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On the eve of today’s 11th anniversary of its
independence, Kosovo has published its
“Platform for Dialogue on a
Final, Comprehensive and Legally Binding Agreement on Normalization
of Relations Between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of
Serbia.” There are a lot of things to like in this document,
including:
A clear statement of Kosovo’s negotiating
goals, which has been lacking: Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as a
sovereign and independent state.
Re-assertion of the validity of the Kosovo constitution on the
state’s entire territory and explicit rejection of any cession of
part of that territory.
Reciprocity: for Albanians in Serbia to be treated as well as Serbs
in Kosovo, for war crimes committed by Serbs to be treated like war
crimes committed by Albanians, including in a special tribunal.
Refusal to create any layer of government between the central one
and municipalities (read any association of Serb municipalities with
governing authority or responsibility).
Approval of the ultimate agreement in a referendum and by parliament
in both Kosovo and Serbia.
Provisions for transparency, inclusivity, and accessibility of the
state negotiating team.
Settlement of outstanding wartime issues (accounting for missing
persons, return of displaced people, return of property,
compensation, reparations, division of sovereign debt, etc.).
An end to UN Security Council resolution 1244 and approval of the
final agreement in the Council and the General Assembly.
Conditioning of progress in EU accession on implementation of the
final agreement.
All good. So what’s missing?
Two things:
Clarity on how and when UN membership
will occur. It may be implicit in the reference to UNSC approval of
the agreement, but it will need to be explicit before the
negotiations are concluded. The controlling powers are China and
Russia: how will they be brought around to allow a breakaway
province to enter the UN? China won’t like it because of Tibet.
Russia may like it but will want a quid pro quo in Crimea and
possibly also South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria.
Any indication of what Serbia might get
in the deal. It is not Pristina’s responsibility to worry about this
in the first instance, but it will need to worry about it in due
course. What would be helpful is for Serbia to publish a similar
platform. It has never been clear what Belgrade wants from the talks
with Pristina, other than convincing Washington and Brussels that
Serbia is willing to talk. That itself does have value, especially
as it has been done on an equal basis that implicitly acknowledges
that Kosovo has a legitimate and independent governing structure
(already also recognized in the April 2013 “Brussels agreement”).
Of course Belgrade has also appeared to want
territory, especially the majority-Serb municipalities north of the
Ibar River. The Platform however is unequivocal in seeking
“recognition of Kosovo’s independence and statehood within the
existing borders.”
There are outstanding issues that might have value
for Serbia: the composition and capabilities of the Kosovo army, the
functions (other than governing) of the not yet created Association
of Serb Municipalities, and Kosovo’s assumption of its share of
Yugoslavia’s debt (mentioned in the Platform). But I doubt these
will be sufficient to lead to an early agreement. More likely,
Serbia will not engage seriously until the failure to reach an
agreement with Kosovo noticeably slows its progress toward EU
accession. Then it will be too late: all the leverage in the endgame
of EU accession lies with the individual member states, which have
to ratify accession, not with the candidate country.
One member state has dared to say what we all have
known for years but no one wanted to say out loud. At the Security
Council 10 days ago Christoph Heusgen, the German representative,
said bluntly in a prepared (therefore cleared in Berlin)
statement:
The only way that Serbia will enter the
European Union will be with a successful normalization dialogue,
with the recognition of Kosovo.
Belgrade would be wise to enter a serious
negotiation sooner rather than later, while it can hope to still get
something in exchange for recognizing Kosovo. Now that it has made
its position clear, Pristina can afford to wait, as its EU accession
is much further in the future.
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