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Here is the latest version I’ve seen of the German-French plan
for normalization between Kosovo and Serbia. It is a step in the
right direction, if fully implemented, but with some dubious
additions and important missing elements.
What’s new
This latest text has a bit more detail on
arrangements for the Serbian community in Kosovo than I have seen
previously, especially in Article 7 (the glitch [sic] is in the
original):
Both sides advocate for the achievement of
concrete arrangements, in accordance with the relevant instruments
of the Council of Europe and using existing European experiences, in
order to ensure an appropriate level of self-government for the
Serbian community in Kosovo and the possibility of providing
services in Kosovo. Kosovo.[sic] some specific areas, including the
possibility of financial assistance from Serbia and direct channels
of communication between the Serbian community and the Government of
Kosovo.
The parties will formalize the status of
the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and ensure a high level of
protection of Serbian religious and cultural heritage, in accordance
with existing European models.
The first of these paragraphs isn’t great. It
fails to make reference to the Kosovo constitution as the basis for
these “concrete arrangements.” It also fails to require reciprocity
inside Serbia for the Albanian community there. What conditions
would govern “the possibility of financial assistance from Serbia”?
Nor is it clear what “direct channels of communication” with the
Kosovo government means. There is already a Council of Communities
that provides such communication with the Kosovo President, as well
as Serb and other community representation in parliament and in the
government ministries.
As for the Church, the text lacks reference to the
longstanding issue of the Decan/i monastery’s property. It should
reference implementation of the relevant Kosovo Constitutional Court
decision.
What’s missing
Most important is what is missing. There is no
apparent reference to recognition of Kosovo by the five EU members
that do not recognize it.
The failure to get recognition by the five
nonrecognizers is a deal breaker. It might not have to be in this
text, but it would have to happen in order for Kosovo to be
convinced that normalization was real. Even with those five
recognitions, this agreement would not come close to the
German/German Basic Treaty it is supposedly modeled after. That
entailed the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic both
becoming members of the United Nations. There is no such possibility
here, as Russia would require an unacceptable price.
EU negotiator Lajcak is said to have met with the
five nonrecognizers this week in Brussels. That’s good, but more is
going to be needed. Each one will have to be convinced that the time
has come to drop their opposition to Kosovo’s European prospects.
Washington and EU capitals, not just Lajcak, will need to engage.
The rest of the iceberg
They will also need to engage on pressuring both
Belgrade and Pristina to make the necessary compromises. Pressure on
Kosovo has long been apparent. It is relatively easy to pressure a
country that has no other option than bandwagoning with NATO and the
EU. Pressure on Serbia is far less so. President Vucic has played a
successful hedging game, balancing Russia and China against the EU
and US.
That game may now be up. The Europeans have
delivered a tough ultimatum to Serbia, one whose specific content is
uncertain but easy to imagine.
Branko Milanovic does:
threats must range from the suspension of
EU negotiations, elimination of EU support funds (that Serbia gets
as a candidate member), reintroduction of visas, discouragement of
EU investors, to possibly additional financial sanctions (say, no
access to short-term commercial loans), ban on long-term lending by
the European banks, EBRD and possibly the World Bank and the IMF,
and for the very end elements of a true embargo and perhaps seizure
of assets.
@Demush Shasha thinks this has caused a notable
change in President Vucic’s tone:
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