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After the calamitous failure of the Trump
Administration’s attempt to take over the economic aspects of
dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade, the European Union
reasserted its primacy in a flurry of meetings last week between
Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti with French
President Macron, German Chancellor Merkel, and EU High
Representative Borrell. Special Representative Miroslav Lajcak is
putting the dialogue, which aims at achieving in months rather than
years comprehensive normalization between Serbia and Kosovo, back on
track within the European context, which is where it belongs. The
Europeans are open to working in tandem with the US, which is
necessary for success.
But haste can make waste. Preparation for
negotiation is often more important than what is said at the
negotiating table. I see lack of preparation in all four major
capitals: Pristina, Belgrade, Brussels, and Washington.
Pristina
With President Thaci sidelined by a pending
indictment, the Prime Minister will lead Kosovo’s negotiating team.
His government has a razor-thin majority in parliament. It needs to
strengthen that to more than two-thirds, and preferably 75%–before
engaging seriously with Serbia. That would ensure that whatever he
agrees in Brussels can be implemented in Pristina. It will also
blunt the role of the Serb representatives, who are controlled by
Belgrade, and enable election of a new President, if the indictment
is confirmed and Thaci resigns.
Hoti has laid out a reasonable platform for his
opening position, but I haven’t seen signs yet of serious
preparation on the many issues that will be on the agenda, including
major political items: will Kosovo aim for bilateral recognition by
Serbia, or will it be content with UN membership? How can that be
achieved? Will Kosovo allow formation of an Association of Serb
Municipalities in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s
requirements? How will disputes over property issues be settled in
the aftermath of normalization? How will Serbs, Serb religious sites
and other property in Kosovo be protected?
Belgrade
President Vucic has what Hoti lacks: more than
two-thirds support in parliament, thanks to an election boycott by
most of his opposition. He dominates the media and the courts in
ways that any autocrat would admire. He also has an enviable best
alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA): he can live with the
status quo, at least until the EU decides to make it painful for him
or presents a more attractive alternative.
But he is trapped in that comfortable position.
While most Serbs care far more about jobs and Covid-19 than Kosovo,
Vucic has done nothing to prepare his citizens for acceptance that
Kosovo is lost. He has instead repeatedly suggested that he would
only give up Kosovo, which is no longer his, if he gets something in
return. There isn’t much to be given. When former Finnish President
Ahtisaari wrote the plan that led to Kosovo’s independence
declaration, he gave Serbia everything it really wanted, because he
thought Belgrade would recognize the new state.
Vucic, or some future leader of Serbia, needs to
set out to convince its citizens that they would gain more from
good, normalized, neighborly relations with Kosovo than from the
current situation. Belgrade’s current stance–that Kosovo may not be
under its control but that is no reason to give it up–is
counter-productive for the Serbian economy and Serbia’s EU
ambitions.
Brussels
Brussels has helped to kill the idea of a land and
people swap between Belgrade and Pristina, which is what Vucic was
hoping for. Now it needs to think about what it can offer as either
carrots or sticks to get Vucic out of his comfortable stance. The
carrots could include Covid-19 recovery aid, Green Deal funding, and
a regional reconciliation fund. I can also imagine sticks: Serbia’s
progress in accession talks with Brussels should be strictly
conditional on its performance in the dialogue with Pristina,
including implementation of existing agreements, renewal of
prosecutions of war criminals, and willingness to accept essential
elements of normalization like cooperation with the Kosovo army and
intelligence services.
On the Pristina side of the equation, Brussels
also has a lot of work to do:
Resolve member state objections to admitting
Kosovo into the EU’s visa waiver program, the conditions for which
Pristina long ago satisfied.
Invent a serious mechanism, if possible jointly
with the US, to monitor and ensure implementation of existing and
future agreements emerging from the dialogue.
Convince the five EU members that have not
recognized Kosovo to pledge to do so not on accession, which is far
in the future, but rather on achieving candidate status.
These moves would give Brussels the kind of
credibility it needs, and currently lacks, in Kosovo. Of course it
would lose that credibility quickly if any carrots offered to
Belgrade are not also provided to Pristina.
Washington
Richard Grenell, still President Trump’s special
envoy for the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue, is not a credible
interlocutor for either Europe, which he has gone out of his way to
offend on numerous occasions, or Kosovo, whose territory he would
have happily traded away. He may continue his parallel, mostly
uncoordinated effort to achieve economic agreements between Belgrade
and Pristina, but the odds are long for anything substantial. He is
already refocusing his attention on the election campaign, which all
along was one of his motives in pursuing a diplomatic spectacular
with Pristina and Belgrade.
Vice President Biden has made clear that he would
return the United States to its normal posture in the Balkans:
support for democracy, the rule of law, Kosovo’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity, and normalization between Pristina and
Belgrade. While Biden is far ahead in current polling, there are
still more than three months left before the election, and six
before inauguration day. It is hard for me to picture anything good
coming from official Washington before Trump is out of office,
though participation in an implementation monitoring mechanism
should be feasible. Brussels, Belgrade, and Pristina should all be
trying to ensure that if Biden is elected, they will be ready to
welcome more serious American engagement.
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