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Chairman Eliot Engel, Ranking Member Michael
McCaul, and members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, thank
you for the opportunity to offer recommendations for the next U.S.
administration in developing its policies toward the Western
Balkans.
This hearing comes at an opportune moment, in the
wake of a deadly pandemic that has exacerbated economic decline,
political disputes, and social tensions in the region, and on the
cusp of a new U.S. administration that can reinvigorate the
trans-Atlantic alliance. President Donald Trump’s national security
team helped to strengthen NATO’s military capabilities along the
eastern front in facing a hostile Russia and included two West
Balkan states in the Alliance – Montenegro and North Macedonia.
However, trans-Atlantic disputes mushroomed in several arenas and
weakened a necessary common approach toward the Western Balkans. A
concerted U.S.-EU policy can enhance security and Euro-Atlantic
integration in a region facing both internal and external assaults.
This testimony offers recommendations for resolving two regional
challenges (the Kosova-Serbia dialogue and the impasse in
Bosnia-Herzegovina) and combating two external threats (Russia and
China).
Kosova-Serbia Dialogue
1. The goal of the Serbia-Kosova talks should be
to devise a roadmap for inter-state recognition. This is the only
sustainable solution that would free both countries to pursue their
aspirations toward EU integration and economic development. Dialogue
without a clear purpose distracts and paralyses both sides.
2. U.S. leadership and partnership with the EU in
reaching a final settlement between Serbia and Kosova is essential.
Without U.S. involvement the EU is a weaker, more divided, and less
influential interlocutor. Without a consistent American role, the
region becomes more exposed to ethno-nationalism, irredentism, and
subversion by outside powers. Washington has demonstrated its
political, diplomatic, and military capabilities in resolving
disputes and dealing with external threats. The resolution of the
Macedonia-Greece dispute through the 2018 Prespa agreement
demonstrates that positive results are achieved with more intensive
U.S. engagement.
3. Although the White House meeting with the
leaders of Serbia and Kosova in September 2020 re-engaged Washington
in the dialogue, the U.S. cannot simply focus on economic factors
and neglect key political and diplomatic decisions. Economic
relations will not be normalized if political and diplomatic
relations remain abnormal. Since the 2013 Brussels Agreement talks
have focused on such issues as minority rights, police reform,
energy, telecommunications, legal reform, and a host of smaller
technical questions. It is time to move the talks forward toward
mutual inter-state recognition otherwise both sides will remain
indefinitely paralyzed in the past.
4. The talks have been sidetracked by several
questions, including government turnovers in both capitals,
democratic deterioration in Serbia, the work of the Specialist
Chambers investigating war crimes allegations in Kosova, and
discussions about land exchanges between Serbia and Kosova that have
little chance of realization but generated fear and dispute
throughout the region.
5. Belgrade and Prishtina can take several
important steps as part of a bilateral “normalization package.”
Kosova can unblock visits by Serbian officials to northern Kosova,
provide Serbian Orthodox religious sites with a special status as
internationally protected shrines, and implement an agreement on the
Association of Serb Municipalities but without executive functions
to preclude state partition. Serbia can unblock opposition to Kosova
entering international institutions such as Interpol or the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
permanently suspend its global de-recognition campaign, and drop its
objections to Kosova gaining a seat in the UN General Assembly.
6. Such steps could convince the five remaining EU
states to recognize Kosova while demonstrating Serbia’s independence
from Russia, which uses its blocking tactics in the UN as leverage
over Belgrade. Trying to balance West and East, in imitation of
Titoist Yugoslavia, is no longer a rational option for Serbia when
Russia is intent on undermining the West and uses Belgrade to
achieve its goals. Simultaneously, Prishtina can declare that the
progress made in the “normalization package” should certify Serbia’s
compliance with Chapter 35 in its EU accession agenda. This display
of bilateral goodwill grounded in self-interest would hasten
Belgrade’s progress toward meeting the criteria for EU entry.
