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People were asking me what I think almost before
the ink was dry on the five pages agreed yesterday between Belgrade
and Pristina on the general principles/main elements of the
Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. The
answer is: it all depends.
It depends on your frame of reference:
If you want to know whether it is consistent with
the Ahtisaari plan and previous agreements between Pristina and
Belgrade, that is one frame of reference. It looks to me as if it
is.
If you want to know whether the general principles
will ensure the Association/Community is formed consistent with
Kosovo law, that is another frame of reference. It looks to me as if
it will be.
If you want to know whether it is consistent with
practices in other situations where a minority in one country looks
to a neighboring “mother” country for support, that is still another
frame of reference. I think you likely can find precedents
elsewhere.
If you want to know whether allowing Belgrade to
assist in providing education, healthcare and urban planning to
Serbs in Kosovo is wise, that is another frame of reference. It at
least might lower burdens on the government in Pristina that it
would find difficult to carry.
But if you ask me whether it looks like a good
idea that Kosovars will have no reason to regret, I confess to
doubts. Those doubts originate with the Ahtisaari plan, not with
this latest iteration of its most dubious provisions. Kosovo’s
negotiators have done well to make it clear the
Association/Community will be formed in accordance with Kosovo’s
constitution and laws, verified by its constitutional court. It is
also clear the Association/Community is supposed mainly to exercise
overview and provide services only consistent with Kosovo law. On
paper it looks like an ethnically defined version of the Democratic
Governors Association (DGA) in the United States. How can I object
to that?
I can, because it is ethnically–not politically or
geographically–defined and could become the kernel of separate Serb
governing structures in Kosovo. That of course is the fear: a
separate Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina has rendered that
country dysfunctional. It is bringing up the rear in the regatta for
European Union membership in the Balkans.
Unfortunately, Ahtisaari left the door open for
that to happen in Kosovo too, specifically in article 9.1 of Annex
III of his proposal:
Based upon the principles of the European Charter
of Local Self-Government, municipalities shall be entitled to
cooperate and form partnerships with other Kosovo municipalities to
carry out functions of mutual interest, in accordance with the law.
9.1.1: Municipal responsibilities in the areas of
their own and enhanced competencies may be exercised through
municipal partnerships, with the exception of the exercise of
fundamental municipal authorities, such as election of municipal
organs and appointment of municipal officials, municipal budgeting,
and the adoption of regulatory acts enforceable, on citizens in
general;
9.1.2 Municipal partnerships may take all actions
necessary to implement and exercise their functional cooperation
through, inter alia, the establishment of a decision making body
comprised of representatives appointed by the assemblies of the
participating municipalities, the hiring and dismissal of
administrative and advisory personnel, and decisions on funding and
other operational needs of the partnership…
This notion of “partnerships” to carry out
municipal functions might be perfectly sensible and workable in a
normal European context. We’ve got some analogies in the US, like
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. But with due respect
to the European Charter of Local Self-Government, it could be a
nightmare in the Balkans.
Some colleagues have said there is not so much to
worry about, because the divergent interests between large and small
municipalities, and between those north and south of Ibar, will
limit what the Community/Association is able to do. That could be
correct, provided the municipalities are driven by their own
interests.
But if Belgrade cracks the whip and insists that
the Serb municipalities obey its lead–which the flow of its
resources may be able to ensure–that argument could be moot.
Combined with the disciplined clout of Serb members of the Kosovo
parliament, the Community/Association could become a real hindrance
to Kosovo’s further institutional development. It will almost
certainly become a source of contention within the Albanian
community, parts of which will see perfidy even if there isn’t any.
Might Belgrade recognize that a functional Kosovo
state is in its interests and a dysfunctional one is not? After all,
a weak or collapsed state in Kosovo could create real problems on
Serbia’s southern border. I think that is true, but I wouldn’t want
to bet on Serbian democracy to come to that conclusion easily. It
has been a long time since Belgrade cared much about governance of
the Albanians in Kosovo. America isn’t the only democracy that tries
all the bad options before doing the right thing.
Do I think the other things agreed yesterday
outweigh the risks associated with the Community/Association? No, I
don’t. I wouldn’t surrender my kingdom these days for either a horse
or an international dialing code, though I might trade a dialing
code for allowing a Serbian telecomm provider to operate.
But really the Pristina government had no choice:
it was obligated to implement the Ahtisaari plan. Too bad that plan
wasn’t better articulated on this issue.
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