|
A few days ago, the Democratic Front (DF) had issued the most
significant threat to date to their partners in the ruling coalition
in Montenegro. One of its leaders, who has been recognized as the
most ardent Russophile, Milan Knezevic, called on his ruling
coalition partners to respect the electoral results and allow the DF
to take over levers of power. Failing that, Knezevic threatened to
“internationalize” the otherwise self-induced crisis of political
legitimacy in Montenegro.
While he was simultaneously addressing several different audiences,
this political threat / blackmail has its history and its curious
internal dynamic.
It was the product of a growing frustration within the DF over the
significant compromises this political coalition made with the
Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro prior and immediately after
the parliamentary election of September 2020. Those compromises were
a sign of a political strength of the late Metropolitan Amfilohije,
and of his refusal at the time to allow anyone else to act as a
political leader of the Serbs living in Montenegro.
Leadership vanity aside, the DF was not initially protesting too
much over it being denied ministerial posts. As I have stated in
some of my earlier analyses of the Montenegrin crisis, the early and
occasional sparks between members of the ruling coalition were signs
of an infighting within a neo-Chetnik movement.
More importantly, DF leaders were keenly aware of the importance of
strategically placing loyal party soldiers throughout various levels
of public administration and state bureaucracy. By doing so, they
were betting on gaining tactical advantage over their political
competitors in upcoming elections. This was their political “long
game”.
One year after the election the situation for the DF does not seem
all that bad. Its party cadre controls a number of important
economic enterprises in Montenegro and significant sections of state
bureaucracy. Moreover, regional political and security situation in
the Western Balkans had worsened over the last several months in a
way that gives a significant push to the DF, and it makes its
leaders feel rather mighty.
That is why this rightwing coalition of Serbian nationalists could
now speak openly about extraordinary election as a sure way of
ending the current crisis. That is also why they have decided now to
voice their threat to “internationalize” the crisis, and blackmail
their colleagues in the ruling coalition. It is because of the
aforementioned new context of regional political radicalization that
the latest threat by DF’s Milan Knezevic should be taken seriously.
His statement is a warning to the Western political actors that they
have to approach the crisis in Montenegro in the context of a
broader and politically well-defined “legitimate and just effort of
the Serbian people to get what is rightfully theirs”. It is also a
reminder that the DF has powerful allies in Belgrade in Moscow.
Points about legitimacy of one’s demands and justice of one’s cause
as well as about having powerful backers abroad are foundational
elements of a victimology narrative that serves to hide hegemonic
and expansionist policies of consecutive governments in Belgrade.
The ongoing secession-minded offensive by the leaders of the
Republic of Srpska para-state, and Serbia’s Aleksandar Vucic
manufacturing of crisis in Northern Kosovo are but the most current
manifestations of such policies.
DF’s threat is also a message to the domestic audience and to the
so-called Serbian electoral corpus in Montenegro. The aim is to
prove the DF is their strongest political representative and the
only voice of the Serb nationalist sentiment as well as truly
devoted follower of the retrograde ideological narrative about “all
Serbs in one state”.
Modern history teaches us that a dream of every hot-blooded Serb
nationalist is to have Montenegro, Kosovo, and the Republic of
Srpska para-state unite with Serbia. The DF leaders see their role
in Montenegro as that of executioners of such a dream. The purpose
of their political activity and also their private lives is to make
sure this “holy trinity” (Montenegro; Kosovo; Republic of Srpska)
joins mother Serbia.
With that in mind, it is reasonable to suggest that the DF taking
control over major government portfolios would further destabilize
Montenegro and question main avenues of its domestic development as
well as problematize its foreign policy objectives and international
obligations.
Truth be told, these concerns might not necessarily be the reason
why the rest of the ruling coalition keeps preventing the DF from
taking control of the government. One is tempted to look towards
personal vanity and craving for absolute power as likely motives.
To step back from a local context for moment. It has to be repeated
over and over again that the breakup of the SFRY is yet to be
finished. Convenient dates when peace accords were signed were just
that: convenient dates that do not accurately and completely reflect
the reality on the ground.
Citizens od Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia
are living through the final phase of the Yugoslav dissolution. We
should not forget that nationalism that destroyed SFRY will not
accept any outcome other than one which satisfied its expansionist
and hegemonic appetites: Greater Serbia. We could clearly see this
in the examples of current crisis in Kosovo, Montenegro and the
Republic of Srpska.
Returning to Montenegro, one of the tools in achieving this
nationalist goal is deconstructing the state institutions of the
sovereign and independent Montenegro by introducing new legislative
solutions and dismantling previous models of governance as well as
by welcoming and actively seeking potentially malevolent outside
influences.
Another such tool is the Census. The ruling coalition is pushing for
a new Census in order to prove that Serbs are the plurality in
Montenegro and to legitimize the existence of the so called
“political Serbs”. To better understand the meaning of the term
“political Serbs” one needs to examine Census data for Montenegro
between 1991 and 2003, follow the growing level of participation of
Serbs in the total population, and consider the broader context and
series of historical events that occurred in that time frame: rise
from 9.34% in 1991, to a whopping 31.99% in 2003.
If the next Census were to show even greater percentage of Serbs
living in Montenegro, the DF and other Serb nationalist political
forces in Montenegro would be able to legitimize their secessionist
demands and argue for the need to test the desire of the majority of
the population. Plainly put, they could call for a referendum on
Montenegrin independence and sovereignty in hope of reversing the
outcome of the May 2006 vote.
On the level of political pragmatism and in light of the upcoming
elections, the DF’s threat is the call to both Russia and Serbia to
step-up their game in the Western Balkans, support the DF political
appetites and ideological projections, and persuade the Serbian
Orthodox Church (SPC) to land its full support behind the DF. The
seriousness of the DF’s effort to mend relations with the SPC is
confirmed by a sudden and rather panicky visit by the President of
the Montenegrin Parliament, Aleksa Becic, to a prominent priest,
Father Gojko Perovic, soon after Knezevic publicized DF’s threat.
The frequency and aggressiveness of demands for satisfying hegemonic
and expansionist appetites of Serbian nationalists in Montenegro and
beyond is in direct proportion to the strength of both the EU and
the US engagement in the Western Balkans.
Gradual but apparent disengaging of the EU has emboldened Serb
nationalists to demand more and do so with a sense of urgency. DF’s
threats and blackmail, and Milorad Dodik’s bellicose rhetoric as
well as Aleksandar Vucic’s manufacturing of crisis in northern
Kosovo are clear signs of this.
On a bright side of things, the latest announcements from the US
administration about the new US Ambassador to Serbia might give a
pause to Serb nationalist. After all, hope is all we have left.
Refocusing on the EU, one could also illustrate its gradual
disengaging by pointing to change in language used in official
statements about the Western Balkans. The official documents
following the 2003 Thessaloniki meeting stated that “the future of
the Western Balkans is in the EU,” while documents from the most
recent meeting in Slovenia (2021) refer to the “European
perspectives of the Western Balkans” and warn that the speed of
accession is in the hands of the individual states in the region.
While shifting responsibility to individual states is neither new,
nor a matter of concern, it is true that “future” and “perspectives”
clearly speak to different levels of the EU engagement in the
region.
The history of the EU political pragmatism in the Balkans and the
role EU plays in Montenegro do not provide assurance for a
preventative and forceful action against militant Serbian
nationalism. In the region where people eat memory for breakfast, it
is impossible to forget that the EU had not acted to prevent and
stop this nationalism in 1990s. With that in mind, we might be well
advised to lower our expectations of the EU and look for home-made
remedies for our political and societal ills. |
