North Kosovo
VEILS REMOVED
By Miroslav Filipovic
Though Serbia strongly criticized Prishtina's and Brussels's plan for
putting North Kosovo under Prishtina's control, Belgrade must have sanctioned that plan
one way or another as the West must have consented to its criticism, at the top of its
lungs, against the abolishment of parallel institutions.
At the time of Zoran Djindjic's premiership, the state considered the
Kosovo question settled in the best interest of Serbia and its people, and was taking no
action vis-a-vis the issue. Moreover, the word had it that Djindjic made a secret
agreement of sorts with the then administrator of Kosovo, Michael Steiner, whereby the two
of them should be minding their own business in their respective territories. Djindjic was
gunned down in March 2003. There is still not logical explanation why it was that he begun
interferring into Kosovo affairs early that year.
At the beginning, Vojislav Kostunica seemed rather confused apropos
Kosovo. However, under the influence of some advisors, he went for a tough and aggressive
policy, maximally profiting from the international community's inertness, weakness and all
other flaws. Kostunica's cabinet based its policy on the Constitution providing Kosovo as
a part of Serbia's territory. So it applied the state's territorial arrangement to Kosovo
and turned a blind eye to the fact that Serbian authorities had no power whatsoever over
the greatest part of Kosovo territory.
Then, in the attempt to cement the solution to the Kosovo problem as it
suited it the best, the Republic of Serbia took a number of measures in North Kosovo and
in the enclaves with Serb population. All these measures were meant to strengthen Serbia's
position, presence and influence in Kosovo. In the field, these measures were implemented
by more or less four groups of persons who can be classified as parallel governance or
state surogates (1), para-military (2), para-police forces (3) and "guardians of the
brigde" and other groupings of criminals, adventurers and renegades (4).
At that time, the cabinet was also seriously considering a military
option to become effective in the event of an unfavorable solution of the Kosovo problem.
According to this plan, Belgrade was to take a series of violent actions aimed at
preventing the implementation of the decision on Kosovo status. Two variants of these
actions were in play. One of them was to occupy North Kosovo by deploying several
thousands of well-armed volunteers (even as many as five thousand). They would have been
given firearmes, mine throwers, trench guns, antiaircraft guns, etc., would have operated
in a "friendly environment" and would have stood for strong guerilla forces with
reliance on the border with Serbia.
The other, more aggressive variant would have been a kind of rebellion
in Kosovo Pomoravlje, also with a long borderline with Serbia. The environment there is
not that friendly, but strong Serb troops stationed in South Serbia could have been
deployed without having to cross the border with Kosovo.
Serbia and thousands of our youngsters were saved by - sheer fear. Not
by wisdom, not by statesmanly consideration or normal common sense, not by grey cells the
Creator endowed human beings with, but by elementary fear, sluggishness and belief that
good Lord would save Serbia. Though supported and even encouraged to action by a great
power, Kostunica did nothing out of fear. Instead of Prishtina, we smashed Belgrade. But
that's not the only historical example of fear being a by far better companion than
wisdom.
Many things have changed with the end of Kostunica's premiership: not
enough but evidently. The most important change is para-military and para-police troops
are no longer live on the state budget. However, huge sums of money are still spent on
parallel governance. By playing on the international community's irresoluteness and
lenience, Serbia has managed to establish an administrative network with actual power in
Serb enclaves. It is assumed that Serbia pays at least 50,000 people working for parallel
institutions in Kosovo and, moreover, pays them with the money it gets from the
international community for some other purpose. Serbia did about the same when it used
international assistance for financing the army of Republika Srpska. Besides, a
considerable number of those people receive double or even triple salaries. Serbia mostly
intervenes through heads of districts. They are fully in charge of state administration
and distribution of funds. Heads of districts are governors of sorts in their districts.
They are also liaisons between different ministries. They are the soul of Serbia's
governance in Kosovo, in the places where such governance operates, I would say.
The international community has tolerated Belgrade's behavior and the
existence of Serb parallel institutions for long. Its tolerance has come to an end now.
After several incidents when Serbian officials had to be banned from Kosovo, the head of
the International Civil Office, Peter Feith, responded with an emphatic statement that
Belgrade-supported parallel institutions in North Kosovo had to be disbanded. The
commander of the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples confirmed NATO's support to the
strategy for dissolution of parallel structures by calling them a security threat. Other
officials in Kosovo, too, seem rather resolute to make some progress in the North and
place the entire territory of Kosovo under Prishtina's sovereign rule.
KFOR will be reducing its forces in Kosovo but not at the detriment of
serious presence of its troops. Though Belgrade gloats over the fact that KFOR remained in
Kosovo, proclaims that its victory and in trashy newspapers boasts of having prevented
Brussels and Washington from expelling UN from Kosovo, the truth is quite the opposite:
ugly and shameful for Serbia and Serbs. KFOR remains in Kosovo only because even insance
Serb clero-fascist dare not use military force against "blue helmets" - peace
forces in a peace-making mission.
Though Serbia strongly criticized Prishtina's and Brussels's plan for
putting North Kosovo under Prishtina's control, Belgrade must have sanctioned that plan
one way or another as the West must have consented to its criticism, at the top of its
lungs, against the abolishment of parallel institutions. And that's not all. The West's
resoluteness and the ease with which Prishtina takes repressive measures against Serbian
officials intent to enter Kosovo and feel there at home indicate that Russia kind of
agreed that the West ignores Serbia's criticism and demands.
This is good news, indeed. If the incumbent government survives its
entire term - and it stands good chances to survive - Serbia might benefit nicely from
everything. It would not only take off its shoulders the stone called Kosovo but could
profit from the saying about honey catching more flies than vinegar. Russia may easily
fall out of love with its and Russian bearish and useless hug may loosen; our movement
towards European values and funds could be speedier; and fascism and clerico-nationalism
could boil down to some thirty-odd parliamentary seats.Alas, not even that would be an
outcome of statesmanly wisdom but a product of irresoluteness, laziness and other traits
that make Serbs prone to calling irresolute and lazy people the names that more adequately
describe certain parts of female anathomy.
Judging by the Kosovo saga, Serbs will again witness a historical rerun.
Belgrade has armed Serbs in "krajinas" (in Croatia and Bosnia) once and set them
on warpath, and then withdrew its army and gave Tudjam a greenlight to smash them.
"Blitz" and "Storm" operations have left scars that are still visible.
Unless Belgrade brings Kosovska Mitrovica tycoons and their Belgrade-seated sponsors to
their senses, new colums of tractors may be soon heading towards Kraljevo.
Will common sense prevail north of the Ibar River? Am I an optimist? I
wouln't say so. For, at the time of the "Blitz" operation a big, bad tiger lived
in Belgrade. Like Cronus, he was swallowing his children but was the tiger respected by
friends and foes alike. Nowadays, just a handful of stupid little bears play in his cage.
They feel good and have fun, but no one in the world has any respect for them, while their
clumsy, bearish games inflict enormous, irreparable damage to Serbs. |