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For Washington, a potential territorial exchange
between Serbia and Kosova could normalize relations between the two
states and help stabilize the wider region. For Moscow, the prospect
of land swaps can add a new dimension to its divide and conquer
plans in the Western Balkans and establish usable precedents
elsewhere.
In recent
months, the prospect of border adjustments between Kosova and
Serbia has been at the center of political debate throughout the
region. Although any such plans are tentative and high-level
discussions have not been transparent, even raising the legitimacy
of territorial changes has sparked both hope and fear in several
states. When Washington reportedly gave the green light to such
negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina, Moscow pounced on a new
opportunity to foster conflict and promote its influences.
During the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the
1990s, Russian officials backed Slobodan Milošević’s plans for a
larger Serbian state that would encompass Montenegro, Kosova, half
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and parts of Croatia. They were not averse to
changing the borders of former Yugoslav federal units in order to
strengthen their main ally in the region. The Kremlin also
calculated that Balkan border adjustments could bolster its own
plans to carve up former Soviet republics and enlarge the Russian
Federation.
Russia’s new partition strategy in the Western
Balkans has emerged in the past few months with several overlapping
goals. The first objective is to create fissures among Albanian
politicians and divide Albanian societies in Kosova, Albania, and
Macedonia. Albanian populations are not only renowned for being
staunchly pro-American, they are also deeply resistant to Russian
political and economic penetration. Moscow may now exploit any
emerging divisions over border changes to implant itself.
In Kosova there is a growing disconnect between
those who support and oppose a transaction involving sections of
Kosova’s four northern municipalities in exchange for parts of three
Serbian municipalities in the Preševo Valley. Moreover, any
closed-door discussions inevitably beget rumors that can be
exploited by provocateurs to inflame political disputes.
Kosova’s President Hashim Thaçi and Prime Minister
Ramush Haradinaj have expressed diametrically opposed positions on
border shifts. Thaçi
met with Putin during the Paris Peace Forum in November 2018 and
reportedly discussed the territorial question. It is worth
remembering that the Russian leader regularly whispers
disinformation to foreign leaders to test their reactions and plant
ideas that suit Kremlin interests.
After his recent visit to Washington, Thaçi
declared that he had received guarantees that Russia would recognize
Kosova once an agreement with Belgrade was implemented that could
entail border adjustments. However, any pledges by the Kremlin must
be treated with enormous caution, as Putin is notorious for breaking
agreements that suit his larger ambitions, whether these are arms
treaties with the United States or border agreements with
neighboring countries.
A second Kremlin goal is to exacerbate divisions
between Serbs and Albanians so that neither Serbia nor Kosova can
enter NATO or the EU. The most effective way to close doors to
membership is by creating diversions that foster inter-state
conflicts so the disputants are viewed as unfit for accession.
Moscow is well aware that both Serbian and Albanian nationalists
will pounce on the prospect of territorial acquisitions and can be
encouraged to pursue more ambitious irredentist claims, such as
dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, or Macedonia.
It is unclear whether the Serbian government is
fully aware of Moscow’s ploys or whether it is being duped.
President Aleksandar Vučić needs to be mindful that Serbia could be
drawn into more protracted conflicts with neighbors by working too
closely with Russia. Belgrade’s stated goal in forging an agreement
with Kosova is for Serbia to gain faster entry into the EU. But why
should the Kremlin assist Vučić in an EU accession endeavor that it
has tried to quash in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and elsewhere?
As Russian officials drive wedges between the
region’s capitals, they can simultaneously offer regional
settlements and inject themselves as mediators to reduce the role of
NATO and the EU. By purportedly assisting in resolving regional
conflicts, Moscow also calculates that it can gain additional
advantages, whether in lessened Western opposition to its gas
projects in Europe or a special status with diplomatic immunity for
its intelligence base in southern Serbia.
A third motive for Russia’s support for Balkan
land exchanges is to establish usable precedents, particularly for
its own partition of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Moscow’s coerced
border adjustments can be propagandized as legitimate moves that
mirror Western support for ethnic homogenization in the Balkans.
This would help reduce calls for sanctions and other punishment
against Russia for carving up its neighbors’ territories.
In an ideal world, a bilateral border exchange
between Serbia and Kosova could be arranged without provoking
political conflicts, ethnic resentments, or irredentist claims. But
conditions in the Balkans and other regions where the Kremlin has
injected its influences are far from ideal. With “normalization”
between Serbia and Kosova as the tempting prize, Western actors may
be stepping into a partition trap whose unintended consequences may
prove more far-reaching than was bargained for.
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