Moscow’s strategy toward Europe is reminiscent of
carving a hunted game. It exploits and exacerbates the
vulnerabilities of targeted states, and widens any lingering
disputes between them. The Kremlin has targeted at least four
portions of the continent: Anglo-Saxon Europe, Western Europe,
Central Europe and the Orthodox Balkans—with the remainder of
Europe’s east to be directly devoured by Russia.
A primary focus of subversion dating back to
Soviet times is to drive a permanent wedge between the continental
European states and the “Anglo-Saxon” countries—the United States,
the United Kingdom and Canada. Moscow views the former as more
malleable, corruptible and exploitable, and the latter as more
likely to challenge Russia’s revisionism.
After a brief interlude following the election of
Donald Trump, the Kremlin has refocused its sights on promoting
transatlantic rifts. Its propaganda depicts the United States as a
hegemon that limits the sovereignty of all European states and
pushes them into conflicts along Russia’s borders, including the one
with Ukraine. In this schema, Britain is depicted as an American
puppet that has now been untethered from the continent following its
Brexit decision.
The second carving strategy is to expand fissures
between Western Europeans and Central Europeans and to foster
various bilateral disputes. Former Soviet satellites, particularly
Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are depicted as nationalistic
and incurably Russophobic, thus preventing rapprochement between
Brussels and Moscow and blocking business opportunities in Russia
for Western European companies.
In addition, EU skepticism is encouraged in all
targeted countries, based on nationalism, populism and conservatism.
Kremlin propaganda outlets castigate the degenerate nature of
European liberalism, the lack of national sovereignty, recurring
financial crises in the Eurozone, failed multiculturalism,
uncontrolled immigration and an inability to combat jihadist
terrorism. In contrast, Russia is depicted as a Christian bastion
against Muslim extremism. All these themes help Moscow influence a
“fifth column” of movements and parties inside the EU that include
radicals of diverse political persuasions.
A third Kremlin carving maneuver encourages a
neutral bloc to emerge across Central Europe. The Czech Republic,
Hungary and Slovakia lie at the epicenter of Russia’s campaign to
subvert NATO states from within, with Poland increasingly in
Russia’s crosshairs. Having failed to keep these countries outside
the Alliance, Putin’s officials calculate that politicians and
governments can be bought or blackmailed to serve Kremlin designs,
transforming Central Europe into a zone increasingly alienated from
Washington.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Slovak
Prime Minister Robert Fico are depicted as sympathetic leaders who
can be enticed to distance themselves from NATO. Ministers in
several countries, including Poland, are also probed for their
susceptibility to Russian financial overtures. Following the Czech
Republic’s 21 October elections, Andrej Babiš—a Moscow-friendly
businessman and leader of the ANO party—could become the next Czech
prime minister and draw the country closer into a Kremlin orbit.
Moscow also endeavors to pull Slovenia and Croatia away from Western
institutions through energy contracts and opaque investments, thus
completing a long wedge of influence between Ukraine and the
Adriatic that could disable NATO operations in the event of war.
Moscow also favors links between the Central
European wedge and traditionally neutral Austria. It views the
“Slavkov Triangle” association between the Czech Republic, Austria
and Slovakia as a useful tool to undermine the Visegrad Group and
help lift sanctions against Moscow. This strategy also contributes
to isolating Poland from other Central European states. Bilateral
disputes are exploited throughout the region to undermine state
integrity, including the position of the Polish minority in
Lithuania, whose leader reportedly maintains close relations with
officials in Moscow and has campaigned for territorial autonomy.
A fourth carving opportunity for the Kremlin is in
the Balkans, where its goal is to create an Orthodox bloc and shield
the region from American influence. Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria are
earmarked as the core of this portion of Europe. Greek governments
have a long tradition of pro-Moscow sentiments. Bulgaria is
perpetually prone to Russian influence through numerous political
and economic entanglements. And Serbia values Russia as a
counterpoint to EU and U.S. pressure in rejecting the independence
of Kosova. Moscow miscalculated by failing to overthrow Montenegro’s
government, reinforcing its determination to join NATO. Nonetheless,
it continues to target both Macedonia and Montenegro through its
broad arsenal of subversion.
Moscow is now fixated on keeping Serbia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosova outside of NATO so it can
deepen its political, economic and informational inroads. The
Central European and Balkan wedges will also contribute to isolating
Romania, which— much like Poland and the three Baltic countries—is
resolutely anti-Kremlin and pro-Washington.
The last portion of the European carcass are the
former republics of the Soviet Union that Moscow either intends to
absorb into its economic and security structures, or transform into
permanently neutral satrapies. These include Belarus, Ukraine,
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. With Europe preoccupied
with its internal divisions and its unsettled relations with the
United States, the Kremlin calculates that it can achieve most of
its objectives without resorting to any significant military
actions.
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