The EU and
the Serbian Civil Society
By Sonja Biserko
The response of the Serbian leadership to the
declaration of independence of Kosovo demonstrated the deep and
dangerous impact of the long-standing radical nationalism on the
internal social and moral fiber of the nation. The response also
demonstrated the continuous threat that the developments in Serbia
represent for the security and the democratic consolidation of the
region. The Serbian political class demonstrated again its inability to
renounce the Greater Serbia project and find a way out of the
nationalistic metastasis. The inflammatory rightist rhetoric and planned
demolition of foreign embassies and Liberal Democratic Party offices
across Serbia, along with an increased NGO demonization, have shown the
depth of anti-Western and anti-European nature of the ruling elite.
Eight years after Milosevic's ouster Serbia is still not even close to a
much-needed change of course and a political consensus on its (European)
future.
To understand the current developments in Serbia, we
must briefly revisit the past, the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis and
the differences in the interpretations of those historical events. We
have to remember the fear of the democratic transformation of Yugoslavia
and its constitutional evolution has dominated the political,
intellectual and cultural elite of Serbia since 1960s. Ever since Serbia
has not been ready to face the complex historical developments and
embrace the democratic changes brought about by the fall of Communism
and the end of the Cold War.
The glorification of the traditional, "authentic"
Serbian values and a continuing political and media campaign against
Europe and the West have resulted in a wide skepticism towards the
Western democratic practices. They have resulted in the new identity
matrix of the Serb nation as a historically correct nation, victimized
by the world powers. That self-induced delusion has not only paved the
way for an immoral conduct, but has also freed the nation from all the
wrongs of the past and those possible in the future. The new mind-set,
removed from reality, has plunged the nation into a permanent conflict
with its neighbors and the rest of the world, generating frustration,
arrogance and aggression. The rabid nationalism has thus devastated the
social fiber of the nation. Compounded by the lack of will to confront
the recent past, including by bringing to justice war criminals, it has
almost destroyed the country's potential for a democratic transition and
the creation of a modern state.
Despite the image of a European Serbia projected in
the public since 2000, the conservative political class of Serbia has
never actually shown its readiness to seriously embark upon the
pro-European road. On the other hand, in order to survive it did accept
foreign economic aid. Despite the fact that 70% of the population favors
closer ties with the EU, the political class has predominantly opted for
the traditional, patriarchal, conservative, Christian Orthodox values.
The lingering lack of resolution of the issue of its
identity and, consequently, of Serbia's place in the Balkans has
deepened the population's frustration. The dilemma Whither Serbia? is
still open. The pro-European course promoted by the Djindjic's liberal
leadership in the 2001-2003 was short-lived. In 2003, when Vojislav
Koštunica became a Prime Minister, Serbia defined itself as a neutral
country aligned with Moscow. The prospect of the change of the current
cultural blueprint depends on the deep social and economic reforms,
ranging from intellectual innovation to enlightened leadership. The
assassination of Zoran Djindjic, who was a true reformer, has created a
huge political vacuum which is acutely felt in Serbia. Certainly, that
is not the problem typical only for Serbia, but Serbia now more than
ever needs not only a leader, but a leader with greatness.
In hindsight, we have to note regretfully that a
timely, decisive, tailor-made and efficient engagement of the
international community, and in particular, of the EU, was missing at
the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis. Moreover, they were inclined to
pursue a policy of appeasement towards Serbia because of its perceived
and objectively central role in maintaining peace and stability in the
Balkans. That was particularly the case in the period after the
assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic. However, with time the policy
of appeasement lost its meaning, because, contrary to all other regional
countries galvanized by the prospect of the EU membership, Serbia failed
to show a genuine interest in getting closer to the EU. In that, and
many other respects, Serbia is a sui generic case in the region.
Also, the international community eventually - albeit
slowly - realized that the Serbian radical nationalism was still alive,
even after hundreds of thousands of war dead, after all the devastations
in Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo, and even after the first NATO
intervention in Europe after the WW2. Even today, the Serbian
nationalists' priority remains the realization of unification of all
Serbs as it had been defined by Slobodan Miloševic and the Serbian
Academy Memorandum of 1986!
After a slow start the international community became
a major factor in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, either through
its mediation of peace accords, through the humanitarian aid, the
organization of various humanitarian actions, the establishment of the
Hague Tribunal, the institution-building, the establishment of the
framework for the democratic transformation, or through a direct
military intervention. The EU's role has been indispensable, especially
in establishing the framework and a road map for a democratic
transformation and integration of the Balkans into the European
structures.
At this juncture I believe that the adjusted
international strategy for Serbia, on which the developments in the
country and its future course depend to a large extent, has to more
focused and comprehensive. It has to help both to restrain the
destructive expansionist course of the ruling elites, as well as to
restore the damaged moral and social fabric. So far the EU and other
organizations have not seriously taken into consideration, let alone
addressed the latter issues and concerns. The social reconstruction of a
possible failed state in the heart of Europe is a new, difficult,
long-lasting and still untried experience. Its importance for the
democratic change in Serbia and peace and security in the Balkans cannot
be overestimated.
Obviously, changes in Serbia must come from the within
the country and society themselves. But, simultaneously, the external
support, and in particular the EU support have to be well thought-out,
extensive and continuous. The support has to be channeled primarily
towards liberal forces and parties, the civil society, the independent
media, small-scale enterprises, trade-unions, student and youth
organizations. Concerted efforts have to be made to support the efforts
by the democratic part of the society, still quite a small one, to widen
the space for Europeanization and democratization. Only the evolution of
a critical mass of intellectual and cultural elite may in the future
create the conditions for a genuine democratic change, a change on the
basis of a truly European, democratic blueprint.
The civil society - a part of the mass media, youth
and student organizations, small and medium-size enterprises, trade
unions, various professional organizations, smaller political parties,
minority organizations and minor political parties - can and should play
a decisive role in creating the general atmosphere leading towards the
change of the value system. They can and should help to open up the
avenue for Serbia's rapprochement with Europe and reduce the monopoly of
the political elite on the future of the SAA.
At this particular moment there the EU can make a
decisive contribution to help mending the social and moral fabric of the
Serbian society by:
- Supporting the establishment of a "Coalition for Europe" that would
include representatives of all social strata; this support is of
particular importance in view of the forthcoming local elections and,
possibly, also parliamentary elections;
- Involving the civil sector in the EU's political dialogue with Serbia;
- Establishing a regional task force for the Western Balkans' European
future;
- Supporting the establishment of an alternative education system,
promoting European values;
- Recognizing the role of human rights organizations as partners in the
creation of a new cultural model;
- Instead of suspending the visa regime, introducing a large-scale
student exchange program and promoting the inclusion of young people
from Serbia into the European educational system;
- Inviting as many as possible young professionals (of various profiles)
to attend training courses organized by the EC;
- Paying special attention to strengthening the contacts and cooperation
between the young political leaders within the EU framework and the
region;
- Putting in place a direct access of the civil sector organizations to
the EU funds;
- Kick-starting regional courses for graduate students in international
law;
- Assisting the independent local media in professional/vocational
training of young journalists;
- Intensifying the civil sector's communication with the European
Parliament and strengthening the parliamentary, trade unions' and all
other sorts of people-to-people exchanges. |