|
In a unique territorial configuration, the NATO
alliance surrounds an area in Europe that may become increasingly
unstable. NATO envelops four of the states that emerged from the
former Yugoslavia—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosova, Macedonia, and
Serbia—but which have no immediate prospect of NATO entry. In the
worst-case scenario, conflicts within and between these states could
entangle nearby alliance members.
In conditions of economic stagnation, popular
frustration, nationalist manipulation, and limited inter-ethnic
reconciliation, at least three potential flashpoints have emerged.
Bosnia-Herzegovina remains the primary danger, where the risks can
rapidly spiral out of control. Republika Srpska (RS) President
Milorad Dodik may not fully realize that he is playing with fire
when he proposes referenda on separation or increases his dependence
on Moscow. Bosniak Muslim reactions should not be underestimated,
and even delayed revenge attacks for the attempted genocide in the
1990s cannot be discounted.
But Bosnia-Herzegovina could implode even without
a provocative political decision by the RS. Conflict might be
triggered by a violent act such as a political assassination or a
terrorist attack. This could become a pretext for the Serb entity to
withdraw from all state institutions in Sarajevo, declare statehood,
and construct a hard border across the country. Moreover, the
creation of paramilitary forces by Banja Luka will simply encourage
similar moves among Bosniak Muslims and Croats. The EU may warn
against armed conflict, but its EUFOR peacekeeping mission lacks
sufficient deterrents to prevent it, while any NATO intervention
could be significantly delayed.
In the worst-case scenario, armed clashes between
Serb and Bosniak paramilitaries may escalate and draw Croats into
the fighting. The political vacuum would provide an opening to
declare Croatian autonomy. Croatia and Serbia could not afford to
stand on the sidelines during the growing crisis as their kin across
the borders are being killed or expelled. If Bosnia starts to
crumble, military intervention by Zagreb and Belgrade would become
almost inevitable, with an enormous risk of clashes between the two
neighbors.
At this point, NATO would have to honor its
Article 5 pledge to Croatia, while Moscow would not want to lose
credibility by remaining neutral. Having assisted Dodik in creating
a paramilitary force and fearing that Serbia could suffer a military
defeat, the Kremlin would likely intervene with assorted
“specialists” and “volunteers” relocated from Russia, Ukraine, or
Syria. This would raise the prospects for clashes between NATO and
Russian forces.
A second crisis scenario could embroil Serbia and
NATO’s newest member, Montenegro. By using every opportunity to
incite conflict, Moscow may seek to demonstrate that even NATO
accession does not guarantee security. The attempted October 2016
coup in Podgorica, organized by Russian military intelligence, was
intended to demonstrate that Moscow can use radical Serbian
nationalists against incumbent governments. Aimed at destabilizing
Montenegro, the coup also delivered a strong message to Belgrade
that it needs to comply with Russia’s international objectives or
face a potential overthrow of the Vucic government. Russian
officials have no enduring loyalties toward their Serbian
counterparts but exploit the latter’s economic and political needs
to further the Kremlin’s anti-Atlanticist agenda.
An assassination or coup in Belgrade would further
damage relations with all of Serbia’s neighbors and increase
pressure on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosova, and Montenegro in
particular. An assertive pro-Moscow administration in Belgrade may
jettison its EU aspirations and even stage provocations to entangle
bordering states in the region’s instabilities. Just as the Kremlin
is testing NATO commitments toward the three Baltic countries,
Serbia could be used as a vehicle by Moscow to test the alliance’s
commitments in defending Croatia and Montenegro.
A third potential conflict revolves around
Macedonia, sandwiched between three NATO members—Albania, Greece,
and Bulgaria. The country could be consumed in an internal conflict
if it continues to be excluded from both NATO and EU membership
because of the Greek veto over its official name. There is renewed
hope that the dispute between Athens and Skopje can be resolved by
the two current governments, which seem willing to reach a deal
under international mediation. Nonetheless, Macedonia faces two
potential dangers, as nationalist fervor can escalate whatever the
outcome of the talks.
If there is no agreement on Macedonia’s name,
inter-ethnic tensions between Macedonians and Albanians are likely
to intensify over the country’s international exclusion. Conversely,
if any agreement is viewed as undermining Macedonian identity, then
radicalization could also accelerate and target domestic and foreign
scapegoats. An internal conflict in Macedonia could also draw in
several neighbors including Serbia, Albania, and Bulgaria.
In an ideal scenario, all Balkan countries would
move steadily toward NATO membership and gain national security
guarantees. But given all the impediments to accession, NATO leaders
cannot assume that armed conflicts in Southeastern Europe have been
consigned to history. In addition to expanding the scope and
frequency of its “immediate response” exercises in the region, NATO
needs to prepare contingency plans for an assortment of potential
combat and peacemaking operations inside its unstable central flank.
|
