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When people power forced out North Macedonia's
regime in 2016, this was an inspiration to dissatisfied citizens
around the Balkans.
Other authoritarians such as president Aleksandar
Vucic of Serbia took note and tightened their stranglehold on
political and economic life, determined not to let the same happen
in their countries.
North Macedonia's incoming centre-left government
then struck historic deals with neighbours Bulgaria and Greece; on
Greek insistence, it changed its name and ended a dispute that had
blocked its path toward the EU and Nato for almost a quarter of a
century.
The EU responded by promising to open accession
talks. Meanwhile, former prime minister Nikola Gruevski was whisked
out of the country by Hungarian diplomats and evaded justice. He is
today a guest of Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban, his
ideological soulmate inside the EU.
At this week's EU summit in Brussels, the EU's
promise was broken.
Whereas a decision had been twice postponed
before, France has escalated to holding the whole collectively
agreed enlargement process hostage, demanding a rethink of the
accession method before talks begin with the two current candidates
- North Macedonia and Albania.
If France's vague demand stands, EU enlargement
for those not already negotiating would evaporate.
The terms for those countries already in that
process - Serbia and Montenegro - would be muddied rather than
clarified in a useful way.
Finally, there is a serious risk of a Gruevski
comeback in early elections that have, in the wake of France's veto,
been called for next April.
In a piece of unprecedented policy vandalism,
Macron has killed off a policy that until recently was seen as a
core function of the EU, and which is the EU's only strategy toward
its Balkan neighbours.
He is right that a policy review and recalibration
is needed - the frontrunners in EU accession talks, Montenegro and
Serbia, have both seen significant democratic and rule of law
backsliding, which belies the theory that the closer a country is to
joining, the stronger is the motivation to reform.
But Macron does not truly want to reform the
process, he wants to wreck it.
This European Council has brought him a great deal
closer to that goal. Contrary to many expectations, he did not blink
when confronted by Germany's chancellor, Angela Merkel. He held fast
against almost all other member states in insisting that a decision
be postponed until after a policy review.
What happened in Brussels this week indicates
France's attempt to transform a lowest common denominator approach
to enlargement that amounted to containment into a formalised
containment policy.
France says that both North Macedonia and
especially Albania have not advanced far enough to start membership
negotiations, and that the accession process is no longer adequate
to the task at hand. Neither of these arguments is entirely without
merit.
But nor do they constitute the true picture. The
absence of critique of the two "frontrunners," despite their
manifest state capture, is one clue.
The way in which France's assertions have been
advanced - without any specifics of what the two candidates are
supposed to do to meet French demands, and without specific
proposals on how to reform the process - suggests that what's at
stake, for Macron, is France's leadership role in a post-Brexit EU.
The Balkan states, and enlargement in general, are
merely collateral damage - expendable in his quest for supremacy. If
the EU is still talking accession with Serbia and Montenegro, there
is no objective reason why it would not do so with North Macedonia
and Albania.
The current mood inside the EU is dark. A number
of illiberal democracies are emerging, none more fully captured than
Hungary. All of them are in member states that joined in 2004 or
after.
But the argument that the EU should therefore
block enlargement is short-sighted. In fact, fighting for values and
standards in the enlargement countries is of one piece with the
fighting for the same values and standards inside the union.
Illiberal allies
Perversely for a president who has portrayed
himself as the anti-Orban in the EU firmament, Macron has
effectively allied with Orban and other illiberals on the EU
periphery.
These include Serbia's president Vucic.
It also includes Macron's openness to
ethno-territorial border shifts, beginning with a "land swap"
proposed by Vucic and his recently weakened Kosovo counterpart
president Hashim Thaci.
On this issue, Macron is even effectively allied
with US president Donald Trump against Merkel. As such, he makes the
national populist disease - and all its attendant effects, including
climate crisis denialism - stronger in Europe, not weaker.
If Macron believes that this policy will protect
him against this domestically or closer to home, he is likely to be
disappointed.
Europe's illiberals are allied and coordinated
beyond the EU member states - indeed, beyond the confines of Europe.
Macron seems to believe he can better defend his
vision of an EU as a Fortress Europe by eschewing alliances with
popular exponents of the EU's foundational values outside its ranks.
This policy is doomed to fail - weakening Europe
when it needs to consolidate around its fundamental values to face
unprecedented societal and civilisational challenge.
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