. Vojslav Šešelj. Hvala lijepo.” BCS ERN 0215-3626

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¹²¹ “Mislim da je ovo Vojo nešto emotivno rekao da smo mi prokockali šansu za stvaranje Velike Srbije, a pogotovo da sam je ja prokockao, ništa nije prokockano, mi natežemo uže sa čitavom MZ i oko je još na našoj strani i svaki dan po jedan milimetar ga navučemo na našu stranu.” BCS ERN 0215-3699

¹²² “Gospodin Milošević je jedne prilike da nikada neće dozvoliti, čini mi se u tom smislu sam tako sam razumio, da dodje strani posmatraču na Drinu.” 0215-3794 “...moje je mišljenje da mi bez Srbije i srpskog naroda preko ne možemo, ne smijemo i ne treba da idemo. Zato bi se ja zalozio da se nadje mogućnost, put i način, da se nadju ljudi koje mogu utrti taj put da naše rukovodstvo i rukovodstvo SRJ i rukovodstvo Srbije i Crne Gore sjedu i da vide da li se mogu dogovoriti oko nekih stvari.” BCS ERN 0215-3794 - 0215-3795

¹²³ “Gospodo kod mene kao čovjeka postoji bojazan, kako živjeti bez Srbije, kako živjeti dalje, kako ako sutra ta granica bude totalno hermetički zatvorena, kako ćemo dalje...” BCS ERN 0215-3836

¹²⁴ “Svjesni smo da smo zatroveniji svaki dan, mi kako želimo god da kvalifikujemo ovaj režim u Srbiji, on nam je ipak najbliži, Srbija nam je najbliže, i u Srbiji je taj režim. Moramo pokušati naši načina, evo i predsjednika je rekao, a i vjerovatno moramo, jedino su nam oni ostali, nemamo prijatelja drugog. ... Nemamo ljudski resursi više ja vam kažem. Neki dan je u Brodu poginulo 4 i ranjeno 15 ljudi, od onog jada i bijede koji tam živi.” BCS ERN 0215-3838

¹²⁵ “ “Postovani gospodine Predsjedniče, ...

“Bili smo ponosni na Vas kada ste povelili političku borbu za dostojanstvo srpskog naroda. Podržali smo Vaš stav da u slučaju secesije mora postaviti pitanje administrativnih granice. Imali ste punu našu podršku o ideju “Svi Srbi u jednoj državi,” jer smo 1918. ostvarili tu ideju. Bili smo spremni da ginemo da se Srbija nikada ne saginje. Bili smo ponosni kada ste u Hagu izdržali sve pritiske i odbacili Haški dokument. Da ste tada popustili sve srpske perspektive za slobodu i prava bile bi izgubljena. Vjerujemo da ni sada nećete priznati Hrvatsku i Bosnu jer bi inače Vas otpor u Hagu i naša oslobodilačka borba bili uzaludni.” 0215-3881

“Odahnuli smo od briga kada je Jugoslavija preuzela obaveza u vezi sa vensovom planom da garantuje bezbednost srpskoj Krajini. Narod nas

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pamti po rečima, ali sudi nama po delima. ... U trenutku kada naši neprijatelji pripremaju najgori genocidni i istrebljujući rat protiv nas, mi narodi u svim srpskim zemljama moramo reći istinu. A istina je da Drina danas gvozdена zavesа kroz koju ne može da prodje niko i ništa. Ne samo da u ugušena našа privredа, koja je hranila i branila naš narod, nego je ugrožena našа odbrana i pripreme za otpor neprijatelju.”

“... Apelujemo, gospodine Predsjedniče, da svojim autoritetom ponovo uspostavite dostojanstvo srpske politike i obezbedite srpsko državno ujedinjenje. Zapad vas je, gospodine Predsjedniče, proglasio posljednjom i jedinom nadom za ostvaranje sopstvenih ciljeva na Balkanu. Sopstvenih, ne srpskih, ciljeva. ... Mi smo želili, gospodine Predsjednice, da ponovo budemo ponosni na Vas. Želili bismo da Vi i drugi srpski prvaci budete nada za ostvaranje srpskih ciljeva i prepreka za osvaranje (sic: ostvaranje) ciljevi naših neprijatelja. Vi to možete. I mi to svi zajedno možemo. Možemo sada i ujedinito i da ostanemo čvrsti i odbrani naših nacionalnih i državnih interesa. Ako to ne učinimo, istorija nam neće oprostiti. Ako to nećete ili nemožete, onda bar uklonite bolnu granicu na Drini koju razdvaja jednorodnu braću. ... U pitanje je opstanak našeg naroda.” BCS ERN 0215-3882 – 0215-3883

¹²⁶ “Tako je bilo dato tri mjeseca Miloševiću da nas smijeni, kada je 4. august uveo on to, evo 6 mjeseci prošlo pa nismo kolabirali, prošlo je 6 mjeseci i mi smo posle 3 mjeseci već bili u dobroj poziciji i čak mo izveli kontra ofenzivu...” BCS ERN 0215-3910

¹²⁷ “Te plate mi nismo primali kao milostinju od njih, nitih primamao za ovo što ovdje neko dobacuje da bi služili njima. Primamo ih na osnovu sporazuma koje je tadašnje Predsjedništvo RS sklonilo sa tadašnjim Predsjedništvom Jugoslavije. Mis znamo da ste vi svojim potpisama obezbedili da nas plaća Jugoslavija.” BCS ERN 0084-5943

¹²⁸ “Došli su gospodo oficiri koje smo mi tražili, ja sam tražio Mladića. 0084-6058. Pratio sam ga, sjedio sam kod generala zajedno sa g. Krajišnikom kod generala Kukanjca u kabinetu i slušali kako naredjuje i komanduje i kako komanduje oko Kupresa, oko Knina. Noći i noći smo proveli kod generala Kukanjca u sobi tada, predsjednik Krajišnik je već bio predsjednik Skupštine, a ja sam bio samo predsjednik Stranke, nisam imao državnih funkcija. Tražili smo Mladića i rekli neka oni formiraju štab kakav oni hoće, nećemo da se petljamo u to.” BCS ERN 0084-6058 - 0084-6059

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¹²⁹ "GŠ sve više je bio usmerena zahteve humanitarne pomoći SRJ od Vojske Jugoslavije odakle su uglavnom podmirivane potrebe od vitalnog značaja za voće njeoružane borbe, kao i na sopstvenu poljoprivredu proizvodnju, proizvodnju i remont, proizvodnju municije i druge vidove proizvodje koji nisu zahtevali značajnija finansijska ulaganja.

"Materijalna sredstva dobijena kao humanitarna pomoć od Vojske Jugoslavije kojim su pokrivena potrebe za oko 45% u ubojnom materijalu i 5% drugih potreba.

"Kao ilustraciju za povećanje navodim pregled utroška nekih vrsta materijalnih sredstava po izborima obezbedjenja od početka rata zaključio sa 31. decembrom 1994. godine, sa potrebama za 1995. godinu u sadašnje stanje. Od ukupno utrošenih količina pesadijske municije od početka rata do danas utrošili smo 9,185 tona, 1.49% te municije obezbedjeno je iz naše proizvodnje, 42.2% iz materijalnih rezervi koje smo nasledili, koje smo imali, koje smo izvukli iz enklava i zatekli u kasarnama te bivše vojske, 47.2% iz pomoć Vojske Jugoslavije i 9.11% iz uvoza, odnosno kupovinom. Trenutno raspoložemo sa 9.69% ukupnih potreba za 1995. godine. ... Za artiljerijsku municiju utrošili smo 18,151 tonau, obezbedjeno je 26.2% iz proizvodnje 39% iz materijalnih rezervi, 34.4% iz pomoći Vojske Jugoslavije i 0.26% iz uvoza. Raspoložemo sa 18.36% ovogodišnjih potreba. Za protivavionsku municiju utrošeno je 1,336 tona, obezbedjeno je 0% iz proizvodnje, znači nismo proizveli ni jednu cauru, ni metak, 42.7% iz materijalnih rezervi, 52.4% iz pomoći vojske Jugoslavije, 4.9% iz uvoza, raspoložemo sa 7.89% ovogodišnjih potreba." BCS ERN 0084-5820 – 0084-5822

¹³⁰ "Ono što puštaju Srbiji kroz sankcije, to ne ide bez znanja Amerike, one što mi iz Grčke dobijemo to ne ide bez znanja Amerike. Nas drže na cjevčici na slamku da dišemo, jer njima treba trajanje krize, ovog rata. Klinton hoće da razori Evropu, hoće da instalira NATO na našim prostorima, mi smo slamka medju vihorovima, nama se igraju svi od reda. Mi moramo da to uzmemo u obzir to ozbiljno i moramo da znamo to ako predsjednik Milošević ne prizna sada, a mi nećemo da mu olakšavamo položaj..." BCS ERN 0410-1808 – 0410-1809

¹³¹ "Mi smo ovdje ja mislim da nema nikako je zaklet, ja samo pominjem tu zakletvu, jer računam ko je pod zaketvom taj ne smije odati državnu tajnu ni kada je ne funkciji ni kada ode sa funkcije.

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“Mi smo se sreli sa predsjednikom Miloševićem posle pada Zapadne Slavonije, pravo da kažem tu je bilo mnogo ranije nekih ppekulacija, kako je on spreman da nas pohapsi ili da nas skloni na neku planinu, pa da se objavi narodu das mo pobjegli na Kipar sa parama i koješta, ja sumnjam da bi on tome pribjegao, ali kada bi neko to uradio sigurno da bi upalilo, narod bi pao u očajanje, u konfuziju i svi bi pobjegli u Srbiji, molim da je ovdje daleko od takvih pomisli i mo smo kada nas je pozvao rekli idemo, šta god nam se desi, ako treba ovom narodu nešto da se desi, neka se prvo nama dvojici desi idemo baš obojica, bio je predsjednika Krajišnik i ja. Otišli smo, moram da kažem da predsjednik Milošević nije ništa promjenio. Prihvatite plan, napišite mi pismo, ja ću da obeybjedim da se skinu sankcije sa Srbije, Jugoslavije bi će te pregovarati dva, tri, četiri mjeseca za to vrijeme ćemo vas ojačati materijalno i onda ako bude borbe vi ćete izdržati, lakše ćete izdržati nakon sto prihvatimo plan tu nema govora da mi smijem dalje borbu voditi.” BCS ERNs 0410-1815 – 0410-1816

¹³² “Okolo Zapadne Slavonije mi smo rekli predsjedniku Miloševiću da je to katastrofa za sve nas, da smatramo da smo svi odgovorni, da takav pokolj itd. On je negirao i rekao poginulo je 200 ljudi, mi smo rekli daj Bože da je 200, mada je i 200 strahota da mi od Hrvata doživimo poraz i da nam ubiju 200 ljudi, da mi smo kazali da se plašimo da je između dvije i tri hiljade. Oni su rekli da je to isto tako bilo izazivanje Hrvata, da je tu trebalo biti mirniji i lukaviji, nisu prihvatili da je otvaranje auto-puta za to odgovorno, ali u cjelini mi smo osjetili da Srbija oceća neku krivicu za to niti daje odlučna da nešto učini.

“Mi smo tražili da mi idemo na Orašje, a 11. korpus da ide na Spačvanske šume i da se sretnemo i da ocijepimo toliko parče Hrvatske i naplatimo, a povežemo Istočnu Slavoniju sa RS, predsjednik Milošević nije bio za to, on je rekao da će oni demonstrativno izaći tamo, da ih uplaše i Perišić je bio, mogu reći da je Perišić zaista dobar čovek, ne može se nikako reći da on nas ne razumije i da on nas ne bi pomogao kada bi mogao, vjerovatno pomaže koliko može a kada bi mogao i više pomogao bi i više to se lično njegove volje tiče i jednostavno nemamo tamo tu vrstu podrške koja je za to da se mi izborimo za državu i ujedinito itd.” BCS ERN 0410-1816

¹³³ “Drugo, kada smo se mi sastali prošli put sa Miloševićem, predsjednik Krajišnik i ja, gdje je bio i oštar razgovor sve smo jedan drugom rekli i brk i nije se ništa, niko nije pomjerio situaciju, međjutim, dobili smo obavještajnim putem reakciju da su Njemci pitali Ruse panično, kako je to

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moguće da su se sastali, pa to ne može da se dozvoli da se oni pomire itd. i svatili smo da ustvari možda treba praviti u svijetu privid sada privid neke sklonosti pomirenja, ili neke saradnje da bismo malo ojačali naš položaj i mi smo to odigrali i odradili, čini mi se da u onoj njeri da i početka nije bilo politička igra između nas, do sada možda bi dobro bilo da odigramo neke političke igre u korist sprskog naroda i da ne govorim mnogo ima još tu dio pogodbe, taj dio pogodbe se realizuje sa njihove strane." BCS ERN 0215-4146

¹³⁴ "Greška Karadžića suviše vezivanje za politiku Slobodana Miloševića, greška Mladića što jos uvijek sprovodi jednu komunističku politiku, to je moj zaključak lični." 0215-4210. "Gospodo toga gospodina iz Dedinja 1991. krajem, kada je već u oktobru i novembru potpisan takav plan, pa sada kasnije obelodanjen. Milan Babić tada još služao, sada ga ponovo sluša ne vredi i kada je rekao osim Srbije i Crne Gore sve će ovo drugo povjesti crni mrak." BCS ERN 0215-4211

¹³⁵ "Goražde smo mi došli u svadju sa Miloševićem i sa svima živima radi toga što smo dali dan, pa dan, pa dan, pa pet dana da se uzme desna obala. Prvi red kuća nismo uzeli, nije uzeto, nije mogle da se uzme, razumem da nije moglo. General Gvero je bio na telefonu sa mnom, svaki čas je govorio dans dopet (*sic*: danas do pet?) sutra do pet. ... Mi zamajavamo Čurkin, Stoltemberka i sve ko je bio od stranaca tu, Miloševića kome su obećali 300 tona nafte, to jedino priznajemo da je on tu bio u pravu, kada smo oborili avion, kada smo napravili onu dramu, namjerno išli, ima snimljeno u Vrhovnoj komandi, svi smo bili da se ide dalje žestoko na Goražde, bili smo na vrhuncu moralne pobjede, međjutim počelo je da to ne to dole jer smo počeli da gnjavimo, da gnjavimo, udri po bolnicipo ovom i onom, a ne mrdaš se ..." BCS ERN 0215-4264

¹³⁶ "Meni je lično Milošević rekao, bio mi je Cimerman, traži da vas ugusi, traži da zatvorim granicu na Drini. Nikada ja svoj narod ugusiti neću. Ja sam to napamtio i računao sam na to, i nikada nisam mogao posumjati da će sa zatvoriti granicu na Drini, jer on rekao da nikada ugusiti neće svoj narod i oslonio sam se na tu njegovu riječ i svi smo se oslonili i vama sam prenio. Jedino na jednoj, prije 4. augusta, na jednoj skupštini sam rekao, ostatćemo sami, kada smo odlučivali hoćemo ili prihvatiti ali nećemo. Do tada nisam ni sanjao da ćemo ostaviti." BCS ERN 0215-4233

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¹³⁷ "Nikada nismo bili za to, da radimo posebno, uvijek smo bili za to da radimo zajedno. Predsjednik Milošević je išao s nama u Ženevi, nije to bila jedinstvena delegacija, ali jeste bila sjedili smo zajedno..."

"Ja ne znam da li je on to zamjerao, ja znam da on zamjera onima koji moraju da ga slušaju. Mi smo njemu mogli da kažemo i oko naše i njegove situacije vrlo pošteno šta misimo a šta može i nemože. Nemamo mi želju da ostanemo posebnu državu. Najviše bi voljela da se danas ujedinito i neka sutra Milošević razgovara. ...

"Medjutim, ako formiramo zajedničku, ne jedinstvenu nego zajedničku delegaciju gdje će naravno Milošević biti formalni ili neformalni šef, a i u Ženevi svaki put je bio šef, to je jasno da on je bio šef." BCS ERNs 0215-4383 - 0215-4386.

¹³⁸ "...gospodo treba znati da smo mi preuzeli jednu strukturu koja je zavisa od Jugoslavije i koja je vezana za Jugoslaviju i platama i penzijama i nabavkom oružja i municije itd., mada smo dobar dio toga platili, dobar dio smo i dobili." BCS ERN 0215-4393

¹³⁹ "Mi nemamo pravo da mijenjamo taj strateski cilj što se uklapa u diskusije predhodnika, to je da imamo kompaktna teritorija, neka je ona i manja, opet ćemo razgovarati, ona mora biti kompaktna. Mi smo imali na tri djela pocjepana država. ... Mi smo bili na sastanku sa predsjednikom Miloševićem, to je tajna i neka ostane ovdje, ali već kada se zna treba reći, ne znam li ko je rekao, ali gospodo to je bila naša inicijativa, povodom odluka ove skupštine da imamo zajednički nastup, da ujedinito sve resurse naše da odbranimo republiku, da vidimo šta se RSK, na ne možemo ovako nastupati, i da srpski blok mora da ima zajedničku politiku. Mi moramo uvijek pokušavati da Srbi ujedine, jer znamo da oni grade na tome svoju strategiju." BCS ERNs 0215-4397 – 0215-4398

¹⁴⁰ "Mogu da kažem samo da aktivni oficiri obezbedili materijalno-tehnička sredstva kojima je 35% stanovnika uspeli da 4 godine drži preko 70% teritorije na kojoj je zivljelo preko 65% stanovnika naših neprijatelji, ja ovdje govorim o stanovništvu ne samo o vojnicima, a oficiri su ipak bili tu srpski koji su obezbjedili materijalno-tehnička sredstva iz one bivše Jugoslavije i donijeli ih zato što smo bili većina i zato što uspjeli..." BCS ERN 0215-4406

¹⁴¹ "Imali smo dosta komandanata u Banjaluci, imali smo veliku vojnu policiju, civilnu policiju, vrlo mali su efekti njihovi rata, ja predlažem da gospodin Arkan dođe na ove prostore i da bude komandant grada Banjaluka.

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Molim vas, nemojte mi zameriti, ono što je on uradio u Istocnoj Slavoniji to su praktični rezultati. One sto on je uradio sa kratko vreme u Novom, on je spasio Novi, Prijedor, itd. i izuzetni su rezultati. Molim ovu skupštinu da me rezumje, iza njega postoje djela, rezultati i prihvatimo to kao istinu." BCS ERN 0215-4503

¹⁴² "Mi u ovom momentu možemo da očekujemo pomoć koju prizivamo cijelo vrijeme iz Jugoslavije samo, po meni, u onome što se zove dobrovoljce. Znači dobrovoljna vojska i dobrovoljno davanje materijalnih sredstava, nećemo da uzmemo u obzir da je tamo izuzetno teška situacija. To dobrovoljci koje predvodi Željko Ražnjatović kao patrioti, čuo sam da su napravili dosta toga uspješnog, međjutim, u izlaganju generala Milovanovića, oseća se da se i to ne prihvata, odnosno da se ne prihvata ni takva vrsta pomoći, pa me isto i to čudi. Mislim da su te jedinice, pretpostavljam da su podrudjene komandovanju, znači komandi VRS, da nisu samostane ili slobodni strijelci." BCS ERN 0215-4509

¹⁴³ "Arkan je u službi politike Beograda, koliko ja znam, inače ne bi egzistiro, u kojoj bi pravnoj državi egzistirala neka paravojna formacija itd. On u funkciji nija došao da pomogne nama nego da izvrši funkciju iz Beograda..." BCS ERN 0215-4529

¹⁴⁴ "Gospodo nas su stavili u bob stazu budemo li ovako taktizirali dovešće nas mečki na rupu, iskočimo iz bob staze proglasimo ujedinjenje, stanimo na granice, proglasimo ratno stanje, odbranićemo se imamo resurse, imamo tehniku, imamo sve. Sada znam i to da tada Amerika nije toliko bila protiv nas, jer nije se bila ni dadužila kod Islama..." BCS ERN 0215-4552

¹⁴⁵ "Ja sam stalno opoziciji i uvijek opoziciji u Srbiji govorio, nemojte da slabite predsjednika Miloševića. ... Slab predsjednik Milošević slaba Srbija, slab predsjednik Srbije, slaba Srbije. Jačajte ga, pregorite tu borbu za vlast, jačajte ga, pohvalite svaki njegov korak. Mi smo gospodo u našoj zemlji to isto iskusili..." BCS ERN 0215-4553

¹⁴⁶ "...bio sam iznenadjen sa predstavnicima koji su nas dočekali u toj delegaciji, a to je bio najviši državni vrh SRJ i oba dvije Republike, dakle bio je prisutan predsjednik SRJ g. Zoran Lilić, bio je prisutan predsjednik Republike Srbije g. Slobdan Milošević, predsjednik RCG g. Momir Bulatović, minister inostranih poslova g. Milan Milutinović i minister unutrašnjih poslova g. Jovica Stanišić. ..." "Ono sto bi želio da istaknem, a to je da je predsjednik Republike Srbije, prvo dobro informisan o problemima i

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stavovima ove skupštine o prioritetnim ciljevima i zadacima koje bi trebalo da budu prihvaćeni i usvojeni od strane MZ. Mislim da je ono što sa, što je moj utisak, da je predsjednik dobro pogodio i zna informisan je o našim stavovima i željama i prioritetnim zadacima RS, koje su poslanici iznosili i koje smo mi zauzimali, ja ne znam kojim putem, ali pretpostavljam da je naša delegacija u svim kontaktima do sada informisala predsjednika Republika Srbije, koji je veoma dobro informisano našim zahtevima i prioritetima, da budu rasmatrani na međunarodnoj konferenciji o bivšoj Jugoslaviji, odnosno o situaciji u bivšoj BiH. ...“Predsjednik je iznio poznate stavove, da smo mi, ono o čemu vjerovatno znate, da smo mi insistirali na faktičkom stanju, a da smo nažalost propusili ili popuštali situaciju kada je faktičko stanje bilo o našoj korist. Zamjera nam što smo ovako jogunasti i da ne kažem sve tako, da nismo prihvatili sve ono predloge koje je on iznosio i koji su nama poznati iz novina i svega onoga što smo još jedanput čuli.

