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Populism has two core components:
anti-elitism and nativism. The first is manifest in an
anti-establishment rebellion by a political party or movement
claiming to represent ordinary, disempowered citizens. The second
places the narrowly defined interests of the nation above all
international commitments.
Economically speaking, populism is
usually protectionist since it seeks to strengthen the national
economy by challenging the principles of globalization,
international competition and free trade. Politically, it is
invariably isolationist in seeking to ensure and defend national
sovereignty from the purported restrictions of international
institutions and regional alliances. And culturally, it is usually
conservative in claiming to defend national traditions from an
alleged global multicultural melting pot.
Beyond these basic commonalities,
populism in practice can blend with various ideologies and policies
and one must be careful not to simplistically equate all of its
manifestations in disparate countries. Indeed, populists differ
significantly on some basic policy prescriptions.
Populism can be pro-authoritarian in a
democratic system or pro-democratic in an authoritarian system. For
instance, modern rightist populists—unlike their ultra-right
predecessors—claim they are defending popular democracy from a
corrupt and elitist government. They can either campaign against
liberalism by opposing state-imposed secularism and what are viewed
as deviations from traditional social norms. Or conversely, they can
claim they actually defend liberalism by opposing immigrants who are
intolerant of liberalism, such as ultra-conservative Muslims. As an
example, the Dutch Freedom Party and its equivalents in Austria,
Denmark and elsewhere assert they are promoting basic human rights
against an anti-democratic Islamic onslaught.
Populism can be ethno-nationalist
domestically or primarily xenophobic against foreigners, but not
necessarily exclusivist against various well-established ethnicities
within the country. Contemporary rightist populism tends not to
focus on ethnic minorities as racial scapegoats but on recent
immigrants who, they claim, take jobs and government benefits away
from natives and subvert national identity. For instance, one of the
key actors in the Brexit campaign was the UK Independence Party,
which seeks comprehensive restrictions on immigration but does not
have an explicitly racist platform against a multi-ethnic or
multicolored British society.
Populism may have either leftist or
rightist prescriptions for the national economy, or it may contain a
mix of both ideologies. Both varieties tend to rally against the
economic establishment, particularly big business and multinational
enterprises they depict as damaging the middle or working class by
moving industries abroad and investing overseas. Hence, they view
global economic competition as hurting the native population.
Leftist populism seeks to redistribute
the economy, with high taxes for the wealthy and a more intrusive
government role, while rightist populism seeks tax breaks for the
indigenous wealthy and business deregulation to stimulate the
national economy. Such commonalities and divisions were visible
during the U.S. presidential election campaign between the leftist
Bernie Sanders “progressives” and the rightist Donald Trump “America
firsters.”
On the international front, populism in
Europe may be anti-American and pro-Russian or the exact opposite,
or it may oppose both American and Russian influence and veer toward
national neutrality. A number of Western European populist parties,
whether leftist or rightist, seek to limit U.S. influence over their
countries, viewing this as a form of economic dominance and
“cultural imperialism.” Instructively, several of these groups
actually supported a Trump presidency, not only because this makes
populism more credible and electable but also because they believe
Trump’s White House will curtail U.S. involvement in European
affairs and support the EU’s dissolution.
Populism may be anti-EU and pro-NATO, or
it can reject both international alliances, viewing them as
expensive commitments and unacceptable constraints on national
sovereignty. In Central and Eastern Europe, populist-veering parties
in Poland and Hungary may seek a lessened EU role in domestic
affairs but they do not support leaving NATO. In contrast,
nationalist populists in Bulgaria and Serbia view Russia as their
patron and oppose the NATO alliance.
At a time of strong anti-establishment
sentiments, the durability of the populist wave in Europe and the
United States cannot be determined. However, any government elected
on an openly populist platform will ultimately be judged by its
economic results—not on its political rhetoric. Indeed, its vehement
anti-establishment positions and expansive economic promises during
the election campaign will necessitate higher achievements than a
previous non-populist government if it is to remain popular and in
power.
Without economic successes, some
populists may veer toward ethno-nationalism, and instead of bread
they will offer their people circuses. Hence, in some countries
populism can be transformed from a potential threat to an outright
danger to democracy and inter-ethnic coexistence.
The traditional or mainstream political
parties need to learn lessons from the populist wave rather than
simply condemning it and bemoaning their election losses.
Ultimately, populism may contribute to democratic development by
exposing the fissures, frustrations and failures in Western
societies, by involving new players in the political process, by
reconnecting politicians with the populace, and by energizing the
electorate to view politics as the responsibility of every citizen.
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