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President-elect Joe Biden will face a crucial
international test in balancing U.S. democracy promotion with
transatlantic security. The Western alliance is premised on the
notion that democratic values and security interests coincide and
that membership of NATO and the European Union strengthen
democracies.
This premise did not foresee the emergence of new
social and national grievances or disruptive threats such as
pandemics.
President Trump’s administration de-emphasized
democracy promotion in foreign policy. In rightist political
circles, democracy programs were viewed as disturbing the
sovereignty of allies and imposing a “liberal” social agenda. For
leftist populists, Washington was too embroiled in assisting other
states instead of focusing on America’s internal inequities.
The election of Biden, a centrist
internationalist, has been optimistically received among most of
America’s allies, but some fear that Washington’s emphasis will now
shift from security to democracy. Trump’s disputes with the EU led
some European leaders to question U.S. commitments to transatlantic
security as well as to democratic values. In reality, NATO‘s
security umbrella was strengthened under the Trump administration,
even while democratic principles came under question on both sides
of the Atlantic.
Biden’s proposal to hold a “Summit for Democracy”
and promise to renew America’s commitment to spreading democracy may
misfire if it excludes states that defend Western interests, even if
their internal politics are not fully compatible with democratic
norms. He should be cognizant of Europe’s evolution and not create
divisions among allies by prioritizing democracy over security.
Indeed, a formula must be found in which both
sovereignty and internationalism are bonded to strengthen the
alliance. International security must not be weakened by ostracizing
states such as Poland and Turkey because of their democratic
shortcomings. These allies are vital for U.S. national security, as
they directly confront an expansionist Russia along NATO’s eastern
flank.
Policymakers need to examine recent history
closely. As emerging European democracies entered the EU and others
were excluded, questions of sovereignty, culture, identity,
tradition, religion, and historical memory came to the forefront. At
the same time, the two halves of Europe converged in terms of
partisanship, political polarization, and suspicion of international
institutions that appeared to impose uniformity.
Assumptions that EU integration would diminish
national differences and forge a pan-European identity proved
illusory. Indeed, historical memories of the communist project in
erasing national identities and creating a uniform “socialist man”
reverberate in today’s Euroscepticism. There are widespread
perceptions that the “Brussels bureaucracy” limits the sovereignty
of member states and imposes policies that undermine traditional
values. Brexit was a reaction to such perceptions, and over the
coming year, Europe will discover whether the pandemic and resultant
economic disruption actually weaken or strengthen the EU project.
Throughout Europe, the traditional left-right
political spectrum has become less clear cut, as new parties combine
policies from both leftist and rightist ideologies. For instance,
governing parties such as Law and Justice in Poland blend a
distributive leftist economic program with a rightist social
conservative platform. Social, economic, cultural, urban-rural, and
interregional divisions have widened, and economic inequalities have
expanded. At the same time, nationalism, populism, and
traditionalism have mushroomed as shields against rapid change and
potential loss of national sovereignty.
Several political formations have exploited the
confusion and fear in central Europe to engage in political “state
capture” through which they try to control key institutions, shape
society in their ideological image, and prolong their rule in future
elections. This authoritarian trend has been evident in moves to
ensure greater executive and parliamentary supervision over the
legal system and the mass media in Hungary and Poland.
The balance between democratic rules and political
ambitions tests the resilience of national institutions, and the
same process is visible in the United States. At the same time, both
Poland and Hungary have demonstrated the strength and durability of
a democratic civil society. If they were able to defeat communist
totalitarianism, then they are more than capable of overcoming
aspiring domestic autocrats.
Heavy-handed U.S. or EU intervention to promote
democracy by excluding certain governments from democracy summits or
other Western initiatives may simply stiffen the resolve of
nationalists and populists and increase domestic polarization. It
will also provide new opportunities for Moscow to widen divisions
between NATO states and penetrate their political structures, and
where sovereignty is undermined, democracy is further imperiled and
international security is endangered.
Janusz Bugajski is a senior fellow at the
Jamestown Foundation in Washington, D.C. His recent book, Eurasian
Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks, is co-authored with Margarita
Assenova. His upcoming book is entitled Failed State: Planning for
Russia’s Rupture.
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