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Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a new conflict
zone between Russia and the west, according to Kommersant, a leading
Russian business daily. This assessment follows a series of
developments which, separately taken, might have rung few alarm
bells. Yet, in combination, and backed by an intensive propaganda
campaign from Belgrade and Banja Luka, they risk shattering the
fragile peace which has held Bosnia together for the last two
decades.
The current tensions first arose when Russia, at
Serbia's request, vetoed a UK draft Security Council resolution
marking the Srebrenica genocide. Since genocide had already been
established in two international courts, the veto in itself had
little significance beyond causing extra friction between the
Bosnian Federation and Serbia. But Security Council resolutions are
rarely vetoed, and Russia’s stance in this case may intimate a wider
agenda in the region.
The next event occurred at the twentieth
anniversary commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide at Potocari,
when the Serbian prime minister, Aleksandar Vucic, was targeted with
stones, shoes and bottles. There were no injuries of any note, and
the incident involved only a handful of the 50,000 or so attending
the commemoration, but Vucic grasped the opportunity to respond in
what the Serbian media termed ‘statesmanlike’ fashion. ‘Victim of
the hour‘, Vucic indicated that he was ready to draw a line under
the episode and reach out a hand of reconciliation, while at the
same time branding his assailants as fools and hooligans, and
blaming the Bosnian authorities for poor security arrangements.
Ties with Russia
Days after the Srebrenica commemoration, an
article appeared in Nezavisne Novine, a leading Republika Srpska
daily, announcing that Serbia, no longer weak, was now poised to
become leader in the region, and even a mediator on the
international stage, at a time of increasing dissension between the
western powers and Russia. Vucic, spearheading Serbia's 'new'
foreign policy, describes it as working towards EU integration
(essential for Serbia’s economic recovery), while maintaining
traditional friendship ties with Russia.
Meanwhile, a referendum in Republika Srpska, an
initiative launched by RS President Milorad Dodik in July, is now
set to take place on 15 November. This would amount to a de facto
exit from the Bosnian justice system, a move vigorously opposed by
European and US leaders as a prelude to the possible disintegration
of Bosnia, and regional destabilisation. The initiative was
supported by Russia, however, presumably for the same reason, and to
extend its influence in the region. Russia’s support prompted Dodik
to approach heads of state and diplomats throughout the region and
internationally in a lengthy letter, justifying his intention. It is
not the first time Dodik has threatened a referendum, but what has
changed is the new energy with which he is pursuing his goals.
Dodik, of course, cannot get very far without
Serbia’s backing and, in particular, that of its most powerful
politician, Aleksandar Vucic. Vucic has consistently declared
Serbia’s support for RS, while making serious overtures to European
leaders in recent weeks, and, at the same time, crafting a new image
of himself, bordering on a personality cult. On the surface, Vucic
appears conciliatory towards Bosnia, even to the point of inviting
the Bosnian presidents to Belgrade in a highly-publicised visit to
demonstrate the superiority of Serbia's security arrangements. The
fact that he skipped protocol by issuing the invitations himself,
rather than through Tomislav Nikolic, the Serbian president, is
telling, but not the first instance of Vucic attempting to outshine
his president.
Conversion or ploy?
So has Vucic undergone a Damascene conversion? Or
is it all just a cynical ploy to gain support and confidence within
and beyond the frontiers of Serbia, whilst continuing to pursue the
old ‘Greater Serbia’ policy tactically, through words rather than
weapons? Whatever the case, it seems to be working in Serbia, where
his personal rating has soared since the Srebrenica episode. This
may, of course, not be entirely unconnected to the increasing
control of the media by Vucic and his close associates – one of
several concerns about the deteriorating situation in Serbia raised
by US Congress members in a letter to Vice-President Joseph Biden on
the eve of Vucic's recent visit to Washington.
Until quite recently, Vucic was little known
outside Serbia, other than for his infamous remark recorded on video
just three weeks before the Srebrenica genocide, when he pledged
before the Serbian Assembly that for every Serb killed, one hundred
Muslims would die. During the Bosnian war, Vucic was spokesperson
for Vojislav Seselj’s Radical Party (of which Nikolic was also a
leading member), known for its brutal campaigns aimed at creating a
'Greater Serbia', involving the conquest of large chunks of Bosnia
and Croatia through murder and the mass expulsion of civilians.
Vucic hastens to stress that his position has now
changed. He even admits that 'some' Serbs were responsible for the
Srebrenica massacres. He is not prepared, however, to acknowledge
his own role, or that of Serbia, in the Bosnian war. Nor does he
concede that the Srebrenica massacres constituted genocide. This
casual dismissal of international judgments in itself casts doubt on
Vucic's credentials as a stabilising force in the region, let alone
an international interlocutor.