7. Washington would need to be closely involved
throughout the normalization process. It may even consider
appointing a special envoy with an intensive knowledge of the region
to underscore its determination to resolve the dispute. The envoy
should work closely with the EU’s Special Representative for the
Serbia-Kosova Dialogue, former Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav
Lajčák, who played a key role in Montenegro’s successful
independence referendum in May 2006.
8. The U.S.-Kosova bilateral relationship has been
weakened in recent months, particularly as it is widely believed in
Kosova that the newly elected government led by Prime Minister Albin
Kurti was maneuvered out of office in March 2020 with alleged U.S.
compliance. Whatever the truth of such assertions perceptions are
important in maintaining trust. The best way that trust can be
reinforced is by Washington re-engaging fully in the talks between
Belgrade and Prishtina and stating clearly that the ultimate goal of
“normalization” is equality between Kosova and Serbia through mutual
recognition. In addition, Washington should intensify its
cooperation with Prishtina in developing the Kosova Armed Force into
a fully capable military force than can help the country qualify for
NATO membership in the years ahead and thereby contribute to Allied
security. This would transform Kosova from a “consumer” to a
“producer” of security.
Impasse in Bosnia-Herzegovina
1. Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a multi-ethnic
democracy but an association of ethnic fiefdoms, in which
nationalist parties maintain divisions in order to control their
co-nationals and protect their spoils. Politicians seeking a more
cohesive state that guarantees equal citizenship regardless of
ethnicity have been consistently sidelined even though they have
significant public support as recent local elections indicate.
2. The Dayton accords were not designed to
construct an integrated state with an effective central government.
Instead, they created a complex administrative structure in which
ethnic balancing predominates and layers of governmental bureaucracy
contribute to inefficiency and budgetary burdens. This system has
obstructed effective decision-making, as ethno-national identity
predominates over civil-state interests. Ethno-politics has stymied
the development of state citizenship, individual rights, and a
competitive democracy.
3. In this climate of state paralysis, the Serbian
entity has steadily moved from autonomy toward sovereignty and its
leader Milorad Dodik, with Moscow’s financial, political, and
propaganda support, has raised the prospect of separation. This has
tempted some Bosnian Croat politicians to call for a third entity
and the partition of the Bosnian Federation. Meanwhile, Bosniak
Muslim leaders remain committed to defending Bosnia’s territorial
integrity.
4. To resolve the Bosnian impasse, U.S. officials
working closely with EU representatives must devise a roadmap for
far-reaching administrative, constitutional, and electoral reform.
Without progress over the coming few years a new frustrated
generation 25 years after Dayton could again reach for other weapons
as a way out of the impasse Unlike in the 1990s, Washington needs to
prevent violence from erupting and not try to extinguish it after it
has flared up. The status quo between the two Bosnian entities is
not a viable long-term solution and can degenerate into regional
havoc.
5. The U.S. administration working in tandem with
the EU has several tools available to promote reform and nurture a
civic Bosnia. Diplomatic, political, and material support for civic
politics across the country can be significantly increased, the rule
of law can be strengthened to ensure that the justice system is
separated from political interests and judges and prosecutors become
independent actors. Economic instruments are both carrots and sticks
– encouraging reform, a more empowered central government, and more
effective local governments, while squeezing out funds to entities
and cantons that block the functioning of the state. Separatists can
be sidelined and sanctioned by exposing their corruption and illicit
ties with Russian oligarchs. Persistent threats against Bosnian
integrity must have consequences and penalties, as they limit
economic development, curtail foreign investment, promote
inter-ethnic discord, encourage radicalism, and endanger the
survival of the state.
6. To curtail destabilizing influences from
Moscow, steps toward NATO membership for Bosnia-Herzegovina have to
be pursued. The Reform Program signed in 2019 by the Bosnian
Presidency is in effect its first Annual National Program (ANP) that
places Bosnia on the road toward NATO accession. Qualifying for NATO
will underscore that the security of the Bosnian state guarantees
the security of all ethnic groups and reduces the prospects for
armed conflicts and territorial partition.
