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In the usual scenario, an incoming U.S. President
believes that he can be more successful than his predecessor in
establishing a partnership with Russia’s leader. Trust is declared,
promises are made, deals are struck, and Moscow’s previous acts of
aggression against its neighbors are overlooked. This new détente
gives cover for the Kremlin to prepare for its next offensive, which
leads to another breakdown in relations, and the cycle begins all
over again.
Instead of repeating a cycle that allows Russia to
pocket the spoils from its territorial revisionism and sets the
stage for further instability, the U.S. administration needs to
calculate the most effective way to constrain Moscow while advancing
its own and its allies’ interests. In sum, there are two contrasting
strategies for U.S. policy toward Putin’s Russia: imperial
accommodation or transatlantic assertiveness.
In the first strategy, policymakers calculate that
a rapprochement with Moscow will defuse the danger of great power
conflict and secure constructive joint initiatives. Unfortunately,
those backing such a policy operate from two erroneous premises:
that the Kremlin is interested in permanent compromises and that
Russia possesses some special interests toward its former satellites
that Washington should acknowledge.
In reality, the Kremlin’s negotiating ploy is not
aimed at ensuring mutual benefits or “win-win” objectives. It is
based on zero-sum or winner-loser calculations, in which Moscow
estimates that it will benefit from a temporary lull in hostilities
with the West even if not all of its expansionist goals have been
achieved. This is an application of Lenin’s dictum for moving “two
step forward, one step back” and is no more than a tactical
peredyshka (pause) before the next offensive.
The second fallacious assumption is that Russia
possesses “national interests” outside its borders. Acquiescence to
such claims diminishes the independence and security of all central
and eastern European states and empowers Moscow to engage in its
imperial adventures. Russia’s foreign policy since Putin assumed
power almost twenty years ago includes determining its neighbors’
foreign and security policies, regulating the extent of their
territories, and dictating their international alliances.
Suggestions have been made about a potential
“grand bargain” between Trump and Putin that would permit Moscow to
assert its dominance throughout former Soviet territories in return
for ephemeral pledges to cooperate in other domains. Paradoxically,
consenting to Russia’s asymmetrical “interests” toward its neighbors
is more likely to result in a collision with NATO. If the Kremlin is
convinced that it has a free hand to intervene in countries along
its borders, it can easily miscalculate and provoke a direct
confrontation with NATO states. The “grand bargain” would then
become a grand failure by increasing the chances that Washington
becomes embroiled in a conflict with Moscow.
In contrast to a self-defeating, accommodating
approach toward Russia, transatlantic assertiveness will strengthen
the Alliance and bolster America’s national interests. The new U.S.
National Security Strategy affirms that Russia is a rival and
competitor aiming to weaken Washington’s international influence and
divide the U.S. from its allies and partners. In light of this
astute geopolitical assessment, Washington’s strategy must deter the
Kremlin from undertaking any offensive actions in Europe that could
provoke a harder American reaction.
To achieve this objective, the defense of key
allies such as Poland, Romania, and the three Baltic states must be
consolidated. Some measures have already been implemented to more
effectively protect the security of these vulnerable NATO allies,
including the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) deployments. But more
needs to be accomplished in the coming years. In particular, NATO
needs to boost its capabilities to quickly respond to any potential
military moves by Moscow. In addition, Washington needs to consider
the long-term advantages of establishing a more permanent military
presence in Poland, as Warsaw has recently requested.
A firmer commitment is also needed to strengthen
the state sovereignty and national security of all former Soviet
bloc countries bordering Russia, particularly NATO partners such as
Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, and to increasingly
involve wavering Russian allies such as Belarus and Armenia. A
renewed war involving any of these states could destabilize the
wider region and ensnare U.S. allies. More intensive political,
military, and economic engagement would serve as a deterrent to
Kremlin intervention.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with
summiting with Russia’s leaders, as long as Trump does not take
Putin’s words at face value or fall into the Kremlin’s trap to
weaken Europe and undercut the transatlantic link. Negotiating from
a position of military strength, Trump needs to demonstrate his
authority by establishing clear markers of what Washington expects
from Moscow, including a withdrawal from Ukraine and an end to
military threats against all NATO allies. Otherwise, as during the
Obama administration, the White House will again find itself
floundering when Putin decides to launch another international
offensive.
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