At times, Vucic appears to talk with a forked
tongue. He likes to present himself as a modern democratic leader,
yet opines that Serbia should return to the policies of Milos
Obrenovic. Does he mean the autocratic nineteenth-century leader who
ruled with a rod of steel, refusing to share power, and became one
of the richest men in poverty-stricken Serbia? Vucic offers a hand
of friendship to Bosnia (and to the Bosniak Presidency member, Bakir
Izetbegovic, in particular) whilst at the same time peddling the
myth through the government-controlled media that the attack at
Potocari was an organised assassination attempt, and that the
security group responsible for the failure to protect him is
directly linked to Izetbegovic. Given the lax security, if the
intent had been to kill, more effective weaponry than stones would
surely have been used. More serious still is the depiction of Bosnia
as a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism, and a base for ISIS, an
allegation likely to gain traction in European capitals already
traumatised by the spread of ISIS in Europe, even though Bosnia is
no more a centre of extremist Islamic activity than other European
states.
Vucic also did not see fit to withdraw the two
international arrest warrants issued by Serbia for Naser Oric and
Ramush Haradinaj, which led to their arrests in Switzerland and
Slovenia, respectively (mirroring the failed extradition warrants
against Ejup Ganic and Jovan Divjak in 2010 and 2011). Both Oric and
Haradinaj had been acquitted of all charges at the International
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, and Oric’s arrest did little to
improve Belgrade’s relations with Sarajevo, whilst Haradinaj's
detention led to tensions between Slovenia and Kosovo. Serbia's
ongoing vigorous opposition to Kosovo joining UNESCO has merely
exacerbated tensions between Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians,
belying Vucic’s allegedly flexible approach to Kosovo independence.
In short, beyond the rhetoric, there appears little of substance to
Vucic’s claim to support stabilisation in the region.
Improving relations
If, despite appearances, Vucic is serious about
wanting to improve relations with Sarajevo, he would be advised to
start by publicly recognising that genocide took place in
Srebrenica, and by declaring Sarajevo as Belgrade’s interlocutor,
and not Banja Luka as at present. He would also need to acknowledge
Serbia’s responsibility in the Bosnian war, not least as a step
towards assisting his own people to come to terms with established
historical facts in relation to the 1990s wars orchestrated from
Belgrade, at which point they may see the irony in their media
giving precedence to a skirmish over the genocide of 8,000 men and
boys.
All this would, of course, amount to a sea change,
which is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Bosnian dysfunctionality
Meanwhile, Russia has been gradually moving
towards closer alignment in the Balkans, to diminish the influence
of the European Union. Natural gas supplies, infrastructure projects
and various investments over recent years have reinforced Russia’s
traditional links with Serbia, Montenegro and RS. Serbia is an
important Russian ally and will be even more so if it secures EU
membership. Bosnia, on the other hand, will serve Russia’s purpose
better if unstable, an aspiration shared by Dodik whose power would
be severely curtailed in a Bosnia integrated into the EU. Dodik,
consequently, has been nurturing close ties with the Russian
leadership, supporting Crimea’s referendum on joining Russia, while
Russia will use its relationship with RS to foment instability in
Bosnia, and thereby be better placed to compete with European powers
for influence in the wider arena.
A certain degree of complacency over the Balkans
has developed in the west in recent years. There are no easy
options. Serbia, under the premiership of the increasingly powerful
Aleksandar Vucic, is still deeply engulfed in revisionism and denial
over the 1990s wars, as recent events demonstrate, and, if admitted
into the EU in its current political configuration, would be likely
to play a divisive role in Bosnia and beyond.
In the lead up to the twentieth anniversary of the
Dayton Agreement in which Milosevic played a major role, and which
laid the foundations for long-term ethnic division in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, there is an opportunity to revisit the Agreement, with
a view to abolishing the two-entity system which is the main (albeit
not the only) source of Bosnia’s dysfunctionality. It is not written
in stone and, as it has played out in practice, contravenes
international human rights law. This move would pave the way to an
ethnically-integrated and more economically and politically stable
Bosnia, which citizens in both entities would welcome if accompanied
by sufficient international commitment and the financial resources
to carry it through. In other words, what most Bosnians, whatever
their ethnic origin, need most is political stability and the
prospect of a more secure economic future.
Russia would be unlikely to intervene to obstruct
the process, as it has already indicated that any initiative needs
to come from RS or Serbia. The main opposition to a revision of
Dayton would come from Banja Luka and Belgrade and, in the absence
of firm international backing, would probably not get very far.
It is not an easy option, but the alternatives
could be a lot worse.
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