Destabilizing External Factors: 1. Russia
1. Two foreign actors are directly contributing to
instability in the Western Balkans – Russia and China. Both
adversaries view the region as Europe’s weak spot where competition
with NATO and the U.S. can be increased, disputes manipulated, new
allies captured, and economic opportunities exploited. America's
increasing focus on China must not distract attention from a more
immediate Russian threat. Kremlin officials may view Washington’s
growing preoccupation with China as an opportunity to intensify
their own policies. Although both Russia and China are expansionist
powers that challenge U.S. and European interests, their current
impact is not equivalent. While China is a long-term threat, Russia
presents the most pressing short-term danger to NATO allies and
partners.
2. Moscow views the Balkans as a strategic asset
and pursues four main goals:
First, expanding Russia’s geopolitical reach.
Traditionally, the Balkans are a stepping-stone to the Adriatic and
Mediterranean and an inroad into Central Europe. Moscow’s influence
over Balkan governments, its role in multi-national formats
(including the Peace Implementation Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina),
its military deployments (as in Serbia), and its institutional
presence through various arms of the Russian state, provide it with
a major stake in the region’s evolution.
Second, fracturing Western cohesion and undermine
Western institutions. Fomenting conflict not only contributes to
unsettling the Balkans, it also divides international responses. One
recent example was the territorial exchange gamble between Serbia
and Kosova supported by Moscow and accepted by some Western
officials. Even debates about partition promote rifts in the region
and policy disarray between Western governments. Unresolved
conflicts and disputed states also enable the Kremlin to claim that
despite its expansion NATO has failed to stabilize the Balkans.
Third, undercutting the U.S. presence. The main
reason for obstructing NATO enlargement is to prevent a growing
American military footprint and to preclude any firm security
guarantees to countries in the region. The Kremlin tries to block
Balkan states from joining the Alliance, as this enhances
Washington’s role in defending Europe. It also seeks to weaken EU
and NATO from within, as its growing influence in Hungary and
Bulgaria demonstrate. Joining NATO helps strengthen state security
but it does not ensure immunity from subversion.
Fourth, capturing allies or supplicants. Economic,
energy, and financial connections are a tool for corrupting,
blackmailing, or bribing officials who can assist Moscow in its
international goals. Although Moscow is not a leading economic
player in the Balkans, compared to the EU or China, its investments
and expenditures are targeted for maximum political impact and the
propaganda of Russian assistance is widespread. Simultaneously,
state directed disinformation campaigns claim that Western
democracies are a failing system, as evident in the recent U.S.
elections, the EU will disintegrate, as evident in Brexit, and
closer ties with Russia offer a valuable alternative.
3. To achieve its strategic objectives, Moscow
pursues several policies:
Promotes ethno-nationalist, xenophobic, and
populist movements to help incite regional conflicts.
Assists the autonomist government in Bosnia’s
Serb entity (Republika Srpska) to keep the country divided and
encourages Bosnian Croats to push for a third entity and split the
Bosnian Federation.
Blocks Kosova from UN membership and courts the
Serbian minority to fan internal disputes.
Exploits Montenegro’s domestic turmoil and
North Macedonia’s obstructed path toward the EU to promote
inter-ethnic conflicts.
Favors ultra-nationalist and pan-Serbian
irredentist groups in Montenegro to disrupt the country’s
independence and pro-Western direction.
Benefits from Bulgaria’s blockage of EU
accession talks for North Macedonia and helps mobilize the
pro-Russia lobby in Bulgaria.
Supports close links between Russian and
Serbian Orthodox Churches to undermine religious freedom and the
independence of autocephalous churches in Montenegro and North
Macedonia.
Corrupts national politicians to favor Russian
interests by remaining neutral or backing Moscow’s positions in
various foreign policy offensives.
Fosters energy dependence by tying Balkan
countries into its pipeline projects and purchasing refineries and
other energy facilities. Energy dependence is used as a method to
ensure political compliance.
Engages in disinformation offensives through
local media and internet networks to enhance Russia’s prestige and
undermine Western institutions. Its messages are designed to appeal
to anti-globalists, Euroskeptics, and ultra-conservatives in which
Russia masquerades as the defender of traditional values, while the
EU and U.S. are portrayed as deviant. The Kremlin also appeals to
the radical left as an anti-imperialist and anti-American vanguard.
