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The indicators are multiple:
A financial crackdown on civil society
and media organizations, not including the nationalist ones
Control over conventional print and
electronic media as well as abusive use of social media
Purchase of major military equipment from
Moscow and China
Signature of a free trade agreement with
Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and refusal to align with EU
Ukraine-related sanctions on Moscow
Courting of Chinese investment and
inordinate praise for Beijing’s help in response to coronavirus
Refusal to prosecute known war criminals
Failure to make substantial progress on
independence of the judiciary
Growing capture of the state for purposes
of grand corruption
Aleksandar Vucic, one-time Information Minister to
Slobodan Milosevic and now in his second term as President of
Serbia, was always an unlikely vehicle of democratization and
Europeanization. But some of us (that means me too) thought it
possible he would do the right thing, if only because nothing else
really makes sense and his credibility with Serbia’s nationalists
was high. Serbia’s road to prosperity and security, we thought, lies
in Brussels, not Moscow. Nixon to China and all that.
We had it wrong. Prosperity and security are not
Vucic’s real concerns. His own hold on power is. Vucic has been
centralizing power, aided by an inept and divided political
opposition. Like his Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic, he is far more
comfortable with the Russian and Chinese autocracies than with
Washington and Brussels. He has undermined independent media and
slow-rolled judicial reform. Separation of powers is a joke–Vucic
holds all of them. He allies himself with the Belgrade Church and
its right-wing supporters. He has become palsy with Milorad Dodik,
despite his understandable distaste for Dodik’s ambition to secede
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, since that would put Serbia in a dicey
situation.
Vucic is no longer “sitting on two stools.” It is
amusing to see that some people imagine that they can still convince
him to opt for the West. He has chosen the East, but we are not in
the midst of the Cold War. The Balkans is no longer a major arena
for great power competition. It barely rates as a minor one. Tito’s
nonaligned fence-sitting served Western purposes. There is no fence
now. The EU and the US shouldn’t care if Vucic goes East, and we
shouldn’t try to buy him off. We need to be patient for the day when
there is a Serbian leader who truly believes in liberal democracy
and is prepared to sacrifice to take his country in that direction.
What does this mean for Kosovo? It means patience.
Prime Minister Hoti is in no position to make territorial or other
major concessions, as he faces real opposition in parliament. At
least some Serbs are drifting in the right direction. Vucic, given
his strong political position inside Serbia, could recognize Kosovo
now with little impact on his re-election prospects in 2022. But if
he doesn’t I can hope someone will emerge to challenge him precisely
on this point: do you want a friendly southern neighbor, or a
hostile one? Do you want Serbs to be safe in Kosovo or in danger? Do
you want to qualify for EU membership faster or slower?
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