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Last week, Federica Mogherini, the European
Union’s foreign and security policy chief, hit the road for her
first trip to the entirety of the so-called “Western Balkans Six,”
the region’s countries not yet part of the Union, to assure them
that their membership perspective was still alive. This was a noble
undertaking, given the crucial elections in the Netherlands, France
and Germany scheduled to take place this year that could rock the
European Union and send it spiraling into a deep internal crisis.
Yet Mogherini’s trip got off to a bumpy start in
the Montenegrin capital of Podgorica. In her speech to
parliamentarians, Mogherini addressed a half-empty room. The
Montenegrin opposition that has boycotted parliament since the
October 2016 elections had rejected Mogherini’s invitation to join
her at the Assembly.
However, it was Mogherini’s own comments that
called into question the EU’s approach to the region as well as the
sincerity of the Union’s commitment to the Western Balkans’ European
perspective. Speaking to the press after her meeting with the
newly-elected Prime Minister of Montenegro, Duško Marković,
Mogherini said, “I was saddened that the opposition was not present
today.” Referring to the continuing parliamentary boycott, she
stated that “trying to return to the institutions - this requires
good will on the opposition side but also on the government side to
create the conditions for the situation to evolve into a normal
institutional situation.” Mogherini ended her comments by explaining
the EU position vis-á-vis Montenegro’s political crisis:
“It is not for the European Union to indicate a
solution. I always say that we do not enter into the politics of
countries, not even in the politics of our own Member States. We
relate it to the institutions of the country and we strengthen
institutions.”
Mogherini notably avoided naming the elephant in
the room – the reason for Montenegro’s ongoing institutional crisis.
On October 16, 2016, in the midst of the election for the
Montenegrin parliament, the police announced that they had arrested
20 Serbian citizens the night before who had entered the country
planning a terrorist attack on state institutions and high-level
officials. Among those arrested was Bratislav Dikić, the sacked
former head of Serbia’s infamous special police, the gendarmerie.
Montenegro’s mostly pro-Russian opposition, which suffered a narrow
defeat at the polls, accused the ruling Democratic Party of
Socialists (DPS) of a stunt aimed at manipulating voters and
subsequently boycotted the new assembly. The opposition had
campaigned against their country joining NATO (as most other member
states have already done); a membership that is currently awaiting
ratification by the US Congress and that is fiercely opposed by
Russia.
In a country (and region) in which skeptical
citizens have a strong predisposition for conspiracy theories, the
notion of a Russia-sponsored coup was initially dismissed. The
German intelligence agency at first also shared the Montenegrin
opposition’s characterization of the incident. It soon became clear,
however, that the allegations were more substantial than many had
initially believed.
As the investigation progressed, Montenegro’s Special Prosecutor,
Milivoje Katnić, first announced that the incident had been a coup
attempt, organized by Serbian and Russian nationalist groups, but
without the involvement of the Russian state. Then, in February,
Katnić accused Moscow of orchestrating the failed coup, citing new
evidence and naming an alleged Russian security services member as
the mastermind behind the attempt. A few days earlier, Katnić had
accused two leading politicians from the opposition Democratic Front
(DF) of involvement in the failed coup, and the ruling coalition MPs
lifted their immunity.
In Berlin, diplomats have become critical of their national
intelligence agency’s original assessment of no Russian involvement,
and the Chancellor’s office has become increasingly worried about
rising Russian interference in the Western Balkans. The EU’s
Intelligence Analysis Center’s assessment excluded neither
possibility. UK and US intelligence agencies that assisted
Montenegrin authorities in their investigation have in recent weeks
concluded that the coup attempt was real and staged by Moscow, and
insist that they possess hard evidence.
Against this background, Mogherini pledged to Montenegro’s ruling
coalition and opposition to sort things out through dialogue within
the institution of the parliament while adhering to traditional
insistence on EU “ownership” in the management of the crisis. This
approach missed the mark completely and seemed to reaffirm the
weakness of the EU’s policy which sadly has been evident in the
Western Balkans for over a decade.
First, a coup attempt aimed at violently overtaking state
institutions, particularly one with involvement of high-level
opposition officials, can’t simply be sorted out in parliament, but
rather must be dealt with in legal proceedings before the judiciary.
Second, Mogherini is to be commended for insisting on the EU’s
engagement in strengthening Montenegro’s state institutions. They
face an extraordinary challenge in dealing with the coup attempt.
Yet the EU itself has in the past contributed to domestic distrust
in Montenegro’s rule of law institutions. Several times during the
accession process Brussels met resistance to reforming the judiciary
but did not trigger the mechanism foreseen in the rule of law
chapters – to stop progress in all negotiating chapters when there
is a blockage in the implementation of chapters 23 or 24.
Finally, the EU has a strategic interest in a peaceful, democratic,
and stable Western Balkans. Russian subversion in the region clearly
undermines those aims. And while it is not the EU’s role to advocate
for Montenegro’s NATO membership, the Union does have a genuine
interest in ensuring that the country’s citizens have the free
democratic choice to make up their minds on which alliance their
state should join.
In that sense, the EU’s foreign and security policy chief would have
better served the Union’s own interests by taking a different, more
direct approach. Mogherini should have acknowledged the coup attempt
up front, sending a clear public signal to Moscow that the EU won’t
tolerate such undemocratic, let alone violent, interventions in the
Western Balkans.
At the same time, she should have warned the ruling party against
misusing the failed coup to undermine democratic procedures in order
to strengthen its own position. She should have offered the Union’s
assistance to Montenegro’s judiciary in dealing with the prosecution
of the failed coup in a way that guarantees professionalism and
independence and that raises public trust in the process. And she
should have scheduled bilateral meetings with opposition
representatives instead of tying dialogue to the parties ending or
at least interrupting their parliamentary boycott.
But Mogherini did none of these things. Doing so would have sent a
strong message to political elites and the public alike of the
Union’s commitment and full support for the democratic process in
Montenegro.
It would also have sent an important signal to Washington where the
new Trump administration and Congress have raised doubts about
continued US commitment to the country’s NATO membership
perspective. It is worth reminding that it was the US under the
Obama administration that blocked the decision on Montenegro’s
membership application for two years, conditioning approval with the
cleansing of the Montenegrin military security services of
pro-Russian personnel. US ratification of Montenegro’s NATO
membership would bridge the wide gap between Trump’s statements on
NATO and those of his cabinet members and draw an important red line
against Russian meddling in the Western Balkans. The fact that
Mogherini’s visit failed to support such an outcome was a missed
opportunity.
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