Editorial
Serbia Under the Berlin Wall
By Sonja Biserko
The period of two decades since the fall of the Berlin
Wall is relevant enough to analyze the trends and processes that are
still on. In the midst of global turmoil, ex-Yugoslavia's disintegration
dangerously signaled the obstacles in the way of a new world order.
After all those wars, crimes, genocide and massive ethnic cleansing in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and ensuing trials before the
ICTY and national courts, it is time for Serbia to start dealing
seriously with the causes and context that have made all that possible
and generated it. The international community, the same as international
and domestic courts, has been avoiding to cope with interpretation of
the conflicts and analyze their context. And that is what, actually,
preconditions genuine overcoming of the past and settlement of crucial
problems in the West Balkans, the status of Bosnia above all. Today it
is obvious that Bosnia cannot "survive" if built on the outcomes of the
war. The Dayton Peace Agreement has to enshrine other criteria as well,
including moral ones, for Bosnia to become a functional state.
Metaphorically, Serbia had erected its own wall before
the Berlin wall came down. It was the only socialist country with a
warring agenda. The Yugoslav federation, therefore, could not have
dissolved peacefully like USSR or Czechoslovakia. Back in 1970s Serbia
began preparing the terrain for the post-Tito era. Its goal was to
centralize Yugoslavia anew - the country with elements of confederalism
under its 1974 Constitution. That was a constitutional frame within
which Yugoslavia could survive under the condition that the demands for
democratization coming from all republics were met.
Serbia was actually dissatisfied with the fall of the
Berlin Wall. It supported the putsch against Mikhail Gorbachev (1991) as
it saw him as a leader undermining Russia's global power. The part of
the Serb elite assembled around the national project expected Russia to
side up with Serbia and help it realize its aspirations vis-a-vis
Yugoslavia. After USSR's dissolution Russia was no more capable of
playing a major role in the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis, despite
its membership of the Contact Group.
Disintegration of USSR overshadowed developments in
Yugoslavia. This made it possible for Slobodan Milosevic to attain his
goals in a relatively short time. He did not manage to overmaster the
whole of Yugoslavia but, with a helping hand from the YPA, he did chart
quickly the borders of the Great Serbia. Milosevic's Yugoslav crusade
did not end with his ouster. The process has been continued by other
means till this very day - true, under pretty different international
circumstances. However, the prolonged settlement of the Yugoslav crisis
mirrored, in a way, the international community's - EU's in the first
place - gaucherie in these new circumstances.
Kosovo's independence marked the last stage of
ex-Yugoslavia's disintegration. At long last, the avenues of
stabilization and progress are open - under the condition that the
region and, above all, Serbia recognize the new realities. In 1991, The
Hague Conference put forth the most appropriate solutions for the then
Yugoslavia. Serbia turned them down, whereas EU missed the opportunity
to back its own proposal. Now, two decades later, EU resumed its
original offer - a valuable one because it cements republican borders of
ex-Yugoslavia. Otherwise, the entire territory could be tailored
endlessly.
It is not only necessary to put an end to "state
issues," but also to understand the whys of ex-Yugoslavia's bloodshed.
Many books have been written on the topic and many will still be. The
future of the entire region rather hinges on proper understanding of two
phenomena: Yugoslavia and communism. Both have been sidetracked and
negated with new states emerging in the Balkans. All national elites
either ignore or negate this part of their common legacy. Anti-fascist
legacy was annulled in Serbia despite the fact that it had singled out
Yugoslavia for its authentic anti-fascist movement. New, liberal ideas
have not been born out of this renouncement. On the contrary, the entire
region, Serbia in particular, resumed the regressive ideas predominant
before and during the World War II.
The opposition in ex-Yugoslavia was not democratic but
nationalistic and anti-communist. Hiding behind the shield of
anti-communism, it derogated Yugoslav society's potential for pluralism.
This particularly refers to Serbia where the so-called Praxis opposition
of 1968 still predominates - the opposition with strong Bolshevik and
dogmatic character. And, of course, there is the nationalistic
opposition. Serbia has not abandoned this matrix yet.
Recently, Eric Hobsbaum said that difficult times were
in store for the countries of South East Europe, because the Balkans "is
still endemically burdened with the legacy of wars, corruption and
crime." It is hard to foresee developments in the Balkans in the present
constellation of the global crises that has notably affected the
countries isolated from main currents of globalization. Back in 2001,
Harold James asserted with good reason that the pace of changes in the
world - along with the uncertainties and insecurity accompanying them -
were playing into the hands of conservativism and extreme promotion of
interests of some nations and states, while choking new and rational
visions for social development and future of the mankind. And all that
made a fertile soil for the deep-rooted anti-Western sentiments of many
Balkan societies, though some of them were on the threshold of EU
accession.
Speaking of Serbia, there are two parallel trends:
while being consolidated with the assistance of EU and US, Serbia
persists on its state project. The global crisis laid bare Serbia's
bankruptcy and the fact that it could not recover without the support
from EU and international institutions. That surely sobered it up in a
positive way. On the other hand, most of its elites - even though the
process of Yugoslavia's dissolution had come to an end - have not given
up the idea about unification of all Serbs. Dobrica Cosic used to say
that Serbs were forced to find a state-political mode for solving their
national question. As early as 1990s he spoke about a federation of all
Serb lands. This strategy affects Bosnia first through radicalization of
Milorad Dodik.
EU's role in Balkan developments has always been
essential - today and in the past twenty years. Together with US, EU has
played a major part in the resolution of Yugoslav conflict since early
1990s but also in transition processes in all the newly emerged states.