“... predsjednik Milosević se čudio da smo mogli da dozvolimo, da je VRS dozvolila, on je to smatrao vojničkom slabosti, neorganizovanosti svim onim faktorima zbog kojih je nastala situacija i faktičko stanje koje je u momentu pregovora nepovoljno za pregovarački proces, za kompletni pregovarački process za RS i za delegaciju bez obzira što će ona zajedno biti sa SRJ. Predsednik je više puta ponavljao svoj i naš interes da se odbrani za pregovaračkom procesu i smatra svojom obavezom i diplomatskom vjestinom da se dio teritoriju koje su privremeno okupirane vrata RS u diplomatskom, odnosno u mirovnom procesu.

“Je bio konstruktivan, mislim da je bio obostrano koristan, ali da nam preстоји jedan mukotrпni process koji treba da se završi u periodu kojije pred nama.” BCS ERNs 0215-4624 - 0215-4627

¹⁴⁷ “Predsjednik Krajišnik rekao, da je Milošević spriječio ofanzivu da nismo mogli uzeti Bihać, on nas optužuje sto nismo Abdiću pomogli, mi smo to trebali raditi za Abdiću. ... Čovjek nas zna sve uglavu iako neke od nas nije ni vidio, osim ono na Palama, upućen je čovjek i jednostavno svu odgovornost on prevaljuje na nekog drugog.” BCS ERN 0215-4630

¹⁴⁸ “Gospodin Stanišić koji je iznio neke stvari koje smo mi nasludjivali, ali koje su potvrdile naša saznanja, o ovo bila je stalna dilema, koj je zaustavio osvajanje Bihaća.

“Mladić je upropastio stvar u Bihaćkom djepu. Abdic je do kraja ostao lozalan Srbima. Davali smo dovoljno municije i naoružanja da glava

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zaboli, ali nije sve izbugljeno. Ne mogu da govorim koliko je vaša Vlada radila privatne poslove.” BCS ERNs 0215-4640 - 0215-4641

¹⁴⁹ "Mi nismo inferiorni na odnosu na Predsjednika Miloševića, nikada nismo bili, prvi put sam bio kod njega, tek kada sam svatio da imamo veliku snagu, to je bio kraj septembar 1990. godine, ... ja sam pozvao i Koljevića i Kozića, vodio sam ih sa sobom, jer nisam htio sam i odmah sam izbio ravnopravan položaj, evo njih neka potvrde, odmah sam zahtjevao ravnopravan. ... Nismo mi bili nimalo inferiorni na ovom sastanku, ali je Predsjednik Milošević razgovarao drugačije sa Vama nego razgovara sa nama, jer je ocijenio da napad je najbolja odbrana, on je svatio da će biti napadnut i napao je nas. On je otvoreni, i polije (*sic*: poslije) u razgovoru smo rekli, svi koji kod nas dolaze polovina i većina su to naši ljudi i oni nama dodju i kaze, vi smijenite rukovodstvo pa će biti bolje, ne birajte više ove ludake, bandoglave sve vi to govorite gospodine Predsjednice vi hoćete da nas destabilizujete, hoćete da nas srušite, a ja vam kažem vi ne možete nas srušiti, ako nas srušite, srusićete državu i narod, prije izbora nas niko ne može srušiti, a ni na izborima ne može, sve smo mi to njemu otvoreno rekli." BCS ERN 0215-4665

¹⁵⁰ "Mi smo 1991. onom Predsjedništvu Jugoslavije, sve je to snimljeno i ostalo tamo, rekli sada imamo šansu da izadjemo na svoje granice, da napravimo državu, pa će nas ružiti, pa će nas napadati, pa će nas priznati. Nije bilo muške snage nije bilo državničke vizije da se to tada napraviti, tada smo imali i veće resurse i veće teritorije i granice, Amerika nije bila zaintačila toliko protiv nas, svi bi klepili ušima da smo slomili Sloveniju i Hrvatsku, slomila za 15 dana, pa ih onda pustali iz Jugoslavije kroz Parlament, al mi smo gnjavili i gnjavili i tonemo dublje i dublje u živo blato i to je razlog zašto što se mi razišli sa rukovodstvom Srbije, ne ideološke razlike..." BCS ERN 0215-4666

¹⁵¹ "Svi znamo, trudimo se da i ja se nadam da ćemo večeras usvojiti i zakon o jediku, mihoćemo da postanemo Srbija i da postanemo jedna nacija, ali dok ne postanemo Srbija, gospodo ja sam protiv ulagivačkog načina. Mi smo bili neki dan sa Predsednikom Miloševićem, sa njim se može pristojno razgovarati, dostojanstveno, kada je potrebnoštro, oštro, kada je potrebno blago i tolerantno, on to dopušta može se i čovjekmora da uzme sebi to pravo. Predsednik Milošević ne mora da zna šta je naš interes, njemu može da se učini da je naš interes to it to, a mi znamo da nije to i to, njego je ovo i ovo.

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Morali smo dati da one pregovore, ali u buduće konačno i predsjednik Milošević ćemo dovesti u zabludu ako mi budemo umiljato jagnje, on će misliti da je to dobro, da idemo pravo tim putem i možemo da propadnemo. Konačno može li se desiti, da predsjednik Miloševiću ako on svate da on ima potpunu vlast nad nama, da oni kažu e sada ćeš ti fino da ih vratiš u federaciju i pokušaćemo da ti udarim sankciju i da ti postičemo opoziciju i ovo i ono. posljedni put smomz reki, vrlo je bitno g. predsjedniče i ministru smo rekli, vrlo je bitno da vinjima kažete da ne možete da sve proizvedete kod nas, da je sa nama teško da smo mi divlji naod, ogrizli smo u ratu, nepovjerljivi smo itd. Nemojte da se hvalite kako možete sve da zavrpite sa nama, onda će da rastu zahtjevi, prema tome sa Srbijom, kao dijete prema majci, ni dijete prema majci ne smije da bude submisivno i bez dostojanstva i bez ličnosti i bez svoga interesa.” BCS ERNs0215-5220 – 0215-5221

¹⁵² “Mi smo se sastali sa predsjednikom Miloševićem dva puta. Prvi put 16.5.1996. na sastanku su bili predsjednik Krajišnik, prof. Koljević i ja a do sastanka je došlo na poziv predsjednikom Miloševića. Vi znate da je Jugoslavija garant Sporazuma i da je on na sebe preuzela obavezu da garantuje da će sporazum biti proveden u RS. Čim je taj sastanak upriličen dosta brzo bili smo svjesni da se rado o nekim novim momentima na koje treba brzo reagovati. Dok smo mi putovali za Beograd, putovala je i odluka, preko medija, predsjednika Karadžića o razrješenju predsjednika Kasagića, tako da smo u Beograd dosli negdje oko 16,30 sati.

Šta je bio razlog Miloševićog poziva_ Sa ranih strana njemu je bilo signalizirano da je došlo do nalih teškoća u provodjenju sporazuma i one se tiču prije svega slobode kretanja, tiču se prestojećih izbora, odnosno dinamike priprema za te izbore...

Predsjednik je Milošević sugerisao da se ide dvofazno. ... Mislio je da bi rešenje bilo da se imenuje čovjek koji bi obavljao dužnost predsjednika, a da se predsjednik povuče malo u sjenku i da se skloni sa ove poyornice da malo udar koliko je to moguće ublaži.” BCS ERNs 0410-2247 - 0410-2248

¹⁵³ “Održavanje i razbijanje postojećeh i ustpostavljanje novih veza sa SR Jugoslavijom, je takodje bila i ostala jedna od osnova na kojima je plan koncipiran. Nije potrebno naglašavati, da se ne radi samo o fizičkim vezama, kao što su saboraćaj, telekomunikacije, energetika i sl. nego o vezama u svim oblastima privrednog društva i duhovnog života. Što te veze budu čvršće biće jača i RS i Jugoslavija i biće širi i jači temelji na kojima će

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se jednog dana graditi, nadajmo se, jedinstvena srpska država u kojoj će Drina biti kičma, a ne i granica.” BCS ERN 0215-5459

¹⁵⁴ “Moramo razbiti birokratski pristup centralizovane ekonomski moći vlasti u BiH. Cilj nam je da se svi republički fondovi decentralizuju, da najveći dio prihoda od građana i pravnih lica ostaju opštinama, regijama i autonomnim oblastima, a samo određena kotizacija da se uplaćaju Republici Bosni i Hercegovini. Dužni smo osmisliti funkciju regija i autonomnih oblasti s ciljem da sačuvamo jedinstvo srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini. Zato ne bismo smjeli dozvoliti da regije postanu posebne cjeline odvojene od ostalog srpskog naroda.” SA01-2008 –SA01-2009

¹⁵⁵ “Mislim da se treba osmisliti redosljed poteza. Da se ide, grubo rečeno, razvaljivaju postojećih opština gdje Srbi nisu u većini. Jer, mi imamo takvih stvari gdje se pojedine mjesne zajednice, naselje u dvije opštine, gdje Srbi nisu u većini, dodiruju se. Znači da iz dvije tri susjedne opštine imamo prostora da formiramo jednu veliku, finu srpsku opštinu.” BCS ERN SA02-4951. Also 0089-8247

¹⁵⁶ “U skupštinama opština gdje su srpski odbornici u manjini, kao Novi grad, Olovo itd. gdje im se majorizacijom nemeću odluke protivne sprskom narodu, treba da formiraju skupštinu opštine kao što smo mi ovdje formirali Skupštinu srpskog naroda. O tome je riječ.

“Sve ostalo, regionalizacija, ja sasvim druga stvar. ...

“Radi se samo o opštinama gdje su srpski odbornici u manjini, da formiraju ovakvu Skupštinu kao što je naša Republička, da bi ostvarivali određena prava. Tu je cijeli nesporazum, kako to ja vidim. Ovo što je rekao Veselinović to je regionalizacija, teritorijalno zaokruživanje kao što radi g. Vještica i ostali.” BCS ERNs SA02-4952 – SA02-4953. Also 0089-8248 - 0089-8249

¹⁵⁷ “Mi u opštinama kao što su Novi grad, Hadžići, Stari grad itd. nemamo nikakva prava. Tu i treba formirati skupštine srpskog naroda. Jer, radom u zajedničkoj skupštini naši odbornici su samo paravan, a ovi rade, provode odluke za koje nikog od srpskih odbornika ne pitaju. Tu je suština. Nemam, inače, ništa protiv da to ne osvojimo. Ali, inicijativa je potekla od mnogih opština da odbornici jednostavno ne mogu izboriti nikakva svoja prava već se samo preglasavanjem to vrši i nameće se tako ta volja. Namećemo i mi volju njima, ne kažem da to nije, ali ovdje se radi o odbornicima srpskog

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naroda.” BCS ERNs SA02-4954 – SA02-4955. Also 0089-8250 – 0089-8251

¹⁵⁸ “Gospodo, hoću da kažem da smo formirali regije koje nemaju konačne granice, tj. konture, i, da bi to dobile saglasan sam apsolutno da se predje na izdvajanje srpskih teritorija, odnosno srpskih opština tamo gdje je to moguće, konkretno na rubnim područjima naše regije.” BCS ERN SA02-4971. Also 0089-8267

¹⁵⁹ “Ja sam za to da se nastavi s organizovanjem srpskih opština, srpskih teritorija, da se to radi brže, ubrzanije i kvalitetnije i da se odredi rok do kada to moramo uraditi. BCS ERN SA02-4972. Also 0089-8268.

¹⁶⁰ “Naime, i pored toga što ova Skupština ima veće ingerencije od skupština opština u smislu da može da donosi odluke koje mogu obavezivati srpski narod u opštinama gdje je u većini, ipak mislim da treba ići korak dalje ukoliko ne mislimo da se Skupština zadržava na proklamacijama. Koraci dalje mislim u pravcu formiranja ministarstava, organi vlasti, formiranje izvornih prihoda za finansiranje tih organa itd. Što se tiče opština ja uopšte ne znam šta znači formiranje skupština opština srpskih u okviru opština gdje se preglašavaju Srbi ako se neće formirati važni organi koji će te odluke da sprovode.” BCS ERNs SA02-4974 – SA02-4975. Also 0089-8270 – 0089-8271

¹⁶¹ “Mi regionalizaciju možemo provesti ne samo da odvojimo srpske regije nego da prihvatimo i dio kapitala koji možemo u onim regijama koje nisu obuhvaćene. To je jedan od ključnih problema na kojem zaista moramo raditi maksimalno.” BCS ERN SA02-4993. Also 0089-8289

¹⁶² “Moramo ih upozoriti da ćemo u opštinama, bar u tom dijelu gdje mi imamo vlast, uvoditi sve savezne zakone i sve republičke zakone koji su u skladu sa istim, onemogućavati provodjenje bilo kog zakona koji je donesen ili koji će biti donesen bez našeg prisustva. Onemogućiti, dakle, to, a isto tako svim zakonskim sredstvima ćemo sankcionisati i omogućiti provodjenje saveznih zakona i saveznog Ustava.” BCS ERN 0089-8216

¹⁶³ “Drugo, mi ćemo imati Ustav ali je pitanje hoće li naša država funkcionisati i mislim, a to sam predložio u jednom našem užem krugu, da bi naš Ministarski savjet trebalo za ovih sedam dana obidje sve opštine i da utvrdi pravo stanje. Da vidimo da li mi imamo strukturu da bi naša vlast

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profunkcionisala. Jer, mi ne možemo biti suvereni ako na svojoj teritoriji ne možemo da ostvarujemo vlast koja nam pripada. Pod tim se podrazumijava mnogo stvari, od prostorija koje su potrebne, do financija, novca, kadrova itd.

“Predložio bih da prije nego usvojimo Ustav na jednom našem zatvorenom sastanku saslušamo izvještaj našeg Ministarstog savjet, da vidimo da li smo u stanju od 23. februara o.g. da profunkcionišemo kao Srpska država Bosna i Hercegovina. Tako je važno da to zajednički procijenimo. Da se ne zaletimo. Da vidimo kako je stvarno stanje na terenu i s čime mi to raspoložemo. BCS ERNs 0215-5359 – 0215-5360

¹⁶⁴ “Molim da se objasni da regije postoje. U podjeli vlasti dobiće ogromno. Nas ovdje ne zanima da srpska vlada koncentriše neku moć. To i tamo treba osigurati. Zato poslanici iz Krajine treba dosta da rade s našim ljudima u Stranci. Jer poslanici su nosioci najviše vlasti. Oni moraju da prisustvuju i radu klubova itd.

“Drugo, ako ima potrebe, i čini mi se da ima, naš coordinator Ministarskog savjeta g. Čizmović, da se predsjednicima opština i s drugim učesnicima održi konsultativni sastanak, da to i održimo. Trebalo bi napraviti jedan upitnik, jednu listu pitanje da se provjeri kako nam koji segment infrastruktura stoji na terenu. Onda će coordinator Ministarskog savjeta g. Čizmović ovu nedelju dana provest na točkovima obilazeći mjesta naših regija Trebinja, Bijeljina, Dobo, Banjaluku i Tuzlu da bi se na tom upitniku do deset petnaestak pitanje moglo ustanoviti kako funkcionišu elementi vlasti: kakav je SUP, da li je lojalan, kakav je SDK, kakvi su drugi elementi vlasti.” BCS ERN SA02-5362

¹⁶⁵ “Ja vam garantujem Bosanska Krajina ne smije postati problematična. Postane li problematična mi ćemo da izgubimo Kninsku krajinu. Alija Boga moli da se mi otcijepimo, da napravimo neku svinjarinju. Uvaliće nam snage UN, stvoriće ‘zonu a’ i ‘zonu b’ i mi jednu sigurno gubimo. A druga će biti u sastavu nezavisne BiH, sa silnim ograničenjima, sa UN, sa Crnicima i srnpurastom djecom koja će se radjati, s ovima i s onima. Mi nemožemo dopustiti da se pet ljudi koji imaju ličnu ambiciju, da upropaste šanse. Mi smo na pragu ostvarenje svojih strateških ciljeva.” BCS ERNs 0081-6572 – 0081-6573

¹⁶⁶ “Prinudjeni smo odgovoriti kako odgovoramo, a to znači dovršiti posao organizovanja vlasti srpskog naroda na svim teritorijama gdje smo većine,

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bilo to apsolutno ili relativno. To znači organizovati vlast na teritoriji Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine.” BCS ERNs SA01-1262 – SA01-1264

¹⁶⁷ “... mišljenja sam da na terenu po srpskim opštinama nije uradjeno sve ono oko čega se ova Skupština dogovorila, zašta joj je mandat dao srpski narod. ...

“Mi moramo tamo gdje smo formirali srpske opštine u njima formirati i one organe koji će Srbima na tim područjima u njima garantovati mir, bezbjednost, sigurnost. Jer, štada kažem ja, na kraju poynajete me svi, znate da sam nastrani istine, pravde, što će reći na strani srpskog naroda, a šta da kažem ja kome da se obratim u MUP-u BiH za slučaj kada prijete klanjem, silovanjem itd. Dakle, najkraće, nekase u srpskim opštinama formiraju srpski organi koji će raditi svoj posao.” BCS ERN SA01-1208

¹⁶⁸ “Ako ćemo Skupština imati u petak ili subotu predlažem da za naredna dva dana u svim AO-ma na terenu sastavimo svoje vlade i da one predlože ko može biti naj čovjek. Jer, mi već četiri pet mjeseci vidimo šta se rad u MUP-u, da će nas to lupiti po glavi. Želim da znam ko je sprski ministar za odbranu. Jer, mi na Romaniji provodimo faktičko stanje, za nas nema dilema. A vi koji ovdje non-stop pričaju ništa nisu uradili.” BCS ERN SA01-1212

¹⁶⁹ “Ako 6. aprila ne budemo imali faktičku vlast na terenu, ovi pregovori biće minimizirani, čak i rezultati i dogovori vezani za njih.” BCS ERN SA01-1217

¹⁷⁰ “... moramo pod hitno formirati srpski MUP u Republici srpskog Bosni i Hercegovini, moramo formirati narodnu odbranu, svoju srpsku armiju, koja na terenu imamo samo je treba tretečiti u ono što moramo imati. Pod hitno moramo uz ovo formirati svoj system platnog prometa. Poslije svega toga moramo zauzeti sve svoje srpske teritorije, fizički, sa svojom teritorijalnom odbranom, svojom srpskom milicijom. To moramo uraditi ako stvarno želimo da postignemo ono što smo rekli da je naš minimum.” BCS ERN SA01-1222

¹⁷¹ “Gospodine predsjedniče, mislim da nama morate narediti da nakon naredne Skupštine naredite to, da to dogovorimo gdje nije uređene i to da sprovedemo u životČČ da Srbi zauzmu svoju teritorju, da na nju ne može doći nikakva druga sila. Hvala. (aplauz)” BCS ERN SA01-1223

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¹⁷² “Novoformirane opštine moraju što prije da uspostave svoje organe, da izrade pečate i počnu da funkcionišu. Mora se milicijom, odnosno našim organima stati na granicu. Ako je to ova ulica, ova ulica. Preko te ulice ne smiju da prelazi niko drugi bez kontrole i dozvole naših organa. Naravno sloboda kretanja da, ali ne smiju da ulaze s oružanim snagama, ni s nečim što bi ugrozili našu teritoriju, našu opštinu. To uključuje i kamionete s eventualnim novcem ili s bilo čim.” BCS ERNs 0089-6886

¹⁷³ “Mi to zakonsko pokriće imamo u Zakonu o unutrašnjim poslovima, imamo i oznake i onom trenutku kada to bude, a biće veoma uskoro, formira se to što hoćemo. Ima razloga da to bude za dva tri dana, takve su procjene, razloge van sada ne mogu reći. Onog trena će sve srpske opštine, kako stare tako i novoformirane, bukvalno staviti pod svoju kongrolu kompletnu teritoriju odnosno opštine. Opština Zvornik stavlja pod kontrolu sve što čini srpsku opštinu Zvornik. Tada, u tom trenutku, za sljedeća tri četiri dana, biće jedinstvena metodologija, vi ćete moći to prenijeti u opštine koje predstavljate i kako i šta sve treba učiniti. Kako izdvojiti milicijski sastav, kako uzeti sredstva koja pripadaju srpskom narodu, kako uspostaviti komandu. Milicija tu mora da bude pod komandom civilne vlast, da je sluša, tu nema zbora – tako mora biti. Mislim da ćemo to danas čuti na Klub poslanika kao uputstva.

