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WHY IS THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA STILL AN
UNFINISHED HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PROCESS?
During the study of current political processes in BiH and the
region, you must take into consideration that the process of
Yugoslav disintegration - which began in January 1990 and culminated
in the wars for the borders of the new post-Yugoslav states in the
1990s - is not over. The disintegration of the communist federations
- Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia shows that this
form of government failed to survive communism or the Cold War. The
disintegration of the Yugoslav federation viewed from this point of
view can be interpreted as a historical inevitability. What makes
the disintegration of Yugoslavia an exception is the way it
disintegrated long and bloodily in the 1990 wars. the disintegration
of Yugoslavia is still ongoing.
The thesis of the unfinished process of disintegration of Yugoslavia
is based on the fact that of the seven successor states of
Yugoslavia, the borders of several of these states are still treated
as an open political issue. These are the borders: BiH and Kosovo,
but also Montenegro, to whose territories their neighboring state,
the Republic of Serbia, still claims the right. In simple terms,
Serbia has never accepted its post-Yugoslav borders as definitive,
and after the end of the wars, which it started and lost on its own,
it does not give up on its pre-war goals. Post-war political groups
in Serbia, with the help of their satellites in Republika Srpska,
Kosovo and Montenegro, are still working continuously on modalities
to expand Serbia's borders. For this purpose, the existing
territorial division of BiH and Kosovo into Serb territories is
used: on the RS within BiH; and the Association of Serb
Municipalities in Northern Kosovo.
WHAT ARE THE REAL REASONS FOR THE CURRENT INSTABILITY
OF THE POST-YUGOSLAV TERITORRY?
In the analysis of the instability of the post-Yugoslav space, it is
important to single out as a historical and political constant the
existence of the Serbian state project which originated in its
modern form in 1844 with the creation of a program document
Načertaniju compiled by Ilija Garašanin, which became public only in
1906. According to this concept, the borders of the modern Serbian
nation-state should be based on ethnic principles, according to
which all Serbs scattered in southeastern Europe should be united in
several states and empires. Garašanin also insists on historical
borders, referring to the restoration of the borders of the medieval
Serbian empire from the time of Emperor Dušan. Such a Serbian state
project, in its later geopolitical variants, also included the
inclusion of territories where the Serbian population was not the
majority, and this raises the question of the realization of this
plan. Throughout history, it has been shown that the realization of
this plan has always been associated with political crime, ie ethnic
cleansing and mass crimes against the non-Serb population in the
territories to which the Serbian state elite claimed. The idea of
the Serbian state project is a constant that has adapted to all
ideological paradigms - from the kingdom, communism to
post-communist democratization (read: confusion).
IS GIVING IMPORTANCE TO POLITICIANS AS INDIVIDUALS HIDDEN TRAP
IN SENSE OD HISTORICAL RADICALISM?
In the past, the Serbian state project has always relied on the
political concept of a strong paternalistic leader, i.e. the "father
of the nation" as the unifier of "divided Serbs." Therefore, the
role of Dobrica Cosic, Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic or Ratko
Mladic as a leader in the historical continuity of the Serbian state
project should not be underestimated. But their historical and
political role must also not be overestimated: this state project
existed before them and survived even after their historic defeat to
create a Serbian ethno-national state despite war violence and
hundreds of thousands of victims of killed, missing and displaced
non-Serbs in wars of the 1990s The demonization of these individuals
and the suggestion that their personal pathology is the cause of
political violence, violence and instability are unfounded.
The obsession of the media, analysts and the public with leaders
from Serbia, Republika Srpska and Kosovo hides a trap from
"historical reductionism" which created the image in public
discourse that all the evils that accompanied the disintegration of
Yugoslavia were the result of "personality pathology" of military
and political leaders. They capriciously and unpredictably appeased
their "bloodthirstiness" by punishing the non-Serb population during
the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Thus, the
wartime president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, bore the infamous
nickname "Balkan Butcher" from the early 1990s; Radovan Karadzic,
the wartime political leader of the Republika Srpska, is still
presented to the public as a "bloodthirsty", and Ratko Mladic as a
psychopath who "lost" himself completely in 1994 after the death of
his only daughter. Insisting on their personal pathology also
diminishes the historical significance of the Serbian state project
as a politically and ideologically rational and well-prepared plan.
