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But even in doing this – above all in fulfilling
the demands related to Kosovo – it still tries to buy time and
impose solutions the international community is deaf to. The long
announced national platform for Kosovo is obviously after having the
Kosovo North solved by the model of Republika Srpska – something
neither Albanians nor Serbs south of the Ibar would or could accept.
Serbia once again wastes time on a solution that was turned down
long ago.
In fact, what is the Progressists’ strategy about?
Nothing but to present themselves internationally as welcome
partners capable of closing the issue of borders while “putting out
the light” domestically.
The new government failed to reach a consensus on
political arrangements in the past six months but managed to
demolish everything its predecessor had accomplished. Twelve years
after the democratic change Serbia’s political, institutional and
administrative architecture is still among most controversial
issues. Tailoring of electoral results to the central government is
alarming and threatens with anarchy. The Constitutional Court’s
decision on unconstitutionality of a number of provisions of the Law
on Competences of Vojvodina – the provisions contrary to the 2006
Constitution – coincided with the beginning of the new regime’s
mandate. Along with ouster of local governments in Novi Sad and
other places in Vojvodina comes the demand for annulment of
Vojvodina’s autonomy.
Public servants have been massively deposed. By
replacing them with “their” cadres at central and local level, the
regime has the regime has made a “cultural revolution” of sorts with
long-term consequences. It has deposed the Governor of the Central
Bank among others. Old cadres made a comeback – especially in the
security sector. Reappointment of judges and prosecutors who had not
been reelected (about 500 persons) created an atmosphere of
revanchism and totally destroyed the anyway half-done judiciary
reform.
Beside political regression at home and undefined
orientation not only toward the Balkans but also Europe, the policy
of the new government leads Serbia toward isolation and a new phase
of overall involution. This policy reflects patriarchalism and
strong resistance to Europeanization and modernization. Populism is
just another form of Serb nationalism that persists as the one and
only ideology. The fact that the biggest part of the public and
liberal civil sector applauds Aleksandar Vucic’s policy in unison
testifies of a threatening phenomenon: resistance to transition to
market economy and the rule of law, and support for egalitarian
distribution.
A solution to Serbia’s present-day political and
moral crisis calls for more imagination and courage. Serbia lacks
self-confidence: hence its aggressiveness. Its elite are divided
over fundamental issues. It has considerable public support because
of its illegitimacy and irresponsibility, and above all inability
for coping with crucial problems of the society.
All this indicates that national strategy has to
change. That change would be a major impetus for Serbia. What Serbia
needs is a “moral minimum” that would help it to get constituted as
a state but also leads toward rational coexistence of nations in
this region. The moral minimum implies a moral vertical – and then
trials before domestic courts that would manifest that the society
really wants to make a clear break with the policy of the past.
We can escape from our recent past – and our
trauma – only once we UNDERSTAND that past. In other words, we can
overpower the legacy of the Milosevic era only once we come face to
face with it.
Every country and every nation have their dark
side of the past. The problem is in how a society copes with that
past and whether or not identifies itself with it. Instead of using
everything ICTY has accomplished, Serbia continues to deny proven
facts. It interprets the wars of 1990s as a conspiracy of the West
and secessionist republics, Slovenia and Croatia. Moreover, it
renounces its own anti-fascist past. Anti-fascism has been deprived
of its sum and substance: morals, freedom and tolerance.
Rehabilitation of Draza Mihailovic is doubly problematic because the
wars of 1990s have been imbued with Tchetnik ideology. Fabrication
of history further confuses young people who know little about the
1990s.
Is the present government capable of coping with
such a legacy bearing in mind Serbia’s dire straits? No observer
with at least some knowledge of Serbia can possibly neglect the fact
that the Progressists have no potential for radical steps. Their
attempt at “disciplining” Serbia while the international community
still turns a blind eye to their actions shows that they are unaware
of how deadly such approach is. Only the Socialists in the present
government and Premier Ivica Dacic know how to rule a country. It
was not by chance only that Ivica Dacic got the tallest order –
Kosovo. It may either destroy or elevate him: depending on how the
agreement with Kosovo is treated in the public, by the media in the
first place.
Aleksandar Vucic floats on citizens’ justified
dissatisfaction: for them, the struggle against corruption seems to
be a way out of misery. Vucic has been trying to channel their
support towards the support to his party in possible early elections
next year, the support that would make it possible for it to
sovereignly rule Serbia. And that would lead to their total control
over the society like the one Putin has been trying to have in
Russia. In brief, everything indicates that a dictatorship in not to
be ruled out: institutions are being bypassed in all crucial
matters. While the public life is choked, tabloids and daily
releases by the Progressists call to account every rational thinking
or criticism.
Tomislav Nikolic secured for himself the most
cushioned place – he entrenched himself in a presidential fauteuil
he intends not to give up soon. He managed to sharpen relations with
the region, strengthen the thesis about victimized Serbs and wipe
out the progress made in regional normalization. He messaged Europe,
“Serbia is Europe, but Europe obviously would not have us.” So he
secured a space to maneuver in – he would have a sound alibi should
Serbia fail to obtain the date for accession negotiations with EU.
The crisis in the Democratic Party and the fact
that it has not managed yet to establish itself as a serious
opposition – which is crucial against the present backdrop – heavily
burdens Serbia’s political scene. Its role is now on the shoulders
of Liberal Democratic Party /LDP/ and a small circle of
non-governmental organizations. At the same time the extreme right,
backed by the government, constantly targets LDP, NGOs and liberal
media.
Unless it fails to decide on the membership of
NATO in near future and fails to meet the conditions for EU
accession negotiations, Serbia will remain an isolated and
marginalized island, but sufficiently neutralized for
destabilization of its neighbors. EU should not allow Serbia’s
isolation. It should develop a more imaginative approach not only
toward Serbia but also toward all West Balkan countries. The “stick
and carrot” policy has its limitations in the societies such as
Serbia.
The criteria Serbia should meet are not attainable
in foreseeable future – because it has not potential for meeting
them and because its orientation is anti-European. Only a new
policy, integrated sectors and developmental strategy could prevent
further regressive trends. |