“Odluku dakle, treba donijeti ali s odložem dejstvom. Ne u ovom trenutku jer za to ima puno razloga.” BCS ERN 0089-6894

¹⁷⁴ “Predsjednici svi SAO treba danas da kažu sve o formiranju srpskih opština, da istaknu zašto su neke formirane gdje nemamo poslanika, a negdje jesu gdje imamo jednog ili dva poslanika. Taj posao treba obaviti kompleto i korektno, prema našem Ustavu. Predsjedavajući je objasnio rekavši da su svi Predsjednici autonomih oblasti dobili uputstvo, trebalo je to da pripreme i organizuju. Ko to nije uradio treba da uradi do petka. ...

“SKUPŠTINA JEDNOGLASNO VERIFIKUJE ODLUKU SKUPŠTINA OPŠTINA O PROGLAŠENJU PODRULJA NOVOFORMIRANIH SRPSKIH OPŠTINA, S TIM DA OPŠTINE KOJE TO NISU URADILE PREDAJU ODLUKU OVJERENU OD NADLEŽNIH ORGANA DO PETKA, ŠTO PREDSJEDAVALJUĆI KONSTATUJE PROČITAVŠI JOŠ JEDNOM OVU ODLUKU GDJE JE TAJ POSAO OBAVLJEN.” BCS ERN 0089-6897

¹⁷⁵ “Nisam pisao nikakav zaključak. Medjutim, iz rasprave koju smo imali proizilazi da bi ova Skupština trebalo da usvoji ZAKLJUČAK koji nalaže

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predsjedniku Vlade Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine i ministrima da do petka pripreme operativni plan preuzimanja vlasti, odnosno uspostavljanja vlasti u Srpskoj Republici Bosni i Hercegovini u oblastima unutrašnjih poslova, narodne odbrane, platnog prometa kako bismo nakon toga mogli zajedno da donesemo jednu odluku na Skupštini od kojeg dana uspostavljamo kompletnu vlast i kontrolu srpske teritorije u Srpskoj Republici Bosni i Hercegovini. Da to istovremeno radimo u svim opštinama u kojoj imamo srpsku vlast i u onim opštinama u kojima smo tek formirali srpske opštine.” BCS ERN SA02-5838

¹⁷⁶ “Predsjedavajući predlaže da se usvoji ZAKLJUČAK DA VLADA SAČINI SVOJ PROGRAM, S TIM DA GA OPERATIVNO USKLADI S VREMENOM, DA DO PETKA PREDLOŽI SVE ŠTO MOŽE, DA SE TAJ PROGRAM PREDLOŽI SKUPŠTINI U PETAK, OSTALO U KASNIJIM FAZAMA.

“SKUPŠTINA JEDNOGLASNO USVAJA PONUDJENI PREDLOG ZAKLJUČKA ŠTO PREDSDJEDAVAJUĆI I KONSTATUJE.” BCS ERN SA02-5839

¹⁷⁷ “Kada se vratite u opštine, naročito u novoformirane, molim vas da uradite ono što ste obavezni i ono što imate pravo i po zakonu: da čim dodjete u svoje opštine odmah hitno formirate krizne štabove. Da pokušate da taj narod dovedete u red da može da se odbrani. Nedjite za te štabove nekoliko rezervnih oficira, da uvede sve koki imaju oružje i formacije, da formiraju teritorijalne odbrane, i, ako je tu JNA obavezno da se u po njenom komadom. Ako nisu neka su pod komandom rezervnih oficira.” BCS ERN 0090-8378

¹⁷⁸ “Rat u Bosni i Hercegovini ništa neće riješiti. Ako započne dobićete planove. Ali, molim vas da taj narod odmah stavite u formacije TO, načelo im stavite rezervne oficire, da se formiraju odjeljenje i vodovi, da se formiraju krizni štabovi, angažuju i penzionisani oficir. To da se uradi u cijelom našem području.

“U kriznom štabu su predsjednik opštine, izvršnog odbora, najviši i napoj vlasti na području. šillegible rezervni oficiri, neka se prouči situacije za odbranu života, imovine, teritorije. Mi drugih planova nemamo. Važno je da se obezbijedi stacionarni dio, koji će da brani teritoriju, polovina ili trećinakoja može biti operativna, ilikoje se može dodati za ukрупnjavanje formacija da bi se mogla braniti teritorije. Mi smo sigurni da ratom ne mogu ništa postići, da nam ne mogu ni+ta, nas odraslih ima koliko i njih zajedno.

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“Prema našim saznanjima Hrvati nemaju aspiracija toliko prema srpskim područjima. Medjutim, krizno je u Bosanskom Brodu, biće i u Kupresu, u dolini Neretve i Derventi. Molim vas da s punim ovlašćenjima Skupština pristupite disciplinovanju ljudi i organizovanju kriznih štabova, uz uvodjenje svih rezervnih oficira i penzionisanih oficira u te štabove da se narod dovede u neki red i da je spreman za odbranu. Isključivo za odbranu. Treba gledati da se mir očuva. Mir nama odgovara i politički nam ide u prilog.” BCS ERN BCS 0090-8378 – 0090-8379

¹⁷⁹ "Naime, pred bojazni da budemo ovladani ili dominirali od strane Izetbegovićeva vlada mi smo izradili neke političke, a manje državne mehanizme otpora zloupotrebi centra, tako da smo sada kada imamo svoju državu te mehanizme naslijedili. Sada nam ce vraćaju kao negativni eho. Odmah ćemo svi znati da se rado o jednoj urodjenoj srpskoj tendenciji autonomaštva, tendenciji stvarana malih knezevina i malih knezova, iza kojih uvijek stoji privatni interes, a nikad interes naroda." BCS ERN 0214-9509

¹⁸⁰ "Dodao bi predhodnost nedefinisanost nadležnosti i funkcija kriznih stabova koji su u jednom broju opština odigrali značajnu ulogu, a u drugim su se izrodili u značanja ... (long space in original) izvorišta razdora postali tromi, brojni i neorganizovani." BCS ERN 0214-9517

¹⁸¹ "... mi smo u jednom periodu radili po uputstvu vladu, pa smo formirali krizne stabovi koji su mislim u jednom momentu činila napredak, a dalje sami smetnja sebi jer vjerovatno bi ih trebalo prevaziti i da se vratimo na redovni skupštinski život, to znači da afirmisemo redovne skupstine a idea krizne stabove možemo zanemariti. Ali sa povjerenicima mi smo ih shvatili da su oni za nas bili nepovjerenje prema izabranim predstavnicima naroda, barem se tako pokazalo, a u pojedinim rješenjima bili su pravlast (). Nisam vidio potrebu da se za Krajinu takvo rjesenje predloži, mi smatramo da to rjesenje Vlade treba primijeniti tamo gdje nije funkcionisala vlast, gdje se vlada morala oslanjati na povjerenika, ali ako funkcionise Skupština, regionalna, okružna, nema potrebe da tamo dolaze pojedinci. BCS ERN 0214-9523

¹⁸² "U trenutku kad smo trebali razbijati unutarnu Bosnu su se regije SAO, oblasti, *[illegible]* u tom trenutku bile i politički i teritorijalno najbolje rjesenje, jer smo mogli tako da se zaokružemo na lokalnom nivou. Medjutim, u ratnim uslovima zaokruženje na lokanim nivou mogli

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[illegible] zaokružuju na jos nižem nivou organizovana na opštinama. Mi smo u jednom trenutku, u opštini Zvornik sam o tome nekoliko puta govorio, došli situaciju da imamo i opštinsku vojsku, policiju i upravu – državu u državi. A tako se, čujem, hoće da *[illegible]* i u istočnoj Hercegovni na nivou oblasti, da *[illegible]* tek mojama na svim što se tiče regionalnog organizovanja.” BCS ERN 0422-6267

¹⁸³ ““Mi smo prošle godine radili regiju i do te mjere ojačali sa jasnim ciljem i sa jasnim zadacim. Regija Krajina je imala zadatak da razbije Alijinu državu. Ja mislim po ugledu na nas regije su isti posao i druge regije i mi smo na tom planu uspeli. I dalje ako bi afirmisali regiju mi bi srušili srpsku državu. Mi to ne smemo raditi. Mi ćemo tražiti sve mogućnosti i načine da afirmišemo tu državu, da bude maksimalno efikasno. Mi tek sada smo postali svesni opasnosti zbog ove decentralizacije u kakvoj se može naći država sa koju smo mi uložili ogromne živote, žrtve i napore. Ja mislam da trebamo ići na maksimalnu centralizaciju, ne samo zbog rata, već zbog toga što smo mi mlada država, država koja je tek nastala. A možemo da primetimo da samo dosta centralizovane države u svetu su zaista uspešne i efikasne države koje daju maksimalan rezultat.” BCS ERN 0422-6268

¹⁸⁴ “Negdje oko krajem maju ili početkom junu odlukom našeg Ratnog Predsjedništva formirane su ratne povjereništva za pojedine reione i imenovani uglavnom poslanici koji su obavljali tu dužnost. ... Povjerenici ne suprotstavljaju se lokalnoj vlasti, oni su vlast ne samo da moraju da podržavaju nego i aktiviraju tamo gdje ona nije bila ili formirana, naročito u onim opštinama gdje mi nismo prije toga imali svoju srpsku vlast nego smo je formirali naknadno. Povjerenici znači podsticu rad izvršnih organa i skupštine opštine i onda gdje je nema da formiraju te opštine. ... Odluka nije izričita prema tome ne kaže sa da je obavezno da u svakoj opštini u republici srpskoj formirati povjereništva nego onde gdje se za to ukaze potreba. Povjerenik takodje ima obaveza da koordinira vojnu komandu koliko je to naravno moguće i civilnu vlast opet u onim uslovima gdje tog povjerenje nema. ... Povjerenik koordinira i uspostavlja kontakte i sa crkvenim vlastima onde gdje to ima kao i narocito u eliminisanju nesklada izmedju ponašanja civilni vlasti prema crkvi kao što ima u nekim djelovima Hercegovine.” BCS ERN 0340-3003 – 0340-3005. Also 0215-9733

¹⁸⁵ “Mape slijede princip komunističke podjele na opšine u Bosni i Hercegovini, a ne princip etničke rasprostranjenosti naroda prema naseljenim mjestima, što bi bilo deino ispravno. Ako bismo prihvatili takav

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postupak, onda bismo prihvatili da se sankcionišu i cementiraju sve one nepravde koje je sprskom narodu učinila prtekla vlast tokom 45 godina diktature. Za to vrijeme, srpski krajevi su bili potpuno zanemareni u razvojnom pogledu. Prvo nas je turska imperija tjerala iz naših dolina i sa plodnih zemljišta u vrhove planina, ostvarujući tako prostor za poturčene Srbe koje se danas nazivaju Muslimanima, zatim je komunistička vlast ubrzano razvijala isključivo muslimanske i donekle hrvatske krajeve, i to je po socijalističkom metodu redistribucije, činila zajedničkim novcem sva tri naroda." BCS ERN 0214-9942

¹⁸⁶ "Mislim da smo otično odradili posao koji smo imali pred sobom iako smo i tu mogli sebi dati kritika vezano za ona uputstva mi smo bili ujedno i članovi opštinskih odbora i SDS-a i vi znate koja smo mi sve uputstva imali i tu bi mogli damo sebi malo kritike. Ima nas koji na terenu nisu odbranili po onom uputstvo što smo imali. Naš je narod negdje stradao malo više nego sto je trebao da strada da smo mi iz SDS bili malo aktivniji na terenu ne bi nam se genocid negdje ni desio." BCS ERN 0215-1199

¹⁸⁷ "Htio bi posjetiti da je odmah pristupio Srpskom oslobodilačkom pokretu u BiH, da je aktivno sudjelovao u radu Ekonomskog savjeta SDS-a učestvovao u radu vrlo značajnih savjetovanja koje smo mi organizovali prije rata. Podsjećam da je u nekoliko desetina primjeraka stampana njegova studija o opravdanosti postojanje autonomnih regija vrlo dokumentovana ekonomska studija." BCS ERN 0215-1403

¹⁸⁸ "...sećate se prije rata sve SAO i sve one mjere bili su posle Alijine greške, mi smo imali 9-10 poteza koji smo napravili izmogli smo ih svi zajedno, ali ih nismo odmah lancirali svih devet poteza neko smo lancirali kako Alija napravi grešku pa mi lanciramo potez pa onda muslimani psuju njemu mater i ne nama." BCS ERN 0215-2234

¹⁸⁹ "U trenutku kada je počeo rat, mi smo imali u opštinama gdje je većina vlas opštinsku, čvrsto je držali, sve kontrolisali. U opštinama gdje smo bili manjina formiranu tajnu vlasti, opštinski odbor, opštinsku skupštinu, predsjednika izvršnog odbora. To su bile sećate se A ili B, varijante. U B varijantama gdje smo bili u manjini 20%, 15% imali smo vlast uspostavljenu i brigadu, jedinicu i tamo, kolika da je ali odred je bio tamo i komandant, i počeo je rat i JNA je ponegdje pomogla koliko je mogla, pomogla je prije toga ..." BCS ERN 0084-6058. Also SA01-2120

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¹⁹⁰ “Republički MUP je u rukama SDA, HDZ koalicije, a postoje indicije da je normno povećanje broja rezervnog sastava milicije njegovo grazičava tehničko opremanje i naoružavanje u službi stvaranje posebne armije u Bosni i Hercegovini. Uputstvo ministra odbrane u vezi sa regrutnim spiskovima njegove naredbe da se vojni obveznici i rezervisti ne odazivaju na pozive predstavljaju flargnantne [sic] primere kršenje Saveznog i republičkog zakona i unošenje meteža u Bosni i Hercegovini.” BCS ERN SA01-2120

¹⁹¹ “Ovdje u Nacrt ustava nisam pronašao srpsku policiju niti bilo kakvu policiju. Ako je ova Srpska Republika interesuje me kakva druga može biti policija već srpske policija. Srpska policija mora da ima svoje znamenje, svoje znakova, da se veće za srpsku istoriju, srpsku tradiciju. Mi smo sve to imali, i hajdmo, danas na ovoj Skupštini prelomiti jasno li mi Srbi, hoćemo lid a se borimo za srpski narod ali za nekakva nedoračene opstraktne ciljeve. A svi ciljevi, ovo vežem za Jugoslaviju, za Bosnu i Hercegovinu to je čista magla u oči srpskog naroda
“Mi imamo još sedam ili 15 dana, i treba da budemo zaista ili patrioti ili, po mom mišljenju, da budemo narodni izdajnici.” SA02-5349

¹⁹² “Školski primjer nam je Bosanska Krupa. Šest mjeseci na našu podgrmečku srpsku teritoriju postojeći MUP, inspekcije niti druge službe ne izlaze na to područje srpskih opština, ne mogu. Na damo. Ne smiju. Mi smo faktički zauzeli svoje teritorije. Ali, ovdje se moramo dogovoriti da svi Srbi, u svim opštinama, novoformiranim i postojećim, preuzmu vlast jer je nismo preuzeli.” BCS ERN SA01-1223

¹⁹³ “Ja vas sada molim da se i po nekim uputstvima koja će se ovdje podijeliti za narodnu odbranu i sisteme informisanja itd. da se na terenu što prije uspostavi faktička vlast Srpske skupštine i srpskog naroda, suverenavlast. Trebalo bi da sve novoosnovane opštine odmah formiraju, onog trena kada vam se javi da imamo svoj posebni MUP, a to će vjerovatno biti iza narednog zasijedanja, da se odmah postave stanice milicije, da se izvuku svi milicioneri. Jer, konačno nama je to život pokazao. Milicioneri su nam izbačeni iz opštine Stari grad, iz Goražda, misim da su bili izbačani i iz Višegrada itd. Prosto naprosto milicioneri više ne rade zajedno i tu činjenicu jednostavno treba prihvatiti a nametnut s nam je, sankcionisati je, tako da se može da vrši kontrola.” BCS ERN 0089-6880 – 0089-6887

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¹⁹⁴ “Ono što je nama ovom trenutku važno jeste ministar unutrašnjih poslova. Biće, naravno, i ministar odbrane. Važna nam je milicija redovnog i rezervnog sastava u broju koji mi hoćemo, jer nam niko međunarodnim ugovorom to ni limitira.” BCS ERN 0089-6893

¹⁹⁵ “MUP BiH je samo zloupotrebjeno sredstvo koje SDA a dijelom i HDZ, u vrijeme dok je bila koalicija, zloupotrijebila u realizaciji političkih ciljeva i to sve funkcije koje MUP ostvaruje na ovom prostorima. To je javna bezbjednost, državna bezbjednost, državna bezbjednost i i uprava za kadrova.

“Ja sam i tada rekao, sada ću i ponoviti, kroz funkciju javne bezbjednosti politička manipulacija MUP-a BiH ogledala se u stvaranju vojske kroz rezervni sastav, koja pripada samo jednom narodu. I naorušavanje te vojske, što smo i danas bili spremni dokumentovati, očito vidim kroz dokumente, kroz distribuciju oružja i skladišta MUP-a BiH, gdje je ono završavalo, kok na p rostore no kojim živi srpsko stanovništvo ni jedna takva cijev za ovo posljednje vrijeme nije otišla. ...

“Manipulacija je bilo kroz samo termin jedinstven MUP.” BCS ERNs SA02-5834 – SA02-5835

¹⁹⁶ “Nadam se, konstatujem da je ovo profesionalno bilo potisnuto dosta od političkog. Nadam se u buduće da srpski MUP treba da bude jedna profesionalna organizacija, odnosno organ državne uprave koji će upravo štiti imovinu, život, tijelo i druga bogatstva koja budu od interesa zaštite.” BCS ERN SA02-5836

¹⁹⁷ “I sad da pomenem ono što je predsjednik rekao... Kad je pominjao MUP, rekao je da ima paralelan MUP, da čak i ima neka paralelna vlast. ... On je trebao nama ovdje jasno da kaže, koji su to krugovi, koji su paralelna vlast, i koji su paralelan MUP. Ovaj parlament mora da to zna. Dok nam se to ne kaže, za nas ne postoji ni paralelan MUP, ni paralelna vlast. ... A ono što se očigledno vidi jeste to da ne može član vlade koji sjedi u Beogradu da osjeća ovaj narod, ako sjedi u Beogradu. Odveo ženu i djecu u Beograd, namjestio tamo stan i sad iz Beograda vodi politiku za narod srpski u Republici Srpskoj. To ne može.” BCS ERN 0215-0274

¹⁹⁸ “Neki dan smo na jednom sastanku čuli izvještaj načelnika Stanice Javne bezbjednosti iz Zvornika, koji je rekao da od četiri cjeline u istoj zgradi vezane su za bezbjednosti, on kontroliše samo jednu cjelinu. U istoj zgradi nalazi se i nacionalna bezbjednost, i sabračajna milicija, i pogranična

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milicija i stanica javne bezbjednosti. Od tih cijelina on kontroliše sam ono što se zove stanica javne bezbjednosti. Nad ostalima normalno nema nadzora. I u gradu postoji specijalna brigade, to je peta cjelina koja se nalazi u Zvorniku, a vlast opštinska, preko načelnika, eventualno, ne da ima kontrolu, nego ima kontakte, informacije i ostalo.

