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Donald Trump’s victory upended the
predictable anti-Russian focus of Hillary Clinton’s foreign policy,
which would have featured a strong presence in the Balkans to
preserve her husband’s legacy and push the remaining states into the
EU and NATO. If Trump’s presumed isolationist stance and
conciliatory tone with Moscow come to fruition, the U.S. will almost
certainly cease to be a major player in the western Balkans, leaving
a precarious power balance between Turkey, Russia, Germany and the
United Kingdom.
In the short term, such an outcome is
likely to strengthen Serb nationalists and pro-Russian politicians,
while the Muslims of the region will now be completely reliant on
Turkish support.
Putin has in recent years awoken Russian
and Serbian dreams of a pan-Slavic link between the two states. In
Serbian President Milorad Dodik, Putin sees an agent of chaos who he
has accordingly emboldened with his support. Conversely, Serbian
Prime Minister Aleksander Vučić had publicly fallen in line with EU
and U.S. demands in opposing the recent Dodik-led referendum on a
National Day of the Serbian Republic, designed to weaken Bosnia’s
already dysfunctional constitutional order and central government
with the aim of holding a referendum on secession in 2018. Putin’s
objectives have centered on expanding and protecting Russia’s sphere
of influence and international status, while also fermenting
problems on Europe’s periphery. While Putin might privately support
Serbia’s EU membership for the opportunity to have a Trojan horse
with veto power to block anti-Russian moves, he will fight against
any more Yugoslav republics joining NATO.
However, Russian interests and its
presence in the Balkans have largely been ad hoc and superficial,
limited to political support – such as the July 2015 U.N. Security
Resolution veto over Srebrenica – without extensive investment,
economic ties or military cooperation due to location. The
possibility exists, however small, for Ankara to exploit its
improved relations with Moscow to bring about an agreement over
influence and stability, beginning with the withdrawal of support
for Dodik. Naturally, concessions will be expected elsewhere.
The impact on British and German foreign
policy will be significant. The U.K. has had strong ties with
Belgrade and demonstrated a pro-Serbian bias since the Great Eastern
Crisis of 1875-78, with both London and Berlin taking turns in
exercising influence in Serbia, between the Berlin-leaning Obrenović
dynasty and the London-leaning Karađorđević line. Support for the
2015 UNSC Resolution over Srebrenica should partially be viewed as a
British attempt to reassert influence over Belgrade, at Berlin’s
expense.
British support for Milošević’s attempt
to preserve Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, with more centralized
power in Belgrade, was grounded in the U.K.’s desire to maintain a
strong, unified Yugoslavia. Such a state would act as a bulwark to a
then newly unified Germany. Berlin’s historic influence over
Slovenia and Croatia would be diminished, while a strong Yugoslavia
would act as an additional check across the continent.
Britain initially led from the back by
blocking the German and Austrian push for Slovenian and Croatian
independence recognition, making it clear that intervention would
not occur and ultimately implementing a containment strategy. Helped
by Washington’s willingness to defer to Britain’s judgement, the
U.K. eventually took the initiative by leading peace negotiations,
gaining French support, and pushing through a U.N. arms embargo,
which guaranteed Serbia’s continued military dominance.
The end of the Cold War, like Brexit,
threatened Britain’s place on the world stage, with its geopolitical
status set to become commensurate with its economic performance.
Britain now finds itself on the fringes of decision-making, with the
“special relationship” between the U.S. and the U.K. already under
threat. Its yearlong anti-Russian focus, in preparation for a
Clinton presidency, has been upended, and Britain will now have to
scramble to preserve its role as the trans-Atlantic link and most
useful American ally.
Britain will seek to secure Washington’s
support for NATO, where London exercises disproportionate influence,
and follow through on Theresa May’s promise to play a leading role
in EU affairs, especially foreign policy. They will pursue continued
French support for anti-Russian initiatives across Europe and the
Balkans, which also serve to distance Paris from Berlin, in turn,
neutralizing German leadership. The U.K. will see its close ties to
Belgrade as vital for re-establishing British influence in the
Balkans to preserve its diminishing stature.
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