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After an extended absence, the Western
Balkans finally returned to the European agenda at the March 9 EU
summit. Traditionally, the region is discussed primarily in terms of
its slow progress toward EU accession. This time, however,
geopolitical and ethnic tensions are raising alarms about the
stability of Europe’s “inner courtyard.” As the region grapples with
new sources of instability, Serbia will be electing a president on
April 2 – and though polls predict a smooth victory for Aleksandar
Vucic, it could be a watershed event for the whole region.
European Council President Donald Tusk
warned that some of the ethnic divisions in the region have been
exacerbated by destabilizing external influences, a veiled reference
to Russia, which has been waging wider disinformation campaigns in
Serbia and elsewhere. Tusk also called for EU institutions to take
more action. EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, meanwhile,
reported on her recent tour of all six Western Balkan countries,
undertaken to reassure the region it had not been forgotten. She
returned with “profound concerns” about destabilizing external
factors. “The Balkans can easily become one of the chessboards where
the big power game can be played,” Mogherini said. These warnings
were echoed by the chairman of the European parliament’s foreign
affairs committee, David McAllister, who thinks that the EU must be
much more visible and engaged in Balkan countries to counter Russian
attempts to destabilize them even further.
It was a timely wake-up call for
Brussels and Berlin, which have been preoccupied by other pressing
issues. “The 21st century in the Balkans is starting to look
dangerously like 19th,” Ivan Krastev observed in the Financial
Times. However, he noted one important difference. In the 19th
century, Russia and Turkey were rivals in the struggle for regional
influence, while Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Britain played
Russo-Turkish divisions to their commercial and political advantage.
Today it is the other way around: Moscow and Ankara are united in
their efforts to reduce the EU’s influence.
The Moscow-Ankara Axis
Both Moscow and Ankara are thought to be
weaponizing renewed Balkan ethnic tensions to play them against the
West. So far, Turkish efforts have been subtler and less disruptive,
but that is beginning to change. In addition to promoting historic
ties and Ottoman cultural heritage throughout the region, Ankara has
recently moved into the business of funding (and perhaps also
organizing) new political movements among Muslim minorities in
several Balkan countries to create its own “zone of influence”. One
example is the new anti-establishment ethnic Albanian party Besa in
Macedonia, which inflicted heavy losses on traditional Albanian
parties in the December 2016 elections.
However, Russia stands out as the most
systematic, disruptive and dangerous external factor, and its
behavior has raised multiple alarms over the last few months. The
real game changer was an attempted coup in Montenegro during
parliamentary elections in October 2016. A group of Serbian
ultra-nationalists and paramilitaries fresh from fighting in the
Donbass was prepared to storm the parliament, cause riots on the
streets of Podgorica, and help the pro-Russian, mostly ethnically
Serb opposition seize power. This would have meant a dramatic turn
in Montenegro’s foreign policy, halting its accession to NATO and
withdrawing its recognition of Kosovo’s independence, with huge
repercussions within the region.
In February 2017, a special prosecutor
in Podgorica overseeing the investigation accused “organs of the
Russian state” of taking an active part in the attempted coup.
Pro-Russian opposition parties still bitterly contest the entire
claim, as well as the implication that two of its leaders were in
contact with the perpetrators. The result is a political stalemate
in the country – the opposition is boycotting the new parliament.
There is hope, however, that things will calm down since the US
senate ratified Montenegro’s NATO membership with a nearly unanimous
vote on March 28, sending a strong signal of continuity.
Still, of more immediate concern is the
deep, prolonged constitutional crisis gripping Macedonia, now the
most explosive Balkan country. Macedonia’s troubles have been
simmering ever since its EU and NATO candidacies were put on hold
due to a dispute with Greece over the country’s name, Moscow was not
very active there until last year, when the Russian Foreign Ministry
began issuing regular statements on Macedonia. Pro-Kremlin media
began to focus on the country, too, and the Russian embassy in
Skopje significantly increased its staff. Moscow now openly supports
the weakened autocrat Nikola Gruevski, who is trying to remain in
power no matter what. It is also challenging coordinated EU-US
efforts to find a peaceful, negotiated way to transfer power to a
diverse coalition of democratic parties, which pledged to further
enhance the status of Macedonia’s large Albanian minority. At
critical moments, when Gruevski called for protests on the streets
of Skopje, Moscow poured oil on the fire by accusing the EU of
trying to create a Greater Albania, and promoted this narrative
through its media network across the Balkans.
And as part of a long-term game in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia is backing another controversial
strongman: Milorad Dodik, the nationalist president of the Bosnian
Serb Republika Srpska (RS). Dodik is again pushing for a referendum
on RS independence, which would alter the Dayton peace agreement –
another keystone of the Western liberal order in the region built
after the ethnic wars of the 1990s.
The Return of Geopolitics
This return of geopolitics has in turn
benefited Balkan autocrats, according to the latest policy brief by
the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG). It has allowed
them to pander to various geopolitical players and investors,
expanding their own informal power structures, patronage networks,
and control of the media at home.
In this context, as stability is given
priority over democracy, Balkan strongmen have become even stronger,
less accountable, and more contemptuous of democratic standards. The
result of this new paradox – with countries moving closer to the EU
but further away from democracy and the rule of law – is growing
dissatisfaction among citizens, accompanied by a loss of trust in
the EU and further alienation from domestic politics.
