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As it turned out, French President Emmanuel
Macron’s proposed strategy for the Western Balkans once again
triggered off debates, within EU and the region alike. Flaws of the
present procedure have been brought in the open for the first time
and relevant amendments taken into consideration. Candidacies denied
to North Macedonia and Albania have been recognized as strategic
mistakes, not only the Balkans but also EU could be paying dearly
for. Having raised the question of Western Balkans’ importance to
EU, the debate resulted in a new methodology for the European
Commission; the said methodology implies, inter alia, that the
Commission and EU member-states should work harder on implementation
of the strategy.
The announced investment plan for the Balkans can
be seen as EU’s comeback on the region’s reformist scene. EU’s
stronger economic presence in the Western Balkans will existentially
tie the region with it on the one hand, and, on the other hamper the
presence of other actors EU is concerned about.
Declaratively, the Western Balkans has been after
Euro-Atlantic integration; the region, however, lacks human
resources to implement reforms preconditioning the membership.
Actually, the region was better prepared for the process before the
1990s than it is now. Wars, attainments turned null and void in the
“name of new values,” failed transition, but the arrangements made
after the wars (Dayton Accords, Kosovo status) as well stalled
Balkan societies and kept alive territorial ambitions some local
leaders have been nourishing for long. The Western community has
underestimated the power of those ambitions and, hence, left the
Balkans be “an unfinished business.”
Because of its lasting ambition for domination
Serbia stands as the biggest obstacle to its neighbors. Belgrade’s
policies hamper democratic consolidation in the neighborhood,
productive regional cooperation and the region’s progress towards EU
and NATO.
Two decades are the period long enough for
realistic assessment of potential of the region as a whole, and of
each individual country. The latter had not been equally developed
in the Yugoslav era, and their concepts for rearrangement of the
common state actually clashed: centralism vs. confederation. Once
the two concepts actually clashed Yugoslavia started disintegrating
in the most brutal way. Three decades later the said differences are
still manifest – in the newly emerged states’ plans for the future
and regional relations in the first place.
In this context Serbia stands out as a country
unwilling to recognize new regional realities – to acknowledge the
reality of new states and threat them as partners on the same
footing. This is evident in its daily stands on its neighbors: the
countries it would not see as independent and is still after their
territories. The said mostly relates to Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Montenegro, Kosovo, and even to Macedonia. Belgrade’s policy for
“protection of the Serbian people” and prevention of their
integration in the countries they are actually living in, fuels
tensions with hate speech and demonization of neighboring nations.
As a central country in the Balkans, Serbia is
trying to maximally play on the existing political and economic
context it sees as advantageous to it. In this sense, Belgrade has
been demonstrating self-confidence, convinced it could make progress
through diversification of its relations with Russia and China. At
the same time, the West’s appeasing policy towards Serbia – treating
it as a regional leader and factor of stability – only strengthened
Serbia’s elites’ belief in viability of their ambitions.
It turned out, however, that Serbia is a key
factor of regional destabilization, and shall remain such as long as
it sticks to pan-Serbian nationalism. Serbia’s national elite has
always been looking forward to international constellation that
would make it possible for it – with a helping hand from Russia – to
round off the “national program.” Russia plays a major role in
keeping that delusion alive; it managed to deeply root the thesis
that “Serbs should be lucky for not being in EU” in Serbia’s public
opinion. By keeping the Western Balkans away from EU and fueling
local disputes Russia is undermining European unity and EU’s
plausibility.
Serbia’s policy for the region barely changed
after Milošević’s ouster. National strategists are actually praising
him for waging wars that earmarked the territories that, as times go
by, new authorities would consolidate as Serbian ethnic areas either
by “democratic means” or “Gandhian non-violent disobedience.” The
means Serbia has been using the current international context to do
with developments in West-Islamic world relation, and especially so
when it comes to Bosnia. From time to time, and thirty years later,
national ideologists give vent to their heartfelt desire for
rearrangement of the Balkans along ethnic lines.
Belgrade has not put an end to the so-called
Serbian question; the way it has been “solving” it is contrary to
the interests of the Serbian people in neighboring countries.
Official documents detailing the policy for the region testify of
Belgrade’s intentions: The Strategy for the Safeguard and
Strengthening of Relations between the Mother Country and Serbian
Diaspora in the Region (2011) and the Charter on Serbian Cultural
Space (2019). The Serbian Orthodox Church, the only legitimate
cross-border institution, is in charge of implementation of both
documents. No wonder, therefore, that Belgrade strengthens its
support to Serbian communities in the neighborhood, as well as the
pressure on neighboring authorities complaining of status and rights
for Serbian communities. In all this, the Progressive Club (Napredni
klub) plays a special role. Its reports are lending force to the
thesis about Serbs in jeopardy in all neighboring countries.
The way in which Serbia’s elites are defining the
country’s strategic interests provides insight into Serbia’s
behavior. Regardless of what party is in power, those interests
remain the interests of the state. “Options” in power differ each
from another only by methods – basics are the same. The present
regime has totally laid bare this strategy and, in a way, opened the
eyes of all neighbors and the West alike. The fluid international
context practically bolstered the regime’s morale: so, its steps
became bolder, rhetoric more open and behavior even more ruthless at
domestic, regional and international arena.
