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In an exclusive interview with
Today's Zaman, Professor Jessica
Stern shared her insights on the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(ISIS). Stern states that “for
Baghdadi and ISIS, the caliphate is
here and now,” suggesting that ISIS
counts the re-establishment of the
caliphate as an essential step
leading up to the apocalypse.
“Although many jihadi groups are
somewhat apocalyptic, ISIS is much
more focused on an end times
narrative and on the imminence of
the prophesied final battle,” she
argues.
She further elaborates that the best
way to fight ISIS ideologically
requires people who can reach out to
the youth. “There are hundreds, if
not thousands, of learned Islamic
scholars and clerics who have said
ISIS is misinterpreting Islam. But
what they are saying is not reaching
the young people who are their
recruits,” she says, adding, “What
we need are credible sources who
know how to talk to young people.”
Stern, who has a doctorate in public
policy from Harvard, lectures at
Harvard Law School. She is well
known for her internationally
acclaimed books, especially on
terrorism, including “Terror in the
Name of God” (2003), where she
collected data by interviewing
religious extremists in the US,
Israel, Pakistan and elsewhere over
a four-year period.
She was portrayed by Nicole Kidman
in the famous movie “The Peacemaker”
(1997), in which Jessica's work at
the National Security Council was
fictionalized. The reason she was
portrayed in the movie was due to
the position she held as director of
the anti-nuclear-smuggling operation
in the first Clinton administration.
As a reminder, George Clooney also
co-starred in the movie as a
military intelligence officer who
used unorthodox methods to get the
job done.
Her dissertation, “The control of
chemical weapons: A strategic
analysis,” submitted to Harvard
University in 1992, also helped to
make her a leading figure in the
field of weapons of mass
destruction.
Stern is a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations and was included
in a Time magazine series that
profiled 100 people with bold ideas.
In 2015, she co-authored her most
recent book, “ISIS: The State of
Terror,” with J.M. Berger, an expert
on political and extremist uses of
social media. Referring to highly
sensitive intelligence sources, they
explain the emergence of today's
most infamous terrorist
organization, ISIS, and try to offer
ideas on how to respond to it.
Could you, please, tell us about
your book? What is the focus of your
book? How has the feedback been?
I wrote the book with J.M. Berger,
who is an expert on terrorist use of
social media. Actually, I met him on
Twitter and I only met him in person
once before I asked him to write a
book with me. What we do in the book
is to explain where ISIS comes from,
how it evolved from earlier jihadi
groups, its relationship with other
groups, how it is competing for
personnel, how it recruits and so
on.
What do you think is the role of
al-Qaeda on the emergence of ISIS?
ISIS comes out of al-Qaeda; it comes
out of the group al-Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI). From the very beginning there
were tensions between “al-Qaeda
central” and al-Qaeda in Iraq. One
of the tensions was that the leader
of al-Qaeda in Iraq was extremely
violent and killed a lot of Muslims,
and [Osama] bin Laden didn't think
this was good for the image of
al-Qaeda. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who
was the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq,
really had it in for the Shiites.
Zarqawi was very good in raising
money through criminal activities.
We still see that feature in ISIS.
He was basically a petty criminal in
Jordan, and his mother urged him to
study Islam, thinking she would save
him from the life of crime.
Unfortunately, the Islam that he
found was simply an excuse to
continue his life of crime. He
beheaded his victims and filmed the
beheadings. Therefore, the things
that people think that are new about
ISIS, actually, are not new at all,
it is just that ISIS got much better
at the filming and the dissemination
of the filming of these beheadings.
The killing of many Muslims, both
Sunni and Shiites, but especially
Shiites, that comes right out of
Zarqawi's ideology and practices.
And really paying attention to
finances was something that Zarqawi
also specialized in. Al-Qaeda
central actually asked al-Qaeda in
Iraq for money, which is quite
unusual. Usually al-Qaeda central
would be disseminating money, but in
this case, they asked for money.
What do you think are the major
differences between al-Qaeda and
ISIS today?
