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With economic conditions deteriorating and social
turmoil escalating in various regions of Russia, President Vladimir
Putin’s self-proclaimed “power vertical” is looking increasingly
like a “power vertigo.”
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, all
Russian governments have failed to modernize the state, whether
through a European model of a democratic market economy or a Chinese
model of state-directed capitalism. Instead, Russia has become a
secret police oligarchy (or “Chekistocracy”) in which political
freedoms are extinguished and the chasm between a corrupt ruling
stratum and the populace has become unbridgeable.
In Marxist terminology, once espoused by Soviet
propagandists, Russia may be heading toward a revolutionary
situation where the “forces of production” are in stark
contradiction with the “relations of production.” In other words,
economic development does not benefit the masses and the ruling
elite is facing growing public opposition and potential revolt.
Putinism is a system that not only spreads
disinformation against its Western adversaries; above all it lies
about itself. Each definition used by officials to describe the
country is based on a falsehood. Russia is not a real federation, as
its diverse regions have no say in their development. And it is not
a “sovereign democracy” or even a “managed democracy,” as there is
no public input into policymaking. As the economy nosedives, the
conflict between state and citizens is heading toward conflict, as
most of the safety valves for peaceful public opposition have been
blocked.
Several recent policy moves are pushing the
populace toward unrest and Putin’s approval rating is plummeting,
even according to official statistics. Russian citizens are now
experiencing their sixth consecutive year of falling incomes. To
make matters worse, Moscow has implemented an extremely unpopular
increase in the retirement age that has reduced state-paid pensions.
This squeeze on family incomes is compounded by rising taxes,
deteriorating communal services, and increasing consumer prices.
Moscow has also angered numerous ethnic groups
through its new language policy. This involves curtailing schooling
in non-Russian languages and restricting indigenous institutions.
Border changes between federal republics, intended to reward Kremlin
loyalists, have also sparked mass unrest in Ingushetia and could
spread to other North Caucasus republics where discontent with
Moscow and its local governors is rising.
Open protests are becoming more commonplace as
public anger boils over in numerous arenas. In recent weeks,
demonstrations have been held against the construction of lavish new
churches, with the Orthodox hierarchy widely viewed as part of the
corrupt elite beholden to the Kremlin. Protests have also been held
against the dumping of garbage from large cities in rural areas.
Massive open-air landfills often located near residential areas
exacerbate health problems and destroy the local environment.
Thousands of people have ignored police bans and marched against
planned new landfills near Moscow and in several regions of Siberia
and the far north.
The litany of regional and local protests is
multiplying and to avoid losing control the Kremlin may try to
impose traditional Soviet methods of mass repression. The regime
cannot reform itself, as any democratic openings and regional
pluralism would threaten the foundations of the Putinist system. To
shield itself from organized unrest mobilized through the spread of
truthful information, the authorities plan to impose restrictions on
internet access for ordinary citizens.
Putin foresaw the prospect of public protests as
early as 2016, when Moscow established the National Guard of the
Russian Federation (Rosgvardia). It constitutes an internal military
force under the direct control of the Russian President that can be
deployed to prevent his removal from office. The National Guard
numbers at least 340,000 personnel distributed across Russia and its
mandate revolves around “protecting public order” – a standard
euphemism for mass repression. But state officials cannot be certain
whether intensified repression will neutralize or radicalize
citizens, or whether Rosgvardia recruits can be trusted to attack
unarmed civilians.
To distract from his failures, Putin can also
engage in new foreign adventures. But the law of "diminishing
returns” will work against him, with a growing number of people
realizing that the campaign to restore Russia as a major power
brings more costs than benefits. The initial euphoria of seizing
Crimea from Ukraine has dissipated and the mirage of greatness
simply disguises increasing impoverishment. Living standards
continue to decline while Moscow spends the dwindling Russian budget
on new weapons systems and conventional or proxy wars outside its
borders.
With his three consecutive terms ending in 2024,
Putin could either alter the constitution to remain President or
create a new position from which he could rule Russia. A closer
union between Russia and Belarus may be one option, similarly to
Slobodan Milosevic in the 1990s who maintained the relic of a
two-member federal Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in order to
rotate his power base. By absorbing Belarus the Kremlin could claim
a new state has been created and Putin would again become President
through fraudulent elections. But even such a maneuver, designed to
demonstrate Moscow’s unification of Slavic lands, is unlikely to
stem the rising tide of resistance to Putinism.
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