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While NATO aims to provide permanent security to
its members and help other states defend their independence, for
Moscow the Black Sea is a launch pad to dominate its former
satellites and project its military power toward Central Europe, the
Balkans, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
From a total Black Sea coastline of 2,538 miles
(excluding the Azov Sea), Russia’s share is only 248 miles, or less
than 10 percent. The three NATO states (Turkey, Bulgaria, and
Romania) contain 1,439 miles (almost 57 percent), while Ukraine and
Georgia hold 851 miles. Despite NATO’s geographical advantage,
Moscow is engaged in an extensive military build-up to dominate the
Black Sea. It aspires to control major sea-lanes, maritime economic
zones, and energy deposits, limit NATO’s maritime presence, and
subdue littoral states that challenge its goals.
Moscow’s strategy toward littoral states consists
of six prongs: destabilizing Ukraine; paralyzing Moldova;
neutralizing Bulgaria; isolating Romania; subduing Georgia; and
pacifying Turkey.
Following Moscow’s capture of Crimea and parts of
Donbas, the prospect of further inroads into Ukrainian territory,
both on land and at sea, are a constant menace for Kyiv. Crimea is
being developed into a Black Sea Kaliningrad that can project
Russian military power across the entire northern littoral. The
purpose is to isolate Ukraine by cutting off its ports in the Azov
Sea, denying access to the Black Sea, stirring conflicts in other
regions such as Odessa and the Danube delta, and depicting Ukraine
as a failed state.
In Moldova, Moscow promotes political corruption,
patronage networks, and election stalemates to paralyze the
government and keep Moldova outside of Western institutions. If such
subversion fails, the Kremlin can rapidly ignite Transnistrian and
Gagauzian separatism to destabilize the country.
Moscow has traditionally exploited Bulgaria’s
pro-Russia sentiments, particularly among socialists and
nationalists. It courts politicians, injects pro-Moscow and
anti-NATO stories in the media, and maintains Bulgaria’s energy
dependence. As a result, Sofia is hesitant in supporting a robust
NATO presence in the Black Sea, including a more effective NATO
fleet.
Romania is the key NATO state in the region where
Moscow has few inroads into its politics or security structures.
Nonetheless, it exploits ethnic, financial, and social factors to
unsettle the government. Putin may also play the Moldovan,
Ukrainian, and Hungarian cards against Bucharest to embroil Romania
in a conflict with its three northern neighbors, whether over
Hungarian minority rights or Moldova’s and Ukraine’s territorial
integrity.
Moscow intends to restore its dominance in the
South Caucasus by subduing Georgia. It has annexed parts of
Georgia’s territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), exported political
corruption, engaged in media and cultural warfare, and threatened to
further divide and isolate the country by creating a military
corridor to its bases in Armenia and restricting Georgia’s maritime
access. This would also sever Europe’s energy connections with the
Caspian basin.
The last piece of Moscow’s Black Sea puzzle is
Turkey, Russia’s historical imperial rival. While the relationship
is unlikely to develop into an alliance, Russia seeks to benefit
from a Western-skeptic government by dissuading Ankara from adopting
policies that jeopardize Russia’s aspirations in the northern,
eastern, and western littorals. Moscow promotes close ties with
Turkey through energy dependence, trade, and weapons sales that
undermine NATO cohesion.
NATO’s strategy in the Black Sea will need a
formula that can offer effective security to Romania and Bulgaria
but without violating the 1936 Montreaux Convention, which restricts
the passage of non-Black Sea navies through the Bosporus Straits.
Creative methods will need to be applied in developing an effective
Black Sea flotilla based on local navies. To prevent future wars,
NATO must also assist Ukraine and Georgia in reinforcing their
maritime defenses and naval ports and providing both with a clearer
perspective for Alliance entry.
The 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest declared that
Georgia and Ukraine would become members but without specifying a
timetable. In the ensuing decade, Georgia has made significant
progress in qualifying for accession as evident in its
civil-military reforms, a web of joint military programs with NATO
forces, overwhelming public support for accession, and Georgia’s
impressive contributions to NATO’s combat missions.
Ukraine’s progress in qualifying for NATO has sped
up since Russia’s attack in 2014. The Ukrainian military has been
reconstructed in wartime conditions and has performed admirably in
defending against Russian forces and their proxies. A majority of
the public supports NATO membership and the constitution has been
amended to declare accession as a strategic goal. Nonetheless, much
still needs to be accomplished to root out corruption and provide
the equipment needed by frontline forces.
It is valuable to consider whether Moscow would
have invaded if both Georgia and Ukraine had already been NATO
members. The experience of the three Baltic states indicates that a
military attack becomes less probable when a country joins NATO,
despite the fact that Moscow covets Baltic ports such as Riga, and
similarly to Ukraine can use the pretext of defending
Russian-speaking minorities. NATO’s article 5 guarantees are taken
seriously in the Kremlin when backed with significant Alliance
capabilities in contested regions.
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