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Since the anti-civilian wars in a collapsing
Yugoslavia in the 1990s, pursued primarily by Belgrade, the United
States and the European Union have sought to ensure regional
stability in the Western Balkans through border agreements,
inclusive constitutions, and international integration. Such an
approach has been challenged by corrupt politicians, weak
institutions, the negative influence of hostile foreign powers, and
mixed messages from EU bodies about Balkan inclusion. However, the
biggest threats to regional security are the expansionist
pan-national projects, especially when they are pursued by a state
actor.
In recent years, the Greater Serbia project has
been revived under the presidency of Aleksandar Vučić. But unlike
during the Slobodan Milošević era, the agenda no longer revolves
around outright war, ethnic murders, mass expulsions, and
territorial capture. The campaign now operates through three main
principles – stealth, flexibility, and patience. Under Milošević, an
enlarged Serbia was supposed to emerge from a crumbling Yugoslavia
by seizing territories containing Serbian majorities from
neighboring republics and by murdering or expelling other ethnic
groups to create Serbian majorities. The project failed largely
because of the resistance of Croats, Bosniaks, Albanians, and
Montenegrins, and eventual international military intervention led
by the United States.
Vučić served as Milošević’s minister of
information and is therefore very familiar with disinformation and
deception to achieve grandiose political objectives. With his
Progressive Party monopolizing Serbian politics and the opposition
sidelined, Vučić has plenty of space to pursue Serbia’s
mini-imperial Balkan ambitions. Belgrade’s current strategy involves
three chief elements – weakening neighbors, duplicitous diplomacy,
and Russian assistance.
Serbia is in no position to challenge Croatia,
which has achieved both NATO and EU membership, although Belgrade
continues to acquire weapons from Russia and China in a mini arms
race with its richer northern neighbor. Croatia has a much smaller
and less compact Serbian population than during the Yugoslav era and
there are fewer political and economic vulnerabilities that Belgrade
can exploit. The three main targets of the revived Greater Serbia
project are Kosova, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Kosova cannot be reabsorbed by Serbia as there is
no international support for such a reversal and the Albanian
population is determined to remain independent. Belgrade’s objective
is to indefinitely delay a final settlement or “normalization” in
bilateral relations with Prishtina and keep Kosova unstable and
uncertain about its future. Hence, the debates about partition and
land swaps were not genuine but a means to distract attention and
stir conflicts within the Kosovar leadership. A weak Kosova enables
Belgrade to increase its regional leverage.
Although Montenegro is a NATO member, Vucic’s
policy is designed to subdue its sovereignty and subordinate its
foreign policy. Serbian officials and media interfered in
Montenegro’s recent parliamentary elections to promote the
nationalist opposition. The new governing coalition can weaken the
country’s Western orientation, especially if the Democratic Front
(DF) exerts dominance in the new government. The party is closely
aligned with Serbian nationalist groups and Russian operatives and
supports the Greater Serbia project. It will seek to strengthen
Serbian identity in Montenegro and cancel the new religious property
law. Bosniak and Albanian leaders will be especially concerned about
rising Serbian chauvinism that could be directed against their
communities in Montenegro.
Bosnia-Herzegovina is the third major target of
pan-Serbianism. The country remains dysfunctional primarily because
of the blocking policies of the autonomous Republika Srpska (RS).
Its leader, Milorad Dodik, periodically threatens separatism to
create a new Serbian state. The territory has a predominantly
Serbian population following the war-time genocide of the Bosniak
Muslims. Although Vučić has avoided openly campaigning for Bosnian
partition and Serbia’s absorption of the RS, the calculation is that
a wider regional crisis combined with conflicts within Bosnia will
provide future opportunities for secession when the West is
distracted.
A second key component of Belgrade’s approach is
duplicitous diplomacy. While claiming aspirations to EU membership
and closer relations with NATO, Serbia seeks to balance the four
major powers – Russia, China, U.S., and EU. It aims to benefit from
each, diplomatically, economically, and militarily, in imitation of
Yugoslavia’s strategy of non-alignment after Tito’s rupture with
Stalin in 1948. This can also disguise and assist the pan-Serbian
project if Belgrade gains support from major international actors.
The third factor that Vučić calculates will help
his Greater Serbian agenda is Russian state assistance. Moscow views
Belgrade as a useful tool to undermine stability in the Western
Balkans, limit Western integration, and expand Russian influence.
Under Vučić’s presidency connections with Moscow have expanded.
Serbia has signed a free trade agreement with the Moscow-led
Eurasian Economic Union, despite strong opposition from the EU. It
has refused to join the sanctions regime imposed against Russia for
its invasion and partition of Ukraine. And it has acquired heavy
weapons from Moscow, including anti-aircraft systems, fighter jets,
and attack helicopters despite persistent warnings of U.S.
sanctions.
Belgrade also continues to expand the
“humanitarian center” in Niš in southern Serbia with Russia’s
security services. The center enables Russian intelligence gathering
throughout the Balkans. In the economic arena, Serbia maintains its
reliance on Russian oil and gas. The second leg of Gazprom’s Turk
Stream gas pipeline will traverse Serbia, which is already dependent
on Moscow for natural gas and its biggest oil company, Naftna
Industrija Srbije, is majority-owned by Gazprom. Serbia is
increasingly exposing itself as a conduit for Moscow to destabilize
South East Europe and challenge American interests.
Instead of direct confrontation that could provoke
Western sanctions, Vučić prefers to operate by stealth and
manipulate the vulnerabilities of neighbors. Instead of a direct
assault on the integrity or sovereignty of nearby states, Vučić is
more devious in diminishing their independence by encouraging
nationalist disputes and favoring local pan-Serbian parties. And
instead of a rapid pursuit of regional dominance, Vučić has opted to
be patient, calculating that time is on Serbia’s side. However, it
cannot be excluded that at some point the Kremlin may try to push or
pull Vučić into a more direct regional conflict that will preoccupy
both the EU and NATO.
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