As I said, they come out of the same
organization. ISIS emerged out of
al-Qaeda's branch in Iraq, AQI. By
2011, Syria had essentially erupted
into civil war, and AQI (at that
point called the Islamic State of
Iraq) wanted to take advantage of
the chaos. In 2013, Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, who became emir of the
organization in 2010, declared
himself the emir of the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant --
claiming responsibility for running
the jihad in both Iraq and Syria.
[Ayman al-] Zawahiri [leader of
al-Qaeda] ordered Baghdadi to return
to Iraq and leave the al-Qaeda
branch in Syria, the al-Nusra Front,
in charge of the jihad there.
Baghdadi refused. Baghdadi declared
himself the caliph in 2014, claiming
that all Muslims, anywhere on earth,
owed allegiance to him. In
Baghdadi's view, Zawahiri owed
allegiance to him rather than the
other way around. Thus the breakup
of ISIS and al-Qaeda, and the
continuing tension and competition
between the two organizations was at
least as much about authority and
leadership as it is about
differences in their objectives and
style. As for those differences --
ISIS holds territory. It has spread
a narrative that is appealing to
young people and has significantly
greater social media skills than
earlier jihadi organizations. ISIS
is a populist organization; Baghdadi
wants to recruit anyone and
everyone, and his organization has
attracted an unprecedented number of
foreign volunteers. Baghdadi
announced that every Muslim is
required to move to the caliphate.
Whereas bin Laden was a little bit
of an elitist, he wouldn't take just
anyone into his organization. This
difference was reflected in the
original tension between Zarqawi and
bin Laden. Zarqawi was an uneducated
man who didn't even finish high
school. He was essentially a thug
who learned about Islam partly in
prison. Bin Laden, on the other
hand, was well educated and a member
of an elite family. ISIS has
retained Zarqawi's brutality, but
Baghdadi is not a street thug. He is
a religious scholar, and in many
ways has more of a claim to
legitimacy as a jihadi leader than
bin Laden did. So, there are lots of
differences. But I think the most
important difference is ISIS's
extraordinary brutality against
Muslims.
Why do you think al-Qaeda never
claimed the caliphate, while ISIS
claimed it at the beginning?
For al-Qaeda, the re-establishment
of the caliphate was a long-term
goal, something that would happen
some time in the future. For
Baghdadi and ISIS, the caliphate is
here and now. ISIS counts the
re-establishment of the caliphate as
an essential step leading up to the
Apocalypse. Although many jihadi
groups are somewhat apocalyptic,
ISIS is much more focused on an
end-times narrative, and on the
imminence of the prophesied final
battle.
Do you think they really believe we
are in the end times, or do you
think they are using it for
recruitment strategies?
I have no way of knowing. I used to
be able to talk to some jihadists. I
can't do that now. To learn whether
they really believe it, I'd want to
go spend a week with Baghdadi and
try to understand his views. That is
clearly not possible…
But do you believe that they are
using those apocalyptic views for
recruitment?
I certainly think they are using it
for recruitment. It is also possible
that many of them believe it. Since
9/11 and the allied invasion of Iraq
in 2003, Sunnis have taken a far
greater interest in the Apocalypse,
a subject that has traditionally
been of only minor interest to them
(as distinct from Shia). In a 2012
Pew poll, in most of the countries
surveyed in the Middle East, North
Africa and South Asia, half or more
Muslims believe that they will
personally witness the appearance of
the Mahdi. In Islamic eschatology,
the messianic figure known as the
Mahdi (the Guided One) will appear
before the Day of Judgment. This
expectation is most common in
Afghanistan (83 percent), followed
by Iraq (72), Tunisia (67) and
Malaysia (62).
So, yes, I think it is possible that
ISIS is deliberately exploiting
apocalyptic expectation to enhance
recruitment, but it is hard to know
how many of the leaders are really
thinking that way. But the
Apocalypse is all over ISIS's
writings. Its sectarian killing and
even its sexual enslavement of
“polytheist” women is partly
dictated, or so ISIS says, by its
preparation for the final
apocalyptic battle, which it
anticipates will take place in the
Syrian town of Dabiq. Thus, ISIS
conquered that town, and named its
online English-language magazine
after it, even though Dabiq was of
limited strategic value.
