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The Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue, aimed at reaching
the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, was
launched in 2011 with the mediation of the European Union. Over the
years, the negotiations were marred by ups and downs. After a long
suspension, lately both the EU and the US – with the appointments of
Miroslav Lajčák and Richard Grenell as special envoys – have stepped
up efforts to resume the dialogue on separate tracks, creating a bit
of confusion in the region and an unnecessary diplomatic
competition. We have asked two outstanding representatives of the
civil societies of Kosovo and Serbia their opinions on the current
political situation and the future of this dialogue.
Lulzim Peci is the Executive Director of the
Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED).
Sonja Biserko is the founder and president of the
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.
EU special envoy Miroslav Lajčák hopes to restart
the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue before the end of July. In your
opinion, what went wrong in the EU-facilitated dialogue so far, and
what should be changed in the format in order for it to make
substantial progress?
LP. First of all, the Brussels dialogue has been
led by the mantra of the “strategic ambiguity” by treating Kosovo in
“neutral status” terms and Serbia as a full-fledged state, which at
the same time was considering Kosovo as its part. This approach,
regardless of the fact that it has brought a very fragile détente
between Kosovo and Serbia, proved to be a strategic mistake, as it
has not led to a comprehensive normalisation of relations between
the two countries. In contrary, relations between them have remained
tensed and hostile. Secondly, more than 30 agreements have been
achieved between the two capitals, but there was not a verification
mechanism in place by Brussels to impose the implementation of those
agreements, which in essence discredited the format of EU dialogue.
The dialogue that is expected to be led by EU Special Envoy Lajčák
should move on from this barren “strategic ambiguity”. Instead, it
should focus on explicit recognition of Kosovo by Serbia which, in
my opinion, is a precondition for a comprehensive normalisation of
relations between Prishtina and Belgrade.
SB. The dialogue went in the wrong direction when
former EU High Representative Federica Mogherini allowed the change
of format, i.e. the partition deal. The problem is that Serbia’s
only option was always partition, and it is not surprising that
Belgrade tried its best to convince the other side to become part of
it. It would be interesting to know details of how Albanians,
including Edi Rama, became Belgrade partners in the deal.
In 2011, the EU was tasked by the UN with leading
the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue. This was done in concert with the
US and other international actors. Now the US is competing with the
EU, facilitating its own dialogue in alternative to European
efforts. Do you think that two dialogues are better than one? How do
you see the American initiative that seems to be based more on a
domestic electoral agenda than on the real needs of Serbia and
Kosovo? Are you concerned that current EU and US diverging actions
as regards the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue could spread also to the
neighbouring countries, impacting on the overall precarious
stability of the whole region?
LP. I do not think that the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue
has any importance in the US domestic electoral agenda. On the other
hand, US Envoy Ambassador Grenell has declared that his mediation
venture is coordinated with German and French National Security
Advisers, and at the same time another meeting is planned to be
hosted by President Macron and Chancellor Merkel in Paris in early
July. Obviously, there are few parallel mediation efforts taking
place simultaneously, but personally, I expect that throughout this
process a trans-Atlantic synergy will be achieved, because this is
not a matter of desire, but a necessity for the stability and
security in the Western Balkans that is also challenged by Russia
and China.
SB. The US and the EU have worked together in the
Balkans since the 1990s, and their alliance had some weight in
talking with Belgrade. Unfortunately, Trump’s administration changed
the context not only in the Balkans, but worldwide. Most of the US
Balkan experts have left the office or are marginalised. The new
ones have little or no knowledge about the Balkans' recent history.
The Balkans are not relevant for the US elections, but for some
reasons they are now trying to cut the deal which is already, as
many insiders point out, on paper. It can also be viewed as an act
against EU credibility. I do not think that a two-track dialogue can
contribute to the solution, having in mind that the EU is against
partition and the US is now facilitating a partition deal. In the
meantime, Russia has also come forward with some messages concerning
Kosovo. All in all, it looks as if the Balkan arena serves as a
playground for some international actors. Since Kosovo is the
European problem, it is only the EU which should be the main broker
in the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue. In case the US option
(partition) wins, it would seriously undermine regional stability
and renew territorial pretensions.
