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The world is facing a Zeitenwende: an epochal tectonic shift.
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has put an end to an era.
New powers have emerged or reemerged, including an economically
strong and politically assertive China. In this new multipolar
world, different countries and models of government are competing
for power and influence.
For its part, Germany is doing everything it can to defend and
foster an international order based on the principles of the UN
Charter. Its democracy, security, and prosperity depend on binding
power to common rules. That is why Germans are intent on becoming
the guarantor of European security that our allies expect us to be,
a bridge builder within the European Union and an advocate for
multilateral solutions to global problems. This is the only way for
Germany to successfully navigate the geopolitical rifts of our time.
The Zeitenwende goes beyond the war in Ukraine and beyond the issue
of European security. The central question is this: How can we, as
Europeans and as the European Union, remain independent actors in an
increasingly multipolar world?
Germany and Europe can help defend the rules-based international
order without succumbing to the fatalistic view that the world is
doomed to once again separate into competing blocs. My country’s
history gives it a special responsibility to fight the forces of
fascism, authoritarianism, and imperialism. At the same time, our
experience of being split in half during an ideological and
geopolitical contest gives us a particular appreciation of the risks
of a new cold war.
END OF AN ERA
For most of the world, the three decades since the Iron Curtain fell
have been a period of relative peace and prosperity. Technological
advances have created an unprecedented level of connectivity and
cooperation. Growing international trade, globe-spanning value and
production chains, and unparalleled exchanges of people and
knowledge across borders have brought over a billion people out of
poverty. Most important, courageous citizens all over the world have
swept away dictatorships and one-party rule. Their yearning for
liberty, dignity, and democracy changed the course of history. Two
devastating world wars and a great deal of suffering—much of it
caused by my country—were followed by more than four decades of
tension and confrontation in the shadow of possible nuclear
annihilation. But by the 1990s, it seemed that a more resilient
world order had finally taken hold.
Germans, in particular, could count their blessings. In November
1989, the Berlin Wall was brought down by the brave citizens of East
Germany. Only 11 months later, the country was reunified, thanks to
far-sighted politicians and support from partners in both the West
and the East. Finally, “what belongs together could grow together,”
as former German Chancellor Willy Brandt put it shortly after the
wall came down.
Those words applied not only to Germany but also to Europe as a
whole. Former members of the Warsaw Pact chose to become allies in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and members of the EU.
“Europe whole and free,” in the formulation of George H. W. Bush,
the U.S. president at the time, no longer seemed like an unfounded
hope. In this new era, it seemed possible that Russia would become a
partner to the West rather than the adversary that the Soviet Union
had been. As a result, most European countries shrank their armies
and cut their defense budgets. For Germany, the rationale was
simple: Why maintain a large defense force of some 500,000 soldiers
when all our neighbors appeared to be friends or partners?
The focus of our security and defense policy quickly shifted toward
other pressing threats. The Balkan wars and the aftermath of the
9/11 attacks in 2001, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
heightened the importance of regional and global crisis management.
Solidarity within NATO remained intact, however: the 9/11 attacks
led to the first decision to trigger Article 5, the mutual defense
clause of the North Atlantic Treaty, and for two decades, NATO
forces fought terrorism shoulder to shoulder in Afghanistan.
Germany’s business communities drew their own conclusions from the
new course of history. The fall of the Iron Curtain and an ever more
integrated global economy opened new opportunities and markets,
particularly in the countries of the former Eastern bloc but also in
other countries with emerging economies, especially China. Russia,
with its vast resources of energy and other raw materials, had
proved to be a reliable supplier during the Cold War, and it seemed
sensible, at least at first, to expand that promising partnership in
peacetime.
The Russian leadership, however, experienced the dissolution of the
former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and drew conclusions that
differed sharply from those of leaders in Berlin and other European
capitals. Instead of seeing the peaceful overthrow of communist rule
as an opportunity for more freedom and democracy, Russian President
Vladimir Putin has called it “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe
of the twentieth century.” The economic and political turmoil in
parts of the post-Soviet space in the 1990s only exacerbated the
feeling of loss and anguish that many Russian citizens to this day
associate with the end of the Soviet Union.