What would you tell us in general
about their recruitment strategies?
I think what is unique about their
recruitment strategy is that it is
so varied and so tailored to the
particular audience. There was a lot
of press coverage of three girls
from North England, who were
incredibly good students and were
completely integrated, they were not
living in the margins of society --
we kind of understand why a person
living completely in the margin of
society might find the ISIS
recruitment appealing. But these
girls from North England were
recruited as well. ISIS generally
uses women to recruit other women,
telling them they have a chance to
play a big role as a jihadi wife, to
raise the next generation. ISIS is
also seeking a wide variety of
recruits -- not just fighters, but
also doctors and engineers.
Recruitment often starts on social
media, but the conversation could
switch over to some kind of
encrypted application and the
recruitment effort can become quite
personal.
In one of your earlier works, you
argued that the Salafi terrorists or
jihadi terrorists are not
necessarily very knowledgeable about
Islam and religious people. Could
you elaborate on that?
This is true for many terrorist
groups, not only jihadi groups. For
example, neo-Nazis in Europe are
often drawn to join organizations
initially through music before they
understand the ideology. One story
told by an escaped ISIS recruit
really struck me. This young man, a
fighter, said he had first joined
al-Nusra, but switched over to ISIS
because they offered higher
salaries. He also said he believed
that ideology played a minimal role
for many of his fellow fighters,
that he believed they would be
equally as happy fighting on behalf
of a Christian group, if they got
paid enough. That it wasn't really
about Islam, it was about the
highest paying job for them.
Also, a lot of Sunni Muslims in the
region feel completely
disenfranchised and unsafe, so it
may be about security rather than an
agreement with ISIS's ideology. We
know that a couple of young men who
joined from the UK had just bought
“Islam for Dummies” and “The Quran
for Dummies.” In the United States,
out of 54 people who have been
arrested in connection with ISIS, 40
percent of them are converts. This
possibility of having an adventure,
reinventing oneself, living in the
only Sharia-based state on earth, or
so ISIS says, can be appealing to
young people who want to remake
society and, most importantly,
reinvent themselves. A person living
in Syria would presumably join for
very different reasons from a person
living in Iowa. In Syria or Iraq, as
I said, it could be about
protection, security, feeling that
the government is either attacking
them or just not protecting Sunnis.
We also know that many of the people
living in ISIS-controlled territory
don't want to be there, but they are
stuck.
What is the definition of
radicalization? What can you say
about the radicalization process of
these jihadi terrorists, especially
ISIS members?
There is a big debate in academic
literature about what that word
means. Some people would say that a
Muslim who suddenly becomes a Salafi
is becoming radicalized. Such a
person could be a quietist Salafi,
who has absolutely no interest in
politics, let alone violence.
Whereas some people use the term
radicalization only to refer to
those who believe in violence. It is
a controversial term. I'm going to
assume that by “radicalization” you
mean the conversion to a belief in
violent jihad. How does it happen?
In so many different ways. Sometimes
friends recruit each other. Some of
the escaped foreign fighters have
said that all kinds of promises were
made to them, that the “five-star”
jihad adventures they were promised
was nothing like what they had
experienced when they got to
ISIS-controlled territory. Sometimes
people start out by watching ISIS's
videos, they may get drawn to ISIS's
version of war games online. Perhaps
they are not very happy with their
lives and want to remake themselves.
They may be drawn to violence. On
the other hand, some people join
ISIS imagining that they are joining
a humanitarian mission. They think
they are going to help Syrians, who
are obviously in desperate need of
help. There are lots of different
reasons.
In Western media in general, what I
see is that they discuss a lot
whether Islam promotes violence, but
do you think the international
community is doing its best to cut
off the financial resources of ISIS?
You are asking two questions. Does
Islam promote violence? Every
religion can be used to promote
violence. I'm not an expert on
jihadism; I have studied terrorism
across religions and ideologies.