Jer nema nadležnost ni nad time načelnikom SJB.

“U Zvorniku se već odavno priča da je pogranična milicija postala zadnji punkt za šverc robama iz Sarajevske i romanijske regije. I pokriva se sve papirima i preko te pogranične milicije. Da vam ne pričam o tome šta se dogadja u carini. To sve treba vidjeti i ispitati.

“Velike primjedbe se stavljaju na Službu nacionalne bezbjednosti. U Službi nacionalne bezbjednosti ostali su sve komunisti i ljudi iz starog režima, koji su prikupljali podatke o nama koji smo povelili SDS. Tu ljudi i dalje prikupljaju podatke o nama. I mi kao stranka na vlasti, nemamo nikakve nadležnosti, ili ja bar ne znam ne znaju članovi Izvršnog odbora i ne znaju ljudi sa kojima sam ja razgovarao. Tu se najviše primjedbe stavljaju – tako ta služba radi, šta radi, gdje radi, kome podnosi izvještaj – ovaj parlament to mora da zna, kako radi ta služba, koga kontroliše, šta radi iko su joj ti šefovi.” BCS ERN 0215-0275

¹⁹⁹ "Danas prisutno dosta privatnih obavještajnih službi, takodje je u ovoj fazi rata, prošlu godinu, i to je vama poznato, bilo je prisutno nekih službi, a i ljudi, a i danas koje rade mimo zvaničkog kanala MUP-a za potrebe MUP-a Srbije. Jedan od takvih obavještajnih centara je bio i TAJFUN, on je od duše radio za više strane." BCS ERN 0215-0312

²⁰⁰ "Po tehnologiji posla SNB (Služba nacionalnog bezbjednosti) svakodnevno razmjenjuje bezbjednosna saznanja sa, prije svega sa SB Vojske RS, zatim republike Srbije, Crne Gore i SRK. Začeci formiranja SNB datiraju iz predratnog perioda, kada je dio sadašnjih kadrova uočavajući namjere muslimansko-hrvatske koalicije i shvatajući ispravnost politike SDS na različite načine bio uključen u određene djelatnosti putem koji su prikupljeni i obezbjedjivani podaci od interesa za srpski narod i njegovo rukovodstvo. Ovi kadrovi su svojim aktivnostima doprinjeli paraliziranju funkcionisanje bivšeg MUP-a, a posebno bivše Službe državne bezbjednosti, koja je bila isključivo u funkciji politike koju su provodila snage HDZ i SDA. Ovi kadrovi su po izbijanju ratnih sukoba se prvi stavili u funkciju oružane borbe i svi kadrovi koji su trenutno u Službi državne bezbjednosti žstari kadrovi' su 28. marta pristupili u MUP SR. Oni su predstavljali jezgro današnje SNB.

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“Obavješnajnom bezbjedonosnom organu GŠ VRS ustupljeno je 550 informacija iz vojnog djelokruga, pored navedenog svakodnevno su razmjenjivana saznanja sa Službom državne bezbjednosti Srbije, pa je u ovom period ustupljeno 295 pisanih informacija.” BCS ERNs 0215-0741 and 0215-0745

²⁰¹ "Vito i Delimustafić, tačno je gospodo da su htjeli meni da zatvore, znate li zašto zato što sam iz MUP-a zajedno sa Stanišićom 560 heklera izvukao na Romaniju i podjelio Sokocu, Rogatici, Han Pijesak i Palama, zato što sam kada je Zoran Cvijetić načelnik SJB u Sokocu 3 mjeseca prije rata istjerao sve muslimane iz stanice pa su ga suspendirovali Vito i Alija i zabranili mu plate i penzije iz specijalne kase dao sav novac da se ta kasa održi za gorivo i plate." BCS ERN 0215-1372

²⁰² “ Nema dobre saradnje izmedju MUP-a i državnih organa. Kada opštinski organi donesu odluku o zatvaranju kavića, to MUP izbjegava i predlažem, kada je postavljen minister Stanišić za ministra sve je promjenio načelnike i komandire bez saglasnosti SDS-a i mi nikakav uticaja nemamo, sve nam je postavio druge ljude i one koje mi ne bi žalili da budu. Što se tiče MUP-a ja vjerujem da je i njima teško na liniji, borbe itd.” BCS ERNs 0215-3203 – 0215-3204

²⁰³ “Treće, to je korupcija u redovima MUP-a, carine i tih organa, to ja mogu da iz života vidim šta se dešava, ja zaista ne izgravam nekog policajca uzela takve razmjere da je to zaista više. Mi situaciju u MUP-u ne možemo pravdati onim specijalnim jednicama što oni momci dobro ratuju, svaka njima čast, ali oni nemaju veze sa onim drugim poslovima.” BCS ERN 0410-1799

²⁰⁴ “Okolo granice, poslije toga se desilo nešto i sda je to u rukama nase DB i njihove DB i nema šverca i švercera više, ono što prolazi prolazi po spisku i pod kontrolom je DB u koju mi imamo veliko povjerenje, a i njihova to DB radi, prema tome sada to država sa državom vrši razmjenu određenih konvoja i nakon toga sastanka je bilo zaista i znatno olakšanje, to možda privatnici ne znaju, jer se manje odnosi na njih, jer se odnosi na vojsku našu, to vi znate u GŠ das u stvari pod kontrolom i stekli smo utisak da bi Srbije ubuduće mogla da čini sve kako bi kršila tu granicu, odnosno da bi godila da nam pomogne što tamo nabavimo moše da prodje. To je bila značajna korist od toga sastanka, ove drugo je bila ista meta isto ostojanje.” BCS ERN 0410-1817

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²⁰⁵ Kovac: "Ispustili ste riječ, da ovi ljudi služe u specijalnim jedinicama MUP-a. Znači nema nikakve potrebe za pravljenje nekog činovničkog aparata, već radi jedne potrebe, popune onih ranjenih i poginulih ljudi koji svaki dan ginu i bore se na svim dijelovima za granicu ove države i to je bio osnovni uzrok i pokretanje svega ovoga, jer mi druge zakonske mogućnosti sada trenutno nemamo i ovo je potreba bila da se ovo ovako donese da se donese ovakav zakon u suprotnom bi došli da ginemo svakodnevno bez mogućnosti popune i naravno, ja ne znam da li je možda u interes da policije nestane da sva izgine, vjerovatno imate pripremljenu neku drugu policiju." Gvero: "Ja nemam nameru da odgovaram na proizvoljna razmišljanja i elemente uvreda..." BCS ERN 0215-0452 - 0215-4053

²⁰⁶ "MUP se sredjuje i ja tražim isključivo da se MUP prioritarno sredjuje. Do prvog februara 957 lica je isključeno iz MUP-a, sva lica koja nemaju odgovarajući stručnu spremu, sva lica koja imaju dosije da su činili što su činili, a nije trebalo, zabranjene radnje izvršena je značajna promjena na čelu resora. Načelnika CJB, načelnika SJB i samo bi trebao biti Kijac da to izloži i to je morao da izloži ovdje, značajno je uradjeno, a ne može biti da se ništa ne radi u državi i da je takva država u opasnosti. Ovo što radimo stvaramo MUP mirnodobski, nema više za šlepere u MUP da se plaća nego jesu u jednoj krizi nije riješeno sistemski da se plaća da se obezbjeđuju uslovi funkcionisanja MUP-a, ali riješićemo i to, trebalo bi ovih dana platni sistem da propadi." BCS ERN 0215-5055

²⁰⁷ Ja sam to pitanje postavio i g. Karadžiću, i, koliko znam obećao je da će se lično angažovati da se organizuje nekoliko jedinica Srba, otprilike oko 2,000, sa Romanije, Sarajeva, Ozrena itd. Ali, toga nema. Mislim da nije poštena da srpsku Bosnu i Hercegovinu gine samo Srbi iz Krajine. Ja bih se zahvalio g. Mediću koji je juče, kada je g. vojvoda Šešelj gostovao u Banjaluci, samokritički rekao da se njegovi Ozrenici nisu pokazali dostojni junaštva svojih predake i partizana i Četnike, pa je zamolio g. vojvodu Šešelja da kada se završi rat dodje na Ozren." SA01-2046 – SA01-2047

²⁰⁸ "...ovdje moram da upoznam pojedine kolege da Romanijci ratuju i to krvavo, da krvave i da već ginu na vukovarskom ratištu. Ko ne zna da danas zna da su dvije uradne romanijske čete zauzele zloglasnu Hercegovačku ulicu u Borovo naselju i razbile ustaše u paramparčad. Jeste da imamo i velikih gubitaka: imamo već dva poginula i desetak ranjenih, od toga trojica naših momaka. U ovom trenutku SAO Romanija ima u pripremi nekoliko bataljona, a momci dobrovoljci su već krenuli i na ratiste na Okučane. ...

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Prva i druga romanijska su na Trpijskoj cesti od prvog dana, i, kada su došli iz autobusa su ubačeni u prvu vatrenu liniju.” BCS ERN SA01-2050

²⁰⁹ “Na terenu se nešto dogodilo, zapravo da vojska raspolaže tehnikom, da im ta tehnika koristi za bukvalno kupovanje Srba. U ovakvom ludom vremenu, ratom i ekonomski opterećenom, jasno je da našem narodu je vrlo bitno da ima oružje kakvo-takvo mada nije svjetan njegova upotrebe i načina vodjenja ovog rata. ... Vojska, mislim da banjalučki korpus i njegovog komandanta, komandante garnizona na regiji Doboja i Banjaluke, odnosno Doboja i Tuzle, je to iskoristila da bi putem tog oružja ‘pokupolava’ jedan dio ili veći dio Srba i da bi uprla prstom na Srpsku stranku i njene čelnike, da bi nas zezvali ‘desnicarima’ ili ‘četnicima’, od čega mi, da vam pravo kažem, daleko i ne bježimo.” BCS ERN SA02 -4941. Also 0089-8237

²¹⁰ “Polazeći od ustavne i zakonske obaveze Jugoslovenske narodna armije da štiti suverenitet i teritorijalni integritet i ustavni poredak zemlje, a u skladu sa svojom odlukom o teritorijama opština, mjesnih zajednica i naseljenih mjesta u Bosni i Hercegovini koja se smatraju teritorijom savezne države Jugoslavije te zaključcima o davanju pune podrške Jugoslovenskoj narodnoj armiji usovjenih 21. novembra 1991. g. u trenutku kada se na našu državu Jugoslaviju vrše sinhronizovani napadi sa svim strana i svim sredstvima se namjerom da se putpuno ragnadi i da se raspadne, Skupština srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini dana 11. decembra 1991. godine upućuje ZAHTEJEV JUGOSLOVENSKOJ NARODNOJ ARMIJI da vim sredstvima koja joj stoje na raspolaganja brani teritorije Bosne i Hercegovine kao sastavne dijelove države Jugoslavije na kojim je proveden plebiscite srpskog naroda i drugih gradjana za ostanak u zajedničkoj državi Jugoslaviji donesena Odluka Skupština srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini o teritorijama opština, mjesnih zajednica i naseljenih mjesta u Bosni i Hercegovini koja se smatraju teritorijem savezne države Jugoslavije.” BCS ERNs SA02-4978 – SA02-4979. Also 0089-8274 - 0089-8275

²¹¹ “Pošto Evropa izgleda, priznaje samo silu ja mislim da se na silu mora odgovoriti silom. Zato bih zamolio da se ne zaklinjemo srpstvom nego bih pozvao i Srbe Sarajeva i Srba SAO Romanija i Sjeverne Bosne da se odazovu mobilizaciji i da odbranimo naše zapadne granice.” BCS ERN 0089-8172

²¹² “Mi moramo imati svoju srpsku jaku vojsku, a ta naša vojska je Jugoslovenska armija trenutno, i, ja vjerujem da će ostati, i u kojoj je srpski narod.

“Armija treba da se transformiše što prije u ovom hodu u borbi protiv fašizma, boje reći protiv ustaša.” BCS ERN 0089-8178

²¹³ “U građanskom ratu u BiH pored toga što bi poginule nekoliko stotina hiljada ljudi, pored toga što bi se nekolike stotina gradova potpuno razrušilo, došlo bi i do masovnog i urbnog preseljavanja naroda, do homogenizacije. I, šta bismo dobili. Dobili bismo ovo što imamo sada: sprske, hrvatske i muslimanske regije samo siromašnije za nekoliko stotina gradova i siromašnije za nekoliko stotine hiljada ljudi.

“To je ukoliko mi ne bismo zahtijevali od jugoslovenskih institucija da i njima zabrane naše otcijepe. Naravno, ni na to imamo pravo, i, jugoslovenske institucije imaju pravo da kažu, izvinite, vi nemate pravo na secesiju jer niste ostvarili uslove za to. A pošto mi nećemo da branimo vjerovatno savezne institucije bi takodje prihvatile odluke naroda, odluke za samoopredjeljenje, uključujući i otcjepljenje.” BCS ERN 0089-8207

²¹⁴ “Armija se u hodu transformiše. Mi smo u Banjalučkom korpusu, na zahtjev svojih Krajišnika i na primjedbe bivšeg generala dobili novog ratnog generala, druga Vukovića, koji je razborit i naučen ratu, vičan ratu, ali vičan da razgovar sa ljudima koji popunjavaju korpus i koji neće opustiti pred najezdom fašista. Prema tome Bosanska krajina se ne bori samo protiv ustaša’Hrvata, bori se protiv Njemaca, Austrije, Madjarske i protiv svih tih zlih sila.

“Samo srpski narod ne može pisati referate, i poeziju i prozu, nego se bora odbraniti silom protiv sile. (aplauz). A Bosanska krajina je ta sila od koje se danas tresu gaće i Turcima i Hrvatima. A ta sila je (aplauz) od 17,654 km², od 1,200,000 stanovnika. Možete pogledati ovu teritoriju (pokazuje mapu) koja nije samo Vojna Krajina od koje se trese gaće i Hrvatima i Turcima nego je i ekonomska snaga koja je uspjela juče u Banjalci da prekineto sve fondove prema Sarajevu. Nećemo hratiti neprijatelja (aplauz), nećemo hraniti one koji nam jamu kopaju. Ako treba hranićemo svoju braća Srbe u Srpskoj Bosni i Hercegovini.” BCS ERN 0224-1733 – 0224-1744

²¹⁵ “Sve to što su donijeli, donijeli su bez našeg prisustva i ovako bi mogli donijeti sledeću odluku da jedna trećinu srpskog naroda protjeraju, da jednu trećinu pošlame i pokatoluće jednu trećinu da ubiju bez nas...

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“I uz to bi još predložio da ova skupština donese zaključak i uputi Saveznom sekretarijatu narodne odbrane i Predsjedništvu zahtjev da srpski regruti služe Armiju samo u onim krajevima gdje srbi žive.” BCS ERN SA01-1690

²¹⁶ “... sa Jugoslavenskom narodnom armijom mislim da je sazrelo vrijeme da se sjedne i razgovara na bazi kako sam rekao političkog i egzistencijalnog njihovog i našeg interesa. Što prije to bolje. Jer se teritorija može braniti naravno na pravički i na Ustavani način a da se brani i određenom fizičkom silom oni koji nemaju takvu silu ili bi ta sila za njih mogla u izvjesnom trenutku da postane sporna da oslanac na nju bude eventualno nesiguran itd. nisu u stanje da sačuvaju te svoje teritorije i da održe vlast koju treba na tim teritorijama da uspostave jer mislim da mi sada trenutno razgovaramo o tome kako na srpskim teritorijama jer odavde od Republičkog do nivoma mjesne zajednice uspostaviti našu vlast i organizirati se da ta vlast profunkcioniše.” BCS ERN SA01-1696 – SA01-1697

²¹⁷ “Naš narod je zbunjen tim odnosom kod nas vlada dobrim dijelom nepovjerenje u ponašanje te armije, na osnovu iskustava koje je ona koje mi imamo koji su se veoma negativno ispoljili u njenom ponašanju u Sloveniji Hrvatskoj. Mi nećemo i ne smijemo dozvoliti ponavljanje tih njenih grešaka ... Zato čini mi se da bi Skupština ova direktno trebalo ba obaveže ministarski savjet u ovom slučaju da mene je najvažnije predsjednik Ministarskog savjeta da on stupi u naše ime sa našim ovlaštenjem u prave kontakte sa armijskim vrhom na ovome našem prostoru .. da armija tačno zna koje njoj ovdje partner skime će ona da razgovara.” BCS ERN SA01-1699 – SA01-1700

²¹⁸ “Što se tiče JNA, ja sam do sada zaista u JNA vjerovao. JNA 99% čine srpski narod, srpski rezervisti. Da li i dalje da prihvatimo tu JNA koje se povlači iz Makedonije na desetine hiljade, a nama u Krajinu dolaze UN da čuvaju srpski narod. Sve više i više sumnjam u nju i lično mislim da ta JNA adekvatno broju kljudi kora da preraste u srpski armiju, srpsku vojsku.

“Neke Srbije i Crne Gore, nemam ništa protiv, budu nucleus buduće Jugoslavie i moćemo se kao Srpska Republika priključiti toj Jugoslaviji u okviru savezne države.

“Moji je lični predlog da vojska koja je u Bosni i Hercegovini, koji čine 90% srpski oficiri i 99% srpski rezervisti, konačno proglasimo srpskom vojskom. To će biti pravi pogodak. Rezultati bi bilo fantastični, vojska će

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ostati u Jugoslaviji. To je moja procjena.” BCS ERNs SA02-5348 – SA02-5349

²¹⁹ “Ovdje vidim da odbranu treba da nosi JNA damo [*previous word unclear*] sreće kad bi to tako i lako bili ostvarljivo. Mislim da za ovih sedam dana treba da iskoriste da u skladu s našim prošlim zaključkom, a on je glasio da se redefiniše naš odnos s JNA u smislu utvrđivanje zajedničkih političkih i egzistencijalnih interesa, hitno obavimo razgovore u Generalštabu, a da se postavi pitanje da li će JNA biti spremna 23. ili još bolje 29. februara 1992.godine kada proglašavamo Ustav, brani teritorije srpskog naroda, odnosno teritoriji koje pripadaju zajedničkoj državi Jugoslaviji. Ako Armija nije u stanju da nam to precizno kaže, koliko kadrova, s kakvim naoružanjem, na kojim pozicijama na našim teritorijalnom odbranom na našim srpskim teritorijama ići da one preraste u srpsku vojsku koje će onda s armijom Srbije i Crne Gore i ostalih zemalja koje čine zajedničku državu ponovo stvoriti ili JNA ili neku zajedničku armiju.” BCS ERNs SA02-5359 – SA02-5360

²²⁰ “Predlažem da bude ovako: da Republike suvereno uredjuje a na druge subjekte djelimično prenosi poslove odbrane i bezbjednosti. Vojska će se prirodno naći u Bosni i Hercegovina jer je ne mogu progoniti iz srpskog sela, mogu do tog sela. Ali, mora da postoji neka zakonska osnova da tu vojsku možemo da prihvatimo, Molim vas sve da pizimo na kontinuitet, on nam je važan, danama to psihičke sekunde da nema Jugoslavije, kontinuitet nam je važan. To se odnosi i na JNA, i, nama je važno da premostimo tu nultu tačku u kojoj nema Jugoslavije. Mi taj kontinuitet moramo da stvarimo.” BCS ERN SA02-5361

²²¹ “Granice da neko odredjuju, ko je srpski narodu odredjivao granice. Niko na to nema pravo. Te granice mi ne priznajemo. Priznavaćemo samo [*illegible*] srpsko oružje. A srpsko oružje će brzo progovoriti, budite ubijaljeni [??]: Ako Alija žrtvuje mir ja žrtvuje život.” BCS ERNs SA01-1311 – SA01-1313

²²² “Ovdje nam prebacuje gdje nalazimo Bosance-Srbe koji tako stalno pominu rat. To se i meni dešava često i našim ljudima na terenu, posebno Vukiću i drugima. I, on kaže da se tako stiče utisak kako Srbi ratom drugim oduzimaju zemlju. Prema toma slijedi njegov zaključak da to ne radimo, da ne pominjemo rat, da uspostavljamo realnu vast i da branimo svoje teritorije.

