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After several provocative statements by Serbian
and Kosovar politicians and in the midst of relative silence from
Washington and Brussels, suppositions are growing that a territorial
exchange is being planned between Belgrade and Prishtina.
Kosova’s President Hashim Thaci has asserted that
the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue will include talks on “border
corrections” – a term that implies the exchange of territory and not
simply demarcation agreements as recently concluded between Kosova
and Montenegro. Some Serbian officials have repeatedly put forward
the territorial option to normalize relations between the two states
but thus far the issue has not been seriously considered.
In a move that inflamed rumors of secret
exchanges, Thaci stated that talks with Belgrade should consider the
unification with Kosova of the Presevo Valley, a part of southern
Serbia with a majority Albanian population. Thaci clearly wants to
bring Presevo into the discussion and not be faced with a unilateral
surrender of northern Kosova in which Serbs form majorities in four
municipalities.
The United States and the EU have consistently
opposed any border changes, viewing such moves as dangerous in a
still volatile region. But rumors are now swirling that Washington
and Brussels may seek to resolve the Serbia-Kosova dispute through a
territorial option and have launched a trial balloon to see what
Belgrade and Prishtina can agree on without direct international
mediation.
In recent media statements, the U.S. ambassador to
Kosova and a spokesman for the European Commission did not rule out
territorial revisions, simply asserting that Belgrade and Prishtina
needed to reach a solution. At the same time, Serbia’s Foreign
Minister Ivica Dacic, claimed that he had discussed a possible
partition during a visit to Washington. Only German Chancellor
Angela Merkel has openly rejected any border changes during a recent
meeting in Berlin with the Bosnian Prime Minister.
Historically, partitions are nothing new, whether
through post-war adjustments by the victorious parties or on the
basis of democratic plebiscites or inter-governmental agreements.
While Yugoslavia was dismembered through wars and elections, Moscow
was unable to hold the Soviet Union together by force, and
Czechoslovakia was amicably divided by Prague and Bratislava. In
each case, however, the new countries were former federal subjects
possessing clear administrative borders and elected governments. The
potential division of Kosova would legitimize a new principle – the
partition of states that emerged from the defunct communist
federations.
Such a process would require at least four
conditions to be realized peacefully. First, because only sovereign
states can exchange territory, Serbia and Kosova would need to
recognize each other as independent countries and not block entry
into international institutions. Second, popular approval in both
countries would need to be secured either through parliament or a
public referendum. Third, international mediation would be essential
to implement any territorial agreements. And fourth, the citizens
affected by the land swaps would have to be assisted in relocating
to the state of their choice.
But even if all these conditions were met, border
changes in the Western Balkans are fraught with perils and would be
interpreted throughout the region as legitimizing national
homogenization. With the principle of multi-ethnicity evidently
jettisoned, demands for mono-ethnicity would escalate and
potentially unravel several countries. Western institutions and NATO
forces may find themselves woefully unprepared for the wave of
instability that could subsequently engulf the region.
In Kosova itself, the Serbian Orthodox Church
vehemently opposes any loss of territory especially as most Serb
religious sites and over 60% of the Serbian population are not
located in the northern municipalities. Radicalized Serbs and
Albanians could incite violent protests in order to expel the other
ethnicity from their assigned territories. And a similar process can
be envisaged in the Presevo valley if a land swap is agreed.
The territorial revisions would also raise support
in Kosova for unification with Albania. Such momentum could rapidly
spread to Macedonia where at least a quarter of the population is
Albanian. Threats to Macedonia’s territorial integrity would
intensify ethno-nationalism, potentially scuttle the name deal with
Greece, and bring both Bulgaria and Albania into an expanding
conflict.
Meanwhile, the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina
could demand the application of the Kosova precedent in order to
join Serbia; the Croat population may petition for western
Herzegovina to be absorbed by Croatia; and the Bosniak population
could campaign for Serbia’s Muslim-majority Sandjak region to unite
with Bosnia. Montenegro would also be caught in the middle of this
maelstrom, with Bosniaks, Serbs, and Albanians all demanding
slithers of the country in which they form local majorities. And all
this is unlikely to occur in a peaceful political and political
climate but may be peppered with violent incidents to prove that
separation was necessary.
Although such a scenario sounds like a Balkan
bonanza for the Kremlin and could contribute to justifying its
partition of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, it would be premature
for Moscow to celebrate the division of any Balkan state. Such
developments would underscore that the Russian Federation itself,
containing 85 federal units, may also be territorially divided
according to ethnic, religious, or regional principles.
Paradoxically, the partition of Kosova or Bosnia could serve as a
prototype for Russia’s future dissolution.
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