Every religious terrorist points to
a religious text as justification
for violence. The advantage to
studying terrorism across ideologies
is that I can see they all play the
same tricks; it's all about a
selective reading of religious
texts.
About the money, I don't know if you
saw that there is a report that ISIS
has just cut its fighters' salaries
in half, which may be related to a
recent bombing raid. The issue of
ISIS's finances is finally being
taken more seriously. ISIS raises
money by selling or taxing the sale
of antiquities, and those
antiquities have been getting out.
Oil has been getting out. They are
trading in amphetamines and, like
most terrorist groups, cigarettes.
They are taxing the flow of refugees
from Libya. Libya has become very
important for them, partly because
of money. There are reports that
Bashar al-Assad buys oil from them.
Turkey, I think, has gotten more
serious about the flow in and out of
Syria of fighters and the sources of
funding. One thing that is different
about this organization is that
ISIS, at least up to now, doesn't
need the support of donors in the
Gulf. There are private donors in
the Gulf -- and many of the Gulf
States have been making a big effort
to stop that flow of cash -- but in
the case of ISIS it is not nearly as
important as it was for al-Qaeda.
Turkey is beefing up its border
controls, but ISIS's sale of oil to
Assad is a hard problem to address.
Do you think that Turkey has taken
ISIS as a serious threat, compared
with how it considers the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK)? Do you think
it prioritized the PKK as a greater
threat than ISIS?
That is one of the problems with the
international coalition against
ISIS; the Gulf States are more
focused on Iran and feel more
threatened by Iran than by ISIS.
Saudi Arabia especially feels more
threatened by Iran. Turkey has been
more interested in fighting the PKK
than ISIS. Turkey, I think, is
becoming more serious now that ISIS
is attacking inside Turkey. Turkey
will become more serious over time,
I believe.
Do you have anything to say about
how they are getting their weapons?
They have stolen a lot of weapons
from the Iraqi military, often
American weapons. Another unique
feature of ISIS is that its
leadership contains many former
fighters, highly trained military
and intelligence personnel. It has a
level of expertise in weaponry and
in fighting that we don't normally
see with a terrorist group. Where do
they get additional weapons and
parts? That I don't know. It is a
very important question.
Could you please tell us what should
be done to fight against ISIS's
ideology?
Another unique feature of ISIS is
that it has made enemies of the
entire world. There are hundreds, if
not thousands, of learned Islamic
scholars and clerics who have said
ISIS is misinterpreting Islam. But,
what they are saying is not reaching
the young people who are their
recruits. I think ignorance about
Islam actually makes the youth more
vulnerable. Ignorance is a
vulnerability. What we need are
credible sources who know how to
talk to young people. I think we
need young people thinking about how
to explain to those kids that this
is not how Islam should be practiced
today. ISIS claims that it is going
back to original texts, but it is a
modern phenomenon. ISIS's ideology
is based on Wahhabism, and it always
points to religious texts, but those
texts require human interpretation.
ISIS is promoting a new religion,
invented by ISIS. So, part of it, I
think, is coming up with a way in
which to talk to the youth so that
they will listen and really think
about how to market that counter
narrative as skillfully as ISIS has
marketed itself. The propagandists,
the filmmakers and the journalists
in ISIS are paid more than the
fighters -- that is how seriously it
takes its propaganda. Facebook and
Google are getting more interested
in thinking about how to disseminate
a compelling counter narrative. But
this isn't just a problem of better
dissemination; we need better
stories, better ideas. My ideal
candidate would be a hip-hop artist
who joined ISIS and left. That would
be an example of somebody who the
kids would like and respect, who
says, as many people have said: I've
joined ISIS, I thought it was a
Shariah based state, I thought I'd
be helping people, I thought I'd be
doing good, but I went there and it
was quite different from what I had
anticipated, I didn't get what I was
promised, it was brutal, the group
kills Muslims. We read those
stories, I read those stories, you
read those stories, but the kids who
are vulnerable to ISIS's message are
not seeing those stories because
they are in the newspapers that many
of the kids who join ISIS from the
outside don't read. |
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