Serbia’s geopolitical interest in
Bosnia-Herzegovina is the safeguard of Republica Srpska (RS) and its
integration with Serbia. RS is seen as Serbia’s only victory in the
1990s and is treated, therefore, as a foreign policy priority. The
above is quoted in the Security Strategy (minister) Vulin has
presented to the parliament. RS is important to Serbia not only for
providing access to the Adriatic Sea but also exerting pressure on
Montenegro (which is more than evident in the past two months),
control over both banks of the Drina River and moving the “line of
civilization” towards the West. In peacetime, attainment of goals by
other means implies acknowledgment of the Dayton Accords as the
optimal solution under specific circumstances.
Geopolitically speaking, Serbia sees Montenegro as
a “domestic issue” and “immeasurably important.” It has never
accepted Montenegro’s independence, and treats it just as a
territory, as another Serbian country. It denies Montenegrin
nationality and language, and argues that Montenegrin identity is
hybrid. Consequently, it strengthens the position of the Serbian
people in Montenegro, while the Serbian Orthodox Church has the
status of “a state within state.” Serbia would like to see a “state
political leader” who pays heed to Serbia’s interests at the helm of
Montenegro. This is why it perceives Milo Đukanović as a stumbling
block on its way. Its ultimate goal is to restore Montenegro within
a common state – it is the only way, it is being argued, for making
both Serbia and Montenegro strategically important.
Serbian strategists have always treated the
Macedonian issue as a main geopolitical issue of the Balkans.
Historian Milorad Ekmečić used to say, “Whoever controls the Vardar
Valley is a hegemonist of the Balkans.” From a strategic point of
view, Macedonia has always been “in the same package” with Kosovo,
which practically explains NATO intervention as well. Namely,
Milošević’s policy was seen as a threat to the security of NATO’s
south wing. This was the reason why in December 1992 Milošević got
the so-called Christmas warning, and in 1993 the UN Security Council
decided to deploy UN troops to Macedonia – to warn Belgrade against
intervening in Kosovo. Belgrade has been involved in all
developments in Macedonia ever since its independence. It strongly
reproached the authorities in Skopje for having recognized Kosovo’s
independence, while wholeheartedly supporting Nikola Gruevski who
was flirting with Moscow at the time. Belgrade has always counted on
Macedonian-Albanian relationship to exemplify a latent conflict.
However, it was because of Macedonia’s fragility and its strategic
importance that the Western international community has put an end
to interethnic conflicts, worked hard on the Ohrid Agreement and
then opened NATO gates to Macedonia.
Nevertheless, Serbian strategists still consider
Belgrade capable of influencing Macedonian population, mostly
through economy and culture, and thus geostrategically tie North
Macedonia to Serbia. In parallel, the state of Macedonia is more and
more under pressure from Serbia in relation to the status of the
Serbian community, the members of which had been deeply involved in
Macedonia’s latest elections when they worked in tandem with
Belgrade’s and Russia’s secret services.
Though expelled from Kosovo back in 1999, the
state of Serbia still sees Kosovo as a geopolitical region crucial
to it. Accordingly, ague its decision-makers, Albanians are not a
state-building nation, while Kosovo as such is a mafia state
incapable of surviving without support from the outside – mostly
from NATO and US. Belgrade is fully aware that Kosovo Albanians are
important allies of the West, as well as that its dynamic population
is oriented towards Euro-Atlantic integrations – which in itself
undermines Serbia’s influence. This was the reason why Belgrade
tried to split Serbs and Albanians; actually, it wanted to have
Kosovo partitioned but failed despite Hashim Tachi – and, more
importantly Edi Rama – were going on with the plan for a while.
“After the intervention Kosovo became most important and
geographically predisposed central geopolitical area,” argue Serbian
strategists, adding that this is why it is imperative to Serbia to
have Kosovo on its plate all the time by meddling with its political
processes. The Serbian list is therefore a major instrument of
making Serbian aspirations for Kosovo come true.
With such pretentious notion about its own
importance Serbia disregards interests of other actors in the region
and, moreover, interests of some players from abroad. It relies too
much on Russia, the interests of which are not identical to
Serbia’s.
The ongoing regional dynamics and, especially,
synchronous developments in Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina reveal
the attempt at creating some new realities (threats with referendum
in RS and religious processions in Montenegro) that would
destabilize the entire region. Serbia’s policy for the region is the
same as Russia’s for its close neighborhood (Ukraine, Georgia and
Moldova). Russia’s behavior in the region aims at compromising EU
and NATO, by destabilizing the entire region through Serbia. And
yet, it can be said that EU – despite many challenges it has to cope
with within – for the first time responds rationally to ongoing
regional developments: it sided with Montenegro and Bosnia, and
warned Serbia that any change of borders was out of the question.
Even Ambassador Richard Grenell, torchbearer of US latest initiative
in the Balkans, wrote in a tweet that any exchange of territories
was out of the question.
The present regime’s “strongman” Vučić could have
gone down the history as someone who had managed to change Serbia’s
deep-rooted orientation. Obviously, however, he is not capable of it
– either due to his own incapacity or because of the pressure from
home or abroad (Russia). So, he will go down the history as a leader
who had totally laid bare the Serbian project, and forced EU to
finally stand up for the region despite all adverse circumstances.
Regional consolidation and solidarity are most
important for making it a subject in international arena rather than
a “puppet.” Regional cooperation is a major element of European
prospects for the Western Balkans. Consolidated Balkans would
testify of EU’s lasting integrative potential. The region’s
partition into different spheres of interest would be fatal, as a
generator of constant tensions. At the Munich Security Conference
2020 Josep Borell said, “If we are incapable of playing the most
important role in our closest neighborhood, then we can say goodbye
to Europe’s role in geopolitics.” Considering EU’s ambitions to
become a global player, the Western Balkans will be the first test
of its capability for it.
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