As to the dialogue that is aimed at reaching a
legally binding, comprehensive agreement with mutual recognition, do
you believe that the question of the land swap is off the table or
it is still an option for the two sides? Do you think that the
setting-up of the Association of Serbian municipalities could help
strengthen stability in the region and further guarantee the respect
of the rights of the Serbian population in Kosovo?
LP. I am sure that Vučić will try to open the land
swap option during the negotiation process, but I do not think that
this option has any support either in Washington or in Berlin and
Paris. Also, this option is strongly opposed by the government and
people of Kosovo, including Kosovo Serbs. Therefore, I think that
this option has minimal chances to become an outcome of the
negotiation process. Strengthening collective rights of Kosovo Serbs
will strengthen multi-ethnic democracy in the country, if it is not
done at the expense of the functionality of Kosovo as a state, which
is a fundamental precondition for increasing the quality of life and
prosperity of every citizen and its people.
SB. Land swap is not off the table yet. As long as
Serbia has Russian support, the swap will be an option for Belgrade.
Unfortunately, Serbia – though rhetorically for the EU membership –
does actually nothing to abide with standards and reforms provided
by the Commission. The Association of Serbian municipalities in
Kosovo is the real reason behind the blockade of the dialogue. It is
about the interpretation of the Serbian status in Kosovo. Belgrade
is pushing for a Republika Srpska- status, which means a
dysfunctional state like Bosnia. The piecemeal approach by the
internationals as was practiced over the last three decades always
ends up appeasing Serbia as the bigger and central state in the
Balkans. Kosovo, also Bosnia, should be viewed from the regional
perspective as well, because this is the only way to keep balance
and hinder ethno-nationalist agendas.
Since its start in 2013, more than 30 agreements
have been signed within the framework of the Belgrade-Prishtina
dialogue. Many of these, though, have not been implemented or only
partially implemented by the two sides. Don't you think that the EU
should set up a verification body to check the follow-up of the
agreements signed?
LP. I think that a EU – US verification mechanism
should be part of the comprehensive agreement between Kosovo and
Serbia, and it should be a subject of Chapter 35 of the Acquis for
Serbia and integration process of Kosovo into EU.
SB. Indeed, these agreements are relevant for both
sides and should be pursued. Dialogue should be continued along
Brussels agreement framework. The EU should get more engaged in
monitoring the implementation of those agreements, which can change
the reality of Kosovo. But recognition of Kosovo is an imperative.
Consolidation of borders would be an important step forward, as it
will hinder the constant homogenisation on both sides and open the
space for other existential issues.
Is there any way the European Parliament can
support the resumption of the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue like, for
example, by setting up a forum of civil society organisations from
Kosovo and Serbia that can accompany and run in parallel with the
official dialogue at non-governmental level? How to prepare public
opinions to accept a comprehensive settlement that in any case will
be a compromise?
LP. The European Parliament can play a threefold
role in relation to the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. First, it might be
very useful in order to increase transparency and accountability of
the EU Commission, if the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
European Parliament establishes a working group on Kosovo-Serbia
dialogue in charge of overseeing the Prishtina-Belgrade negotiations
that was missing in the past. Second, the Committee can engage MPs
from both Kosovo and Serbia in a dialogue for normalising relations
and building cooperation between the parliaments of both countries.
Third, facilitation of the dialogue between civil society
organisations and media from both countries may help building a
positive environment for public opinions in both countries to accept
a possible agreement.
SB. The EU should also be more engaged with civil
society, especially the part which advocates liberal values and
Kosovo sovereignty. There should be more communication between the
two sides on different levels – civic, academic, media, cultural.
This can prepare society for the normalisation of relations and
future cooperation.
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