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Montenegro’s imminent entry into NATO, as its 29th
member, provides both momentum and opportunity for the Alliance. The
Summit in Brussels on May 25 is an important venue to specify NATO’s
strategic direction in the Western Balkans to counter the threats
still facing this volatile region of Europe.
NATO has pursued two mandates in the Western
Balkans since the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s – enlargement and
intervention. The entry of Slovenia, Albania, Croatia and now
Montenegro into the Alliance demonstrates a commitment to
incorporate all of South Eastern Europe in the world’s most
effective security structure. Concurrently, the continuing presence
of NATO forces in Kosova and the military mission in
Bosnia-Herzegovina indicates that the Alliance remains ready to
engage if armed conflicts were to recur.
Nonetheless, the current challenges to Balkan
stability are not primarily military but political, economic and
informational, particularly where flammable local disputes can be
ignited through targeted foreign subversion. And this is precisely
where NATO can play a key role: by identifying vulnerabilities,
enhancing national security, promoting interstate military
cooperation, detecting, deterring and defeating Russian subversion
and Islamist terrorism and bolstering steps toward eventual NATO
entry.
In this context, Montenegro can serve as an
example to its neighbors for NATO’s involvement in the region. In
addition to assistance in modernizing Montenegro’s armed forces and
enhancing security along the Adriatic Coast, the Alliance can help
establish a NATO Center of Excellence, similarly to other member
states. Given Podgorica’s recent experience with Moscow, the
Center’s focus could be on Countering Foreign Subversion and Coup
Attempts.
Beyond Montenegro, both Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Macedonia should be designated as NATO’s next members. The Alliance
maintains a military headquarters in Sarajevo that assists in
defense reform and counter-terrorism. In 2010, NATO launched a
Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Bosnia, but entry has been blocked
by one key obstacle: the transfer of 63 military facilities from the
entity level to the central administration. The Serb entity
government has delayed completion of the process and is violating
state law. Unfortunately, the EU has been a laggard in pushing
Bosnia’s local governments to enforce the rule of law despite
considering EU candidate status for Bosnia later this year. The
legal transfer of all military facilities must be one of the
conditions.
In the case of Macedonia, a clear roadmap for
membership has to be applied, as the country has fulfilled its MAP
requirements. Once a new bi-ethnic government is formed in Skopje
the prospect of membership can contribute to reducing tension, as
both Macedonians and Albanians favor NATO entry. However, this will
also require a more vigorous mediation process with Greece in which
Washington can play a prominent role. Although Athens continues to
dispute Macedonia’s name, there is no reason for the country not to
enter NATO under the designation that Greece itself uses since the
bilateral Interim Accord of 1995 – the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia.
While NATO maintains a presence in Kosova, it is
time for Kosova to gain a presence in NATO. Approximately 4,500
Allied troops remain stationed in the new state in continuation of
the KFOR mission established after NATO’s intervention in 1999. NATO
has helped to create a professional and multi-ethnic Kosova Security
Force, consisting of lightly armed units responsible for security
tasks. The force will eventually be transformed into a military
structure once the constitutional and organizational changes are
implemented. The process can be accelerated by including Kosova in
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program to develop a modern military
operating alongside NATO forces. Kosova would then join 22 partner
countries from outside NATO, in which PfP has been an important
stepping-stone toward NATO membership for twelve other states.
The remaining country, Serbia, will prove more of
a challenge for completing the NATO umbrella over the Balkan
Peninsula. In addition to lingering resentment over the Allied
intervention to liberate Kosova from Milosevic’s massacres in 1999,
Serbia has forged close ties with Moscow. It has allowed the Kremlin
to establish a base near the southern city of Niš purportedly to
handle humanitarian emergencies, but also believed to serve as an
intelligence gathering facility.
Despite its Russia-friendly policy, Serbia’s army
participates in NATO programs since joining the PfP in 2006 and has
obtained an Individual Partnership Action Plan that could become a
step toward a MAP and eventual membership. If the Serbian military
had a choice free of political considerations it would certainly
favor joining the most modern and effective military organization
rather than being linked with a second-rate Russian structure.
However, even with NATO accession the mission is
not completed, as the Alliance must continue to help its members
monitor and protect against foreign subversion. Indeed, NATO’s role
needs to be augmented in countering Russia’s information offensives,
intelligence penetration and political manipulation. The guiding
principle is that Russia’s NATO-phobia cannot be allowed to sabotage
the future of the Balkans as an integral part of the transatlantic
world.
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