In order to achieve its goal, this project had to conquer by force
the territories on which the Serbian side claimed the right and then
ethnically "homogenize" those territories. Historical examples of
attempts to implement such a state project show that Serbian
territory could only be conquered by force and involved mass crimes.
against non-Serb civilians. Every individual politician who puts
himself in the functions of this project a priori agrees that this
plan can be realized only through a campaign of crimes against the
non-Serb population. Thus, neither ethnic separation and ethnic
homogenization in the conquered territories were a consequence of
the war between the warring parties, but the goal of the wars of
conquest of Serbia in the 1990s. Serbia led these wars in Croatia,
BiH and Kosovo. Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic, despite the war
defeats, still managed to prepare the project at least to some
extent for its next historical phase. Namely, even after the defeat
in the war in BiH - the Republika Srpska survived as an entity - and
that Serbian "war booty" keeps the Serbian state project relevant.
Returning to the overestimation of the role of individuals, it is
important to emphasize that the current political crisis in BiH
cannot and must not be attributed to Milorad Dodik's political
megalomania, nor to his efforts to protect his financial interests
(read: corruption). Let us ask ourselves whether BiH would be
different, i.e. more stable, peaceful, more united and more
prosperous if it were not for Dodik? Would the Dayton demarcation
within BiH have been abolished long ago if it were not for Dodik?
Would the administrative division of BiH into RS and the Federation
survive but become politically irrelevant to the functioning of BiH
as a sovereign state without Dodik? The answer is that these steps
directed at "separating" RS from BiH and "annexing" RS to Serbia -
not implemented by Dodik, would be carried out by another RS
politician. The Serbian state project needs a strong leader in every
phase of its political dynamics. Dodik has imposed himself as the
bearer of this project at the RS level in the last two decades. He
put himself in the service of the Serbian state project, and it is
his acceptance of this project that Dodik serves for his political
longevity because of the support he can count on from Belgrade. The
simplicity of the political goal of this project is precisely
Dodik's formula for success: to separate RS from the
'non-functioning' state of BiH - which the RS leadership makes
non-functioning - and to annex it to the state of Serbia. The big
question that has preoccupied the local and world public at the end
of 2021 is whether this will really happen. And if it happens, will
it be a step in completing the process of disintegration of the
Yugoslav federation or will it be a step in the direction of new
tensions, i.e. an overture to new armed conflicts. If the
international community does not allow the borders of the existing
post-Yugoslav states to change - primarily BiH and Kosovo - how will
their sustainability be guaranteed? Is there a path that leads to
the long-term political stability of the post-Yugoslav space?
Because in the sea of disagreements over resolving tensions and the
acceptability of border changes - there is a widely accepted
consensus that any new conflict will be impossible to isolate within
BiH's borders and that the domino effect of the conflict will spread
to Kosovo, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia and perhaps even Albania
and Serbia.
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR COMPLETING THE PROCESS OF
DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE (NON) POSSIBILITY OF
ESTABLISHING
DEFINITIVE INTERSTATE BORDERS OF POST-YUGOSLAV STATES?
We will mark off out four possible scenarios that we can expect in
the near future:
Scenario 1: The Western Balkans as a region of permanent
geo-political instability like the Middle East.
This scenario is currently relevant in BiH, where it is perceived as
a transitional period until a permanent solution is found for the
disputed state borders. However, all indications are that this
condition is not temporary. An example of this kind of political
instability is provided by the Middle East. This concept is the
result of the post-colonial presence of great powers in the
territories of their former colonies. The post-colonial powers by
the principle of division and rivalry between Middle Eastern states
are in fact strengthening their political presence and strengthening
their economic and security interests. Every new war conflict in the
Middle East leads to realignment and adjustment in such a way that
the great international players always find ways to stay in the
game. The creation of protectorates in areas that were contested by
various parties in the decolonization process - such as Palestine -
did not lead to a final solution but created an area of permanent
instability from those areas. The protectorate model in BiH and
Kosovo gives the international community a key role in finding
solutions to stabilize the post-Yugoslav space. If the international
community decides that maintaining the status quo is the best way
forward, Western powers present on the field directly or through the
UN or the OSCE will allow relations between local political rivals
to strain from time to time, before they can intervene. and
"stabilize the situation." Such a policy justifies the constant
presence of foreign actors in the region, but also opens space for
geo-political competition through the presence of Russia, Turkey,
China and other global players. Thus, the final solution for BiH and
Kosovo is constantly postponing to some uncertain future.
Scenario 2: “Correction of borders” as a euphemism for redrawing the
borders of BiH and Kosovo by agreement of local actors under the
auspices of international actors, ie USA and EU. As the final phase
of disintegration of Yugoslavia.