4. Moscow views the government in Serbia as a
useful tool to undermine stability in the Western Balkans, limit
Western integration, and expand Russian influence. Under Aleksander
Vučić’s presidency connections with Moscow have expanded. Serbia has
signed a free trade agreement with the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic
Union, despite strong opposition from the EU. It has refused to join
the sanctions regime imposed against Russia for its invasion and
partition of Ukraine. It has acquired heavy weapons from Moscow,
including anti-aircraft systems, fighter jets, and attack
helicopters despite warnings of U.S. sanctions. Belgrade also
continues to expand the “humanitarian center” in Niš in southern
Serbia with Russia’s security services. The center enables Russian
intelligence gathering throughout the Balkans.
In the economic arena, Serbia remains reliant on Russian oil and
gas. The second leg of Gazprom’s Turk Stream gas pipeline will
traverse Serbia, its biggest oil company, Naftna Industrija Srbije,
is majority-owned by Gazprom, and Gazprom holds a majority stake in
the largest gas storage facility in southeastern Europe, Banatski
Dvor in Serbia. Serbia continues to expose itself as a conduit for
Moscow’s interests. In trying to imitate Titoist Yugoslavia by
balancing Russia and China with the U.S. and EU, Serbia is
subverting its own links with Western institutions and weakening
security on the Balkan peninsula.
5. In confronting Russia’s attempts to destabilize the Western
Balkans the new U.S. administration can pursue the following
policies:
Promote a regional initiative focused on vulnerabilities that the
Kremlin exploits, including disinformation, corruption, and the
funding of nationalist extremism. The degree of cooperation in
combating Russia’s inroads will indicate the strategic orientation
of each government and their willingness to counter Moscow’s
destabilizing policies.
Expose Russia’s illicit money flows in the region, its media
connections, disinformation campaigns, and the links of Russian
oligarchs and intelligence services with local politicians,
nationalist parties, religious institutions, and social
organizations.
Impose sanctions such as asset freezes and issuing arrest warrants
against Russian agents, oligarchs, and entities engaged in corrupt
activities or inciting ethnic conflicts or coup attempts in the
Balkans.
Assist media outlets and civic organizations to better coordinate
their efforts in exposing and countering disinformation promulgated
by Russian and Chinese sources through on-line social networks.
Undercut Moscow’s influence by helping to facilitate faster EU
integration for Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.
Stronger U.S. leadership can help consolidate the rule of law and
invigorate anti-corruption campaigns.
Encourage the inclusion of the Western Balkan in the
trans-continental Three Seas Initiative (3SI). The north-south
transportation corridor will boost economic performance, initiate
commercially viable cross-border infrastructure projects, and help
provide alternatives to dependence on Russian energy and Chinese
loans. This can also accelerate the entry of participating states
into the EU by meeting the regulatory and legal standards of 3SI
membership.
Pay greater attention to nearby states that can exert a negative
influence in the Western Balkans, especially Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Croatia, by enabling them to resist Russian penetration and
strengthen the NATO alliance, including required levels of defense
spending. Moscow is intensifying efforts to undermine EU and NATO
from within. Joining NATO does not ensure immunity from foreign
subversion, especially if local leaders calculate that they can
profit politically or personally from Moscow.
6. A successful U.S. policy has to be undergirded by a strong NATO
and a firmer approach toward Russia’s government. The new U.S.
administration must avoid another self-defeating “reset” with the
Kremlin in the fruitless hope that America’s chief adversary can be
transformed into a genuine partner. Moscow views compromises as
weaknesses that embolden its revisionist ambitions. A more assertive
U.S. policy needs to spotlight Russia’s growing vulnerabilities,
including its economic weaknesses and escalating domestic turmoil.