Nowhere is this seeming contradiction
more clearly displayed than in Serbia, the largest Balkan country
and the lynch pin of stability for the whole region. While current
president Tomislav Nikolic is a key Russian ally in Belgrade, Prime
Minister Vucic represents a younger, pragmatic, and less
Moscow-friendly generation in Serbian politics – but not necessarily
a shift toward European values. The recent events in Montenegro
apparently spurred Vucic to action: In February, following a long
period of rumors and speculation, he announced his decision to run
in the upcoming presidential elections, and arranged to move the
date up to April 2.
Vucic has come a long way since joining
the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS), headed by the
notorious Vojislav Seselj, serving as its minister of information
during the Milosevic era. A decade later, in 2008, Vucic followed
Nikolic, resigning from the SRS over its resistance to Serbia’s EU
integration and switching to the latter’s new Serbian Progressive
Party (SNS). SNS subscribed to the pro-EU, pro-Western course that
has since dominated Belgrade’s geostrategic orientation since the
end of the Milosevic regime.
In 2012, when Nikolic became president,
Vucic took over the SNS party and led it to form the next
government. He became popular for his vigorous drive against
corruption, which resulted in several high-profile investigations
and arrests, including that of the country’s main oligarch. He also
focused on starting EU membership talks and did not shy away from
the tough decisions they required. In particular, he proved to be
more willing to compromise on Kosovo than the pro-EU liberals before
him. In economic policy, he helped the country manage its public
debt, which is now under 70 percent of GDP. He also pledged to
increase pensions, privatize state companies, and expand the private
sector, though so far that has been more talk than action. In the
meantime, his governing style has also become increasingly
authoritarian, in tune with his shady control of the country’s
tabloid media.
Despite the fact that Serbia’s
opposition has never been weaker or more fragmented, Vucic now
presents himself as a lone fighter against a united front of
traitors and crooks, financed by Serbia’s enemies.
He is the undisputed front-runner in the
presidential election; the only open question is whether he will be
forced into a run-off or win an outright majority in the first
round. Forcing Vucic into a second round would be a healthy
development for Serbia’s embattled democracy, opening more space for
liberal opposition and alternative political actors, including
authentic anti-corruption social movements that now target and mock
Vucic himself.
To keep his power base in Belgrade
intact, Vucic needs to win a convincing victory. In order to
mobilize his nationalist core constituency, he even traveled to
Moscow on March 27 for a photo opportunity with Russian President
Vladimir Putin. In a delicate balancing act which went unreported in
domestic media, his minister of defense, Zoran Djordjevic, called
for joint Serbian-US military exercises. This comes on top of
another development: so far, Vucic has refused to grant personnel at
the joint Russian-Serbian humanitarian center in Niš diplomatic
status. Insiders say that such move would turn it into a Russian spy
outpost for the whole region.
In spite of these setbacks, Russian
influence in Serbia is greater than in any other Balkan country. On
top of historic ties between the two Slavic and Eastern Orthodox
nations, Moscow has been able to play on Serbia’s national sentiment
as a humiliated regional power that was forced to accept the Pax
Americana. Belgrade lost a series of brutal wars after the break-up
of Yugoslavia, and was bombed by NATO during the war over Kosovo
(1999). Revisionist, anti-Western rhetoric has thus been very
popular in Serbian politics and media.
And Moscow skillfully played this card a
decade ago to privatize part of Serbia’s energy industry, which is
now owned by Gazprom. Since then, the Kremlin has established a
significant presence in the country’s disgruntled media. The local
branch of Sputnik, established three years ago, has become the
leading news agency in the country, and about 20 other media outlets
spread distinctly Russian spin on domestic and foreign developments.
Business as Usual Won’t Work
So, what should the EU do? First, it
should build up on the momentum from the last few weeks to
demonstrate more attention and reassurance. Several EU foreign
ministers could work together on a series of high-profile visits to
the region. This might be a good opportunity for new German Foreign
Minister Sigmar Gabriel to provide some leadership and initiative
for Europe’s political re-engagement in the Balkans. The status quo
there is no longer sustainable, and carries considerable risks.
EU foreign policy chief Mogherini and
her European External Action Services (EEAS) should be given a new
mandate to expand their work in the Balkans, now limited only to
Bosnia and the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue. Other dangerous situations,
like the one in Macedonia, have become urgent security challenges
and cannot be left to the EU Commission’s technocratic approach
alone. Instead of playing geopolitics with Balkan leaders, EU
Enlargement Commissioner Hahn should return to his task of helping
candidate countries prepare for EU membership. He could also improve
the way EU funding and other support is promoted among Balkan
societies and counter widespread perceptions that Russia is doing
more for them.
Once Brussels get its act together,
Berlin and a few other EU capitals that still pay attention to the
region (a diminishing number!) could reach out to Washington to come
up with joint transatlantic effort to calm the Balkan waters. This
is a good moment to engage with the new US administration to support
a vital interest of Europe’s, one that is closely related to the
future of NATO and also fits into American global strategy.
The belated wake-up call at the EU
summit a few weeks ago was a reminder that the fates of Europe,
NATO, and the Balkans are inextricably tied together. If it is
followed by diplomatic action and sustained political engagement,
not everything about the EU will look so gloomy in 2017.
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