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French President Emmanuel Macron has described
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a "ticking time-bomb" and a grave concern for
Europe because of jihadists returning from Syria. He is tapping into
the anti-Bosniak stereotypes propounded by former Serbian leader
Slobodan Milošević during the wars in the 1990s. In reality, the
threat to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the broader region does not stem
from religious extremism but in the country’s internal ethnic
divisions and the destabilizing role of outside powers.
Macron recently blocked Western Balkan countries,
including those with sizeable Muslim populations, from entering the
European Union. In practice, his obstruction of EU accession talks
with Albania and North Macedonia will contribute to endangering
regional security more than any returning jihadists. Evidence
indicates that jihadism is more serious in France than anywhere in
the Balkans, particularly regarding the number of terrorist
incidents. Moreover, over 1,900 French citizens flocked to the
battlefields in Syria and Iraq as compared to about 300 Bosnian
citizens.
The fundamental problem for Bosnia-Herzegovina is
that successive Serbian and Croatian governments have not fully
accepted the country as a legitimate and sovereign multi-ethnic
state. The degree of pressure applied against Bosnia depends on the
extent of nationalist fervor within the governments in Belgrade and
Zagreb as well as on favorable international conditions, including
the ignorance or naïveté of some West European leaders.
While Serbia hides behind Russia to challenge
Bosnia’s integrity, Croatia conceals itself behind its membership in
the EU. Macron's controversial statement parrots remarks attributed
to Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović that Bosnia is a
security threat that is harboring terrorists. Although she
subsequently denied making these comments, the controversy led to
condemnations by the Bosnian government and ratcheted up tensions
between Bosniaks and Croats.
For Belgrade, Moscow plays a useful role by
defending Bosnia’s quasi-separatist Serbian entity (Republika Srpska
– RS) in the international arena and indicating that it could
support secession. Russia uses the Balkans as a strategic asset, not
simply to disrupt the region’s inclusion in the transatlantic
security sphere, but to undermine Western cohesion. The Kremlin
prefers that countries not join the Alliance as this enhances
Washington’s role in defending Europe. Nonetheless, Moscow is also
intensifying efforts to undermine the EU and NATO from within, as
its growing influence in Croatia, Hungary, and Bulgaria
demonstrates. Joining NATO helps strengthen state security but does
not ensure immunity from foreign subversion, especially if local
leaders calculate that they can profit politically or personally
from Moscow.
Croatia is now a primary Kremlin target to curtail
the development of energy projects that would challenge Russia’s
monopolistic ambitions toward regional gas supplies. Zagreb is also
useful for Russia in keeping Bosnia off balance. Nationalists in the
ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in both Croatia and Bosnia
view Russia’s presence as an opportunity to buttress their claims to
a third Croatian entity in Bosnia. Indeed, Serb and Croat leaders
collaborate in weakening the central government in Sarajevo. Trapped
in the middle, the Bosniak population could also radicalize, not in
religious militancy but through secular nationalism to resist
Serbian and Croatian irredentism.
The imminent departure of the United Kingdom from
the EU and the retirement of German Chancellor Angela Merkel can
also undercut support for an integrated Bosnian state, particularly
if Macron pursues his acquiescent approach toward President Vladimir
Putin. Given the negative role of neighbors and growing perceptions
of EU neglect, durable Bosnian stability depends primarily on the
United States. Washington and those NATO Allies that are determined
to resist Russia’s destabilizing inroads need to take the leading
role in integrating Bosnia internally and internationally.
After the appointment of a U.S. special envoy in
October 2019 to focus on normalizing relations between Serbia and
Kosova, a special representative should also be selected to deal
with Bosnia’s precarious stalemate. No status quo is durable and the
ingredients for a new conflagration are present, including economic
stagnation, nationalist radicalization, blockage to international
institutions, and the unsettling involvement of outside powers.
A special representative will need to focus on
three priorities to reinforce the Bosnian state. First, in
constructing a modern state the election law needs to be reformed to
EU standards, where ethnic identity does not override civic
citizenship in competing for office. Second, in building legitimate
institutions, the rule of law must ensure that the justice system is
separated from political interests so that judges and prosecutors
become independent actors.
And third, steps toward NATO membership have to be
consolidated. The Reform Program recently signed by the three-person
Bosnian Presidency is in effect the first Annual National Program
(ANP) that places Bosnia on the road toward accession. The new U.S.
envoy would need to concentrate on its implementation. Qualifying
for NATO will underscore that the security of the Bosnian state
guarantees the security of all ethnic groups and reduces the
prospect of external conflict. At the same time, Washington must
convince Zagreb that enabling Russia’s penetration weakens host
governments, inflames regional tensions, and undermines NATO
cohesion.
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