International democracy initiatives proposed by the President-elect
should zero in on the Russian Federation by supporting human rights,
individual freedoms, political pluralism, ethnic equality, and
genuine federalism in this increasingly unmanageable state. In this
way Russia’s offense against the trans-Atlantic alliance can be
turned into a much more difficult defense in which the Kremlin
regime will be increasingly confronted by Russian citizens demanding
their basic freedoms. In restoring the vitality of Western alliances
and democracies Washington can demonstrate that it is not in
conflict with citizens of the Russian Federation.
Destabilizing External Factors: 2. China
1. China’s long-term ambitions are to replace the U.S. as the
leading global power. At present, its expanding influence is based
primarily on investment, trade, and development assistance that can
undermine trans-Atlantic unity. Russia is a minor player in
geo-economics, apart from its supplies of fossil fuels. China has
become the key rival for the U.S. in a sphere where global
leadership is ultimately decided - economic power. It has the
world’s second-largest economy and is the largest exporter and
second-largest importer of goods. China’s expanding global role is
not dependent on military power but on economic penetration and
leadership in advanced technology. The Chinese regime has no plan to
impose its system of government on European states but aims to
change global standards for trade and investment that will favor
Beijing over its competitors.
2. China’s global ambitions are encapsulated in its Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), involving more than 20 countries and aimed at
developing land and sea corridors linking China with Central Asia,
the Middle East, and Europe. Unlike Russia’s failing Eurasian
Economic Union, China’s Eurasian ambitions are backed by substantial
resources and they prey on poor countries with high levels of
corruption and limited immediate prospect of joining the EU.
3. Beijing has steadily increased its investments in many BRI
countries, especially in telecommunications and physical and digital
infrastructure, and seeks to set regulatory standards that will
advantage Chinese enterprises. Beijing has selected investment
targets that are viewed as politically profitable inroads into the
EU and bought or invested in assets amounting to over $300 billion.
State-owned Chinese companies finance the construction of roads and
railways throughout South East Europe. This forms part of Beijing’s
plans to link China with Europe and is a conduit for exerting
political influence. China “17+1” investment project with 17
countries from Central-East Europe (CEE) is a direct inroad into the
continent. Serbia has become a center of Chinese investments,
accounting for more than half of announced funding in the Western
Balkans since 2012.
4. In exchange for economic investments, Beijing seeks diplomatic
support for its expansive agenda or to mute criticisms of its
policies in international institutions. It aims to divide Europe
from the U.S. and prevent the emergence of an anti-China front.
Beijing’s offers to boost local economies are difficult to resist,
particularly by poor countries along the BRI route in search of
capital. Beijing’s geoeconomic strategy increases dependence on
Chinese finances and technology and disregards Western regulatory
and legal standards. Beijing’s spying networks are also expanding.
They penetrate the business sectors of Western states and steal
intellectual property and industrial secrets to benefit Chinese
companies.
5. Western states need to implement policies that can contain
Chinese influence but without damaging the economic development of
BRI countries. They must boost Western competitiveness in foreign
markets while ensuring that China’s investments adhere to
international standards and do not push governments into becoming
permanent debtors. The U.S. and EU will need to work together to
prevent the takeovers of key economic sectors in the Balkans and
CEE, invest in new technologies, and improve conditions for private
and public investment. This is especially urgent given the negative
long-lasting economic impact of the pandemic. The EU’s Economic
Investment Plan that will reportedly allocate up to nine billion
euros for projects in the Western Balkans is an important starting
point. The recent commitment of the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation to finance several projects in the region is a
valuable addition.
6. Similarly to investigations of nefarious Russian activities,
Chinese money flows, political connections, business links, and
media inroads must be systematically investigated and neutralized
where they violate legal standards. Although there is a growing
analysis of China’s economic penetration in the Western Balkans,
more attention must be paid to Beijing’s political, social, and
cultural infiltration and the negative impact on democracy and
security. Beijing has developed sophisticated cyber hacking
operations and similarly to Russia it can blackmail or bribe
vulnerable politicians and businessmen to favor Chinese geopolitical
interests. Beijing is also expanding its presence through funding in
academia, the media, cultural initiatives, and civil society
activities to promote China’s foreign policy goals.
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