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While the coronavirus pandemic preoccupies
Washington, the Trump administration is inadvertantly stoking a new
conflict in the Balkans. In a hastened effort to forge a settlement
between Serbia and Kosovo that would enable U.S. forces to leave the
region, the White House could unravel many Western achievements
since ending the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s by inciting new regional
rivalries.
Kosovo is in the midst of a political crisis as
the coalition government fell apart on March 25 because of
disagreements over responses to the pandemic. But the real battle
has pitted President Hashim Thaci, who has reportedly discussed
Kosovo’s partition with Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vucic, against
Prime Minister Albin Kurti, who is adamantly opposed to any border
changes. Washington has evidently sided with Thaci in the forlorn
hope that it can quickly settle the Serbia-Kosovo dispute.
The core of this Balkan standoff is Belgrade’s
refusal to recognize Kosovo as an independent state. This
inter-state paralysis hinders Serbia’s ambitions to enter the
European Union and freezes Kosovo’s entrance into international
institutions. Instead of agreeing on implementable steps toward
bilateral recognition, Thaci and Vucic seem to believe that an
exchange of territory will be a magic wand in normalizing relations.
The fall of the Kurti government and the resulting
political turmoil provides an opportunity for Thaci to bypass
government and parliament in making deals with Belgrade. The
swirling rumors in Pristina about U.S. supported land swaps has even
forced the State Department to issue a statement denying that there
is any secret plan. But the wording of the statement did little to
assuage growing fears that Thaci and Vucic are negotiating with
Washington’s blessing.
If a land swap is considered by some officials to
be such a great deal, then one wonders why it has only been
discussed secretly and is regularly denied. If Washington supports
territorial changes, it should be clear how exactly this will occur
with full democratic legitimacy. A credible land exchange would
require several preconditions: Serbia and Kosovo recognizing each
other as independent countries; popular approval through a
parliamentary vote or public referendum; necessary constitutional
amendments; and assistance to citizens affected by the land swaps
during their voluntary relocation.
Without such a comprehensive package, three
immediate threats will surface: Domestic, regional and
international. Half-baked border alterations are likely to create
even more domestic conflicts in both Serbia and Kosovo. Without
plebiscites and parliamentary approval, deals struck behind closed
door will not be widely accepted and can accelerate feelings of
grievance. In Kosovo this will intensify political conflicts
especially if the country does not benefit from UN membership as a
result of the deal. And in Serbia, the loss of any more territory
could inflame nationalism if the deal does not culminate in EU
entry. Such disputes are more likely to turn violent during times of
economic disruption, fear and uncertainty that the pandemic has
unleashed.
Regionally, border changes approved by the U.S.
will encourage separatists and irredentists to interpret them as
legitimizing national homogenization. With the principle of
multi-ethnicity evidently jettisoned, demands for mono-ethnicity
would escalate and potentially unravel several countries. Western
institutions and NATO forces may find themselves woefully unprepared
for the wave of instability that could engulf the region. Calls for
several hundred American troops to be withdrawn from the vital NATO
mission in Kosovo will add fuel to the flames.
Territorial revisions in Kosovo could raise
support for unification with Albania. Such momentum could spread to
North Macedonia, where at least a quarter of the population is
Albanian. Threats to North Macedonia’s territorial integrity would
intensify ethno-nationalism and potentially bring both Bulgaria and
Albania into an expanding conflict. The Serb entity in
Bosnia-Herzegovina can demand the application of the Kosovo
precedent in splitting from Bosnia, likewise with the Croat
population in western Herzegovina and the Bosniak population in
Serbia’s Sandjak region.
Internationally, the prospect of land swaps adds
another dimension to Moscow’s divisive plans in the Western Balkans
and establishes usable precedents elsewhere. The most effective way
to close doors to NATO and EU membership is to exploit inter-state
conflicts so the disputants are viewed as unfit for accession.
Moscow is well aware that various Balkan nationalists will pounce on
the prospect of territorial acquisitions and can be encouraged to
pursue even more ambitious irredentist claims. Russian officials can
simultaneously offer regional settlements and inject themselves as
mediators.
Kremlin support for Balkan land exchanges also
establishes valuable precedents, particularly for its own partition
of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and other targeted states. Moscow’s
coerced border changes can be depicted as legitimate moves that
mirror Western support for ethnic homogenization in the Balkans.
This could reduce calls for economic sanctions against Russia for
carving up its neighbors’ territories. Instead of pushing back on
Moscow’s subversion and destabilization of the Balkans, U.S.
supported border changes could turn out to be a gift for President
Putin.
Janusz Bugajski is a senior fellow at the
Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington, D.C. His
recent book, co-authored with Margarita Assenova, is entitled
“Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks,” Jamestown
Foundation, Washington, D.C.
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