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I will point out some key issues and challenges that should be taken
into account during the writing of the new national strategy for
preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism, which
were ignored in the Strategy that ends this year. The new strategy,
as we heard today from EU representatives, should be tailored to the
needs of the country where it is implemented.
This means that, above all, it should start from the actual
socio-political reality. It is essential to discuss not only the
manifestations of violent extremism, the forms in which it occurs,
but also its essence, causes and consequences. The latest example
includes the events related to the mural of war criminal Ratko
Mladic. The ruling structures, together with extreme right-wing
groups, are safeguarding the mural. The mural is a symbolic
manifestation of a much deeper meaning. Namely, the glorification of
war criminals as national heroes who allegedly sacrificed themselves
for the Serbian national interest. At the same time, this implies
that the wars of the 1990s were justified and defensive, and that
Serbia does not accept the new reality in the Balkans. These
implications have upset the entire region, and the international
community is sending messages for the first time underlining that
the glorification of war criminals is unacceptable. This trend has
been present for a long time, without anyone sending warning signals
apart from a few individuals and civil society organizations.
Today, at this gathering, it is not possible to ignore such a
context. Extremism cannot be analyzed outside of what the leading
political narrative imposes. When I talk about the political
narrative, I do not mean only party narratives, but also leading
narratives in academic and cultural circles. The radicalization and
polarization of society does not happen in a political vacuum, but
is always a consequence of the ruling ideology. A strategy for the
prevention of extremism that does not have reality as a starting
point cannot be successful or bring something new to society.
The leading narrative is clearly expressed in several Government
documents. These include the "National Security Strategy", "Charter
on Serbian Cultural Space", "Strategy on preserving and
strengthening relations between the home country and the diaspora
and home country and Serbs in the region", "Culture Development
Strategy". The goal of all of them is the integration of Serbian
ethnic territories, as the former Minister of Defense, and now
Minister of the Interior, Aleksandar Vulin, has said on several
occasions, as have many others. The "Serbian World" project is
seriously threatening the stability of the region.
Although there is no single definition, there is some consensus in
the European Union on several general characteristics of right-wing
extremism, namely: anti-democratic sentiments, authoritarianism and
nationalism. There are also two important elements of non-violent
right-wing extremism: hate speech and provoking violence among
opponents.
The foundations of right-wing notions in Serbia are: the idea of
ethnic homogenization, striving to merge state and ethnic borders,
denial of anti-fascism, strengthening traditionalism and
authoritarianism, Orthodoxy treated as a superior religion compared
to other ethnic and religious groups, resistance to
interculturalism, expressions of chauvinism and intolerance towards
minorities.
The key notions of radicalizing narratives are the victim (real or
unreal; developing a narrative of the victim is necessary to
legitimize past or future conflicts), followed by narratives of
vulnerability and necessary defense.
During the war, extremists were mostly part of paramilitary
formations and cooperated with the Serbian regime at the time. After
2000, they transformed into associations, movements and numerous
groups of hooligans at football matches that spread hate speech and
were involved in violent incidents.
One of the goals of the Strategy is to promote dialogue between
cultures and religions and create conditions for representation in
institutions of social groups and individuals who are potentially at
risk of radicalization. However, opposite trends are at work in
Serbia. The latest reports of the Helsinki Committee show that
members of minority groups, especially Bosniaks and Albanians, feel
unsafe, precisely because of an increasing number of incidents, as
well as messages about the "Serbian World". Ten days prior, we
witnessed the chauvinistic behavior of Serbian fans at the handball
match between Novi Pazar and Red Star. Ratko Mladic’s name was
chanted, and security officials allowed banners with similar
messages to be brought into the stadium.
The way in which threats are defined in the Strategy indicates an
unobjective view of the situation and a reduction of the issue to
Islamist radicalism. This also leaves space for abuse of the
Strategy and further discrimination against minorities. For example,
ethnically motivated extremism and separatist tendencies in certain
parts of the territory are perceived as a threat.
The goals of the Strategy include communication with the public by
sending positive messages aimed at vulnerable groups in society.
Leading media, however, play a key role in radicalization. The
narratives are deeply Islamophobic. The media very often associate
Bosniak Muslims and Kosovo Albanians with the "Islamic threat". One
example is the weekly supplement published in Politika in 2019
entitled "Green Transversal: the Balkan Corridor of Instability".
The supplement was printed the same week when the marking of the
Srebrenica genocide anniversary was taking place. The goal of media
narratives that link Bosniaks and Albanians to paramilitary jihadist
organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, as well as perpetrators of
terrorist attacks in the West, is to portray Bosniaks and Albanians
as a threat to Serbia in certain crisis situations.
The unequal treatment of foreign fighters, those fighting on the
side of pro-Russian forces in Ukraine and those who have gone to
Middle Eastern battlefields, drastic differences in court rulings
and trials also point to a reductionist approach.
The influence of right-wing extremists on the public is much greater
than the influence of other extremists, due to the tolerance of
state institutions towards them and due to the compatibility of
their programs with mainstream discourse. Right-wing organizations
have an open space for action.
For years, civil society organizations have been committed to
creating a database of hate crimes. It should be borne in mind that
the transition from ideological advocacy, threats and hate speech to
physical violence does not happen overnight. In the last year, the
activities of extreme right-wing groups in Serbia have escalated.
Events organized by civil society organizations, such as
commemorations of victims of crime, are held in a tense atmosphere
under the constant threat from right-wingers; in the last year and a
half, artists and public figures have been exposed to the harshest
threats through social networks; so-called people's patrols have
been threatening migrants, there was also an incursion into the
refugee camp in Obrenovac with Islamophobic chants... This series of
examples could go on indefinitely.
More and more extremist right-wing organizations are hiding behind
humanitarian work. By engaging in socially acceptable activities,
they "soften" their image in order to be socially accepted and reach
mainstream media more easily. One such organization is Leviathan.
A new approach to violent extremism would also require a change in
Serbia's political culture. Radical discourse also includes messages
from the most important institutions, such as Parliament. I am
thinking primarily of the unfounded accusations made by the ruling
party's MPs that certain civil society organizations are preparing a
coup.
The Strategy must not be used to narrow the space for civil society
to operate, as was the case when the Ministry of Finance launched an
investigation into money laundering and terrorism financing against
20 individuals and 37 NGOs, including investigative media,
journalists and prominent NGOs for human rights.
Nationalism and chauvinism are induced from above. Politicians rely
on right-wing voters, which further radicalizes the political field,
instead of decontaminating the political space from fascism and
nazification.
The glorification of war criminals, as opposed to the
memorialization of crimes, at the center of which would be reverence
for the victims, encourages groups that have the potential for
violence.
Threatening political messages towards neighboring states
(especially threats with weapons) also encourage certain groups in
Serbia that destabilize the region and endanger the security of
citizens. Nurturing right-wing groups that pose a danger to society
as a whole, could completely backfire in some other situation – for
example, if the government were to give up on the "Serbian World"
rhetoric.
The research and work of the Helsinki Committee, especially with
young people, has shown so far that the most effective response to
extremism is conversation about human rights, opening a dialogue
with arguments about the wars of the 1990s and possible
alternatives.
Finally, since representatives of the Ministry of the Interior are
also participants of this event, I would like to warn that the
arrest of my colleagues Aida Ćorović and Jelena Jaćimović also
encourages right-wing violence. The Helsinki Committee has never
received any response from competent institutions regarding the
countless complaints in relation to threats made against the
founders of our organization and our associates.
The event was organized by the OSCE Mission to Serbia and the
Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and Social Dialogue of the
Republic of Serbia |
