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On 6 October, the three main nationalist
formations that have dominated all political institutions were
re-elected by their respective ethnic constituents. The results
indicate that Bosnia’s administration will remain gridlocked and the
country paralyzed in its aspirations toward EU membership. However,
after each election cycle, the status quo becomes less sustainable
and post-election politics are likely to witness growing
radicalization and instability.
Bosnians elected a new state parliament,
assemblies in the two entities, ten cantonal assemblies within the
federation entity, and a three-member state presidency. Milorad
Dodik, head of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, won the
Serbian seat in Bosnia’s presidency and Šefik Džaferović from the
ruling Party of Democratic Action gained the Muslim seat. Željko
Komšić, a relative moderate, won the Croatian seat to the national
presidency but Bosnian Croat seats in parliament will again be
dominated by the Croatian Democratic Union.
Even in the most optimistic scenario, the
formation of new governments at the entity and central levels will
take prolonged negotiations. In the federation entity there is
currently no legal basis for the election of a new House of Peoples,
as the approval of a key election law has stalled. In addition,
Croat leaders complain that Bosniak Muslims upended the 1995 Dayton
accords by voting across ethnic lines to elect Komšić to the
presidency and defeat Dragan Čović, the Croatian Democratic Union
candidate. This will contribute to immobilizing the federation and
central governments.
At a more fundamental level, Bosnia’s ethnic
politics disguises failed reforms, economic decline, and social
despair. The country’s infrastructure is rapidly deteriorating, the
healthcare system is collapsing, education and welfare are
threadbare, and the legal system remains deeply corrupt. The country
has Europe’s highest unemployment rate of 25% with over 54% of young
people out of work. The country faces a demographic crisis through a
combination of low birth rates, high mortality, and growing
emigration.
Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a multi-ethnic country
but an association of ethnic fiefdoms, in which nationalist parties
maintain divisions in order to control their citizens and protect
their spoils. Politicians have been stoking fears of armed conflict
since the end of the last war and claim to be protectors of national
interests in order to divert attention from deep-rooted corruption
and economic failure. Politicians seeking a more cohesive state that
guarantees equal citizenship regardless of ethnicity are
consistently sidelined.
Numerous initiatives for constitutional changes to
amend Dayton and eliminate entity vetoes and ethnic voting have
failed. Dayton was not designed to construct an integrated state
with an effective central government. Instead, it created a complex
administrative structure in which ethnic balancing predominates and
layers of governmental bureaucracy contribute to inefficiency and
budgetary burdens. This system has obstructed effective
decision-making and guarantees that ethno-national interests
predominate over civil-state interests.
Ethno-politics has stymied the development of
state citizenship, programmatic pluralism, individual rights, and a
competitive democracy. Ethno-nationalist parties, treated as
equivalent to ethnic collectivities by international actors, are
primarily based on patronage networks and their leaders are adamant
that the civic principle cannot be applied in Bosnia but only a
system of inter-group balance.
In this climate of state paralysis, the Serbian
entity has steadily moved from autonomy toward sovereignty and its
President Milorad Dodik, with Moscow’s financial and political
support, has raised the prospect of separation and unification with
Serbia. This has tempted some Bosnian Croat politicians to call for
a third entity and the partition of the Bosnian Federation.
Meanwhile, Bosniak Muslim leaders have warned about a new war as
they are committed to defending Bosnia’s territorial and
constitutional integrity.
EU leaders have proved inadequate in resolving
Bosnia’s predicament. Despite several Balkan summits, the country
has achieved only limited moves toward accession. Summits in Sofia,
Brussels, and London over the summer produced vague commitments to
speed up the process of integration at some indeterminate time after
the European Parliament elections in May 2019. In reality, EU
preoccupations with populism, migration, and Brexit mean that there
is no appetite for further enlargement.
The evaporation of an EU perspective contributes
to stirring nationalist and separatist sentiments, as frustration
and resentment invariably assume an ethnic dimension. The EU is also
blamed for failing to push through constitutional and political
reform. As long as there is no violence, Brussels appears content to
keep Bosnia in limbo and actually benefits from the political
paralysis because it keeps the country at arms length from
membership.
However, the durability of Bosnia’s status quo may
prove deceptive. During each election cycle, economic decline,
ethnic division, state bankruptcy, and social desperation further
exacerbate nationalist radicalization. Ethno-nationalist leaders who
have in effect divided the country between them will have fewer
resources to offer citizens. This can exacerbate turf battles in
which a unified government will prove even more difficult to forge
and the separatist option will become more appealing. In this
acrimonious climate, armed conflicts can again be provoked and may
ultimately prove the only way to break the stifling deadlock.
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