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The Great Game, a prolonged 19th century
confrontation between the British and Russian empires in Central
Asia, is often invoked as a prime example of the struggle for
influence between major powers. But another Great Game was played
out at that time in the Balkans between Russia and several European
powers when the Ottoman empire began to retreat. We are now
witnessing the 21st century version of the Balkan Great Game, but
where Moscow relies on subversion and deception as it cannot compete
militarily or economically with the West.
Putin’s Russia does not simply meddle or have
malign intentions on the Balkan peninsula. These terms are
misleading simplifications that disguise Moscow’s long-term
objectives and may weaken the urgency of a concerted Western
response. Words and definitions frame perceptions and help determine
political actions, so it is important to understand the nature of
the challenge. The Kremlin views the Balkans as a strategic asset
and pursues at least four consistent goals.
First, it seeks to expand Russia’s geopolitical
reach. Traditionally, the Balkans are a stepping-stone to the
Adriatic and Mediterranean, a link between Europe and Asia, and an
inroad into Central Europe. Moscow’s influence over Balkan
governments, its role in multi-national formats (including the Peace
Implementation Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina), its military
deployments (as in Serbia), and its institutional presence through
various arms of the Russian state, provide it with a major stake in
the region’s evolution.
A second and related goal is to fracture Western
cohesion and undermine the role of Western institutions. Fomenting
conflict not only contributes to unsettling the Balkans, it also
divides international responses. One recent example was the
territorial exchange gamble between Serbia and Kosova supported by
Moscow and accepted by some Western officials. Even debates about
partition promote rifts in the region and policy disarray between
Western governments. Unresolved conflicts and disputed states also
enable the Kremlin to claim that despite its expansion NATO has
failed to stabilize the Balkans.
A third Russian objective is to undercut the U.S.
presence. The main reason for obstructing NATO enlargement is to
prevent a growing American military footprint and to preclude any
firm security guarantees to countries in the region. The Kremlin
prefers that Balkan states not join the Alliance, as this enhances
Washington’s role in defending Europe. Nonetheless, it is also
intensifying efforts to weaken EU and NATO from within, as its
growing influences in Croatia, Hungary, and Bulgaria demonstrate.
Joining NATO helps strengthen state security but it does not ensure
immunity from subversion.
A fourth Kremlin goal is to gain allies or
supplicants. This is where the economic and energy dimensions are
most pronounced in corrupting, blackmailing, bribing, or
subordinating officials and politicians who can assist Moscow,
whether by weakening sanctions, not condemning Russia’s actions in
international fora, or urging a return to normal business. Although
Moscow is not a leading economic player in the Balkans, compared to
the EU or China, its investments and expenditures are targeted for
maximum political impact and the propaganda of Russian assistance is
pronounced. Simultaneously, state-directed disinformation campaigns
claim that Western democracies are a failing system, the EU will
disintegrate, and close ties with Russia offer a valuable
alternative.
In the context of these strategic objectives,
Moscow deploys a broad arsenal of tactical tools evident in four key
domains. First, it promotes local nationalism to stir conflicts
between rival nationalist projects and enable the Kremlin to
intervene diplomatically. For instance, it helps the autonomous
government in Bosnia’s Serb entity to keep the country divided and
encourages Bosnian Croats to push for a third entity.
In Kosova, which Russia blocks from UN membership,
the Serbian minority is courted as a repressed nationality in order
to fan internal conflict. North Macedonia's domestic turmoil and its
obstructed path toward the EU has also been exploited by Moscow.
Montenegro presents another opportunity for destabilization, as
witnessed in a coup attempt directed by Russia’s military
intelligence officers in October 2016 and continuing support for
Serb nationalists and the Serbian Orthodox Church who oppose
Montenegro’s independence.
The second Kremlin tool is the corruption of
national politicians and businessmen to favor Russian interests and
remain neutral or support Moscow’s positions in its various foreign
policy offensives. Third, Moscow fosters energy dependence by tying
Balkan countries into its pipeline projects and purchasing
refineries and other energy facilities. Energy dependence is used as
a method to ensure political compliance.
And fourth, Russian state organs engage in
disinformation offensives through local media, internet, and social
networks to enhance Russia’s prestige and undermine Western
institutions. Its messages are intended to appeal to anti-globalist,
Euro-skeptic, ultra-conservative, and religious constituencies in
which Russia masquerades as the defender of traditional values and
the EU and United States are portrayed as immoral and deviant.
Simultaneously, it continues to pose to the radical left as an
anti-imperialist and anti-American vanguard. These themes have
resonance throughout Europe, but especially in regions with deep
uncertainties about the future.
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