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Pa ko neko hoće rat on će ga voditi protiv nas, mi ćemo biti napadnuta strana, što je vrlo bitno.

“To je velika razlika ako neko napada nas i ako mi zaprijetimo da ćemo ratom spriječiti uvodjenje centralne vlasti. Mnogo nam je lakše da ta centralna vlast primijeni silu kao što su specijalci došli u Bileću pa se vratili podvijena repa. Sada ne smiju da predju na našu teritoriju. Absolutno ne smiju da prodju. Ako predju oni su agresori, oni su prestupnici, prestupaju na našu teritoriju. I iz drugih kontakata s armijom na najvšem nivou možemo da vam kažemo da trenutno u tom pogledu možemo da budemo spokojni.” BCS ERNs 0089-6881 - 0089-6887

²²³ “ ... u ovom trenutku nam ne odgovara stvaranje nacionalne garde, mnogo je bolje JNA. Ako bi mi to sada stvorili onda bi se armija morala odmah podijeliti. Morali bi da ostavimo sva sredstva koja se sada nalaze u nečijim (tudjim) rukama. A onako ćemo u pogodnom momento to raditi. Nacionalnu gardu bi trebalo stvoriti u onom trenutku kada, eventualno, armija bude prisiljena da promijeni svoju suštinu. U tom trenutku ćemo imati mnogo bolji položaj.” BCS ERN 0089-6893

²²⁴ “ Mi znamo da se naš narod naoružavao, ne znamo sve kako i kojim putevima, ali znamo da narod ima dosta oružja, ali moram da kažem da mi nemamo paravojnih formacija.” BCS ERN 0090-8378

²²⁵ “Srpski narod je nakon povlačenja jugoslovenskih oficira i ogromnog broja koji su napustili ovaj prostor a nisu smjeli napustiti niti je trebalo, da tako postavimo upitnik i mogućnosti da oni to napuste, pribrala se sa oficirskim kadrom koji je ostao i koji je po našem mišljenju veome zaslužan za potpun vojni triumph srpske vojske i srpskog naroda u BiH Našeg naroda jeste potpuno stradalo, stradali su uglavnom nejak i stranci koji nisu mogli da pobjegnu od ustaškog noža ali u osnovi cjelina srpskog naroda je spasena zahvaljujući ispočetka nešto jugoslovenskoj vojsci ali više TO a kasnije zahvaljujući vojsci Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine da većina srpskog naroda nije prošla onako kako je to planirao naš neprijatelj.” BCS ERN 0214-9507

²²⁶ “Nije rijetko da u svakoj opštini podtoje, kako je rekao čini me se naš pukovnik i komandant Subotić vojne i paravojne milicijske i para milicijske vlasti. Nije rijetko vidjeti u ranoraznim uniformama sa nekim crnim šeširima, crnim košuljama, šupljim rukavicama, rašnjiranim čizmama da crvenim, zelenim, neznam već kakvim beretkama crnim pepirima i sl. koju

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vlast ti ljudi predstavljaju i čija je to vlast, ja mislim da ovde je mjesto da o tome raspravljamo da donesemo jedan zakon, šta je vojna vlast a šta je civilna vlast. Kako treba izgleda civilna vlast, a kako treba da izgleda vojna vlast. Da bi u tome uspjeli ja mislim da je potrebno da prvo organizujemo mjesnu vlast.” BCS ERNs 0410-2025 – 0410-2026

²²⁷ “Ja mislim da su redovi vojske dobro sredjeni, dase bore za bolje sutra i da ne ratujemo svakih 50 godina, već dajedom završimo, da imamo svoju državu, svoje ja, svoj ponos, svoje dostojanstvo. Zato se borci bore. ...

“Ja vas molim da nas shvatitte da smo mi sada u jednoj velikoj ofanzivi. Tačno je ovo što poslanik jedan kaže da ima paravojske, ima u korpusima koji egzistiraju dva i po tri meseca, da se i ti korpusi bore protiv toga, da ćemo imati jedinstvenu vojsku i da je imamo. Ne bi to trebalo osporavati. To smo počeli da radimo i dajte nam podrškupa ćemo i mi ići dalje.” BCS ERN 0410-2086

²²⁸ “Stvarno je zavladao je strah od para vojnih formacija. Gdje je vojna policija, gdje je milicije da stane tome na kraj. Jedna žena kada se udostojila da stane tome na kraj i da zove vojnu policiju a vojna policija se na takve primjedbe smije i kaže pa neka useljavaju. Mi smo odlučili u opštini da ćemo dodijeliti stanova onoliko koliko vojsci treba jer u Banja Luci vojni centar mislim da treba da postoji da su tu najbolji uslovi i najpovoljniji uslovi djelovanja. To je republička funkcija, zadatak kojeg treba opština Banja Luka da izvrši ali će izvršiti i mi to činimo, ali nemožemo izvršiti ako para formacije, izbjeglice i druge useljavaju protiv pravno u stanove, a niko im ne staje na kraj tu Izvrsni odbor ne može puno uraditi sam mada ima čestitih ljudi koji u miliciji itekako dobro odredjuju ali prethodio paraformacije rješavaju to na način kako rješavaju i čine opstrukciju srpskoj vlasti.” BCS ERN 0422-6228

²²⁹ “Vojni izvještaj Skupštini je podnio general Ratko Mladić, Komandant Glavnog Štaba Vojske Republike Srpske.

“General je istakao izmedju ostalo, da su vojni rezultati evidentni i da je naš položaj povoljan. Medjutim, još sve nije riješeno, a mišjenje je da se vojnički sve i ne može riješiti. General Mladić je istako da se više pažnje treba posvetiti kvalitetu [illegible] kvalitetu vojske, od opremanja vojske preko discipline do učinka. Zahtijevao je od Skupštine da se energičnije ogradimo od parapolitike i paravojske, da se ne dijelimo ni po kakvim osnovama, već da budemo maksimalno jedinstveni. Neophodno je spriječiti

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sve nečasne radnje koje čine pripadnici i vojske, i policije i politike." BCS ERN 0410-2683

²³⁰ "Ovi problemi nisu nastali od jučer i ovo je pomalo sramno da se tek sada raspravljaju, ovi problem datiraju od oktobra do septembra mjeseca 1991. godine, kada su prvi vojnici počeli da izlaze na teritorije uglavnom sada koje drže Srbi, kao tada je mobilisani vojni obveznici na terenu, kad su oblaciti vojnu opremu." BCS ERN 0214-9713

²³¹ "Ima dosta oficira koji žele da se mješaju u vlast. Prije svega da pomenem pitanje mobilizacije. Često puta lokalne komandanti brigada dodju da srpskom ljudi koje treba da mobiliše. Takav primjer sam vidio u Višegradu, ... sam tamo bio povjerenik. ... Mi smo iz Savezne Republike Jugoslavije maltene prihvatili sve oficire. A često puta su nama oficiri dolazali i služeni i oni koji se ne mogu puno upotrebiti u ratne operacije i često su takvih uhlebljeni u stabovima, dok operativnih oficira za vodjenje jedinice imalo vrlo malo i vrlo malo sposobnih." BCS ERN 0215-0276

²³² "Kod nas ima bar jedno 150 mafijaa koje voze golfove neregistrovane, obuceni u uniformama, nose pistolje i najsavremenije oruzje i naocale i hodaju i niko im ziv ne smije niti ih ko moze da angazuje. Plackaju, hodaju, ubijaju, svercuju itd. Ja sam pitao komandante brigade i ovako mi kazu, onaj tamo iz vojnog osjeka posalje poziv da on mobilise, ali ne smije niko da ga mobilise. To je povezana mafija od Ilidze, Rajlovca, Vogože pa do Ilijaš, stvarno koji se koji se svi Đivi od nas bojamo. Neka dodje neka specijalna jedinica da to prekontroliše. Znete koliko to smeta poštenim borcima koji gledaju kako oni to rade." BCS ERN 0215-0295

²³³ "U samom gradu Brčkom, a to je da ekscese koji su izazvali odredjeni pripadnici vojske RS nisu paravojne formacije, već su nalaze u sastavu Vojske RS, jedino što nose drugacija obilježa to su te takozvane 'crvene beretke' inače u razgovoru sa komandantom brigade ti momci su predvidjeni da neka specijalna ofanzivna dejstva i sigurno imaju neki beneficirani status u našem gradu, i može zbog toga što su duže vremena bili neupotrebljeni, kako da kažem, možda zato su napravili te ekscese, jer dugo nisu ratovali." BCS ERN 0215-1105 – 0215-1106

²³⁴ "Ja sam odgovoran Vama i narodu, meni su odgovorni komandanti, komandanti GS, GS i komandanti korpusa i brigada. Data je saglasnost da sam formirao Vrhovnu Komandu da sam ne odlučujem, ne da zaklanjam iza te Vrhovne Komande, ja potpišujem, ja odlučujem i odgovarajući za svaku

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odluku, ali sam formirao Vrhovnu Komandu na širokoj isnovi i mislim da ima devet ljudi koji su po položaju tu da me pomognu da sagledamo da odlučimo i prihvatili smo da se taj prsten rešava... Mirovne snage možemo da iskoristimo ako ih zatisnemo izmedju nas i Muslimana i zaledimo stanje ali moremo da dobijemo tapiju na tu zemlju." BCS ERN 0215-2320

²³⁵ "Izvršena je disperzija oružja zahvaljujući JNA, izvuklo se što se moglo izvući i rasulo po srpskom prostoru i podjelo narodu, ali narod je organizovala SDS i stvorila vojsku, to je bila vojska. Zajedno sa milicijom to su bile oružane snage SR BiH, one su stvorile prostore, oslobodile su i stvorile prostore. Negdje uz pomoć JNA, negdje bez pomoći JNA, a negdje i krijući od JNA, jer je JNA, komandovao i Huso i Uso, a šta se dešava. Pravimo razne računice i pogodbe sa Jugoslavijom, odlučujemo se da od te TO od tih srpskih brigada koje jeste vodio SDS, ali ne kao partisku vojsku, nego kao narodnu vojsku, jer nije smio svako da stane na čelo brigade ilegalne i da se suprostavi zelenom beretkama..." BCS ERN 0084-6058

²³⁶ "Oni su mladi momci i hrabri, mogu da kažem da su to oni Knindje, bili su na svim ratištima i tražili smo sada da ostanu da ovo završe, da još ove preostale porodice podmirno traktorima. Ti momci su trebali, tražena je njihova mobilizacija da ponovo idu..." BCS ERN 0084-5922

²³⁷ "Predali smo veliku teritoriju. Jeste pomogla dosta JNA, negdje je i odmogla JNA. U Sarajevu nije htjela da uradi ono što smo mi tražili. Nije htjela da nam da četu tenkovsku da mi uradimo što mi tražili. Rat bi bio završen da je uradila. Kada je vladika govorio o banjalučkom korpusu to je bila JNA, i sadašnji komandant Talić i Kostić i ostali su nam puno učinili i poslije toga su prihvatili korpus i ostvarili od njega srpski korpus." BCS ERN 0215-4230

²³⁸ "... to mogu da kažem prilično dobro, s obzirom na snage sa kojima smo raspolagali, prilično dobro držimo pozicije koje smo imali. Držimo sve svoje krajeve, sve opštine, sva naselja od Sarajeva i držimo naše neprijatelje, sad moram i mogu da kažem da držimo naše neprijatelje u potpunom okruženju, tako da im ne može da dodje vojna pomoć, ni u ljudsku, ni u nauružanju." BCS ERN 0084-7722

²³⁹ "...ovaj rat moramo završiti što prije. Vjerujte, kod nas se ne radi već dva mjeseca, sve fabrike su zatvorene. Kod nas se, kako kaže naš narod, dikla kuka i motika u rat. Mi smo spremni, mi držimo 50 km okruženja oko

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Ilijaša. Mi smo organizovani, i ja sam molio TV da dodje da snimi kako smo mi organizovani za rat u Ilijašu, kako je organizovana odbrana linije. Jest istina da smo mi pokrali dosta stvari. Imamo mi svega još dole da živimo. Mi smo pokrali 32 tone cisterne nafte i benzina. Mi smo presjekli i minirali prugu i nema više dolaska u Sarajevo. Mi smo minirali i auto-put. Sve ćemo učiniti da više neprijatelj iz pravca Zenice u Sarajevo neće doći, a i odozgo ko poče biće gotov.” BCS ERN 0084-7728.

²⁴⁰ “... poznavajući ko nam je neprijatelj, u kojoj mjeri je on perfidan, i u kojoj mjeri mu se ne može vjerovati sve dotle dok se on fizički, vojnički ne uništi i ne slomije, što podrazumijeva, naravno i eliminisanje i likvidaciju njegovih ključnih ljudi. Ja se odmah opredjeljujem za ovu prvu opciju, ratnu opciju ...” BCS ERN 0084-7729. “Ja kao nesrečni ratni minister zdravlja znam da mi je ovog trenutka, i nama svim, ja gledam na vojsku i na nas civile na jedno, izručeno 150 ljudi iz vojne bolnice koji su sa sobom uspjeli izvući gaće i odijela i ni jednog instrumenta. ... Ali, oni koji budu planirali operaciju Sarajeva, oslobadjanja Sarajeva ili uništenja žive neprijateljske sile u Sarajevu, moraju da planiraju šta će sa zdravstvenim objektima. I odmah da vam kažem, ako će Vojna bolnica pasti u ruke neprijatelju, onda sam ja za to da se Koševska bolnica uništi i da neprijatelj nema gdje da se lijeći.” BCS ERN 0084-7731

²⁴¹ “Moram da vam kažem, da podsjetim, prisutne, u srpskoj opštini Bosanska Krupa ima samo 24% Srba, nas ima 14,500 a Muslimana ima 47,000. Što nam predsjednik kaže, nama nije bilo do rata u srpskoj opštini Bosanska Krupa, ali smo na to bili prisiljeni. Nije se više moglo živjeti u srpskoj opštini Bosanska Krupa od drskosti, od vojnog egzercira, od niza stvari, od preuzimanja nasilno svih firmi sa oružjem u ruci, od toga da je sve i jedan Srbin ostao bez posla u opštini Bos. Krupa, od toga da ni jedan profesor Srbin nije htio potpisati lojalnosti, pa ni jedan Srbin u opštini Bos. Krupa. Zbog toga smo morali gospodo da zaratimo. Mi smo se godinu i po dana spremali za rat u srpskoj opštini Bos. Krupa jer smo znali da će do tog rata doći i da do njega mora doći. Moram sad sa pravom postaviti pitanje kako se moglo desiti da se u roku dva dana operacija zauzmu dvije trećine grada. Mi smo došli, fala Bogu, do naše granice, jer smo je tako i mi zamislili i nacrtali i vi dobro znati, narodni poslanici, da smo rekli mi da je naša granica desna obala rijeke Une i da mora biti desna obala rijeke Une granica...” BCS ERN 0084-7731 – 0084-7732

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²⁴² "Ljudi i narodi nisu piljci niti ključevi u džepu pa ćemo ih rpremjestiti (sic: premjestiti) tamo amo. ... Rat ne možemo voditi ni na svakom frontu niti protiv naroda, ja bih ovdje predložio da mi usvojimo takvu pamet da mi nećemo u rat a ako budemo napadnuti mi ćemo se braniti i mi nećemo rat protiv Muslimana kao naroda, niti protiv Hrvata kao naroda, već protiv onih koji su taj narod povelili i nahuskali na nas.

"Prema toma mi nemožemo očistiti niti možemo imati rešeto prosijemo samo da ostanu Srbi ili propadnu Srbi i ostali da odu. Pa to je, to neće, ja neznam kako će gospodin Krajišnik i gospodin Karadžić objasniti svijetu. To je ljudi genocid." BCS ERN 0084-7742 - 0084-7744

²⁴³ "I mi trebamo još ovog momenta u prsten staviti aždajinu glavu Sarajevo i iz njega može da ima izlaza samo onaj koja ćemo mi pustiti, a ne svaki od nas već onaj ko je glavnik, ko komanduje. Mi ne smijemo kazati, mi ćemo uništiti Sarajevo, ne mi nećemo, mi hoćemo da sačuvamo Sarajevo, nama Sarajevo treba. Mi nećemo kazati da ćemo srušiti dalekovod ili vodu isključiti, ne jer to Ameriku diže na noge, ali gospodo, mi vas molimo sve u redu, e, jednog dana nema vode u cijelom Sarajevu. ... Prema toma mi moramo mudro saopštiti svijetu, gađali su oni, pogodili dalekovod i nestalo struje, gađali vodovod, nestalo struje tu i tu, vršimo napore i popravljamo, to je ta diplomatija." BCS ERN 0084-7747

²⁴⁴ "Mi ratujemo, mi smo u okruženju, nas napadaju svaku večer, mi nemamo drugog rješenja nego da tučemo a da rušimo gradove. Mi smo Visoko srušili u jednu trećinu, možda će večeras i druga trećina biti. Oni nam provaljuju na odredjeni mestima, ubijaju i prave genocid, mo smo poslali na televiziju 9 ljudi, ubijeno je, pa onda noževima masakrivano. Svaki dan nam ubijaju po neke ljude, jer su tako vje[ti i podli prevaranti." BCS ERNs 0084-7751- 0084-7752

²⁴⁵ "Mi danas kontrolišemo cilju savoju (sic: svoju) teritoriju, možda kontrolišemo i ponešto teritorije koja bi pripala ili koja će pripasti ako pogodbi bude pripasti drugim nacionalnim zajednicama, ali se tokom rata iz razloga bezbjednosti te teritorije ne mogu ustupati, one se mogu ustupiti jedino nakon garantovanog mira i garantovanih granica od strane medjunarodne zajednice." BCS ERN 0214-9507

²⁴⁶ "Što se tiče odnosa sa Muslimanima u vojnom pogledu oni neće nikakve pregovore oni u malom broju mjesta prihvataju miran zajednički život i čekanje političkog rješenja. Tako je u Bijeljini i oko Bijeljine gdje

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Muslimani ne pokazuju želju da se bore protiv Srba i protiv njihove države i gdje u osnovi žive mirno i dobro, tako je nakon i u Krajini gdje nakon eliminacije ekstremista Muslimanski narod je prihvatio da živi sa Srbima, tako je u Sanskom Mostu, Ključu i Prijedor, gdje je nažalost bilo borbi i te borbe su izazvali muslimanski ekstremisti ali je nakon njihove eliminacije ostanak naroda nije za borba protiv Srba." BCS ERN 0214-9508

²⁴⁷ "Oko Sarajevo, kao što vam je poznato srpski narod ne dopusta da bude porazen i mi kontrolišemo vojnički gotovo sve naše okruženja oko grada, pri čemu nismo dopustili da se snage centralne Bosne da se spoje se snagama u Sarajevu, jer bi to bio katastrofalan ishod niti dopustamo da se dovoze plaćenici i dobrovoljci kojih ima u Turskoj spremnih ali kojih ima u arapskim zemljama koji bi za novac sigurno došli da se bore protiv srpskog naroda. Mi jako dobro znamo kako bi to izgledalo. Zahvaljujući Sarajevskom ratištu Vlada i skupština i svi drugi državni organi A. Izetbegović ne funkcionisu i pokazalo se da država BiH nikada nije funkcionisala i nikada nije uspostavljena izvan Jugoslavije." BCS ERN 0214-9508

²⁴⁸ "Naš narod u potpunosti opredijeljen za borbu odnosno za mir, jer mi nemamo više razloga da se borimo skoro sve smo svoje oslobodili u konačnom razgovoru bismo mogli i da vratimo neke teritorije ako neko selo nije naše i to je pitanje koje se ne može olako definisati ali u osnovi mi možemo da kažemo da mi imamo svoju državu da su na granici te naši vojnici, da je naš narod potpuno opredijeljen da živi u toj državi i da li će se sa nekim drugim udruživati sa ostalima u Bosni i Hercegovini ili sa nekim drugimi što će te opet bi kao predstavnici narod odlučiti u tom smislu mi politički stojimo odlično." BCS ERN 0214-9511