It was in that environment that authoritarianism and imperialistic
ambitions began to reemerge. In 2007, Putin delivered an aggressive
speech at the Munich Security Conference, deriding the rules-based
international order as a mere tool of American dominance. The
following year, Russia launched a war against Georgia. In 2014,
Russia occupied and annexed Crimea and sent its forces into parts of
the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, in direct violation of
international law and Moscow’s own treaty commitments. The years
that followed saw the Kremlin undercut arms control treaties and
expand its military capabilities, poison and murder Russian
dissidents, crack down on civil society, and carry out a brutal
military intervention in support of the Assad regime in Syria. Step
by step, Putin’s Russia chose a path that took it further from
Europe and further from a cooperative, peaceful order.
EMPIRE STRIKES BACK
During the eight years that followed the illegal annexation of
Crimea and the outbreak of conflict in eastern Ukraine, Germany and
its European and international partners in the G-7 focused on
safeguarding the sovereignty and political independence of Ukraine,
preventing further escalation by Russia and restoring and preserving
peace in Europe. The approach chosen was a combination of political
and economic pressure that coupled restrictive measures on Russia
with dialogue. Together with France, Germany engaged in the
so-called Normandy Format that led to the Minsk agreements and the
corresponding Minsk process, which called for Russia and Ukraine to
commit to a cease-fire and take a number of other steps. Despite
setbacks and a lack of trust between Moscow and Kyiv, Germany and
France kept the process running. But a revisionist Russia made it
impossible for diplomacy to succeed.
Russia’s brutal attack on Ukraine in February 2022 then ushered in a
fundamentally new reality: imperialism had returned to Europe.
Russia is using some of the most gruesome military methods of the
twentieth century and causing unspeakable suffering in Ukraine. Tens
of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians have already lost
their lives; many more have been wounded or traumatized. Millions of
Ukrainian citizens have had to flee their homes, seeking refuge in
Poland and other European countries; one million of them have come
to Germany. Russian artillery, missiles, and bombs have reduced
Ukrainian homes, schools, and hospitals to rubble. Mariupol, Irpin,
Kherson, Izyum: these places will forever serve to remind the world
of Russia’s crimes—and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.
But the impact of Russia’s war goes beyond Ukraine. When Putin gave
the order to attack, he shattered a European and international peace
architecture that had taken decades to build. Under Putin’s
leadership, Russia has defied even the most basic principles of
international law as enshrined in the UN Charter: the renunciation
of the use of force as a means of international policy and the
pledge to respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity of all countries. Acting as an imperial power, Russia now
seeks to redraw borders by force and to divide the world, once
again, into blocs and spheres of influence.
A STRONGER EUROPE
The world must not let Putin get his way; Russia’s revanchist
imperialism must be stopped. The crucial role for Germany at this
moment is to step up as one of the main providers of security in
Europe by investing in our military, strengthening the European
defense industry, beefing up our military presence on NATO’s eastern
flank, and training and equipping Ukraine’s armed forces.
Germany’s new role will require a new strategic culture, and the
national security strategy that my government will adopt a few
months from now will reflect this fact. For the last three decades,
decisions regarding Germany’s security and the equipment of the
country’s armed forces were taken against the backdrop of a Europe
at peace. Now, the guiding question will be which threats we and our
allies must confront in Europe, most immediately from Russia. These
include potential assaults on allied territory, cyberwarfare, and
even the remote chance of a nuclear attack, which Putin has not so
subtly threatened.
The transatlantic partnership is and remains vital to confronting
these challenges. U.S. President Joe Biden and his administration
deserve praise for building and investing in strong partnerships and
alliances across the globe. But a balanced and resilient
transatlantic partnership also requires that Germany and Europe play
active roles. One of the first decisions that my government made in
the aftermath of Russia’s attack on Ukraine was to designate a
special fund of approximately $100 billion to better equip our armed
forces, the Bundeswehr. We even changed our constitution to set up
this fund. This decision marks the starkest change in German
security policy since the establishment of the Bundeswehr in 1955.
