|
Following Catalonia’s referendum on independence,
some politicians have equated Catalonia with Kosova. Such
comparisons are not only politically misleading, but also stir
instability in both the Balkan and Iberian peninsulas. Kosova gained
independence under NATO and EU supervision following a campaign of
mass murder by the Milosevic regime against Kosova’s inhabitants,
after which reunification with Serbia was no longer a viable option.
Catalonia is testing the framework of Spanish democracy and the
right to regional self-determination that could ultimately result in
separation from Spain.
Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić has claimed
that the EU was hypocritical in recognizing Kosova’s independence
while dismissing Catalonia’s aspirations for statehood. Dačić has
conveniently forgotten recent history. Kosovar separatism was a
reaction to state repression, which entailed the abolition of
Kosova’s autonomy and the attempted genocide and expulsion of the
majority Albanian population in Belgrade in 1999.
Belgrade lost its legitimacy to govern a
population that its government sought to systematically expel or
murder, thereby precipitating NATO’s intervention. Countries that
lose wars also invariably lose the lands they conquered or
brutalized. Belgrade consistently demonstrated that it primarily
sought the territory of Kosova—not its inhabitants. For instance, it
excluded more than a million Albanian voters from voting lists for
Serbia’s October 2006 constitutional referendum and from all
national elections, demonstrating that they did not belong in
Serbia. Kosova declared its independence in February 2008.
Some EU governments voiced fears that Kosova’s
independence would destabilize a number of multi-ethnic European
countries. In reality, the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union
and Czechoslovakia—and the emergence of two dozen new countries
during the 1990s—did not precipitate the breakup of Western European
democracies. Unlike in Kosova, Catalans and other nations did not
face mass murder at the hands of the central state and no
international security force needed to intervene to prevent further
bloodshed.
The EU’s various regional sovereignty movements
operate within a democratic framework. Several pro-autonomy parties
have won increasing local control for their territories in a number
of countries. Although the majority of the public may support
membership in a larger state, sentiments for statehood have
accelerated in Catalonia and will be boosted by the heavy-handedness
of the central government. If outright secession is to be avoided,
the region’s autonomy must be preserved and negotiations resulting
in constitutional changes will be essential.
The notion that Catalonia looks toward Kosova as
an example and precedent for separation is not serious. The Catalan
movement has a long tradition, fortified over the past decade by
Spain’s economic crisis and the belief that the region would be
wealthier as an independent state within an EU framework. Whether or
not the regional government declares independence, Madrid’s reaction
is crucial to prevent radicalization and violence. Prime Minister
Mariano Rajoy should beware of relying on coercion to control
Catalonia. Otherwise the region may witness civil unrest and
potential armed insurgency.
Kosova’s independence did not trigger Catalan or
other separatist movements; this was accomplished by prolonged
political and economic disquiet in Spain, combined with a revival of
regional identities, the promise of economic improvement and the
prospect of peaceful separation. Indeed, Catalan leaders asserted
three years ago that it was Scotland’s independence referendum in
September 2014—even though it failed—that had invigorated the
Catalan movement.
In Catalonia we are not witnessing the rise of
ethno-nationalism, as the Spanish government contends, but an
awakening of a regional movement for self-determination. Such a
process is not necessarily conflictive but can forge political units
better adapted to the 21st century than larger and more cumbersome
states. An effective antidote to EU skepticism may indeed be greater
sub-state autonomy and even administrative independence where
regions can find flexible solutions to local problems.
Although Kosova does not serve as a model for
Spain, there is one specific link shared by Madrid, Prishtina and
Belgrade. Spain is one of five EU countries— along with Cyprus,
Greece, Romania and Slovakia—that have not recognized Kosova’s
independence, and the Serbian government has praised Spain’s stance.
However, that relationship may now begin to fray. Belgrade’s
comparison of Kosova and Catalonia could be interpreted in Madrid
and Barcelona as underscoring equivalence between Milosevic’s brutal
“ethnic cleansing” of Kosova in the 1990s and Rajoy’s police
crackdown against voters in the Catalan referendum and the potential
suspension of Catalonia’s autonomy.
Moscow has also played its part in exploiting the
Catalan-Spanish dispute. Every European election and referendum
provides an opportunity for the Kremlin-funded media and its cohorts
of disinformation to encourage EU discord and division. No country
should consider itself immune from such attacks. In the Spanish
case, Moscow has promoted the country’s fracture even though Madrid
has been soft on Russian President Vladimir Putin by urging the EU
to ease the sanctions it imposed on Moscow for its ongoing war in
Ukraine. Maybe it is time for Spanish authorities to not only to
engage in a fruitful dialogue with Catalan leaders, but also to
explain the difference between Catalonia and Kosova—and adopt a more
assertive and effective policy toward Russia.
|
