|
Negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo, which restarted in Brussels
on Tuesday under the auspices of the European Union, hold the key
for stability in the Western Balkans.
Without an agreement on mutual recognition as independent states,
the festering dispute will unsettle borders, curtail economic
development, and preclude EU integration. For the talks to succeed,
the Biden administration needs to play a more active role in the
process. Whereas the EU is viewed in the region as divided and
unreliable, the United States retains credibility because of its
leadership role in resolving previous Balkan conflicts.
The Biden administration has confirmed that mutual interstate
recognition between Serbia and Kosovo is the only viable solution.
The acceptance of final borders would allow for economic development
in both states and inhibit the Kremlin’s corrupt regional inroads.
Without a bilateral agreement, the region could again descend into
conflict propelled by Serb and Albanian nationalist ambitions. Since
Kosovo declared independence in 2008 and was recognized by the U.S.
and all but five EU members, Serbia’s government has dedicated its
foreign policy to blocking the new country’s entry into
international institutions. It has worked closely with Vladimir
Putin’s Russia in trying to delegitimize Kosovo’s statehood and
promote an expansionist agenda.
Under President Aleksandr Vucic's "Serbian World" agenda, which
mimics Putin’s "Russia World" agenda," Serbia intends to dominate
several neighboring states and eventually incorporate territories
with large Serbian populations. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and
Montenegro stand on the front lines in defending their sovereignty
but feel they receive insufficient political assistance from the EU.
Meanwhile, Serbian irredentism is directly backed by Moscow to
disrupt the region and create a stronger Balkan ally.
Belgrade’s objectives toward Kosovo are to indefinitely delay a
bilateral settlement, maintain uncertainty about its future, and
potentially absorb some of its territory. In the case of Montenegro,
Vucic's policy is designed to subdue its sovereignty and subordinate
its foreign policy to that of Serbia. Belgrade works through Serbian
nationalists included in the new governing coalition who want to
backtrack on the country’s Western orientation, even though
Montenegro is already a NATO member.
Bosnia-Herzegovina is the third major target of pan-Serbianism. The
country remains dysfunctional primarily because of the blocking
policies of the autonomous Republika Srpska. Its leader, Milorad
Dodik, periodically threatens separatism to create a new Serbian
state and merge with Serbia. Although Vucic has avoided openly
campaigning for Bosnian partition, he calculates that a wider
regional crisis, combined with conflicts within Bosnia itself, will
provide opportunities for secession and unification with Serbia when
the West is distracted.
Pan-Albanian aspirations will be driven by the lack of realistic
prospects for EU accession for Albania and Kosovo and for countries
with large Albanian communities such as North Macedonia and
Montenegro. Resentment of EU policy is compounded by what is widely
viewed as Western tolerance of the Greater Serbia project and an
unwillingness to strongly confront Russia’s interference throughout
the region.
Ambitious politicians can exploit numerous grievances while
promising national unification across existing borders. There is
widespread anger with corrupt politicians and institutions that
contribute to economic stagnation, rising unemployment, and the
emigration of young and educated people. Elections change little as
the state is dominated by interest groups who use their period in
office to enrich themselves and remain in power. In Serbia’s case,
the government has also become increasingly authoritarian.
Frustration with Brussels has been compounded by painfully slow
progress in providing coronavirus vaccines in much of the Balkans
and the denial of visa liberalization for citizens of Kosovo — the
only country in Europe that lacks such an arrangement with the EU.
For Albanians, paralysis in the Pristina-Belgrade talks, the
nonrecognition of Kosovo’s statehood by five EU members (Spain,
Greece, Cyprus, Romania, and Slovakia), and Kosovo’s inability to
enter major multinational institutions such as the United Nations
have deepened public resentments.
In these challenging conditions, the idea of national unification in
one state structure can hold a promise of progress and historical
justice. Kosovo’s unification with Albania would evidently ensure
its protection under the NATO umbrella and provide Pristina with
greater global access. For Serbs, an enlarged Serbia would finally
bring the entire nation into a single state. But moves toward state
enlargement would inevitably spark conflicts with neighbors and spur
demands for border changes among other ethnic groups. Although
political leaders repeat the formula that nationalist aspirations
will be neutralized through pan-European unification, they must also
be calculating how to benefit from nationalist sentiments if the
path to the EU is indefinitely blocked. |