Our soldiers will receive the political support, materials, and
capabilities they need to defend our country and our allies. The
goal is a Bundeswehr that we and our allies can rely on. To achieve
it, Germany will invest two percent of our gross domestic product in
our defense.
These changes reflect a new mindset in German society. Today, a
large majority of Germans agree that their country needs an army
able and ready to deter its adversaries and defend itself and its
allies. Germans stand with Ukrainians as they defend their country
against Russian aggression. From 2014 to 2020, Germany was Ukraine’s
largest source of private investments and government assistance
combined. And since Russia’s invasion began, Germany has boosted its
financial and humanitarian support for Ukraine and has helped
coordinate the international response while holding the presidency
of the G-7.
The Zeitenwende also led my government to reconsider a decades-old,
well-established principle of German policy on arms exports. Today,
for the first time in Germany’s recent history, we are delivering
weapons into a war fought between two countries. In my exchanges
with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, I have made one thing
very clear: Germany will sustain its efforts to support Ukraine for
as long as necessary. What Ukraine needs most today are artillery
and air-defense systems, and that is precisely what Germany is
delivering, in close coordination with our allies and partners.
German support to Ukraine also includes antitank weapons, armored
troop carriers, antiaircraft guns and missiles, and counterbattery
radar systems. A new EU mission will offer training for up to 15,000
Ukrainian troops, including up to 5,000—an entire brigade—in
Germany. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic, Greece, Slovakia, and
Slovenia have delivered or have pledged to deliver around 100
Soviet-era main battle tanks to Ukraine; Germany, in turn, will then
provide those countries with refurbished German tanks. This way,
Ukraine is receiving tanks that Ukrainian forces know well and have
experience using and that can be easily integrated into Ukraine’s
existing logistics and maintenance schemes.
NATO’s actions must not lead to a direct confrontation with Russia,
but the alliance must credibly deter further Russian aggression. To
that end, Germany has significantly increased its presence on NATO’s
eastern flank, reinforcing the German-led NATO battle group in
Lithuania and designating a brigade to ensure that country’s
security. Germany is also contributing troops to NATO’s battle group
in Slovakia, and the German air force is helping monitor and secure
airspace in Estonia and Poland. Meanwhile, the German navy has
participated in NATO’s deterrence and defense activities in the
Baltic Sea. Germany will also contribute an armored division, as
well as significant air and naval assets (all in states of high
readiness) to NATO’s New Force Model, which is designed to improve
the alliance’s ability to respond quickly to any contingency. And
Germany will continue to uphold its commitment to NATO’s nuclear
sharing arrangements, including by purchasing dual-capable F-35
fighter jets.
Our message to Moscow is very clear: we are determined to defend
every single inch of NATO territory against any possible aggression.
We will honor NATO’s solemn pledge that an attack on any one ally
will be considered an attack on the entire alliance. We have also
made it clear to Russia that its recent rhetoric concerning nuclear
weapons is reckless and irresponsible. When I visited Beijing in
November, Chinese President Xi Jinping and I concurred that
threatening the use of nuclear weapons was unacceptable and that the
use of such horrific weapons would cross a redline that humankind
has rightly drawn. Putin should mark these words.
Among the many miscalculations that Putin has made is his bet that
the invasion of Ukraine would strain relations among his
adversaries. In fact, the reverse has happened: the EU and the
transatlantic alliance are stronger than ever before. Nowhere is
this more evident than in the unprecedented economic sanctions that
Russia is facing. It was clear from the outset of the war that these
sanctions would have to be in place for a long time, as their
effectiveness increases with each passing week. Putin needs to
understand that not a single sanction will be lifted should Russia
try to dictate the terms of a peace deal.
All the leaders of the G-7 countries have commended Zelensky’s
readiness for a just peace that respects the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of Ukraine and safeguards Ukraine’s ability to
defend itself in the future. In coordination with our partners,
Germany stands ready to reach arrangements to sustain Ukraine’s
security as part of a potential postwar peace settlement. We will
not, however, accept the illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory,
poorly disguised by sham referendums. To end this war, Russia must
withdraw its troops.