This concept is based on supporting the ethno-nationalist concept of
post-Yugoslav states on the principle of "self-determination of the
people" as advocated by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and
because of which the Serbian side waged wars for "Serbian
territories." This approach resulted in "separation "Serb from the
non-Serb population, which during the war was a euphemism for crimes
against non-Serbs who lived in the territories to which Serbia
claimed the right. The conquered territories were then ethnically
"homogenized", which leads to the most serious crimes such as
genocide in territories where there were almost no Serbs - such as
in Srebrenica and Zepa. Ethnic separation and ethnic homogenization
was the way in which both the Republika Srpska Krajina in Croatia
(1990-1992) and the Republika Srpska in BiH (1992-1995) were
created, and to which northern Kosovo was isolated as an ethnically
pure Serb territory in 1999. It is important to emphasize that the
international community also accepted the model of ethnic separation
because all peace agreements for BiH were based on ethnic separation
into Serb and non-Serb territories. The same principle has been
applied to Kosovo. Thus, the post-war structure of BiH and Kosovo -
the only two post-Yugoslav states with a majority Muslim people - is
based on the territorial separation of "Serbian territories", which
makes both countries unstable because the question of what and how
with Serbian territories is constantly raised. The international
community has supported such divisions and thus destabilized these
states as well.
Also, by separating these Serbian territories, the international
community helped Serbia prepare the ground for their annexation to
the post-Yugoslav Serbian state. From 2017 to 2020, the
international community behind closed doors is working on an
initiative to "correct the borders" between Serbia and Kosovo with a
large part of the public in the region and beyond.
The exchange of territory and population between Serbia and Kosovo
is one thing, but how to exclude the seceded RS and its annexation
to Serbia from these games? While this approach of the international
community is hailed by analysts as a pragmatic step towards
consolidating the disputed borders; others dismissed it as political
immorality because it rewards Serbia with territories it homogenized
through ethnic cleansing campaigns to the non-Serb population in the
wars it started but also lost and whose defeat left behind mass
graves and mass crimes. The Border Correction Initiative shows that
Serbia's geo-political goals coincide in some important respects
with those of the US-led international community. Both sides oppose
the existence of majority Muslim states in the "heart of Europe" and
in the case of BiH and Kosovo these states are weakened by internal
territorial divisions making them permanently unstable and
dysfunctional states. Are the Serbian territories in BiH and Kosovo
a temporary solution, i.e. will they survive within their home
countries or are they still created by war and preserved by peace
agreements with the aim of being separated and annexed to Serbia at
some point? At least for now, the international community has given
up on the agreed 'border correction' with the cooperation of both
Serbian and Kosovo politicians, but it is very indicative that this
initiative was ever launched.
Scenario 3 - Euro-Atlantic integration of BiH and other Western
Balkan countries through NATO and EU accession.
Of the seven successor states to Yugoslavia, the most prosperous,
stable and safest are Slovenia and Croatia, which are members of
NATO and the EU. Of the remaining five countries - BiH, Montenegro,
Serbia, Northern Macedonia and Kosovo, only Montenegro and Northern
Macedonia have become members of NATO. None of these five countries
is an EU member, nor is membership a realistic option in the
foreseeable future. Moreover, Kosovo is not yet recognized as a
state by the UN and functions as a de facto state, so that Kosovo's
membership in NATO and the EU has been moved into some indefinite
long-term perspective. BiH and Kosovo are the only post-Yugoslav
states with a majority Muslim population. In the last 26 years, i.e.
since the end of the war, the EU has had enough time and space to
support and accelerate integrative processes. One of the stumbling
blocks is the lack of understanding of the EU, ie. some of its
member states - such as France and the Netherlands - to understand
and accept the fact that the Muslim population is from BiH, and
Kosovo where the Muslim population is majority but also Muslims from
Serbia and Northern Macedonia is an important part of Europe's
historical and cultural heritage. their place in Europe. In
addition, their willingness to accept EU normative values is a
reality that would be politically irresponsible to ignore due to the
existing global Islamophobia, which is also felt in Brussels. The
incentive for the Euro-Atlantic integration of the remaining
post-Yugoslav countries should come primarily from Washington and
Brussels.
Scenario 4 - Outbreak of a new war conflict, ie. changing boundaries
using force.
The outbreak of war in regions of permanent instability is always an
option. Regardless of the presence of the international community,
an armed conflict can break out suddenly and unplanned, because only
one match is enough to light barrels of gunpowder. Because there are
certainly plenty of weapons in the region for some new next war. One
of the ways into the armed conflict would be the withdrawal of the
RS from the political institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as
well as the announced establishment of the RS armed forces, which
means that the RS is becoming independent. This automatically raises
the issue of the use of force by BiH institutions because the BiH
armed forces have a duty to protect the constitutional order of BiH,
which is pathetic for their fundamental mandates. Within the BiH
army and federal police, the most motivated would be Bosniak cadres
who defended the territorial integrity of the state of BiH with
great sacrifices in the 3.5-year war. The international community
will not accept this precisely because of the possibility of war
breaking out if Dodik continues to separate RS from BiH. Unilateral
separation of RS in this way would lead to the uncontrolled
disintegration of the protectorate system and overture to chaos
where actors like Russia would use the new situation for new
conflicts and dangerous escalations in favor of their anti-EU
strategy. The international community will try to prevent the war at
all costs.
