Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj has circulated a
30-page draft comprehensive agreement between his own Republic and
Serbia. It contains a lot of things I might like, including
extensive arrangements for cross-border cooperation, protection of
Serbs and Serb monuments in Kosovo, and implementation of the many
technical agreements already reach between Pristina and Belgrade.
But there are some obvious problems. This paper is
essentially to an opening negotiation proposal. From that
perspective, it incorporates serious negotiating errors that should
be fixed before any encounter with Belgrade. On first reading, I see
two glaring problems:
The agreement foresees entry into force before
Kosovo membership in the United Nations. Since that can be blocked
by Russia or China even if Belgrade is prepared to allow it, Kosovo
could find itself out on a limb, having committed to give Serbia the
substantial benefits contained in the agreement without getting a
big part of the quid pro quo. It is inadvisable to run that risk. UN
membership should come first. Only after that is finalized should a
comprehensive agreement of this sort be signed.
The draft agreement includes a long list of unilateral concessions
to Serbia on governance arrangements in Kosovo at both the central
and local levels. All such concessions should be proposed as
reciprocal, not unilateral. There is no reason why Kosovo should not
ask for the Albanian-inhabited areas of southern Serbia whatever
arrangements are provided to Serbs in Kosovo.
Admittedly reciprocity is not provided for in the Ahtisaari
agreement (from which many of these governance and other provisions
are derived) but that is now overtaken by events, because Serbia
refused to sign on. A sovereign state should not make unilateral
concessions in its own proposal, unless it is certain they will be
appreciated. The way to determine whether Serbia is really
interested is to see if they are prepared to pay the price of
reciprocity. If so, fine. If not, why should Kosovo concede even
before the negotiation starts?
I see other potential concerns as well. The draft agreement includes
a dispute settlement mechanism that relies on the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in The Hague. Why not the International Court of
Justice? The draft agreement omits reference to cross-border
cooperation between the countries’ security forces. This should be
included: no two countries sharing a fortified border, which for the
foreseeable future this one will be, can afford not to have regular
consultations on national security issues as well as dialogue
between their chiefs of staff. Kosovo does not yet have a
full-fledged army, but cooperation of this sort should be starting
sooner rather than later.
I am told that the Kosovo parliament, in creating a new negotiation
team, has ruled out border changes. That is certainly a good thing.
I’m pretty sure I’ll find additional wrinkles in
this opening gambit, but that will have to suffice for now. Anyone
want to join me in offering suggestions and comments?
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