GOOD FOR THE CLIMATE, BAD FOR RUSSIA
Russia’s war has not only unified the EU, NATO, and the G-7 in
opposition to his aggression; it has also catalyzed changes in
economic and energy policy that will hurt Russia in the long run—and
give a boost to the vital transition to clean energy that was
already underway. Right after taking office as German chancellor in
December 2021, I asked my advisers whether we had a plan in place
should Russia decide to stop its gas deliveries to Europe. The
answer was no, even though we had become dangerously dependent on
Russian gas deliveries.
We immediately started preparing for the worst-case scenario. In the
days before Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, Germany suspended
the certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which was set to
significantly increase Russian gas supplies to Europe. In February
2022, plans were already on the table to import liquefied natural
gas from the global market outside Europe—and in the coming months,
the first floating LNG terminals will go into service on the German
coast.
The worst-case scenario soon materialized, as Putin decided to
weaponize energy by cutting supplies to Germany and the rest of
Europe. But Germany has now completely phased out the importation of
Russian coal, and EU imports of Russian oil will soon end. We have
learned our lesson: Europe’s security relies on diversifying its
energy suppliers and routes and on investing in energy independence.
In September, the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines drove home
that message.
To bridge any potential energy shortages in Germany and Europe as a
whole, my government is bringing coal-fired power plants back onto
the grid temporarily and allowing German nuclear power plants to
operate longer than originally planned. We have also mandated that
privately owned gas storage facilities meet progressively higher
minimum filling levels. Today, our facilities are completely full,
whereas levels at this time last year were unusually low. This is a
good basis for Germany and Europe to get through the winter without
gas shortages.
Russia’s war showed us that reaching these ambitious targets is also
necessary to defend our security and independence, as well as the
security and independence of Europe. Moving away from fossil energy
sources will increase the demand for electricity and green hydrogen,
and Germany is preparing for that outcome by massively speeding up
the shift to renewable energies such as wind and solar power. Our
goals are clear: by 2030, at least 80 percent of the electricity
Germans use will be generated by renewables, and by 2045, Germany
will achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, or “climate
neutrality.”
PUTIN’S WORST NIGHTMARE
Putin wanted to divide Europe into zones of influence and to divide
the world into blocs of great powers and vassal states. Instead, his
war has served only to advance the EU. At the European Council in
June 2022, the EU granted Ukraine and Moldova the status of
“candidate countries” and reaffirmed that Georgia’s future lies with
Europe. We also agreed that the EU accession of all six countries of
the western Balkans must finally become a reality, a goal to which I
am personally committed. That is why I have revived the so-called
Berlin Process for the western Balkans, which intends to deepen
cooperation in the region, bringing its countries and their citizens
closer together and preparing them for EU integration.
It is important to acknowledge that expanding the EU and integrating
new members will be difficult; nothing would be worse than giving
millions of people false hope. But the way is open, and the goal is
clear: an EU that will consist of over 500 million free citizens,
representing the largest internal market in the world, that will set
global standards on trade, growth, climate change, and environmental
protection and that will host leading research institutes and
innovative businesses—a family of stable democracies enjoying
unparalleled social welfare and public infrastructure.
As the EU moves toward that goal, its adversaries will continue to
try to drive wedges between its members. Putin has never accepted
the EU as a political actor. After all, the EU—a union of free,
sovereign, democratic states based on the rule of law—is the
antithesis of his imperialistic and autocratic kleptocracy.
Putin and others will try to turn our own open, democratic systems
against us, through disinformation campaigns and influence peddling.
European citizens have a wide variety of views, and European
political leaders discuss and sometimes argue about the right way
forward, especially during geopolitical and economic challenges. But
these characteristics of our open societies are features, not bugs;
they are the essence of democratic decision-making. Our goal today,
however, is to close ranks on crucial areas in which disunity would
make Europe more vulnerable to foreign interference. Crucial to that
mission is ever-closer cooperation between Germany and France, which
share the same vision of a strong and sovereign EU.
