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Hence, news of the recent breakthrough after two
decades of negotiations between Macedonia and Greece has to be
treated with caution at a time when renewed conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina also lurks on the horizon.
Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Macedonian
Prime Minister Zoran Zaev finally signed an agreement to rename the
former Yugoslav republic “North Macedonia.” Despite persistent Greek
opposition, Macedonia retained its name, its language will remain
“Macedonian,” and its nationality will be defined as
“Macedonian/Citizens of the Republic of North Macedonia.” Skopje
also made a significant compromise by agreeing to alter the
constitution so the appellation “Republic of North Macedonia” is
used both internationally and domestically.
However, the agreement needs to be ratified by the
Macedonian and Greek parliaments and through a public referendum in
Macedonia. As a result, a long hot summer is looming, as domestic
disputes over the agreement accelerate. In Macedonia, the Social
Democrat government has a slender parliamentary plurality and will
find it problematic to muster the two-thirds majority necessary to
enact constitutional changes. Zaev may need to call for early
elections to buttress his parliamentary support.
The Macedonian government will also organize a
referendum and must convince the majority of citizens that an
adjustment in the country’s name will bring concrete benefits by
opening the road to NATO and EU membership. The opposition VMRO
party will likely mount an intensive anti-agreement campaign and
various nationalist groups have already started organizing street
protests.
The Greek government also faces domestic
resistance to the Macedonia deal. Tsipras’ coalition partners, the
Independent Greeks, look certain to oppose it and will force the
government to seek opposition support. Extensive public protests are
expected and this will make it increasingly difficult to push the
agreement through parliament.
Athens has promised to lift the veto on
Macedonia’s NATO and EU membership once Skopje enacts constitutional
changes. With the agreement widely praised in Brussels and
Washington, international players must focus on encouraging
Macedonian voters. One important step would be for the upcoming NATO
Summit to announce the start of membership talks with Skopje. EU
entry will take much longer, especially as the Union itself remains
divided on whether to continue enlarging. To help galvanize a
positive referendum result, EU leaders will need to give Macedonia
the green light for launching accession talks.
Macedonia has now reached a pivotal moment in its
history. If the votes are positive, the country will gain momentum
for full international integration. This would undercut nationalism
and separatism in the country and contribute to stabilizing the
wider region. However, if the parliamentary vote in either Skopje or
Athens fails or the deal is rejected in a referendum, Macedonia will
have lost a unique opportunity to end its isolation.
The stalemate between Serbia and Kosova, despite
intense U.S. and EU pressure to “normalize” relations, further
undermines regional stability. Belgrade and Prishtina need to follow
Athens and Skopje in forging an historic agreement in which a degree
of Serb minority autonomy in Kosova enables Belgrade to unblock
Kosova’s progress into international institutions. In stark
contrast, recent proposals for territorial exchanges between the two
states could stimulate irredentist ambitions in the region.
Storm clouds are also gathering over
Bosnia-Herzegovina as the October general elections approach. Serb
Republic President Milorad Dodik has floated the idea of a
referendum on separation, but the country could implode even without
such a direct provocation. A stalemated election and failure to form
a central government or pass a national budget could become a
pretext for the Serb entity to withdraw from all central
institutions and declare statehood.
In a worst-case scenario, Serbian separatism would
lead to armed clashes between Serbs and Bosniak Muslims, provoking
military intervention by Zagreb and Belgrade, with a significant
risk of clashes between the two neighbors. The limited EUFOR
military deployment would be quickly overwhelmed, while NATO may be
pulled into the escalating conflict to honor its Article 5 pledge to
Croatia.
Russia remains an additional and persistent cause
of instability in the western Balkans. Moscow supports both Greek
and Macedonian nationalists to impede the bilateral agreement,
discourages Serbia from pursuing relations with Kosova, and promotes
Bosnia’s paralysis to keep it outside Western institutions. The
Kremlin promotes regional instability and undermines EU and NATO
goals; and at some point, it can intensify its support for Bosnian
Serb separatism to fracture the country. Russia has sold weapons to
the Serb entity, trained Bosnian Serb paramilitaries, and dispatched
nationalist “volunteers” to demonstrate its solidarity. In the past
decade, Moscow has provoked wars in Georgia and Ukraine and the time
may be ripening for opening another front for its proxies in the
Balkans.
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