|
The forceful inauguration of the Metropolitan of the Serbian
Orthodox Church in the Cetinje Monastery once again has, alongside
prior regional incidents and indicators, shown that there will be no
political stability in the Western Balkans, and perhaps no lasting
peace, as long as the regime of Aleksandar Vučić is in power in
Belgrade.
The Cetinje incident from September 4th and 5th will have various
and far-reaching consequences on Montenegro’s domestic politics as
well as in the Montenegrin society.
When and if the emotions subside, all the domestic actors involved:
the current government, the current opposition (former government),
the Serbian Church, political leaders on both sides, as well as
church dignitaries, have yet to reassess and discern what was won
and lost in this crises-ridden and critical political and societal
incident. Then, depending on their evaluations of the events, they
are likely to determine their future strategies.
There is, however, one “external” factor and actor about whom
something must be said. The forceful inauguration of the
Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Cetinje Monastery
once again has, alongside prior regional incidents and indicators,
demonstrated that there will be no political stability in the
Western Balkans, and perhaps no lasting peace, as long as the regime
of Aleksandar Vučić is in power in Belgrade.
In order for this conclusion to not be just another political claim,
it is necessary to consider what kind of a regime is under
discussion, and why its prolonged existence causes troubles and will
cause even greater ones in the future for the region that we
inhabit.
“THE PEOPLE’S STATE AND THE PEOPLE’S PARTY”
Aleksandar Vučić is a continuation of a ruling pattern which, with
certain short-term interruptions, has been dominant in Serbian
history for almost the last century and a half. As early as a young
doctoral student in Germany, Zoran Djindjic described this pattern
saying that one of the pillars of Serbian conservatism was the idea
and practice of “a people’s state with a people’s party as a social
glue.” He certainly had in mind the long rule of Nikola Pasic and
his radicals, Tito and the Communist Party in Yugoslavia (and
Serbia), and, of course, Slobodan Milosevic and the SPS, whom Đinđić
ultimately overthrew in the year 2000.
Đinđić believed it was his mission to change this pattern and make
Serbia a more modern and democratic state. Even after his tragic
death, the reforms he initiated provided that, despite the turbulent
political scene, order in Serbia until 2012 functioned within some
sort of minimal democratic standards.
TURNING BACK THE HISTORICAL CLOCK
From the moment the former regime parties took power again in the
2012 elections and Aleksandar Vučić, firstly de facto, and quickly
de jure, became the new leader of the country, the historical clock
had been brought back to the “natural state” within Serbian
politics, the very thing Đinđić wanted to change – “a people’s state
with a people’s party as a social glue.”
Since then, and nota bene, since the 2014 elections in Serbia, under
Vučić has been (re)established an order which, however you may call
it, is certainly not democratic.
Observing all the important characteristics, it can actually be
deemed a neo-Milosevic regime, adapted to function in the 21st
century.
Dušan Pavlović, professor at the Faculty of Political Science in
Belgrade, in his impressive article on the political economy of
Vučić’s rule, calls this regime a system of “extractive
institutions”, i.e., an order in which everything is subordinated
for the pursuit of public finances and the withdrawal of money from
large state businesses and affairs in order to keep control of the
most important institutions that guarantee long-term rule – those
being the electoral process, the media, and the judicial system. [1]
Regimes in which a multiparty game exists, but the field on which
the game is played as well as the conditions under which the game
takes place are not leveled, but rather adapted to only one player,
represent the typical feature of modern undemocratic rule.
In the political science, these kinds of regimes are more commonly
referred to as “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky-Way) [2]or
“electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler) [3].
“HARDWARE” AND “SOFTWARE” DICTATORS
This type of regime, established once before in 1990s under
Milošević by means and ways of one classical “hardware” dictator,
has been restored, revived, adapted and strengthened with the coming
to power of Aleksandar Vučić. Many techniques of the rule typical of
Milošević’s era are also used by Vučić, who by the way was part of
that era serving as Milošević’s Minister of Information. Vučić’s use
of these techniques are though adapted to suit an autocrat of the
digital era through various “software” means.
Vučić entered his authoritarian phase, which still lasts today,
during the parliamentary elections in 2014, and since then, he has
turned the key institution of a democratic society – free and fair
elections – into a mere means of legitimizing his authoritarian
rule.
Dieter Nohlen, one of the most known researchers and authors on
elections in the world, established long ago that, in addition to
the above mentioned legitimizing role, the function of elections in
authoritarian regimes is to: secure internal political calmness;
contribute to the acquisition of a reputation from external actors;
at least partially integrate the opposition into the system and make
adjustments within government structures and thus contribute to
stabilizing the regime. [4]
All these elements are represented in Vučić’s regime. Elections
taking place are marked by the aggressiveness towards voters
displayed from the activists of his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).