More broadly, the EU must overcome old conflicts and find new
solutions. European migration and fiscal policy are cases in point.
People will continue to come to Europe, and Europe needs immigrants,
so the EU must devise an immigration strategy that is pragmatic and
aligns with its values. This means reducing irregular migration and
at the same time strengthening legal paths to Europe, in particular
for the skilled workers that our labor markets need. On fiscal
policy, the union has established a recovery and resilience fund
that will also help address the current challenges posed by high
energy prices. The union must also do away with selfish blocking
tactics in its decision-making processes by eliminating the ability
of individual countries to veto certain measures. As the EU expands
and becomes a geopolitical actor, quick decision-making will be the
key to success. For that reason, Germany has proposed gradually
extending the practice of making decisions by majority voting to
areas that currently fall under the unanimity rule, such as EU
foreign policy and taxation.
Europe must also continue to assume greater responsibility for its
own security and needs a coordinated and integrated approach to
building its defense capabilities. For example, the militaries of EU
member states operate too many different weapons systems, which
creates practical and economic inefficiencies. To address these
problems, the EU must change its internal bureaucratic procedures,
which will require courageous political decisions; EU member states,
including Germany, will have to alter their national policies and
regulations on exporting jointly manufactured military systems.
One field in which Europe urgently needs to make progress is defense
in the air and space domains. That is why Germany will be
strengthening its air defense over the coming years, as part of the
NATO framework, by acquiring additional capabilities. I opened this
initiative to our European neighbors, and the result is the European
Sky Shield Initiative, which 14 other European states joined last
October. Joint air defense in Europe will be more efficient and cost
effective than if all of us go it alone, and it offers an
outstanding example of what it means to strengthen the European
pillar within NATO.
NATO is the ultimate guarantor of Euro-Atlantic security, and its
strength will only grow with the addition of two prosperous
democracies, Finland and Sweden, as members. But NATO is also made
stronger when its European members independently take steps toward
greater compatibility between their defense structures, within the
framework of the EU.
THE CHINA CHALLENGE—AND BEYOND
Russia’s war of aggression might have triggered the Zeitenwende, but
the tectonic shifts run much deeper. History did not end, as some
predicted, with the Cold War. Nor, however, is history repeating
itself. Many assume we are on the brink of an era of bipolarity in
the international order. They see the dawn of a new cold war
approaching, one that will pit the United States against China.
I do not subscribe to this view. Instead, I believe that what we are
witnessing is the end of an exceptional phase of globalization, a
historic shift accelerated by, but not entirely the result of,
external shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war in
Ukraine. During that exceptional phase, North America and Europe
experienced 30 years of stable growth, high employment rates, and
low inflation, and the United States became the world’s decisive
power—a role it will retain in the twenty-first century.
But during the post–Cold War phase of globalization, China also
became a global player, as it had been in earlier long periods of
world history. China’s rise does not warrant isolating Beijing or
curbing cooperation. But neither does China’s growing power justify
claims for hegemony in Asia and beyond. No country is the backyard
of any other—and that applies to Europe as much as it does to Asia
and every other region. During my recent visit to Beijing, I
expressed firm support for the rules-based international order, as
enshrined in the UN Charter, as well as for open and fair trade. In
concert with its European partners, Germany will continue to demand
a level playing field for European and Chinese companies. China does
too little in this regard and has taken a noticeable turn toward
isolation and away from openness.
In Beijing, I also raised concerns over the growing insecurity in
the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait and questioned China’s
approach to human rights and individual freedoms. Respecting basic
rights and freedoms can never be an “internal matter” for individual
states because every UN member state vows to uphold them.
Meanwhile, as China and the countries of North America and Europe
adjust to the changing realities of globalization’s new phase, many
countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America that
enabled exceptional growth in the past by producing goods and raw
materials at low costs are now gradually becoming more prosperous
and have their own demand for resources, goods, and services. These
regions have every right to seize the opportunities that
globalization offers and to demand a stronger role in global affairs
in line with their growing economic and demographic weight. That
poses no threat to citizens in Europe or North America. On the
contrary, we should encourage these regions’ greater participation
in and integration into the international order. This is the best
way to keep multilateralism alive in a multipolar world.