There were two levels of their transition - first, the establishment of
states and, second, transition itself. Regional cooperation as a
component of EU accession predominates but so does the process of nation
and state-building too. The latter has not been completed yet.
Wars have slowed down nation-building. And now,
Serbia's refusal to acknowledge regional realities further protracts it
in Serbia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Unfortunately, the radical Serb
nationalism is still in action regardless of war consequences and EU and
US' twenty-year endeavor to stabilize the region. Radical nationalism
not only lives on territorial aspirations but also prevents the
establishment of a modern Serb state.
Serb nationalists have scored a considerable success:
they have imposed ethnic principle as a crucial criterion for settlement
of all territorial disputes. They have not only rounded off all Serb
territories by war but also ethnically consolidated them, and are now
just waiting for favorable circumstances for unification. Over two
decades - in the shadow of the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo - they
have also ethnically consolidated Serbia proper. Serbia's right-wing
nationalistic radicalism, xenophobia and hatred for the "other" have
boiled down minorities to a minimum and are still reducing their
percentage in overall population. As it has attained almost all its
goals, now Serbia's elite takes it impermissible to miss a unique
historical opportunity for final "liberation of Bosnia" and rounding off
Serb ethnic space even at the cost of disintegration of Serbia proper.
In his major book "History of Serbia from 19th to 20th Century" German
historian Holm Zundhausen lucidly concludes, "Serbia's history would
have taken a different course had its elites been interested in
consolidation of the state and society rather than in territorial
expansion. Serbia could have been a highly developed country but that
was sacrificed in the name of a lofty idea, which took it hundred years
back."
Serb elite's attitude towards borders keeps regional
tension alive and stands in the way of regional integration, EU's major
precondition for accession. In the past months EU and US have been
obviously trying to close the Serb question and thus the Balkan question
too. Negotiations on Bosnia's future are in process and, in parallel,
EULEX is spreading throughout the territory of Kosovo. Serbia has been
"remunerated" with prospects for EU and NATO accession - a remuneration
strongly opposed by elite circles.
Crimes, genocide and massive ethnic cleansing, as well
as the still open question of borders, deeply changed all the societies
in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia, Bosnian in particular.
Regional disintegration was followed by renewed
authoritarianism, nationalism and reallocation of resources through
privatization processes. It was also marked by national homogenization
and massive expulsion of minorities, which remained a predominant policy
of the newly established states. One nation became dominant in all of
them. Against all odds, however, the region retained its multiethnic
character. Democratization process does not hinge on national
homogeneity, as insisted by some authors, but also on the region's
political culture based on populism, collectivism and egalitarianism.
Predominance of collectivism is evident in the denial of liberal
democracy, market economy in the first place. National diversity could
be seen as obstructive in the first stage of democratization. However,
the point is in the resistance to the Western model of democracy.
Unformed or very weak societies are the biggest
problem for democratization. The concept of a civil society in just in
embryo - and not only the regime but also forces outside it strongly
oppose it. The concept of human rights culture is seen as an implant
taken over from Anglo-Saxon societies or a new form of imperialism that
chokes national identities. In this context, expectations that
post-communist transition could not but lead towards the transfer of
power from the state to individuals are exaggerated. More attention
needs to be paid to regional tradition and value system - i.e. regional
potential for democratization. Institutions standing for democratization
policies are not sufficient guarantees. Educational systems and value
systems throughout the region must undergo changes. Most of regional
elites would still see liberal values implying individual responsibility
as something unacceptable.
In the long run, integration of the region into EU
could suppress nationalism and open the door to liberalization and
economic cooperation. However, Serbia's fragility threatens with
fragmentation and destabilization of the country. Only speedier
integration into Euro-Atlantic structures could avoid such a scenario.
Therefore, the debate "NATO: yes or no" comes at the right moment.
Croatia's and Albania's membership of NATO is a new strategic challenge
for Serbia - for it fundamentally changes its closest neighborhood.
Should it fail to opt for NATO membership in near future and should it
fail to meet the preconditions for EU candidacy, Serbia would become an
isolated island but neutralized enough not to further destabilize its
neighbors.
The debate on the draft statute of Vojvodina in the
Serbian parliament indicated political consciousness of Serbia's elites.
It laid bare the whys of ex-Yugoslavia's disintegration: non-acceptance
of a modern state, now of Serbia as such. Though the statute was "pushed
through" the parliament the fact remains that Serbia is divided over the
issue, which will crucially determine the pace of its movement towards
EU.
A speedier pace towards EU necessitates that Serbia
changes its attitude towards Kosovo and Bosnia, cooperation with the
tribunal in The Hague and its own territorial arrangement in near
future. Any hesitation whatsoever only diminishes its prospects for
inner stabilization. For, the time runs, the same as Serbia's chances
for turning into an equal factor of international relations at long
last.
However, it is not enough just to hope that the
Balkans would make a breakthrough. Europe itself needs to establish a
political community and get transformed. It needs to move towards a
plural society. This could encourage citizens of the Balkans, too. A
pluralistic Europe is a challenge to be answered only by responsible
regional elites capable of critical and creative thinking and action.
US Vice-President Joseph Biden's tour of the region
demonstrated US strategy for stability of the Balkans. The map of the
Balkans would have been different today - probably closer to Cosic's
ideas about its rearrangement - were it not for US involvement. At the
same time, after two decades of its conflict with the world and US in
particular, the visit provided Serbia with an opportunity to finally
normalize its relations with the leading global power, recognize the
values that have been considerably undermined by the global crisis and
turn into a constructive and creative factor of international relations. |