²⁴⁹ "...sada imamo taoce čitave gradove i stanovnike čitavog područja Zenica, Sarajevo, pa i nekih drugih." BCS ERN 0214-9525

²⁵⁰ "65% srpske teritorije po katastru pripada našem narodu, a 70% je osvojene, sto je samo 5% u korist, u odnosu na predhodnu cifru, ako odjemo od toga da neprijatelj dobije onoliko koliko mi poklonimo ko bi onda imao smjelosti da objasni našim ljudima da napuste ono što već imaju, što mu predstavlja kompenzaciju za prostor koji mi je razoren popaljen ili sa koga je otjeran." BCS ERN 0215-9532

²⁵¹ "Dozvolimo da vojnički radimo sa vojnicima, a ne da ubijamo žene i djecu, zato što nose dimije, ili ne znam šta, je sam ti rekao u razgovoru s sa

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jednom pukovnik da li su oni to svatiti i kako su svatili, ali ja sam za viteško razovanje (*sic*: ratovanjeĐ?), a ne za genocid." BCS ERN 0214-9554

²⁵² "Konkretno ja tražim od nas da ne raspravljamo uopšte o granicama našim, da ne raspravljamo uopšte o lokaciji i mjestu gdje će biti vlada dok se ne završi rat, to su dva moja predloga da o tome ne raspravljamo nikako. Ratni naš cilj je da vojnički vidimo ko je jači u Bosni, ali na bojnopolju jer se bojno polje i radi danas. Motiv naš je Srpska Država. Srpske zemlje. To je moj cilj i moje traženje od ove skupštine, da ne raspravljamo o granicama." BCS ERN 0214-9555

²⁵³ "Kad su Srbi u Sarajevu digli ustanak i kad su uzeli određene teritorije pod svoju kontrolu, o tome momentu nije bilo Vlada ili se bar nije znalo gdje je. Čak šta više u prvim danima nismo znali da li je i gospodin Karadžić živ. Kada smo saznali da je živ i kad je sišao među nas na Ilidža i dao nam određena ohrabrenja Srbi su u Sarajevo na tim prostorima zadržali određenu teritoriju pod kontrolom, a po nekim dijelovima i proširili svoje teritorija i potjerali muslimane sa teritorije gdje su oni praktično u većini." BCS ERN 0214-9561

²⁵⁴ "Jedna je bila inicijativa da mi pokrenemo zahtjev Skupština da se hitno sve međunarodne institucije a pogotovo novinari ako se posjetili naše logore da zahtijevamo da posjete i logore u koje su zatočeni Srbi i da se zahtijeva da se izvrši zamjena zarobljenika, takva jedna Deklaracija bi bila dobra i bila bi zaštita naših zarobljenika, ako se sjećate prošli put kada smo bili u Sarajevu da smo tada rekli i zauzeli stav i zadatak je bio ovog pregovaračkog tima da predloži i da zahtijeva da se stavi kao pitanje na Konferenciju u Londonu, to je pitanje zatočenika, u stvari naših ljudi koji su u tim etničkim prostorima muslimanskim. I mi smo stavili to da je usvojeno da se mora hitno prići formiranju koordinacionanog tijal (*sic*) od tri predstavnika od sve tri strane da bi se omogućilo svako čovjeka koji je u jednom zutvorenom (*sic*) gradu da bi mogli izaći na slobodnu teritoriju na koju hoće. Pa bih ja zamolio Komisiju da pripremu takvu jedin zahtjev ili da ovde oblastimo jednu komisiju koja bi takav zahtjev uputila međunarodnim komisijama za oslobadjanje zarobljenika i za zamjenu zarobljenika." BCS ERNs 0214-9606 – 0214-9607

²⁵⁵ "Predsjednici se obavezuju da će učiniti sve da se osnuje međunarodni sud za zločine i ti se zločini ponavljaju na nekoliko mjesta mislim za one koji su narednili zločine, etničko čišćenje itd. itd. Dakle, ovo su osnovni detalji koji daju ton toj Londonskoj konferenciji i mislim da iz tih proizilazi

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sasvim jasno da je vrlo neugodan utisak o tome što nas od tog svijeta dalje čeka.

“Nama se logori za zatvorenike, zarobljenike, za civile neznam ni ja za koga više otvaraju po Republici niko iz vlasti ili većina nas iz vlasti nezna ko ostvara te logore, minister čiji je resor da vodi brigu o izbjeglicama se zaprepasti kad mu ljudi iz Medjunarodnog crvenog krsta kažu pa eto ima logor i tamo. Jeli to država, izvinite, to ne nemože biti država, to je totalna jedna anarhija i criminal u koji smo mi svjesno ili nesvjesno manje ili više ogrezli svi zajedno.” BCS ERN 0422-6231 – 0422-6232

²⁵⁶ “Vode nemamo 5 mjeseci, niko ništa ne poduzima, u Sarajevu, čim nema dva sve vode UN znaju. Zato sam govorio našem predsjedniku Karadžiću u Banja Luci i predsjedniku Prstojeviću na Ilidži zavrni vodu sarajlkjama kad i nemamo neka pokrepiju i oni.” BCS ERN 0422-6241 – 0422-6242

²⁵⁷ “Nismo pitali ni vas, ni gospodina Karadžića, ni gospodina Krajišnika šta smo trebali da uradimo u Prijedoru, jedna zelena opština u Bosanskoj Krajini je bio Prijedor, da smo slušali vas mi bi danas bili zeleni, mi bi danas bili Krupa i Prijedor, nebi bio Prijedor. Mi smo ih sredili i spakovali tvrdim pakovanjem tamo gdje im je mjesto.” BCS ERN 0214-9745

²⁵⁸ “Kako je bio njemu da je u okruženju kao što je muslimanski narod i njegova oružana snaga, ako se tako nazvati, u Cerskoj, u Srebrenici, pa ceka kad će mu ovaj transportom 500-800 metaka.” BCS ERN 0214-9843

²⁵⁹ “Jer mi vjerujte ne možemo više živjeti zajedno. Ja ne znam koji to bili uslovi sada bili da živemo zajedno, ja morem biti iskren oni su nama mnogo zla nonijeli, i ni mi njima nismo ovoga puta mnogo manje.” BCS ERN 0214-9916

²⁶⁰ “Iz Sarajeva u vozilu UNPROFOR-a u kojima je bio pukovnik Sartr, Francuz, bio je i potpredsjednik Turalić Hakija, te krnje vlade Bosne i Hercegovine, naši su to vozilo zaustavili i pretresili, jedan od naših vojnika je sa sest metaka ubio tog Turajlića. (Aplauz) Molim vas da ne razbijamo tako klimu prema UNPROFOR-a, ima i onih koje dobro rade, mi ćemo odložiti oštar protest, ja sam naredio već da napišu protest do Hambijara i ja sam to njima rekao prošli put, UNPROFOR niti Ujedinjenje Nacije nisu servis, ni logistika Alije Izetbegovića, niti Franje Tudjmana niti naš, ali ipak moramo voditi račun, moramo biti mnogo, mnogo trezne glave, ja vas molim da nemojmo da nas neki pojedinac povuče u nesreću.” BCS ERN 0214-9927 – 0214-9928

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²⁶¹ "Ako su eventualno napravili kod nas neko nedjelo, i ne možemo da se zakunemo da nema nedjela. Mi smo čuli ukupno za 18 silovanje. Nismo provjerili sva ta silovanja, mi ćemo to provjeriti, nema niko pravi da siluje, 18 ne 18,000 nego 18. ... Mi treba da sudimo Srbima koji čine nedjela. Mi ne damo ga nikome da ga drugi sudi. Mi smo suveren narod i to hoćemo da radimo i time obavezujemo i druge da to rade ako hoće, ako neće prave farse kao Tudjman sto je sudio pa oslobadjao, ali mi se nismo u ovom ratu nikada oslonili na kriminalce, naši komandanti su ugledni oficiri, ako nisu oficiri ondu su ljudi iz naroda, oni koji nisu školovani oficiri i kada se to zna jasno da je naša vojska nije nikada napravila nedjelo, odnosno vojska nije napravila nedjelo, mogao pojedinac je napravio nedjelo, mada i vojske sumnjam..." BCS ERN 0215-0078

²⁶² "Htio sam zbog toga da ovdje kažem zbog toga što smo i pohvatali špijune i vodiče i one koji su mjesecima saradjivali sa muslimanskom stranom. To se radi o stanovnicima opštine Pljevlja, državljanima SRJ muslimanske nacionalnosti, u saradnji o doturu hrane, a otkrili smo da se radi o velikom koridoru dotura hrane u Goražde. Utvrdili smo do je sve u tome učestvovao i vidjelismo da ima i dobar broj Srba i okolnih sela u to umiješan.

"Po mom misljenju, sporne teritorije su one srpske teritorije koje još nisu oslobodjene. To su za nas te, kao što je Goražde. Ako ne oslobodimo taj grad, u kome ima zatočenih Srba, a bojem se da ne budemo a svi oko te opštine zatočeni, a sve što smo uradili, bojem se da će to sve biti polovično. Jedna oaza je to koja se mora što prije razčistiti, prekinuti svaku vezu Sarajeva sa istokom. Ako one ostane, ona će nas napadati, proširivati i nas u okolini poklapati. Zato sam ramo da se pitanje oslobadjanja toga grada treba što prije riješiti. Smatramo da Goražde nije uzeto zato što ce dobro brani nego zato što se slabo napada. Da mi napravim dobar napad i da to riješimo. Hvala." BCS ERN 0215-0105

²⁶³ "Jos nešto, nemojte bude veći katolici od papa. Ja predlažem da zabrani satanizovanje Srba od Srba. Molim Vaš glavna je tema u Banja Luci 24 sata o džamiji, ja ne kažem da ih treba hvaliti što su srusene, ali nemojte toliko plakati, barem na našim sredstvima informisanja. Ja ću svima oni koji kukaju, uvećati razglednicu u boji i neka je nose sa sobom." BCS ERN 0215-0210

²⁶⁴ "Srebrenica i Žepa tu smo mi precizan ugovor o ulogu UNPROFOR-a definisali. Neće nas prevariti. Radi se o tačnoj deklaraciji linije sukoba i od

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te linije sukoba pošto su Srebrenica i Žepa pod zaštitom snaga Ujedinjenih nacija. Tamo je tačno dogovoreno da bude jedna kanadska četa ojačana, odnosno jedna četa u Žepi. Oni su tražili neke dodatne snage radi logistike i u dogovoru i odobrenje Predsjednika štaba i vrhovne komande mi smo to njima dozvolili. Sada je u toku pregovorački proces stavljenje pod zaštitu užeg dela Sarajeva. Razdvajanje snaga može biti na liniji gdje su snage sukobljena." BCS ERN 0215-0250

²⁶⁵ "a mi ćemo im morati sve tamo nadoknaditi što smo im strušili i popalili i 17 džamija s temeljem sraznili." BCS ERN 0215-0530

²⁶⁶ "Ja bih rekao da je područje Srbobrana slobodno od prvog dana. Samo smo to oslobodili, nismo zavalili u pomoć nikoga nego smo to učinili sami. Naši borci su ostali kod kuće, branili svoja ognjišta, svoj grad, svoju Krajinu. Jednostavno, branili su srpstvo i pravoslavlje. Nisu tražili ugljeblja ni u Beogradu, ni u Novom Sadu, kako neki drugi sto su radili." BCS ERN 0215-0541

²⁶⁷ "Kako se uzme to sa Srebrenicom, ja mislim da to je naš poen, jer da smo ušli u Srebrenicu, ušli bi ljudi čije su porodice pobijene, 1,200 Srba je pobijeno bilo bi krvi do koljena, a mi bi mogli izgubiti državu za to. Zato ja smatram da se Morillon nas spasio, a ne Muslimane kada je ušao u Srebrenici. Šta u Srebrenici oni imaju puške, ali te puške nas opravdavaju da i lobimo, oni izadju po 300-350 iz Srebrenice oni izlaze sa puškama i mi se ne možemo prema njima ponašati kao prema civilima, naša ih vojska lobi jer su to neprijateljske snage na našoj teritoriji i konačno Stoltenberg me pitao da li se mi slažemo da oni evakuise Srebrenicu i da sve odvedu u Tuzlu, kakav su dobitak dobili Muslimani u Srebrenici. Oni su kao u kavezu i tamo su još neki kanadjanin koji ih tamo prodaju robu..." BCS ERNs 0215-0376 – 0215-0377

²⁶⁸ "Važno je da smo mi izvukli Srbe iz Goražda, mi ne želimo da pucamo po Goraždu nema potrebe da upalimo ni jedan metak po Goraždu. ... Mi smo vojnički već pobijedili, mi moramo politički pobijediti, to znači moramo predviđati šta će se desiti i preduhitriti te događaj ili dan ranije sa potezom koji čini neku besmisleni mjeru protiv nas. ... Ugovori koje je Muslimanska strana potpisala su ponizavajući za Muslimane. To je katastrofa, to je za istoriju, to je priznavanje srpske pobjede i UN su to potpisale, Morijon je to potpisao..." BCS ERN 0215-0377

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²⁶⁹ "Vi znate da smo mi u opštini Krupa na Uni onako kako je ova skupština odlučila da je granica zapadna granica Države Srpske rijeka Una, mi smo to odmah 21. Aprila uradili onako kako smo se i dogovarali tada. Tamo sa te strane trebale su da budu balije, međjutim, nisu se mogli tu zadržati zbog toga što smo mi bili na ovoj strani, ... Balije su sada između nas i snaga UNPROFOR-a i u zadnje vrijeme neprekidno nas provociraju i diraju." BCS ERN 0215-0691

²⁷⁰ "Bilo je više muslimanskih. I kad se razgovara se Livnjacima, da bi preselili to stanovništvo koje je pobjeglo. To su najžešći ekstremisti, građani muslimanskog stanovništva, čiji su očevi i pradjedovi pravili teške zločine i genocid i u onom i u ovom ratu. Znači, jedan od ciljeva jesta da se ti Muslimani rastjeraju. Njih ima dosta u Livnu i ne znaju šta će sa njima. Dosta ih je došlo kao izbjeglice, ... pa im sad predstavljaju veliki problem." BCS ERN 0215-6015

²⁷¹ "Trebali su da očiste svoje opštine kao sto smo mi očistili..." BCS ERN 0215-0676

²⁷² "... mi smo tada dobili pravo da formiramo svoju republiku i preliminarno prihvatanje jedne značajne teritorije u preliminarnoj mapi to je teritorija koja je istorijski, više istorijski nego etnički bila srpska i s obzirom da je to bilo preliminarno bilo i prije rata tada nam je MZ priznala značajnu teritoriju preko 50% BiH i prihvatila priznanicu da je to srpsko bez ikakve agresije. Dakle, naša teritorija, njene granice nisu rezultat agresije nego rezultat di mi tu živimo kao većina već vjekovima. ... u tom ratu mi smo branili svoju teritoriju, postavili neke linije odmah na početku rata i iza tih linija sklonili većinu svoga stanovništva koje smo uspjeli da izvučimo iz muslimanskih i hrvatskih teritorijai bili citavo vrijeme spremni na razgovore učestvovali u tim razgovorima, bili veoma kooperativni i najkooperativniji kada je u pitanju humanitarne stvari, konvoji, bili najdisciplinovanija vojska i policija, nismo vršili odmazde, vršili smo jedino opravdane i svrsishodne vojne operacije i to do granice naših etničkih prostora, rijetko prelazeći na susjednom području izključivo iz razloga taktičkih iz razloga odbrana. ... Da li bi ostvorena Lisabonska konferencija bez pogibija nama bi bilo lakše da naš narod povučemo sa njegovih ognjišta, jer bismo mi stvorili državu." BCS ERNs 0215-2184 – 0215-2186

²⁷³ "Sam u datumu srpske istorije novije ostacžće zapisan 16. 08. 90., tada vojni obveznici u Kninu nisu hteli da vrata oružje, nisu primili Generala Trajčeskog, tražili su da dodjem ja, dosao sam i rekli su, recite kada ćemo

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pucati, rekao sam kad nas napadnu ustaše, a tada sam rekao da sam najsretniji oficir zato što srpski vojnik neće da vrati oružje." BCS ERN 0215-2324

²⁷⁴ "Nismo mi u Sarajevu izgubili, pogledajte bi narodu u Sarajevu negine se, živi se normalno, podijelili smo grad, granične prelaze napravili prolaze turci kroz našu teritoriju i mi ih kontrolišemo i na ulazu i na izlazu kada idu sa Visoko. Šta oni sada rade oni prave incidente nebili smo mi to zatvorili da oni traže promjenu status toga puta da idu bez kontrole, a mi zgrabimo ulicu ko smo i izaćemo im u susret i zatvorimo to i nedamo im da prodju itc. To su velika lukavstva, moramo očuvati taj karakter tog koridora berlinskog tipa, da bi ga natjerali da se Sarajevo definitivno podjeli i teritorije kompaktiraju, pa cemo mu kvadratni metar brda izmedju Vogošče i Visa uzedemo mu kvadratni kilometer na Drini." BCS ERN 0215-2545

²⁷⁵ "Oni će nama nju osporavati zbog etničkog čišćenja, ovoga i onoga, ali mi ćemo reći – i Srbi su etnički poičišćeni." BCS ERN 0215-3005.

²⁷⁶ "Svjestan sam da smo blokirani od cijelog svijeta, blokirani smo od SRJ, to su stvarno nove okolnosti koje su tu kod nas, moramo ih biti svjesni, moramo biti svjesni činjenice da će se desiti ono sto će se desiti a to je poslije 15. oktobra, nastaviće se rat, no sreća je nastupa zima pa ga nećemo moći ni balije voditi, ali će do proleća sigurno se dobor naoružati UN će izaći i mo ćemo na proleće morati da završimo taj rat. Imamo vremena, da ja kažem tako, da procenimo da do proleća pripremimo se i m i za taj rat koji će sigurno doći do njega i zbog toga ja ću gospodine predsjedniče pročitati ovo i završavam." BCS ERN 0215-3321

²⁷⁷ "Imam utisak, a to se vidi iz medjunarodnih izvještaja, niko u svijetu od Jugoslavije nije očekivao da zavede protiv nas ekonomske sankcije, već vojne i političke, mi razumemo ukoliko Srbija, odnosno Jugoslavija mora da zavede vojne i političke sankcije, ali ekonomske sankcije nerazumemo. To je pogrešno time se legitimišu sankcije koje su uveden protiv Jugosavije, a mi imamo potpuno pravo da protiv Muslimana uvedemo sankcije i da ptica ne prodje sve kod Svijet ne prisili Jugoslaviju da digne ekonomske sankcije, vojne i političke neka ostanu. Nije nam potrebna ni vojna ni politička pomoć, ali privreda nemože da živi ovako na ovaj način i konačno i Jugoslavija će sigurno pretrpjeti velike štete, jer je naš privredni prostor i privredni prostor RSK čine oko 25% jugoslovenskog privrednog prostora." BCS ERN 0215-3177

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²⁷⁸ “Molim vas mi smo tukli sarajevsku televiziju svim sredstvima koja smo imali i nismo joj mogli ništa. Ja sam tek kada je rat počeo svatio zašto je zgrada sarajevske TV onako ružna, ja sam tamo ulazio kao književnik itd. to su neke kasete, zidovi, hodnici nešto čudno, to je sve pravljeno za slučaj rata, jer su oni znali da će biti gradjanski rat.” BCS ERN 0215-3592

²⁷⁹ “Mi ćemo budite ubjedjeni, ja bi volio da nisam u pravu, i daj bože da nisam, da ćemo jednog dana morati se definitivno razračunati sa Muslimanima sa sva vremena. Ne trebamo se mi plašiti ostaće prazni prostori i Kupres Hrvati kada su uzeli, Srbi nisu ostali tamo u zagrljaju, sutra bilo da uzmemo koji grad turski Sarajevo, Tuzlu ti muslimani neće ostati u zagrljaju Srba i stvoriće se čisti etnički prostori.” BCS ERN 0215-3340.

²⁸⁰ “Bilo je neodgovornih izjava, odgovornih ljudi u Krajini, izjava da se bombardovao Zagreb izdala mi je kosi na glavi ...

“Propustili smo dve 100% šanse, prva je Hrvatska je po prvi put od međunarodne zajednice počela dobijati šamare zato što je to udarila, sa tim izjavam mi smo te šamare pretvorili u čvoke, jednostavno Tudjman je dobio legitimitet da uradi to što će da udari, je mi Bože moj bombardujem civile, rušimo crkve itd.