That is why Germany and the EU are investing in new partnerships and
broadening existing ones with many countries in Africa, Asia, the
Caribbean, and Latin America. Many of them share a fundamental
characteristic with us: they, too, are democracies. This commonality
plays a crucial role—not because we aim to pit democracies against
authoritarian states, which would only contribute to a new global
dichotomy, but because sharing democratic values and systems will
help us define joint priorities and achieve common goals in the new
multipolar reality of the twenty-first century. We might all have
become capitalists (with the possible exception of North Korea and a
tiny handful of other countries), to paraphrase an argument the
economist Branko Milanovic made a few years ago. But it makes a huge
difference whether capitalism is organized in a liberal, democratic
way or along authoritarian lines.
Take the global response to COVID-19. Early in the pandemic, some
argued that authoritarian states would prove more adept at crisis
management, since they can plan better for the long term and can
make tough decisions more quickly. But the pandemic track records of
authoritarian countries hardly support that view. Meanwhile, the
most effective COVID-19 vaccines and pharmaceutical treatments were
all developed in free democracies. What is more, unlike
authoritarian states, democracies have the ability to self-correct
as citizens express their views freely and choose their political
leaders. The constant debating and questioning in our societies,
parliaments, and free media may sometimes feel exhausting. But it is
what makes our systems more resilient in the long run.
Freedom, equality, the rule of law, and the dignity of every human
being are values not exclusive to what has been traditionally
understood as the West. Rather, they are shared by citizens and
governments around the world, and the UN Charter reaffirms them as
fundamental human rights in its preamble. But autocratic and
authoritarian regimes often challenge or deny these rights and
principles. To defend them, the countries of the EU, including
Germany, must cooperate more closely with democracies outside the
West, as traditionally defined. In the past, we have purported to
treat the countries of Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin
America as equals. But too often, our words have not been backed by
deeds. This must change. During Germany’s presidency of the G-7, the
group has coordinated its agenda closely with Indonesia, which holds
the G-20 presidency. We have also involved in our deliberations
Senegal, which holds the presidency of the African Union; Argentina,
which holds the presidency of the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States; our G-20 partner South Africa; and India, which
will hold the G-20 presidency next year.
Eventually, in a multipolar world, dialogue and cooperation must
extend beyond the democratic comfort zone. The United States’ new
National Security Strategy rightly acknowledges the need to engage
with “countries that do not embrace democratic institutions but
nevertheless depend upon and support a rules-based international
system.” The world’s democracies will need to work with these
countries to defend and uphold a global order that binds power to
rules and that confronts revisionist acts such as Russia’s war of
aggression. This effort will take pragmatism and a degree of
humility.
The journey toward the democratic freedom we enjoy today has been
full of setbacks and errors. Yet certain rights and principles were
established and accepted centuries ago. Habeas corpus, the
protection from arbitrary detention, is one such fundamental
right—and was first recognized not by a democratic government but by
the absolutist monarchy of King Charles II of England. Equally
important is the basic principle that no country can take by force
what belongs to its neighbor. Respect for these fundamental rights
and principles should be required of all states, regardless of their
internal political systems.
Periods of relative peace and prosperity in human history, such as
the one that most of the world experienced in the early post–Cold
War era, need not be rare interludes or mere deviations from a
historical norm in which brute force dictates the rules. And
although we cannot turn back the clock, we can still turn back the
tide of aggression and imperialism. Today’s complex, multipolar
world renders this task more challenging. To carry it out, Germany
and its partners in the EU, the United States, the G-7, and NATO
must protect our open societies, stand up for our democratic values,
and strengthen our alliances and partnerships. But we must also
avoid the temptation to once again divide the world into blocs. This
means making every effort to build new partnerships, pragmatically
and without ideological blinders. In today’s densely interconnected
world, the goal of advancing peace, prosperity, and human freedom
calls for a different mindset and different tools. Developing that
mindset and those tools is ultimately what the Zeitenwende is all
about. |
