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The next three months will be crucial in Ukraine’s war of
independence from imperial Russia. The results will have
profoundimplications for global security, Europe’s development, and
trans-Atlantic relations. Not least, the consequences will have a
direct impact on the future of the Western Balkans.
There are three possible outcomes of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine –
a Russian victory, a Ukrainian victory, or a prolonged stalemate
inside Ukraine. Russia has already lost several battles in its
failure to capture the capital Kyiv and the second largest city
Kharkhiv, or to dislodge and replace the Ukrainian government.
However, Russian forces have expanded their control over the Donbas
regionin eastern Ukraine and captured large sections of two other
regions in southern Ukraine. Despite massive losses of troops and
equipment, the Kremlin does not admit its weaknesses and Putin could
still use substantial military reserves in the intensifying war.
A victory for Russia could be declared after the seizure of the
entire Donbas. Putin could claim that his “limited military
operation” had been achieved while disguising Russia’s inability to
take any major cities He may calculate that the West would support a
ceasefire even if that benefits Russia because it would ease
pressures on European economies and prevent a direct confrontation
with NATO. Moscow would then expect sanctions to be eased so that it
could restore its own economy and rebuild its military.
The notion that the Kremlin is seeking diplomatic exit strategies in
Ukraine is based on a delusion. Having staked so much on victory any
retreat from captured territories is a defeat for Putin that will
hasten regime collapse. Conversely, any settlement that leaves Putin
in possession of territories gained through aggression is a defeat
for the West, as it will encourage future military conquests once
sanctions are eased. The surrender of territory in Donbas would also
capsize the Biden democracy agenda, as it would effectively give a
green light to carving out autocratic entities from democratic
states.
The wider impact of a Russian victory in seizing a chunk of Ukraine
would be to encourage other imperial powers such as China to actmore
aggressively. In the broader Europe, it can embolden Moscow to
expand its influence and encourage its partners, particularly
Serbia, to pursue a more aggressive regional agenda. The Kremlinmay
calculate that the West will be more willing to make compromises and
push countries to surrender some of their territory or elements of
their sovereignty to prevent another war. Western war-weariness in
Ukraine could then translate into wider appeasement.
A prolonged stalemate in the current war suits neither Russia nor
Ukraine. It would deeply drain their resources, destroy
theireconomies, and deplete their militaries. International
sanctions would not be lifted and Europe’s moves toward energy
independence from Russia would continue. For some Western
policymakers, a prolonged but low-intensity war may seem like a
safer option, as Russia’s gradual military and economic declinewould
reduce the risk of Putin resorting to nuclear weapons.
In stark contrast, a Ukrainian victory in the war would be
ground-breaking, with positive effects throughout Europe, including
the Western Balkans. Victory could be achieved in stages. First,
Ukrainian troops better armed with long-range artillery,
multiple-rocket launchers, tanks, and other heavy weapons would push
back Russian forces from newly occupied territories to their
pre-February positions. Second, as more military equipment is
assimilated from abroad and new troops enter the battle zones the
Ukrainian counter-offensive would liberate all of Donbas and destroy
military infrastructure in neighboring regions of Russia that feeds
the war.
A third offensive would be aimed at liberating Crimea, at a time
when the Russian economy enters a severe contraction later in the
summer and its military is incapable of replenishing troops and
equipment to effectively defend the captured peninsula.
When it becomes clear that Russia has not only lost numerous battles
but the entire war in Ukraine, Moscow’s global standing will
plummet. Instead of a superpower, the country will be increasingly
perceived as a weak state, an imperial impostor, and an unreliable
ally. Russia’s current partners such as Serbia and the Serb entity
in Bosnia-Herzegovina will then face a clearer choice – whether to
support the loser or to acknowledge the winner. Moscow would be in a
much weaker position to provide military assistance or diplomatic
support for the “Serbian World” agenda although it may still try to
stir conflicts to try and disguise its own failures.
One fascinating development will be Serbia’s domestic reaction to a
Russian defeat, where much of the population still harbors illusions
about its allegedly great “Slavic brother.” No doubt, denial and
anger will take time to dissipate, with the glaring reality that
Belgrade can no longer rely on Moscow to promote irredentism and
deprive Kosova of membership of international organizations. Serbs
in Bosnia will also feel more naked after Putin loses his emperor’s
clothes in a failing Russian state. This will provide new
opportunities to consolidate the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
move toward NATO membership.
In the bigger picture, a comprehensive Ukrainian military victory
that liberates its occupied territories would send a powerful signal
that attacks on independent states end in failure, that war crimes
will be punished, that NATO is united in confronting aggressors, and
that the West is prepared for Russia’s implosion. Ukraine must
therefore be supplied with all necessary weapons that will hasten
its victory. Ukraine’s triumph will constitute a strategic victory
for the West, as it would help demolish the last empire that
threatens European security. The entire Balkan peninsula would
benefit from Russia’s imperial defeat and face improved prospects
for EU integration and economic development.
(Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in
Washington DC. His recent book, Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s
Vulnerable Flanks, is co-authored with Margarita Assenova. His new
book, Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture, will be published
in June) |