Intimidation, corruption, ballot manipulation and the deafening
noise of a huge number of media obedient to him have become
standard, and the situation has been deteriorating from election to
election.
The way Vučić understands the electoral process and how it serves
him is probably best evidenced by the fact that following the
example of his autocratic predecessor Slobodan Milošević and in the
putinesque stile, Vučić since the 2012 elections, including the 2017
presidential elections, has never in any televised debate met and
juxtaposed arguments with any opponent or member of the opposition.
[5]
In the election process, he descends exclusively from the Olympic
heights of absolute power and leads several-hour long monologues in
front of the cameras in the media he controls. Something like this
is unthinkable in a democratic society and is always a safe
indicator that something is wrong with the regime at place.
The degradation of institutions that should be pillars of a
democratic society under Vučić has reached the point that the
central institution of democracy – the Parliament (the National
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia) now has comparisons only with
the Russian Duma in Moscow and the Belarussian Parliament in Minsk,
as there, as well as in Belgrade, take place only MPs from the
ruling parties or their satellites and like-minded people.
A similar situation cannot be found elsewhere in Europe, except in
these three countries. The same degradation experienced the
Government of Serbia which is, according to the Constitution, the
center of executive power, i.e., the body that should lead the
country’s foreign and domestic policy. However, like in Milošević’s
time, constitutional hypocrisy here is at work as the Serbian
government whoever is the prime minister serves only as the
executive body of the President of the Repubic and follows his
commands regardless of the fact that head of stats has relatively
weak powers according to the Serbian Constitution.
THE PAN-SERBIAN PROJECT
Authoritarian regimes, although per definitionem being prone to
violence and potentially dangerous to their environment or even
beyond, do not necessarily need to pursue an aggressive foreign
policy. Josip Broz Tito with his non-alignment, Juan Peron in
Argentina, Franco after the Second World War, the rulers of the UAE
today – these are just some of the examples for this statement.
However, the regime of Aleksandar Vučić is following in Milošević’s
footsteps. With the same goal as his predecessor in the 1990s of
“solving the Serbian national question”, Vučić adopted a revisionist
and aggressive approach in his regional environment. Here too, in
comparison to Milošević, an adaptation was made related to the time
and circumstances. There are no wars or open use of force, albeit
the already mentioned “software” approach is used.
As Januš Bugajski notes, this is a masked pan-Serbian project that
is being implemented with patience and flexibility, manipulating the
vulnerability of neighbouring states and societies, without directly
attacking their formal sovereignty. [6]
The most important actors that Vučić uses for this creeping march on
the region are the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), the loyal elites
in the neighbouring countries (Dodik in BiH, the Democratic Front in
Montenegro) and the media machinery in Serbia itself. Relatively
invisible actors such as intelligence services, and perhaps parts of
the criminal underworld are usually involved in this kind of
subversive activity.
AGGRESSION ON MONTENEGRO
How it works in practice is shown by the rather long time aggression
on Montenegro (almost two years) in which the regime media, portals,
bots and other means of the digital era are one of the main weapons.
As is the case of treatment of Vučić’s opponents in Serbia, the
neighbouring country is being attacked on command through the use of
public and private media, brutal propaganda, false news, fictional
events, incredible conspiracy theories and the toughest possible
vocabulary.
In this (mis)use of the media for regime goals and needs, Vučić has
certainly surpassed Milošević, although many (naively) believed that
what was done with the media in the 1990s was difficult to repeat.
Cheap and low-level journalism and media that are ready to become
just someone’s political megaphones existing in democracies too, but
their absolute domination and readiness to follow the ruling elite’s
command today’s situation in Serbia alike, are completely
unthinkable and unacceptable in a democratic society. This is also
one of the safe indicators of what type of regime is at play.
In addition to the permanent maintenance of political instability in
BiH and the delay of producing any solution in relations with
Kosovo, by the forceful enthronement of the Serbian Metropolitan in
Cetinje, Vučić has demonstrated that he is ready for more risky
actions.
After the “success” in the Montenegrin capital, he acted smug,
victorious, convinced of his power and, like Saddam Hussein or
Muammar Gaddafi, addressed his opponent, the president of another
country, with a derogatory “you”, which is the manner of dictators,
not democratic politicians.
In doing so he acted as a replica of his predecessor.
While waging wars in the former Yugoslavia, Milošević constantly
emphasized that Serbia was not at war, but only defending itself
against various opponents, real or imagined, as the propagandistic
production of later had never been a problem. A similar, but even
more grotesque inversion was launched by Vučić, claiming that he
would “defend Serbia from the 30-year aggression of Montenegro”
against them!
