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The Balkan motto might well be “another year,
another crisis.” While the political impasse in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and the recognition dispute between Serbia and Kosova both need
urgent resolution, the stability and independence of Montenegro is
also under increasing threat, with Belgrade and Moscow aiming to
weaken the country’s independence.
The broad coalition government in Podgorica
elected in August 2020 was widely viewed as a fresh start after
three decades of rule by the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS).
Western capitals hoped that the new administration could root out
corruption and enable Montenegro to make faster progress toward EU
membership. But instead of a “clean hands” approach, the coalition
government has demonstrated its vulnerability to the underhand
Belgrade-Moscow agenda.
The dominant coalition, For the Future of
Montenegro, appointed the new Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokapić; the
second-placed coalition, Peace is Our Nation, installed Aleksa Bečić
as speaker of parliament; and the junior coalition partner, the
United Reform Action (URA) appointed Deputy Prime Minister Dritan
Abazović. Even though most of the cabinet has no formal party
affiliation the influence of pro-Belgrade activists remains
pronounced.
At the core of the threat to Montenegro is
Belgrade’s non-acceptance of the country’s distinct national
identity and separate statehood. In his Greater Serbia ambitions
President Aleksander Vučić is scheming for a Serbia-Montenegro
Union, presumably modeled on Putin’s drive for a Russia-Belarus
Union, with Montenegro as the junior partner. In such an
arrangement, Belgrade would determine Montenegro’s foreign and
security policy, weaken Montenegrin identity, and sideline the
Albanian and Bosniak minorities.
The strongest political force in the leading
coalition, the Democratic Front, is committed to reversing
Montenegro’s independence. But rather than pursuing a fast-track
approach that could fracture the government, it envisages a
step-by-step process of forging tighter links with Serbia and using
the tripartite coalition as a camouflage to maintain a parliamentary
majority. Conversely, the two junior governing coalitions evidently
calculated that they needed the Democratic Front to gain power and
pursue their reformist platform. However, one often discovers in the
Balkans that it is easier and more profitable to promote nationalism
than to conduct reforms.
The Russian connection with the new government is
also becoming clearer. Montenegro’s appeals court revoked the
sentences of the October 2016 conspirators who sought to overthrow
the previous government under the direction of Russian intelligence
services. Moscow clearly applied pressure to reverse the decision
and is enhancing its role in Podgorica.
Negative trends are also evident in Montenegro’s
security sector regarding several problematic appointees. Milan
Knežević, leader of the Democratic Front involved in the 2016 coup
plot, was emplaced as chairman of parliament’s Security and Defense
Committee. With other appointments in the security sector evidently
coordinated with Belgrade and Moscow, NATO may need to freeze the
sharing of sensitive information with Podgorica to avoid being
compromised. Serbia and Russia are also targeting Montenegro’s
strategic assets, including plans to purchase the port of Bar and
the country’s electric company.
The more radical pro-Serbian forces cannot
monopolize power but one should not discount a provocation designed
to enhances their position. The local elections in Nikšić in
mid-March may provide an opportunity to escalate conflicts in the
country given that activists from Serbia and Bosnia’s Republika
Srpska have targeted the town to enhance the pan-Serbian vote.
However, despite some early successes, including
Montenegro’s general elections, Belgrade’s unification project faces
several obstacles. The tripartite government coalition remains
brittle and hangs by the slimmest parliamentary majority. The URA
may conclude that its clean government idealism cannot be
implemented with Serbian nationalists embroiled in corrupt foreign
deals with Russian oligarchs and state-directed companies. The
government could face charges of corruption and mismanagement that
would undermine its initial public support.
The resistance and backlash of the Montenegrin
majority will also become more visible during attempts to undermine
their identity. The law on religious property, designed to
strengthen the role of the autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox
Church, has been overturned. The Serbian Orthodox Church seeks to
tighten its clerico-imperial jurisdiction over Montenegro, cognizant
that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church officially gained ecclesial
independence from the Russian Orthodox Church in 2019 and is
reclaiming much of the property appropriated by the Moscow
patriarchate. Further anti-Montenegrin maneuvers may include the
introduction of dual citizenship, so that non-resident Serbs can
register in the census and vote in elections, and the pursuit of
cultural and educational campaigns to turn Montenegrins into Serbs.
The DPS lost power largely because of public anger
with corruption and cronyism, but it still remains the largest party
and has a chance of rallying Montenegrins around a program of
national self-defense from assault by Belgrade and Moscow. But it
will need a broader political coalition, calculating that Serbia’s
assault may actually strengthen Montenegrin identity. Support for
statehood and NATO membership is reportedly rising in the country,
with some polls indicating that 67% of citizens now back
independence and 55% support NATO membership, with only 7% wanting a
common state with Serbia and 20% a loose union.
The role of the Quint embassies (U.S., Germany,
France, UK, Germany) will be important in the coming months to
discourage any government decisions that generate open conflict.
Above all, the Biden administration must become more active to
undercut Vučić’s Greater Serbia goals through a three-pronged
approach. First, the Serbia-Kosova dialogue has to be given teeth in
line with Biden’s recent letter to Vučić calling for mutual state
recognition. Second, a multi-national initiative must be launched to
implement necessary constitutional changes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
develop a fully functioning state. And third, Vučić must be warned
that political interference in Montenegro’s politics will rebound
negatively against a government with destabilizing foreign
connections. The tentacles of Kremlin influence in Belgrade and
Podgorica need to be unearthed and amputated.
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