“Dalje rušenje crkava gospodo, ja se javno ovdje ogradjujem, a tražiću i da se Skupština ogradi od ruđenja crkava ovdje, bez obzira što su oni nama srušili toliko crkve, to nije u srpskom mentalitetu. Srbi nikada nisu bili vandali. Srbi nikada u istoriji nisu ratovali protiv gradjevina i crkava. Gospodo ta crkva nije hrvatska crkva, to je crkva cijelog katoličkog svijeta, ne mojte baš da bez potrebe guramo čvrst u oko cijelom katoličkom svijetu, vandalski čin otom potom, rušenje džamije i rušenje svetog Ive bilo je u ratnoj zoni na svijet nija mrdnujo uvom, ovdje u Banjaluci nije ratna zona gospodo, ovdje se ne vodi rat, ovdje se ruše civilni objekti, a da ne kažem da se ubijaju civili što nije bilo svakako dobro.

“Gospodo godinu dana, međunarodna zajednica u početku nije bila, nama nije bila nikada naklonjena, ali nije bila izričito ni protiv nas, to dokazuju sledeći primeri. Godnu dana, pošto je ovo zatvoreni sastanak mogu reći, mi smo dobili prednost aviona, tenkova, luna to naši neprijatelji nisu imali, pa i kada je pod pritiskom svetskog javnog mijenja uvedeni zabrana letova ta odluka donesena je sa početkom od mjesec dana umjesto da završimo posao tada, odredjeni komandant je recitovao stihove i otvorao izložbe na moj kruh, to je moje da radim, umjesto da je radio posao sa

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avijacijom, posao nije odradjen. Umjesto toga mi smo grantirali gradove, gospodo nije rješenje granatirati gradove.

“Dubrovnik nam je nanio veliku štetu, zbog jednog ispaljenog snajperskog metka sa nekog prozora mi smo rušili zgradu, pa kako svijet onda može da nas podržava kada to je takve stvari radimo.

“Ovo što nam radi Milošević, to je stvarično, ali i mi tome doprinosimo i daje mo mu na neki način alibi. Ovdje slučaj sa Šešeljom ... Šešelj je ovdje dibio veliki publicitet na vom državnim medijama, Šešelj je u pravu možda 100%, ali gospodo ne može se dovesti, to je neprimereno u međunarodnoj zajednici da se dovodi opozicioni predstavnik susedne države, čak one od koje zavisi i da javno govori to što govori o predsedniku Miloševiću. Normalno da će poslije toga predsjednik Milošević pravdati blokadu, čak ne daj Bože, Bože mi oprost i priznanje BiH, rećice pa vidite šta mi rade.

“Ne smijemo to raditi, ne smijemo se na taj način ponašati. ... Mi smo konvoje UN radili svašta, otimali smo robu, rekvirirali benzin ...

“Predlažem Ministarstvu informisanja da hitno razradi strategiju medijskog rata koji ćemo mi voditi za dobrobit ove RS...” BCS ERN 0410-1767 – 0410-1772

²⁸¹ “Nemojte zamjeriti samo da komentarišem. Mislim da je gospodin Grahovac, gospodin Kelečević rekli ono što gotovo svaki učesnik ovdje misli i baš im ja želim u svoje ime da zahvalim, ma kako nam istina nekada ne odgovara, jer nije lijepo slušati ovo radi toga što nas to boli, ali to je istina.” BCS ERN 0410-1777

²⁸² “Gospodine predsjedniče, gospodo poslanici, kolege. Ja ću ovdje u prvi mah, kao poslanik reći da sam neočekivano srećan kada je bilo poslanika kao što je Zlatko Kelečević da kaže nešto otvoreno, iskreno, pa maker nešto i odudaralo od nekog zvanično saopštenja.” BCS ERN0410-1786

²⁸³ “Gospodi Kelečević je dosta dobro govorio ako ja smijem da komentarišem, nemam ja pravo ni ja ni Gvero i niko da izričemo pohvale, ali hoću da kažem da se slažem sa mnogo toga što je rečeno, jedino ne mogu da se sasvim slažim da smo mi trebali prema Čurkinu biti drugačiji. Čurkin i Kozirev su američki ljudi. Oni nisu ruski ljudi to će se uskoro vidjeti, ja se nadam da će Kozirev uskoro pasti. BCS ERN 0410-1807

²⁸⁴ “Hajmo da vidimo šta kaže međunarodni, kako mi ocjenjujemo međunarodne faktore, šta će reći oko skradina, ako mi sada kažemo treba

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uzeti Bihać, treba uzeti Orašje, ja tvrdim treba konačno raskinuti i dići enclave, možda je to lajlakši posao, u Srebrenici i Žepi itd., ali i moramo da znamo šta nam je cilj svim snagama da udarimo i da razriješimo jedno pitanje.” BCS ERN 0410-1781

²⁸⁵ “Ja moram da vam kažem da pored superiornosti i naoružanju i drugih stvari, mi od samog početka rata neke stvari nismo mogli da uzemo. Nismo mogli da uzmemo Dorbinju recimo, uzeli smo dva kraja Dobrinje, centralni dio Dobrinje nismo mogli da uzmemo. Brdo Žuč u Sarajevo Napadli smo 90 dana teškom artiljerijom, slupali smo živo, pojavi mo se turci još u rovu i čekaju nas, kao što mi na Doboju čekamo, pa ne damo tako turci na Žuči čekaju, kao što mi ne čekamo na Bihaću, nego vojska koja se vraća da uzme teritoriju ne može da dodje u borbeni kontakt po dva dana ide naprijed nema turaka nigje znači naša se vojska povukla duboko.” BCS ERN 0410-1807

²⁸⁶ “ Ono oko bombardovanja Zagreba, ja se slažem da trebamo tući Zagreb, ali ni smijemo to reći, ako je to trebalo da kaže se, na onaj način se prenijeti, to je morao da bude oprezan urednik koji je to pušto, ako to odgovornosti ne bude danas ovdje i ako mi baš nikoga ne utvrdimo odgovornim danas ovdje, bez obzira da li je to urednik TV ili minister, ili predsjednik Vlade ili ostali, mi ništa danas nismo uradili osim puke konstatacije.” BCS ERN 0410-1827

²⁸⁷ “Što se tiče rušenja crkava, ja mislim da je naše ministarstvo zauzelo stav i jasno dala Vlada svoj stav, ne bi dobro bilo da Skupština zauzima stav, da kažem samo zašto, samo zato što ćemo izazvati revolt kod ljudi tamo. Toliko ljudi poginulo, vrlo je odmjereno saopštenje našeg Ministarstva za vere i to je dobro i to je politički, ne bi trebalo ponovo i Skupština iako se ja slažem da je bilo dobro da smo iznijeli.” BCS ERN 0410-1914

²⁸⁸ “Stav je GŠ i stav ovog parlamenta je bio prije, da mi ne lociramo pripadnike UNPROFOR-a na našim područjima, do duše nekada nam zatreba da pofatamo taoce. Ovo je zahtjev UNPROFOR-a za uspostavljanje baze jedne čete UNPROFOR-a u Ilijašu, znači to je negativan odgovor da to ne možemo odgovoriti. Isti će odgovor biti kao što smo to radili i prije.

“Ko je za, da se ne udovolji?_

“Ko je protiv?

“Ima li suzdržanih?

“Hvala lijepo.” BCS ERN 0215-4013

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²⁸⁹ “Vama je svima poznato da se sa Herceg-Bosnom u određeno vrijeme trgovalo, pa čak i vojno saradjivalo i mi moramo dati, mislim da to baš ovaj organ može da da jedino kvalifikaciju oko toga, jer će se postaviti pitanje šta je sa tom silnom municijom i tehnikom koju smo mi dali Herceg-Bosni, šta je sa ostalom silnom trgovinom, šta je sa ostalom trgovinom koju smo ostvarili, ako je to sve bio promašaj i ako je to sve bilo pomaganje neprijatelju onda moramo svi odgovarati koji smo u tome učestvovali i Vlada, u GŠ, i MUP i svi ostali.

“... bojim se da sutra neće biti optuženi oni koji je sa Srbijom saradjivao ako nastavimo ovako kakve ćemo sve ljudima davati etikete, pa će nam se neke 49. godine stalno ponavljati, nekakva čišćenja, kako kome u određenom momentu bude trebalo.” BCS ERN 0215-4123

²⁹⁰ “Moram da kažem da smo mi odlučili da se zaoštavanje i Vrhovna komanda i ja kao komandant i sa GŠ smo usaglasili da je nama najlošio rat niskog intenziteta, dugog trajanje itd. i da moramo zagrijati situaciju, uzeti šta se gdje može, stvoriti usijanu atmosferu i dramtizovati, zaprijetiti eskalacijom itd. jer smo primjetili kada god mi napredujemo na Goražde, na Bihać ili drugdje ili kada se oko Sarajeva zaoštri da onda ide međunarodni da se diplomatske aktivnost ubrza. Tu smo mi oko Sarajeva nešto radili, uzeli smo ta orudja, to su četiri orudja, možda nam nisu bila neophodna, ali ona su dovela do poznatog bombardovanja koje nam je nažalost nanijelo materijalnu štetu, jer nismo izvršili disperziju tih sredstava, to bi bila velika ogromna šteta. I ovako je značajna šteta.” BCS ERN 0215-4145

²⁹¹ “Mi smo naredili hapšenje, nismo baš pojednostili naredili kako će se vezivat, ali odrazilo se dobro, to je bilo vrlo šokantno za svijet, sada mi to lako, kada na pitaju da li je to bilo lijep gest, ja ih pitam da li je lijep gest bombardovati sprsku dubinu i plašiti našu djecu i starce da bježe, ondanema niko odgovor, tako da se ne odgovori odgovorom nego pritu pitanjem i oni nemaju šta da kažu. To je kao što znate dovelo do strašnog zagrijanja, bilo je i osuda čak iz Jugoslavije itd.

“Mi smo u jednom trenutku svatili i ocjenili kada su oni uspjeli da ih nazovu taocima, da će nama biti dramatično da se ... kvariti u našim rukama i dovsti do negativnog efekta i do opravdanja za eventualno vojno mešanje velikih vojnih razmjera gdje bi mi izgubili državu. ... Odlučili smo da je bolje da umješamo Srbiju i da ojačamo njenu poziciju u svijetu, čime smo malo s ebe, malkice oštetili kao pregovarače, ali smo signurno za to desetostruko više dobili, što se same Srbije tiče ...

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“Nismo smjeli sve da ih puštamo odjednom, nego smo proporcijama, čak smo ostavili 15 do kraja ove nedelje da bismo mogli u Sarajevu zadržati oružje koje imamo, znajući za ofanzivu, a i nameravajući da nešto uradimo u Sarajevu, sada ne dolazi u obzir nikakvo vraćanje oružja zbog ove ofanzive, tako da smo mi na neki način izvukli još neke koristi iz cjelokupne krize.” BCS ERN 0215-4145- 0215-4146

²⁹² “Poslednji naš veliki uspjeh je bio vraćanje Srpske opštine Bihać, odnosno ona kacija, a poslije toga imamo ove sitne neke neuspjeha inaše još sitinjelijechenje tih neuspjeha vraćanjem polovičnim itd. ali tu, i sinoć smo na sastanku utvrdili tu ima nekoliko razloga, jedan od razloga je i slabo snabdjevanost naševojske, ali smo sinoć otvoreno i pošteno sagledali da to nije u pitanju nesposobnost ili nemar države kako smo često bili kao država optuživani, nego teškoće u koje smo napali od strane blokada SRJ. Mi još uvijek nemamo nekih materijala i materija, da pravimo neke kalibre, a pokazalo se da ih nemamo i zbog blokada a i zbog toga što su u Srbiji bile havarije u nekim fabrikama i odmah se osjetilo nema toga materijal da se to doradi. Mi smo odlučili da uradimo sve i da malte ne sve devizne rezerve trošimo samo isključivo kako to i nadam se da ćemo u tome uspjeti.” BCS ERNs 0215-4148 – 0215-4149

²⁹³ “Snabdjevanje vojske hranom itd. ide dosta dobro, tu se i opštine i Vlada dobru snalaze, naravno humanitarna pomoć je isto tako veoma važna jer mi dobijamo ogramne količine pomoći, a od te pomoći oko 50% pomoći, koliko ja znam, ministar je li ide za Vojsku, što se ne bi smjelo čuti iz ove sale, mislim da to međunarodne organizacije i znaju, ali što na neki način to rade i tu je prof. Koljević, dr. Kalinić i g. Vladušić su zaista pravi mučenici...” BCS ERN 0215-4149

²⁹⁴ “Imali smo, kao što znate, uspjeh u Srebrenici i Žepi, tom uspjeha nema prigovora ni primjedbe, naravno, mnogo gluposti su napravljene nakon toga, jer je mnogo muslimanskih vojnika lutalo okolo sumama, i tada imali smo gubitaka, u samoj akciji nismo imali gubitaka. U Žepi smo imali uspjeh, mada nama Žepa je pojele najmanje 15 dana i tu smo dosta zamajali i tako da nam se desilo da nam u medjuvremenu padnu Glamoč i Grahovo.” BCS ERN 0215-4187

²⁹⁵ “Problemom Žepe gospoda draga mi smo rešili da dva brigade sada imamo u zoni II krajišnjog korpusa iz Drinskog Korpusa. Problemom Srebrenica takodje smo stvorili adekvatne rezerve i učinilo smo to u periodu

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u kome smo procenili da medjunarodna zajednica neće reagovati neposredno poslije događaja koji su se desili u zapadnoj Slavoniji i išli smo isključivo zato i to je bila jedna od strategiskih odluka GS i realizovali smo u skladu sa najboljem mogućnostima uz minimalne gubitke maksimalnom racionalizacijom i upotrebom snaga u vreme kad je taj isti Drinski korpus davao brigadu na sarajevskom ratištu i kada nismo dovodili ni jedinice MUP-a ni jedinice iz drugih zona odgovornosti izuzev jedinice Drinskog Korpus. Ne znam da li sam shavio dobro Predsjednika Republika, ali smatram da nikakve veze Žepa i Srebrenica nemaju sa gubitkom položaja u Glamoču i Grahovu, gubitak položaja rekao je gospodin Predsjednik da smo se zabili u Žepi 15 dana, da smo zabili tamo 2 generala i da je to imalo za posjedicu da Glamoč i Grahovo su bili postavljeni u tim starešinskom smislu, a odgovorni su za ostale krajeve." BCS ERN 0215-4202

²⁹⁶ "Takav je bili odnosi i prema UNPROFOR-a u Srebrenici, kada je rešen problem Srebrenice, kada je pritisla medjunarodna javnost na nas, je instrukcija i od Predsjednika državnog komiteta za saradnju sa UNPROFOR-om, sa kojim sam razgovarao svakodnevno, jer sam trebao da vodim psihološko propagandu aktivnost kompletnu oko rješavanja operacije u Žepi i Srebrenici i vodio sam, kontaktirali smo po 50 puta dje rečeno, nastojte da što pre rešimo problem toga UNPROFOR-a da nam se ponovo ne nabaci sindrom talača nakon onoga što smo imali posle bombardovanja i mi smo odradili u skladu sa postojećim sporazumima i dogovorima." BCS ERN 0215-4207

²⁹⁷ "Potpukovnik Milutinović ... daje stranim agencijama katastrofalne snimke koje mogu Mladića da koštaju da mu se na Hagu pokažu. Pustaju oni koga hoće pa se snime leševi žena po ulicama Srebrenice pa se to pusti na stranim medijama." BCS ERN 0214-4234

²⁹⁸ "Drugi put iz Goražda General Mladić je u tri sata ujutro dignut po vašem naredjenju i išli smo svi zajedno kasnije gore kod Miloševića, kada smo bili i ja i General Mladić i svi mi protiv, i Predsjednik Krajišnik da prihvati da prekinimo ofanzivu na Goražde." BCS ERN 0215-4262

²⁹⁹ "Ponovo ste pominjali Žepu. General Mladić je u Zepu dolazio samo helikopterom i otišao, a ja i Krstić smo dobili zadatak i odradili smo ga onakao kako je trebao i mislim da ova Žepa ne zaslužuje da bude predmet prigovora generalima, naprotiv ona je riješena i ja sam objasnio šta smo stvorili i kolike rezerve njenim oslobadjanjem." BCS ERN 0215- 4263

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³⁰⁰ "Sjećate se kada sam neglo sazvao Vrhovnu Komandu i sve predsjednike opština da se ona tri kilometra, da se obuku policajci i civile da kažu uredu, dio pripada i nama ta tri kilometra, nemojte da se take ne rad, tako se ne radi sa svojom državom, da smo Srebrenicu uzeli i ušli u nju kada je bio Morion, nas bi bombardovali, ali znate kako, tepih bombama, spržili bi nas, došao je trenutak, ja sam direktivu broj sedam i to signiro da se uzme i Teočak, Srebrenica, Žepa i Goražda, sve je to potpisano i išli smo snažno u to. Vi ste sami u telegramu opisali po prvi put sam se čudio zašto Tolimir ovako fino poštuje Predsjednika Republike, izvještavate kako je Predsjednika Republike veoma zadovoljan, ohrabruje vojsku da nastavi, dok mi ljudi nisu rekli, po coveće on tebe hoće da umješa da slučajno ne bi ti rekao da ti nisi za to, ja sam za sve naše odluke i ja stojim iza njih, i snimljene su Vrhovne Komande i sve u njima stoji i usmeno i pismeno sam naredio da se ide na Žepu i Srebrenicu." BCS ERN 0215-4264 – 0215-4265.

