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External assertiveness often serves as an
effective diversionary maneuver to dampen domestic turmoil by acting
on the deception that Russia is under threat.
Moscow’s tools of aggression against neighboring
states rely on stealth and surprise. This was most evident during
the attack on Ukraine in 2014 and the takeover of the Crimean
peninsula. Russia’s rulers camouflage their aggression or divert
attention to other potential conflicts. This strategy generates
confusion, undermines a coherent Western response, and maximizes
Kremlin capabilities. To avoid being caught off-balance once again,
it is worthwhile for U.S. and NATO policymakers to assess each of
the potential targets along Russia’s long borders, pursue deterrents
where feasible, and prepare for the military and diplomatic
consequences of Moscow’s intervention.
From the Baltics to the Caucasus, Moscow has a
number of latent conflicts that it can reanimate. Estonia and Latvia
have been in Russia’s crosshairs since Putin assumed power almost
twenty years ago. Their economic and political successes upon
leaving Moscow’s orbit contrasts most starkly with Russia’s
failures. They have been consistently attacked for allegedly
repressing their Russian-speaking population even though
international watchdog groups dismiss such disinformation. While
Moscow is unlikely to stage a full-scale invasion and confront a
concerted NATO response, it can provoke conflicts in parts of both
countries that have a sizeable Russian-speaking population,
including the Latgale region in eastern Latvia.
Further south, the Suwałki Corridor between Poland
and Lithuania remains vulnerable to Russian penetration. The
Kremlin’s land forces operating from the Kaliningrad exclave and
Belarus are in a position to close the Suwałki Corridor and impede
NATO as a security guarantor to its three Baltic members. On the eve
of the NATO summit, CEPA issued a landmark report on how the
Alliance can strengthen its deterrent capabilities in the Corridor
by enhancing its preparedness, responsiveness, and reinforcements.
Belarus may be another target for Moscow to raise
nationalist temperatures and subdue a potentially wayward ally.
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka is steadily improving relations with
the West in order to help shield Belarus from Moscow’s pressures.
Such moves have stirred fears in the Kremlin that Minsk will
eventually seek membership of Western institutions. The recent
appointment of Putin’s confidant Mikhail Babich as the new
Ambassador to Belarus indicates that the Kremlin is increasing its
pressures on Lukashenka to allow for Russian bases closer to the
Polish and Lithuanian borders. Babich may also threaten Lukashenka’s
position by assisting pro-Russia factions opposed to closer
relations with the West.
Ukraine remains prone to further destabilization.
An escalating flash point is the Azov Sea, where Russia’s navy has
blockaded the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdiansk for several
months. Moscow has steadily increased its naval presence possibly in
preparation for seizing control of the entire Azov coastline and
cutting off eastern Ukraine from the Black Sea. Russia could also
intensify its attacks on Ukrainian controlled parts of Donbas. The
unexplained assassination of Aleksandr Zakharchenko, head of one of
the proxy separatist groups in Donetsk, may signal that the Kremlin
is preparing new leaders to expand its offensive.
In Moldova, Russian services are exploiting
divisions between the country’s pro-European and pro-Eurasian
streams. Both government and opposition leaders accuse each other of
links with Russian intelligence services and the resulting protests
and political paralysis are destabilizing the country and halting
its progress toward the EU. Such a scenario may also escalate into
conflicts with the Moscow-supported separatist region of
Transnistria and the autonomous region of Gagauzia. This could
precipitate more direct Russian intervention on the grounds of
defending Russian speakers in the torn Moldovan state and increase
Moscow’s troop presence along the borders of Ukraine and Romania.
In the South Caucasus, Georgia remains vulnerable
to a renewed Russian military thrust as Moscow reinforces its
occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This could be couched as
an “anti-terrorist” operation or a mission to bolster the Russian
military base in Armenia. At the same time, Moscow’s dissatisfaction
with Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his campaign
against political corruption could either trigger more direct
interference in Armenian politics or a provocation to restart the
war with Azerbaijan over the occupied territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Such scenarios could topple the reformist government in Yerevan and
redouble Armenia’s dependence on Russia.
The Kremlin is unlikely to engage in two extensive
armed conflicts simultaneously, but this may be possible if both are
relatively limited or involve mostly proxy forces. The accompanying
propaganda barrage would aim to convince an increasingly restless
population that Putin is resolutely defending Russian interests
against foreign enemies. To preclude new forms of aggression or make
it as costly as possible for the Kremlin, NATO states must monitor,
expose, and counter the activities of Russian services, provide
military, intelligence, and diplomatic support to NATO partners, and
push to resolve simmering conflicts, such as the one over
Nagorno-Karabakh, that can be exploited by the Kremlin.
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