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Berlin will be hosting Balkan leaders Monday. This
summit will be EU High Representative Mogherini’s last chance before
she leaves office to strike a deal on “normalization” of relations
between Serbia and Kosovo. The Germans have let it be known that
they are firmly opposed to border changes as part of such a deal and
hope to kill the idea. But that leaves open the question of what
Serbia could get from recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign and
independent state.
Belgrade lost sovereignty over Kosovo due to
Slobodan Milosevic’s depredations, including annulment of Kosovo’s
autonomy under Socialist Yugoslavia, the expulsion of Albanians from
its Serbia institutions, the establishment of an apartheid-like
regime, mass atrocities committed against innocent women and
children, state violence to chase Albanians out of Kosovo, and
continued hostility after the fall of Milosevic to the establishment
of self-governing democratic institutions that provide significant
privileges for Serbs. Even after the fall of Milosevic, Serbia did
nothing to “make unity attractive,” in the Sudanese phrase.
Serbia is entitled to nothing in Kosovo, but of
course not being entitled doesn’t mean you can’t ask for what you
want and use what leverage you have to get it. Serbia has leverage
because it has been successful in blocking entry for Kosovo into
some international institutions, including the United Nations. No
doubt they give awards for that in the Serbian foreign ministry, but
it isn’t doing anything for Serbia or Serbs except denying the
Kosovars their dreams and holding out the forlorn hope that some day
Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo can be restored. Inat (spite, more
or less) is emotionally gratifying but not otherwise rewarding.
The trick for Serbia and for Kosovo is to ask for
things that your adversary, or someone else, can give. That is where
President Vucic has failed. He has asked for a chunk of northern
Kosovo that includes a municipality that was Albanian-majority
before the war as well as Kosovo’s major non-energy mineral deposits
and its main water supply. Alternatively, Vucic appears ready to
accept an Association of Serb Municipalities that would allow
Belgrade to govern all the Serbs of Kosovo, north and south of the
Ibar river. No self-respecting Kosovo president could concede these
intrusions on sovereignty, no Kosovo parliament would approve them,
and no popular referendum is likely to confirm them.
What could Vucic reasonably hope for? First and
foremost is removal of an otherwise insurmountable obstacle to
European Union membership. Germany and several other EU member
states have made it plain that they will not ratify Serbia’s
membership without complete and irreversible normalization of
relations with Kosovo. Even if their governments wanted to do so,
which they don’t, their parliaments would not. If Serbia, as it has
planned to do, waits until it is fully qualified for EU membership,
it can expect nothing in return for normalization with Kosovo, since
all the leverage will then be with the EU and its member states. All
membership aspirants yield on the last issues remaining once they
have met the other EU membership requirements. Ask the Slovenians
and Croatians.
Having wisely decided to normalize earlier rather
than later, what can Vucic hope for? Pristina’s recently approved
negotiating platform gives one hint: a good deal on payment of
former Yugoslavia’s sovereign debts. There are other possibilities:
Kosovo has approved conversion of its lightly
armed security force into an army, not least so it can join NATO.
Belgrade says it fears the Kosovo army would be used against Serbs.
It is not hard to imagine a Kosovo army entirely designed for
international missions that would pose no threat to Serbs either in
Kosovo or in Serbia, whose army is far larger and better equipped
than anything Kosovo can afford. Two hints: focusing on helicopters
(the Americans have them conveniently at hand at Camp Bondsteel) and
cyber defense would give the Kosovo army opportunities to add real
value to NATO.
The most important Serb historical and
religious sites in Kosovo are south of the Ibar river, where most of
the Serb population lives in enclaves. Further enhanced security
arrangements that would ensure the sites and the people remain
inviolate but still respect Pristina’s sovereignty should be doable.
Kosovo has imposed high tariffs on Serb
imports, in an effort to force Serbia into normalization. That isn’t
working: Serb goods are entering Kosovo without passing through the
official entry points. The Europeans and Americans are berating and
threatening Pristina. The tariffs need to end, as they are no more
than an incentive for smuggling and enrichment of organized crime
that neither Kosovo nor Serbia should want if they want to be taken
seriously by the EU.
Kosovo’s constitutional court has issued a
ruling that clarifies what kind of Association of Serb
Municipalities would be acceptable. If Serbia is prepared to respect
Kosovo’s constitutional order, it should take what is on offer, and
provide comparable arrangements for Albanian communities inside
Serbia.
The nub of territorial contestation between
Kosovo and Serbia is the municipality of North Mitrovica, which is
still controlled by Belgrade (insofar as it is controlled) but was
majority Albanian before the 1999 war. The Americans managed a
similarly sensitive town in northeast Bosnia, Brcko, by declaring it
a condominium of both the Federation and Republika, the two halves
of the country. That effectively removed it from control of both and
made it a self-governing entity with a special status, under
American tutelage, within the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
sovereignty. A similar solution for North Mitrovica, within the
sovereignty of Kosovo, is conceivable. Whether American tutelage is
practicable is another question.
Both Belgrade and Pristina want immunity from
prosecution for their own citizens who participated in the 1990s
fighting, some of whom still serve in high positions. Odious though
it may be to me, mutual amnesty for everything but war crimes and
crimes against humanity is permissible. In both capitals it is
widely assumed that whichever leaders take up President Trump’s
invitation to sign a historic deal in the Rose Garden will be immune
from prosecution.
None of this can happen quickly or easily, but
there are some immediate steps that would point in the right
direction:
1. The defense chiefs of staff should meet and
begin the process, common among neighboring countries, of exchanging
information on their respective forces and defense strategies. They
should also discuss security for Serb communities and sites in
Kosovo as well as for Albanian communities and sites in Serbia.
2. CEFTA, the central European free trade
association in which both Serbia and Kosovo participate should begin
an intense process of examining trade complaints by both Belgrade
and Pristina, including the tariffs, with a view to resolving them
by the end of this year.
3. Kosovo’s Ministry of Communities and Returns
should begin talking with Serbia’s Ministry of Public Administration
and Local Self-Government about reciprocal cooperation arrangements
for Serb communities in Kosovo and Albanian communities in Serbia.
4. All those concerned should read Bill Farrand’s
account of what he did at Brcko in the first years after the war and
how he did it. It is hard to picture that any international could
reproduce that success in North Mitrovica without extraordinary and
plenipotentiary powers. And it is pretty much inconceivable that
anyone but an American, aided by a Russian and a European, could
even begin to hope for success in less than a decade of concerted,
well-resourced efforts, including backup by whatever NATO forces can
be provided.
5. Both Serbia and Kosovo need foreign investment
and faster economic growth, not least to provide employment and keep
their young people at home rather than fleeing to the European
Union. The EU and US should be prepared to ante up for a
multi-billion dollar/euro package of economic support, provided
Pristina and Belgrade implement a serious normalization process.
Normalization may not arrive in one magical
package this year, as some overly sanguine diplomats have been
hoping, but as the result of a long and difficult process. It is
going to require a lot of intense and complex cross-border
cooperation. The time to start that has arrived.
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