³⁰¹ "Izmedju Grmeča i Kozare, ja mislim da to i Milošević mora da zna, to je rečeno i stranim pregovoračima, izmedju Grmeča i Kozare ne može ništa pripaditi nikome nego nama, jer je tamo izvršen genocid, tamo je srpski narod postradao i tamo je broj muslimana porastao prema 50% na osnovu genocida a ne na osnovu nekog prirodnog razvoja i u dolini Neretvi izvršen genocid." BCS ERN 0215-4387

³⁰² "Mnogo naši pojedinci nadobrobdni, neodgovorni, popije dvije rakije i kaže daj de da tata pikne jednu, na pravi pičvajz po gradu i baca granata na civilne. Gospodo mi nikada nismo htjeli priznati da se padale te naše granate. Ja znam odgovorno to nije radila ni Vrhovna komanda ni GS, takve naredbe nisu davali, ali neki nadobudni i neodgovorni pojedinci su to radili. Mi smo trebali, ubuduće to treba da radimo, da se ponekad i prizna da se to desilo, ali da kažemo da su to uradili neodgovorni pojedinci koji će biti uhapšeni, trebali smo čak izvesti neko sudjenje kao blef, vidite šta radi gospodin Tudjman." BCS ERN 0215-4493

³⁰³ "Naša kataklizma počinje sa Bihaćem negdje oko nove godine. ... ali nam je bilo prezentovani euforično da smo mi već u gradu itd. Uspostavljanje tadašnjeg mirovnog procesa i predika vatre je katastrofa za RS. To je moje konstatacija, ne predlažem da je usvoji skupština kao konstataciju da je tačna. A najveća greška rata je Srebrenica je i Žepa i za to neko treba da snosi odgovornost. ... Ko je odgovoran za to? Mi smo legalizovali pred MZ *Šmedjunarodna zajednica* da se mogu uzeti zastićene zone, a onda smo nakon pet dana galamili kako ne može se na zastićenu

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zonu RSK udariti, a mi smo prije pet dana uradili to što smo uradili. Izgubili smo poziciju koju smo mogli da branimo." BCS ERN 0215-4484

³⁰⁴ "Poslanik Dodik : Jedini izlaz za RS je prekid vatre. Ja se slažem sa tim, a ne po svaku cenu. To znači da nam ostaje borba. Kaže da je naša najveća greška Srebrenica i Žepa, jer smo uzeli zastićene zone, a branimo se što nas napadaju iz zastićenih zona. Verovatno će pametniji ljudi posle nas, da li je Srebrenica i Žepa greška, ja ovog momenta znam, da nismo uzeli Srebrenicu i Zepu, ne bi sada imali Romaniju, sa vojničke tačke gledišta. U političke aspekte i u metodologiju uzimanja Žepa i Srebrenica i ulazim nisam bio prisutan, samo sam bio informisan kao i vi. Bio sam na zapadnim granicama RS." BCS ERNs 0215-4539 – 0215-4540

³⁰⁵ "Ja sam pregledao, odobrio i potpisao sedam direktiva, osmu i devetu mi niko nije podnio ni da je pročitam, a kamili da je potpišem, radi toga što je general Gvero pisao i ostali koga će da slušaju. ... Ja to neću da trpim, moram to da vam kažem, je li treba i narodu da kažem pa da se narod uplasi, i molim novinare da o tome ne pišu. Moram ponovo ovdje da pomenem primjer iz onoga sudjenja u Nimpergu, kada se pravda veliki njemački pravnik koji je osuđen, pravda se američkom kolegi i predsjedniku suda, kaže nisam znao da će dotle doći, ne gospodine kolege, vi ste prvi slučaj kaka ste napravili ogriješili se od pravo i čovječanstvo, ne zanima me kolike su dimenzije vaših grešaka." BCS ERN 0215-4553 – 0215-4554

³⁰⁶ "Ja sam kao vrhovni komandant stao iza plana za Žepu i Srebrenicu, za Srebrenicu uglavnom. Žepa se podrazumijevala. Gospodo mi bismo izgubili rat na postoji Žepa sa 90,000 naoružanih muslimana izgubili bismo rat. Lično sam nadgledao plan bez znanja GS, ne nikrijući nego slučajno nailazeći general Krstića i savjetovao mu da pravo ide u grad i da proglasi pad Srebrenice, i poslije ćemo se juriti sa Turcima po šumama, odobrio sam i biliži zadatak i radikalni zadatak i ne kajem se za to." BCS ERN 0215-4556

³⁰⁷ " Ja sam imao sretnu okolnosti das am sav taj narod podgrmečki naoružao ja lično, svakom uručio pušku u ruke, nemom hvala Bogu i ručni bacač, nekom i onu 120, nekom 82, nekom minobacač 60mm. itd. zato što smo u onom ratu 1941-1945 godine, strašan genocide doživili preko 12 hiljada Srba je sigurno iz opštine Krupske stradalo u onom ratu, to mi je bila sreća u svemu ovom što sam do sada radio sa vama i u ovoj državi, medjutim imao sam i strašnu nesreću zato što sam u prava dva mjeseca vido tu brigade, došao na Unu uzeli Krupu i sve, tu je bila državna granica po odluci ove

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Skupštine, tu se utvrdili, minska polja postavili itd.” BCS ERNs 0215-5106 – 0215-5107

³⁰⁸ “Lično mislim da je naš životni prostor i teritorija na kome radimo i živimo ugrožen pa da to moramo spriječiti. U stvari moramo spriječiti useljavanje Muslimana na naše teritorije i prostore. U cazinskoj krajini ima oko 250,000 – 300,000 Muslimana i to na vrlo malom prostoru. Mi ih jednostavno možemo zatvoriti u taj prsten i nama ne odgovara uopšte da nam se priključe. Čak nam odgovata [sic] da budu posebna krajina Cazinska krajina koja se apsolutno ekonomski biti ovisna od nas. Svaki metar kvadratni srpske zemlje imaće astronomsku cijenu za jedno vrlo kratko vrijeme i mi ih svojom politikom apsolutno moramo dovesti u takvu situaciju.” BCS ERN SA02-4972. Also 0089-8268

³⁰⁹ “Posebno treba ukazati i voditi računa o još jednom momentu o genocidu u koji je izvršen nad srpskim narodom. Jer, brojna područja ostala su bez stanovništva zahvaljujući pojedinim neprijateljima koji su danas vaskrsli. Međutim, iz toga zločina niko takodje nemože da izvuče pravo. To se naročito odnosi na pojedina područja Bosanske krajine, naročito Kozare i drugih područja gdje je naš narod, sada je nadpolovična većina ili nije, upravo zbog toga genocida.” BCS ERN 0089-8161

³¹⁰ “Drugo, predlažem da se naglasi da srpski narod kao drugi narod po broju ima 64% teritorije BiH.” BCS ERN 0089-8162

³¹¹ “Što se tiče većina ostala bi mnogo područja u Bosni i Hercegovini nedefinisano jer niko ne zna tu većinu. Mislim da treba da se kaže područja gdje smo većina. Mi smo se s jednim od naših partners dogovorili da tamo gdje oni čine relativnu većinu mi ćemo područja definisati kao njihova, a gdje mi činimo tu relativnu većinu našem.” BCS ERN SA02-5336

³¹² “To što mi moramo da učinimo već danas, to je da se srpskom narodu predoči da mora da bude spreman da će doći do mijenjanja teritorija, do preseljenja stanovništva. Iako se danas poteže floskula ‘izdaje srpskog naroda’. Mi koliko to bilo bolno globalni ciljevi nacija moraju biti na prvom mjestu. Moramo da budem spremni da damo neke kamenjare u Krajini za druge kamenjare, ali od Metkovića do Dubrovnika. A to znači za izlaz na more. I buduća srpska država ne smije da bude geografski monstrum, da jedan kraj ne može da saobraća s drugim, da bude država sa Bangladešom. ... Odmah iza rješavanja našeg državnog problema pitanje

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nataliteta treba da bude naš prioritetni cilj. Treba učiniti sve da se Srpkinja stimuliše na radjanje.” BCS ERN 0081-6546

³¹³ “A nama nije cilj da Hrvatska ne može da postoji. Nama je cilj da se i Hrvatska zaokruži, a i svakom Srbinu je jasno da Hrvati i Srbi ne mogu u zajedničkoj državi. Analogno tome ne mogu ni u zajedničkoj vojci, takodje da i BiH ne može imati armiju. Ostalo bi nacionalne garde u svakoj republici, a policija koja bi bila pod kontrolom svake republike. Malo smo razmatrali na kojim principima be se mogli razriješiti srpsko-hrvatsko odnosi u opšte s obzirom na krajine. Oni misle da bi najbolje bilo preseljenje stanovništva. Od toga se kosa diže na glavni Evropljanina. Oni smatraju da tamo živi između 150 i 250,000 Srb u kršu, da su jako siromašni itd. I da bismo mi dali najbogatija imanja u Vojvodini kao da bi vojvodjani došli u onaj krš. To je jedna nebulozna slika. To izvan BiH bilo je kao neko pipanje pulsa. Oko Bosne i Hercegovine oni su potpuno saglasni, i to se vidjelo.” BCS ERNs SA01-1356 – SA01-1357

³¹⁴ "Nažalost, sve manje moremo racunati na Srbiju koja je već iscrpljena prijemom naših izbjeglica i ranjenika, a i sama je u teškoj situaciji i u blokadi. Pa zato moramo stvoriti uslove za unutrašnje vojne i prisilne emigracije a to ne možemo bez teritorije. Mi moramo inostranstvu davati do znanja da treba i sami da se prisjete da se osvojeno teško napusta. I posljednje što dolazi u obzir je kompromis na račun osvojenih teritorija.” BCS ERN 0214-9532

³¹⁵ "Šta ćemo mi raditi ako dobijemo državu u kojoj smo manjina. Šta ćemo raditi ako zbog jednog potoka ili jedne jednog brda golog izginemo i opet dobijemo neprijatelja u svom državu na taj način. ... Evropa ne želi i ne smije da dozvoli islamsku državu ovde, to je naš veliki problem, to je naš najveći problem. One žele nas i Hrvate da zadrže u jednoj unitarnoj Bosni da mi kontrolišemo Muslimane ne možemo u toj unitarnoj državi.

"Mi dobro znamo gdje dodje fundamentalizam da se tu više živjeti ne može nema tolerancija oni se natalitetom učetvorostručuju, a mi Srbi nismo tome dorasli, ne da samo mi Srbi nismo tome dorasli čak ni Hriscani u Libanu nisu dorasli tim orijentalnim mentalitetime koje daje Islam. Prema tome m to nemožemo. Ni Srbi ni Hrvati zajedno natalitetom ne mogu da kontrolišu prodor Islaman u Evropu jer za 5-6 godine bi u unitarnoj Bosni Muslimana bilo preko 51%. ... Ako oni dakle neće nikakvu islamsku državu na Balkanu, onda je još manje vjerovatno da hoće čistu islamsku državu, dakle islamski kanton, muslimanski kanton na području Bosne. Ovo

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je tačno što je gospodin Kuprešanin rekao, mada to niko otvoreno u Evropi neće reći, da je ovaj sukob podjaren da bi nestali Muslimani." BCS ERNs 0214-9581 – 0214-9582

³¹⁶ "Zapazio sa jedan, po meni krupan politički problem, problem iseljavanja nesrpskog stanovništva. Nikakvi jedinstveni kriteriji na području Republike Srpske ne postoji, niki kakvi zakonski akti. Došlo je do strašnog haosa i pristupa ovom po meni krupnom političkom pitanju. Ja ne znam kako vi mislite. Moje je mišljenje da ih bude što manje s nama. Treba im omogućiti da idu što prije i poželjeti im sretan put. Medjutim, zbog nedostatka zakonske regulative dobija se utisak da im onemogućavamo da se ise. Skupština opštine Banja Luka je mislim najbolje učinila. Tri dokumenti su potrebna da se isele nesrpski stanovnici sa područja Banjaluke. Ministarstvo NO *Šnarodna odbrana*Č je donijelo 14 zakonskih akata za iseljavanje. Čak u toj zakonski obavezi traži se i plaćanje PTT *ŠPošta telefon telegraf*Č usluga, a da onda napusti područje RS. Na drugoj strani, neke vojne komande, isto tako propisuju svoje kriterije, a neke opštine srpske plaćaju mostarinu, u Bos. Gradiškoj naplaćuju 100 maraka po glavi muslimana što predje most. To se zove mostarina. Gospodo, kamo sreće da RS ima kapitala pa im platimo da oni odu." BCS ERN 0215-0103

³¹⁷ "Išli smo na to da ostvarimo cilj, a to je etnički-geografski kontinuitet srpskog naroda, prilikom smještaja izbjeglica, a u stvari gradili novu demografsku politiku RS. U tom cilju imali smo dva zadatka, da raseljeno stanovništvo sto prije zbrinemo i smjetšimo (*sic*: smještimo?) i zaposlimo kako bi krenulo prvo neka njegova ekonomska konsolidacija i kasnije i politička integracija životna u sredini u kojoj se našao." BCS ERN 0215-0737

³¹⁹ "Alija upravo nudi obećava da se svi vrata na svoje. Gospodo, nema srpske države u bosanskom loncu bez preseljavanja i raseljavanja. Ako želimo etnički čistu svoju srpsku državu, a želimo je, zar ne, ako svi znamo i istićemo da se njima zajedničkog života nema, onda moramo da shvatimo da nam upravo ovaj predlog mapa to nudi i preseljenja mora da bude." BCS ERN 0215-0539

³²⁰ "Ne sikiraju meni muslimanke enklave na našem prostoru. Pametna državna politika u budućnosti će ovo uspješno razriješiti, bojim se za prostore koji su u njihovom okruženju ili su pod međunarodnom upravom, a

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računaju se pod 53% nama dodijeljenog prostora, ovdje prije svega mislim na Sarajevo. ... Ja moram kazati, ovo govorim sve da bi lakše zaključili, da su Sarajevo Srbi napustili najvećim delom." BCS ERN 0215-0636

³²¹ "Ima još 500-600 Srba dolje južno od Bihaća. To je sve. A sačuvali smo 250,000 mjesta životnog prostora gdje su Muslimani življeli." BCS ERN 0215-0592

³²² "Ovo što bih ja zaista htio da bude naš stav ovdje, da se utvrdi da muslimani i hrvati ne mogu da se vraćaju na prostore gdje ćemo mi imati vlast, a da to analogija važi i za nas da se nećemo vratiti na prostore koji će pripasti Hrvatima. ... nemože se oteti u našem narodu uvjerenje da mi nikad pravimo kompromise da više brinemo o njihovoj sudbini vlastitog naroda. ... treba da otpane bilo kakva pomisao da ćemo mi dobiti 500 muslimane i više koji će biti u okviru neke naše buduće države." BCS ERN 0215-2154

³²³ "Može se desiti ili da probati da nam uvale sve muslimane ili će probati da podijele Bosnu kao Sandžak pola Srbima pola Hrvatima, u tom slučaju će probati da nam uvale Tuzlu, mi ćemo morati, možda biti u prilici da prihvatimo to, ali ćemo ih delimitirati u nekoj njihovoj autonomnoj pokrajini iz koje neće moći slobodno da se naseljavaju u naše krajeve..." BCS ERN 0215-2232

³²⁴ "osvrnuli su se na položaj muslimanskih vlasti na manipulišu delom srpskog naroda koje kao etničke taoce drže u gradovima pod svojom okupacijom. Nije bio teško prozreti prvobitnu svrhu oduzimanja držanskih prava Srbima u muslimanskom delu Sarajeva, Tuzli, Zenici, i drugim gradovima od početka rata. Svrhu osnivanja nacionalno ponizavajući i navodnih srpskih konsultacionih vijeća kao što nije teško prozreti ni stvarnu pozadinu najnovijeg formiranja takozvane skupštine građana srpske nacionalnosti." BCS ERN 0215-2333

³²⁵ "Mi se tim problemom moramo prvo pozabaviti da bismo uspostavili geografski kontinuitet srpskog stanovništva na prostoru RS. I tu su četiri prostora koji su izuzetno osjetljivi i na kojima treba raditi. Prvi je Stara Hercegovina, na području Srbinje, Višegrad, Rogatica. Drugi je Birač – na prostoru Vlasenica, Bratunac, Zvornik. Treći je Posavina, i to u dva pravca – uz Savu i rubovima Trebave, Vlašić itd. Četvrti je Sansko-unsko područje, a peti je Vrbasko područje. Sansko-unsko područje: Krupa, Novi, Prijedor i Ključ, Sanski Most do Ključa, a vrbasko na liniji Kupres-Srbobran-Jajce. Nama nedostaje stanovništvo." BCS ERNs 0215-2385 – 0215-2386

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³²⁶ "Kada je u pitanju homogeno preseljavanje izbjeglica to smo uspjevali u početku rata. Čini mi se da ovo ovdje treba malo mekše staviti jer sve ćemo teže u narednom period moći da preseljavamo čitava sela, pa bi tu trebali bit mekši." BCS ERN 0215-2457

³²⁷ "Prvo ne vjerujem da gospodo možete povjerovati u najveći čudo svjetsko da je Brdjanin upošte mogao učestvovati da vrata Hrvati i Muslimani, ja javno kažem za govornicom da bi imali pola gradova muslimanskih da nije bilo budala kao što je Brdjanin i sl." 0215-2662. "... ja sam strašno se naljutio samo zbog par stvari, što se spominju Muslimani i Hrvati itd." BCS ERNs 0215-2662 - 0215-2663

³²⁸ "Teritorijalno rješenje predpostavlja iseljenje preko 300,000 Srba, uključujući one koje moraju napustiti prostore koji pripadaju našim neprijateljima kao i onaj dio Srba koji je već jednom izašao na teritorijom pod kontrolom naših neprijatelja i ovo podrazumijeva i proces iseljavanje iz RSK obzirom da već ima takvih indikatora i straha zbog koridora, da je već i opao promet preko koridora zbog specifičnog statusa i odnosa međunarodnih faktora oko Brčkog." BCS ERN 0215-2944

³²⁹ "Mi smo stvorili nove realnosti. Lokalno rečeno, Zvornik je bio 60:40 u korist Muslimana, ali su došli Srbi i iz Zenice, zaposjeli Kozluk, Muslimani otišli u Evropu ili ne znam gdje. I tad su nam gospoda rekli – s kojim pravom vi tražite Zvornik. Mi smo kazali, sva je Bosna bila srpska. To je istorija, to nas ne zanima. ... Ovaj rat je stvorio realnost, sada su ovdje Srbi iz Zenice. Ako vi želite da date Muslimanima Zvornik onda trebate napraviti novi rat da ove Srbe protjerate nazad u Zenicu. Po tom pravu tražimo Zvornik. Po istom tom pravu tražimo svoju državu." BCS ERNs 0215-3381 – 0215-3382.

³³⁰ "Plašim se iskreno da vam kažem i ovo što se desilo u Banjaluci. Ne volim ja te Hrvate i Muslimane, Hrvate ne volim pogotovo, ali plašim ono što se desilo. Dešava se nešto što cijeli svjet smatra da je najveći kriminal, kriminal progonstva. Zašto? Mislim nije loše ako toliko Hrvatska TV velika adut daje na taj progon Hrvate i Muslimane iz Banjaluke iako ono što njihova TV prikazuje reakciju svijetu i stranih agencija novinskih i TV izveštača, ja vam kažem da to nije uopšte nije bezazleno." BCS ERN 0215-4415 – 0215-4416

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³³¹ "da se ide na Skupštinu Jugoslavije sa zahtevom da se Srbima sa ovih prostora omogući naseljenje prostora Jugoslavije, da Muslimane iz Sandžaka preselimo ovdje, da do šiptara preselimo ovdje, tako svet i Evropa hoće, ... ali da imamo kao rezervnu varijanta da nateramo Jugoslaviju da je dužna da brani ove prostore, ili da nas primi ili da brani ove prostore." BCS ERN 0215-4503

³³² "Mi se moramo isturiti ispred našeg izbjeglog stanovništva da odgovaramo za tu imovinu, odnosno da odgovaramo za povarnjanje. To nam je vrlo bitno, da onaj ko je izbjegao iz Drvara da mi njega namirimo koliko možemo od imovine koja je napuštena od naših neprijatelja. Jer da nisu bili neprijatelji ne bi napustili i da onda mi kažemo, ti nije je ovo vlasništvo nemaš više sa ovim čovjekom ništa, izvoli se obratiti nama, a mi ćemo onda sa tobom da vidimo.

"Mi ćemo sada tražiti da nam se nadoknadi imovina koja je napuštena u Drvaru, da bismo mogli da nadoknadimo njihovog povratnika, znači moramo zakonom maksimalno zakomplikovati ili doći čak u nemoguću situaciju da mi ne možemo to da izmirimo i da moramo tražiti načina da izmirimo, ali da se izbjeglo stanovništvo oseća bezbjedno da je ono dobilo to i da država stoji iza toga." BCS ERN 0215-4946.

³³³ "Mi kod napuštene imovine ne dijelimo srpsku imovinu, koja hrvatska, koja muslimanska, nego je napuštena, prema tome tretman tih je kao i dezertera." BCS ERN 0215-4979

³³⁴ "Smještaj izbjeglica je humano ljudsko i ne znam šta da nabrojim pitanje, međjutim, na području opštine Brčko, to je i potrebno strateško pitanje, nama je svaki naseljeni stanovnik, svako dijete, svaka žena u ovom momentu i vojnik u dobrani, ako popunimo prostor područja Brčkog nećemo imati opasnosti da će nam neko doći, ja hoću da iznesem da se sada na području Brčkog vodi, čini me se odlučujuća strateška bitna za to područje, ovih dana sam bio na jednim pregovorima kod Doboja sa muslimansko-hrvatskom stranom, bio sam u delegaciji i tamo sam saznao da se pozicije MH strane nisu ništa promjenile od 1991. godine, ni za dlaku, oni i dalje iste ciljeve hoće da ostvare, nisu promjenili ni taktiku, oni ne krijus voju namjeru da živimo zajedno." BCS ERN 0215-5215

³³⁵ "Biće briga o izbjeglicama i raseljenim licima, znači dosledna, brza i efikasna primjena Zakona o napustenoj imovini i Zakona o izbjeglicama i raseljenih licima. Svakako da ćemo tu voditi računa da naselimo strateški za

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naš najznacajnije krajeve RS, a o tome je bilo riječi o diskusijama na prethodnoj sjednici Kluba i Glavnog odbora, znači vodićemo računa gdje najprije moramo graditi, raditi i naseljavati.” BCS 0410-2557 – 0410-2258

³³⁶ “Samo porast nataliteta, racionalni razmještaj stanovništva, naseljavanje prigraničnih i drugih nenaseljenih ili nedovoljno naseljenih prostora, stimulisanje poljoprivrede, da se vežu za zemlju i odbrane svaku stopu, što više oslonja na vlastite resurse što manje zavisno vitalnih proizvoda mogu RS obezbediti političku i svaku drugu nezavisnost i slabilnost. Takav pristup dosledno je sproveden u planu u maksimalnom.” BCS ERNs 0215-5458 – 0215-5459