Politics is full of absurdity, many of them happen in democracies,
but there is no such inexhaustible source of all kinds of “believe
it or not” miracles such as one can find in authoritarian regimes
and their leaders.
EU AND BALKAN
As it is the case in domestic politics, Serbia, an EU candidate
country, under Vučić`s regime doesn’t care too much about EU values
and principles in foreign policy either, nor does Serbia consider
itself obliged, as other candidate-countries to aligned its foreign
policy with Brussels. Instead, Serbia arms itself from Moscow, and
routinely supports Russian occupation of Crimea, as well as human
rights violations by China in Hong Kong and Xinjiang.
Edward Joseph, lecturer at John Hopkins University in Washington and
a Balkan expert, calls this situation a “charade”, and emphasizes
that there is an establishment in the Western Balkans of “…a
dangerous disequilibrium has been established where the countries
that have accepted the Western order receive far more scrutiny over
their corruption and ethno-nationalism than the actor that is openly
updating Milošević’s 'Greater Serbia', while promoting the
authoritarian model aligned with Moscow and Beijing.” [7]
Taking into account that the government in Belgrade is already a
consolidated authoritarian regime that has suppressed the start of
democratic reforms and created institutions that suits authoritarian
government, that after this internal consolidation turned to
aggressive revisionist foreign policy in the region of Western
Balkans, where Montenegro is one of the main targets of that policy,
opens some, we could say, essential questions.
First, what is the EU policy and role in all of this?
One of the main characteristics of the EU is that, other than
economic, it is the union of common political values - liberal
democracy and the rule of law. In the name of defense of its
essential values, the EU more than once has showed its willingness
and determination to sanction its members for violation of these
values – in 1990 – Austria under the rule of Haider`s ultra-right
nationalists, and today Hungary and Poland for its anti – EU,
illiberal politics of Orban and Kaczynski.
If EU treated its member states in this way, the question is what is
the attitude towards an EU
candidate-country in which, opposite of EU values, an authoritarian
regime exercising an aggressive and revisionist policy towards its
neighbouring countries in the region and also playing the role of an
ally of the West`s geopolitical opponents, has been established.
Until when will the EU, opposite to its values, accept the country
with this kind of a regime as a legitimate candidate for the
membership in its club, opening and closing chapters for the
accession in the EU, without drawing any “red line” about what an EU
candidate-country can and cannot do without consequences. The
question to raise is also whether maybe the EU`s current approach is
one of the causes why the country that is a candidate for the EU has
undisturbedly established an authoritarian regime that considers
that time has come to achieve by other “means”what Milošević did not
succeeded by wars?
Maybe the time has also come for Brussels to consider this
questions.
THE NEED TO REVIEW THE POLICY OF “NON-INTERFERENCE”
The second and analogous issue concerns NATO, a military-political
alliance based on the principle of “all for one, one for all”
wherein the member states take this principle seriously.
In the Western Balkans, there is currently a situation in which one
of the allied countries has been exposed to more or less open
pressure and aggression (albeit for now by hybrid means, without
open violence) in a period lasting more than a year and a half by a
non-NATO member that is an ally of its authoritarian role models in
Moscow and Beijing.
For how long is this situation, that among other things opens the
door of the Western Balkans for even greater influence to main
geopolitical adversaries of the Alliance, acceptable and for how
long can it last without triggering even a diplomatic reaction from
NATO member states? As in the case of the EU, is the policy of
“non-interference” perhaps one of the reasons why this situation was
created at all? Perhaps the time has come for some conclusions to be
drawn in the headquarters of the Alliance.
These questions are not rhetorical. They are concerned with
stability and democracy in the Western Balkans and its strategic
choice between the West and East. Neither the EU nor NATO can expect
that the battle for this strategic choice, for the integration of
their European backyard into a common Western system can be won
without their active engagement and without being ready to defend
their values whenever they are threatened.
“Pobjeda” September, 13, 2021
[1] Dušan Pavlović, The political economy behind the gradual demise
of democratic institutions in Serbia, in: Southeast European and
Black Sea Studies (2019).
[2] Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.
Hybrid regimes after the Cold War (2019).
[3] Andreas Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism. The dynamics of
unfree competition (2016).
[4] Dieter Nohlen, Izborno pravo i stranački sustav (1992).
[5] Dušan Pavlović, The political economy behind the gradual demise
of democratic institutions in Serbia, in: Southeast European and
Black Sea Studies (2019).
[6] Janusz Bugajski, Balkan na još jednoj istorijskoj raskrsnici,
govor na otvaranju Cetinjskih filoloških dana, Portal CdM, 2. 9.
2021.
[7] Edward Joseph, A Way Out of the Balkan Morass: Restoring US
Leverage in the Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue, Wilson Center, May 14, 2021. |
