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Moscow has a long history of disseminating
disinformation to soften up its targets and achieve specific
political goals. In Soviet times such initiatives were often
included under the rubric of “agitprop” – agitation and propaganda.
Agitprop campaigns were not only designed to convince people about
the Bolshevik version of reality, they were also intended to
mobilize them to act upon these convictions. Putinist agitprop aimed
at Western societies has a similar purpose.
Kremlin propaganda offensives against democratic
systems include both psychological and policy components. The
objective is not only to divide Western societies, many of which are
already politically polarized, or even to cultivate pro-Russian
states. Its primary strategic goals are to paralyze democratic
systems, fracture international institutions, and incapacitate
national decision making particularly in countries that may
challenge Russia’s neo-imperial aspirations.
While Soviet communism had a unitary ideological
message in the global competition between two distinct
socio-economic systems, Moscow’s contemporary narratives are
“multi-ideological.” Its messages lack a singular precept or core
value but are tailored and adapted for maximum impact among a
diversity of targeted audiences.
These propaganda narratives include at least three
major message clusters – traditionalist, progressivist, and
sovereigntist. The “traditionalist“ narrative is constructed to
appeal to anti-liberal, Euro-skeptic, social conservative, and
conventional religious constituencies in which Russia poses as the
defender of traditional values. Conversely, EU and U.S. leaders and
institutions are depicted as immoral, deviant, decadent,
multi-culturalist, atheistic, liberal, and libertarian.
In this propaganda vortex, the principles of NATO
and EU integration are condemned as being in direct confrontation
with traditional social, familial, and religious values. Whereas the
Soviet Union proclaimed itself as a revolutionary social force,
Russia now poses to conservatives as a counter-revolutionary power
that cherishes stability, continuity, faith, and tradition.
Paradoxically, fundamentalist traditionalism in a multicultural
context can also be presented as revolutionary by appealing to
disaffected nationalist youth as well as to the conservative older
generation seeking to restore an idealized bygone era.
A second Kremlin-generated narrative can be
designated as “progressivist.” It is a more direct successor to
Soviet propaganda and crafted to appeal to Western radical leftist,
militant pacifist, anti-globalist, anti-militarist, anti-capitalist,
anarcho-nihilist, and radical environmentalist movements. It depicts
Russia as an inheritor of the USSR, a staunch bastion of
anti-imperialism and an internationalist vanguard against American
global hegemony and corporatist capitalism.
A third distinct Kremlin narrative bundle is the
“sovereigntist.” It often overlaps with the traditionalist agitprop
but focuses on the promotion of ethnic nationalism, regionalist
separatism, xenophobic racism, protectionist nativism, and
absolutist state sovereignty. Propaganda campaigns along the
sovereigntist front are designed to fracture Western democracies by
promoting domestic secessionist movements and inter-ethnic or
inter-regional rivalries, while urging the dismantling of
multi-national institutions such as NATO that allegedly threaten
state independence.
The three major narratives are not simply
fashioned to passively appeal to Western citizens. The main purpose
is to agitate and marshal people to act upon their perceptions and
convictions. Agitprop can influence party preferences, voting
patterns, and policy choices. It may mobilize the young to engage in
protest actions, join militant political organizations, or actively
support single-issue causes. Propaganda of the word is combined with
propaganda of the deed.
Kremlin-linked oligarchs fund organizations and
campaigns in Western societies that reinforce Moscow’s three
clusters of narratives. In the traditionalist package, a number of
ultra-rightists and populist parties have reportedly received loans,
PR assistance, and campaign funds from Russian sources. In return,
party leaders applaud Russia’s foreign policy and heap praise on
Vladimir Putin as a strong and effective leader. Connections are
also pursued with conservative church organizations, including
evangelical groups in the United States that believe and preach that
Russia is a staunchly religious and family-oriented country.
In its progressivist agitprop, Russian sources
have funded or given publicity to ultra-leftist parties and
movements that can help challenge the policies of Western
governments. They primarily target younger generations who are more
inclined to participate in anti-government protest actions or they
seek to maneuver green movements and other causes to promote Kremlin
interests.
Sovereigntist agitprop has benefited from a
bonanza of ethno-nationalist, separatist, and pro-sovereignty
movements in Europe. Brexit provided a valuable opportunity to
support ruptures in the European Union and even the potential
breakup of the United Kingdom. Regardless of their merits, Scottish
and Catalan independence have either been encouraged or discredited
by Russian propaganda activists with the aim of disrupting the
domestic cohesion of Western countries.
Various liberation movements in Western states,
including marginal separatists from Texas and California, have been
invited to conferences in Moscow. Such gatherings also enable
Russian officials to showcase and legitimize separatist groups in
Georgia, Ukraine, and other neighboring states, while excluding
autonomist, regionalist, and separatist organizations active in the
Russian Federation. Moscow has also encouraged ethnic, racial, and
religious disputes and fueled other socially divisive issues in the
U.S.
The eclectic nature of Putinist agitprop not only
broadens its appeal but it also ensures that countering Moscow’s
disinformation is more challenging than in Soviet times.
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