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Friday, Serbia President Vucic announced measures
intended to reverse Kosovo independence. He is no longer content to
refuse to recognize Kosovo but wants instead to take at least part
of it. Meanwhile, the American Embassy in Belgrade continues to
profess confidence that he is moving Serbia toward the West.
Jasmin Mujanovic tweeted week before last:
US policy in the Western Balkans is clear as mud.
The US supports Vucic despite his pro-Russian associations, whereas
it opposes Kurti despite his pro-Western positions. In Bosnia, the
US opposes Vucic’s proxies, whose counterparts in Montenegro it
helped depose a pro-NATO govt.
All this is true. The State Department has lost
the bubble. It is time to find it again.
Long-term objectives
US objectives in the Balkans should be clear, not
confused. They should apply separately to all the states of the
region, while recognizing that interactions among them may affect
progress. Let me offer these longer-term goals for those countries
that want a good relationship with the US:
Democratic governance based on equal
rights, with reasonable guarantees for minorities;
Secure sovereignty and territorial
integrity without use or threat of force.
These goals are consistent with NATO and EU
membership for any state that wants to join those institutions.
Where we stand now: Bosnia and Serbia
Things are headed in the wrong direction.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serb and Croat
nationalists are reversing the progress made in the first decade
after the 1995 Dayton accords. “Dayton” ended the war but left the
warring parties in power. For a decade thereafter, bold
international intervention forced ethnic nationalists to accept
reforms that pointed towards sovereignty and territorial integrity
as well as equal rights.
Since 2006 however ethnic nationalists have been
unraveling the prior progress. The Americans this year pushed the
leading Bosniak party out of power, claiming it inimical to
statebuilding. Ironically, that party supported democratic
governance and territorial integrity. The main Croat and Serb
opponents of Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are
still waging their fight from position of power.
In Serbia, President Vucic has taken over a weak
democratic regime and turned it into a de facto semi-autocracy. He
holds a majority in parliament but more importantly has concentrated
power in the presidency. From there, Vucic wields the police and
other security forces against a weak and fragmented opposition. He
has also aligned Serbia with Russia on Ukraine sanctions and bent
over backwards to attract Chinese investment in sensitive areas like
telecommunications and security technology. He buys off Western
criticism by supplying ammunition to Ukraine, purchasing French
warplanes, and selling lithium to Germany.
Where we stand now: Kosovo, Montenegro, and
Macedonia
Kosovo, where alternation in power has occurred
several times, has a popular prime minister who exerts sovereign
authority in Serb-majority northern Kosovo in ways that give the
Americans and European qualms. They want him to consult and get
permission for anything he does that might upset either the Kosovo
Serbs or Belgrade. He hasn’t been willing to do that. But Prime
Minister Kurti nevertheless aligns unequivocally with the West. He
has no alternative.
Friends of Putin now run Montenegro, which became
a NATO member in 2017. NATO-member Macedonia, to its credit,
peacefully alternated political parties in power earlier this year.
Some in the current majority lean towards Russia, but the Albanian
partners in the coalition are more reliably Western-oriented. That
however is no guarantee, so Macedonia requires careful watching.
The threat
None of these places is top priority in a world
where Russia has invaded Ukraine, China is threatening Taiwan, and
Iran and its proxies are at war with Israel. But if something goes
wrong in the Balkans, it will spread rapidly to other places.
The biggest threat is Belgrade’s increasing
devotion to what it terms “the Serbian world.” This is Greater
Serbia, de facto if not de jure. Vucic wants to control the Serbs of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. His security
services pursue this goal actively and aggressively, with support
from Moscow. He has been successful de facto in Montenegro. In
Kosovo, many Serbs are not devoted to Vucic, who has demonstrated
little concern for their welfare. But he maintains control through
finance and intimidation. In Bosnia, Vucic has gradually gained more
leverage on the main Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, who is sanctioned
by Washington and has driven his 49% of the country into arrears
with Moscow while espousing secessionist intentions.
Partition of Bosnia and Kosovo would serve Vucic’s
irredentist goals. That would greatly cheer Moscow and revivify its
ambitions in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, if not also Kazakhstan.
The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Western Balkan
states stands as a counter to what Putin is seeking elsewhere. That
has encouraged him to use Serbia as a proxy. Last year, Belgrade
kidnapped two Kosovo policemen, rented a riot against NATO
peacekeepers, and sponsored a terrorist incident in northern Kosovo.
Serbia intended for that incident to give Belgrade an excuse to move
its military into the north. That would have cheered Moscow and
encouraged its efforts to take all of Donetsk.
The current approach isn’t working
The Biden Administration has tried to appease
Serbia to prevent Belgrade from acting on its irredentist goals and
to win it over to the West. It has lavished praise and money on
Vucic while withholding both from Kurti and denouncing and
sanctioning Dodik. This is incoherent. Vucic and Dodik are aligned
with Moscow and share the goal of Greater Serbia. Kurti’s commitment
to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is a main barrier
against their ambitions.
Jim O’Brien, the State Department’s Assistant
Secretary for Europe, has recognized that northern Kosovo and
Dodik’s secessionist threats are the main security threats in the
Balkans. But he looks to the peacekeeping forces in both places to
meet them.
That has proven a temporary expedient, but the
European force (EUFOR) in Bosnia is weak and deployed in ways that
would prevent it from reacting in a timely way to a determined
secessionist move. The NATO-led force in Kosovo is stronger and
better positioned, but would it be able or willing to prevent
Serbian armor from rolling in to take northern Kosovo? It is 25
years since the NATO war that liberated Kosovo from Serbian rule. It
is high time Kosovo–like any other sovereign state–be able to defend
its own territorial integrity.
The reset needed
Appeasement of Serbia isn’t working. Chastising
Kosovo isn’t working either. Montenegro is lost for now. Bosnia and
Macedonia are at risk.
Washington needs to reset its Balkans policy in
more coherent directions:
It should support Pristina’s efforts to
govern in equitably in northern Kosovo and help plan the next moves
in that direction.
It should end appeasement of Serbia,
publicly criticize Vucic’s irredentist and anti-democratic
intentions, and end the lavishing of praise and money on Belgrade.
The US should encourage the redeployment
of EUFOR to the northeastern Bosnian town of Brcko, where it would
represent a serious deterrent to secessionism.
Washington should insist that Bosnia
implement the European Court of Human Rights decisions that would
end the country’s ethnic-based politics.
Washington should lead an effort to
isolate Montenegro’s russophiles from sensitive NATO information.
It should also warn Macedonia that it
will be next if the russophiles there remain in power.
Kamala Harris is as clear as she can be about
Putin’s perfidy in Ukraine:
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