My colleague at SAIS and its Foreign Policy Institute, Ed Joseph,
has organized an unusual group to strategize about how to deal with
growing instability in the Balkans. Regional stagnation due to EU
hesistancy as well as Russian and Chinese meddling threatens more
than two decades of progress. The group includes scholars with
origins in both Serbia and Kosovo as well as EU non-recognizing
states Romania, Slovakia, and Spain.
I was not involved in preparation of
their report and did not know about it until published. I’ll
offer an arms-length critique of some of its more salient points.
Convergence on recognition is right
The report is right to put the emphasis on convincing
non-recognizers to recognize Kosovo, with due respect to the
difficulties of the process. This is the centerpiece of what they
call a “convergence” strategy. They are also correct to point toward
Greece as the most likely of the non-recognziers to do the right
thing. So it is regrettable that the report does not include a Greek
author. That said, surely the encouraging approach they suggest is
preferable to a punitive one.
Irredentism is a real threat…
One of the reasons for urgency about recognition is the growing
threat of irredentism. Belgrade is dreaming of a “Serbian home” that
includes Serb-populated parts of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. That idea is indistguishable from Greater Serbia. That
was Slobodan Milosevic’s goal in going to war in Croatia and Bosnia.
(Kosovo and Montenegro were already under Serbian rule at the time.)
Some in Tirana and Pristina, including the current prime ministers,
like the idea of Greater Albania, which is ruled out in the Kosovo
constitution.
…but legal sanctions are not an appropriate response to talk
These ethnically-motivated territorial ambitions are, as the report
suggests, a prime cause of Balkan instability. But the authors make
the mistake of suggesting the US legally sanction their paladins.
That proposal is attracting a lot of press attention in the region,
but it isn’t going to happen. Washington does not levy legal
sanctions for opinions but rather for actions. US officials may
limit access and even visas for foreign officials who say things
Washington regards as destabilizing. But the miscreants will have to
introduce legislation, organize and arm paramilitaries, or take some
other tangible action to incur frozen assets or other legal
sanctions.
The bigger error
That is not however the report’s biggest error. It argues that
recognition and eventual NATO membership for Kosovo will change
Belgrade’s “strategic calculus,” incentivize Serbia to accept the
Western order for the Balkans, and deter Russia.
I doubt these propositions. Belgrade claims it is “neutral” but in
fact is re-arming beyond any need to confront real military threats.
Serbia is also moving towards domestic autocracy. Its politics have
shifted definitively toward virulent ethnic nationalism. Its
democratic opoposition is moribund. Its media are not free. Even the
constitutional amendments approved last weekend are but a first step
towards an independent judiciary, if implemented in good faith.
Recognition of Kosovo and its progress toward NATO will likely
prevent any Serbian military intervention. But it will also
incentivize Serbia further in the wrong directions. Ethnic
nationalist politicians will benefit. Moscow will be ready and
willing to arm Belgrade against NATO. Russia can even be relied upon
to block Kosovo UN membership if Serbia were to somehow agree to it.
President Putin will have a price in mind–in Georgia, Moldova, or
Ukraine–before surrendering his trump card.
Whole and free is a dead letter for now
Let me be clear: I like the idea of working hard for recognition by
the EU non-recognizers, especially the four who are members of NATO.
The Alliance needs to prepare for Kosovo accession no later than
completion of its army, scheduled for 2027. But the notion that
recognition or NATO membership will somehow undo Serbia’s domestic
and international drift in the wrong directions is fanciful. Europe
“whole and free” is a dead letter for now. So too is the Balkans
“whole and free.” The region will divide because that’s the way
Moscow and Belgrade want it. The only question is where the lines
will be drawn.
So what do I think of the report? Good on its central thesis
concerning recognition, but oversold on the strategic impact. There
is no magic wand. The West needs to gird for a long struggle in the
Balkans. |