WHAT ARE THE TRENDS FOR POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO GEOPOLITICAL
INSTABILITY THAT CAN LEAD TO NEW WAR CONFLICTS?
Finally, two trends in the development of the crisis can be singled
out in the summary of this exposition. TREND 1 - postponing final
solutions for the distant future in order to avoid conflicts only
underscores the continuation of the trend of "permanent
instability." Serbia, unprepared to agree to the current borders, is
emerging as an important factor in these processes. This country
does not want to become a member of the NATO pact due to the NATO
intervention in 1999, and the sincerity of the current political set
in the efforts to become a member of the EU are also questionable.
With an initiative such as the Open Balkans - currently supported by
Serbia, Northern Macedonia and Albania - Serbia is trying to redraw
the borders of post-Yugoslav states as a precondition for Serbia's
entry into the EU. This initiative, which is also called "Little
Schengen", flirts with EU membership while in fact looking for a way
for Serbia to legitimize the consolidation (read enlargement) of its
post-Yugoslav borders and to change the borders of both Serbia and
Albania by exchanging territories according to ethnic principles. so
that the north of Kosovo belongs to Serbia and the rest of Kosovo
merges with post-communist Albania into one state. This initiative
aims to create an enlarged states of Serbia and Albania at the
expense of smaller neighboring states with Serb and Albanian
populations. Therefore, it is not surprising that this initiative
does not have the support of Kosovo, Montenegro and BiH. But it is
surprising that he has the support of Northern Macedonia because
this approach to ending the disintegration of Yugoslavia directly
calls into question the territorial integrity of this country
because who will be able to stop the inclusion in this new Albania
and western parts of Northern Macedonia where Albanians live in
ethnic enclaves? It is questionable how this concept of the Open
Balkans can ever lead to EU membership of Kosovo, BiH, Montenegro
and Northern Macedonia. This initiative seems more like a way to
"pacify" Serbia in order to avoid its adherence to Russia's
interests in Russian geopolitics, in which the destabilization of
the Western Balkans and the post-Soviet space plays an important
role in the EU's destabilization strategy. The "Open Balkans"
initiative is a typical example of "creative ambiguity" according to
which each side in the process can interpret it as it suits which
side. "Permanent instability" is a reflection of the current trend
in global politics of the post-Hadrat multipolar world, and
according to this trend, permanent crisis hotspots are being created
in those parts of the world where neither side can achieve supremacy
and dominance. The most illustrative examples of this are the Middle
East and the conflicts in Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, as well
as in Africa in Somalia, Ethiopia, Mali, and Congo. These trends
include - but also precede - the situation in the post-Yugoslav area
where the West does not really know what to do with Kosovo and BiH
as majority Muslim states.
TREND 2 is the trend of Europeanization through which the
disintegration of Yugoslavia would be brought to an end and which
would close the border issues as an open political issue. This is
the most logical and ideal trend that would enable the stabilization
of the region and that would offer long-term integration processes
with political, economic and social progress offered by the
Euro-Atlantic perspective. The disputed interstate borders would
become irrelevant with the Euro-Atlantic initiative. This trend
offers the perspective of long-term political-military stability and
socio-economic prosperity. It implies a pro-active policy of the
international community in accepting the current borders of all
post-Yugoslav states. Thus, Kosovo should be recognized as a UN
member state within its current borders, followed by membership in
NATO and the EU. Montenegro and Northern Macedonia, which are
members of the NATO pact, should become full members of the EU as
soon as possible. BiH should become a member of the NATO pact under
accelerated procedure, and then the EU. This approach also implies
the recognition of Islamophobia in its ranks as one of the reasons
for hampering EU integration in most EU countries. Muslims from BiH,
Kosovo and Serbia and Northern Macedonia are an important part of
European history and culture. Their European commitment is very
clearly articulated in political and public discourse. What is
needed now is for the EU and NATO to use this as an incentive for an
accelerated process of including all post-Yugoslav states in their
ranks.
Dr. Nevenka Tromp teaches at the University of Amsterdam at the
Department of European Studies. Tromp worked at the ICTY from 2000
to 2012 in the Political Leadership Study Team at the Prosecutor's
Office. She is the author of the book The Unfinished Trial of
Slobodan Milošević, which was published not only in English but also
in Croatian under the title "Death in The Hague" (2019). |
